Written evidence submitted by the Royal Academy of Engineering (SDY0009)

The Royal Academy of Engineering is the UK’s National Academy for engineering and technology. We provide progressive leadership for engineering and technology, and independent expert advice to government in the UK and beyond. We are grateful for the opportunity to submit a response to this inquiry, informed by the expertise of our Fellowship, which represents some of the nation’s best practising engineers, including leading researchers, industrialists, innovators, and entrepreneurs.

The Academy’s National Engineering Policy Centre delivers advice to government on research and innovation policy and national security issues. Internationally, the Academy has been a delivery partner for the Newton Fund, Global Challenges Research Fund and International Science Partnership Fund, working on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA international research and innovation partnerships. It is also an endorsing body for the Global Talent visa. The Academy is preparing to launch a Global Engineering Diplomacy Hub in 2026, and it is in this context that it is answering this consultation.

The Academy would be delighted to provide further information on the content of this submission, or to assist the Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee in any way as it continues to consider these important issues. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the Academy.

Summary

• The Academy welcomes this inquiry from the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee – leveraging the UK’s long-standing reputation for excellence in science and innovation will be incredibly valuable in contributing to national priorities and bolstering the UK’s soft power on the global stage.  
• Consistent messaging and alignment between government departments, teams and strategies is key to ensuring international stakeholders confidently view the UK as a principled, competent partner. We recommend that the government create an International Science and Technology Strategy with strong alignment of science diplomacy initiatives to the sectoral and geographic priorities highlighted in the industrial strategy, emphasising the role of investment, to facilitate this much needed cohesion.
• The creation of the Science and Technology Network (STN) should be harnessed as an opportunity to simplify and clarify science diplomacy strategy, and to embed a whole government approach. The STN can play a greater role in promoting UK tech entrepreneurs overseas, attracting investment, and building relationships with tech giants.
• The UK boasts an effective, permeable science policy interface, as demonstrated by world-class National Academies, UKRI and other stakeholders. The strengths of these entities should be leveraged to complement STN initiatives, especially through improving the strategic focus of its information gathering function.
• The government’s focus on strategic advantage is welcome. However, the threat from Russia and competition with China means that approaches to strategic advantage need to be reconsidered within the UK and across Europe to avoid unnecessary competition and to ensure impact is scaled. While the definition of specific strategic advantage objectives has been helpful, a shift to a more delivery-focused and dynamic culture across government will be needed to effectively progress the actions necessary at pace to achieve these goals. 
• To remain resilient in the face of an increasingly volatile and chaotic geopolitical environment, the UK should be flexible and agile enough to effectively respond to changes and to identify and seize opportunities as they arise. For instance, the UK should maximise opportunities to emphasise issues such as diversity, circularity, sustainability and global responsibility to position itself as an inclusive, value-led alterative to Silicon Valley for global tech entrepreneurs, and as a model for inclusive entrepreneurial ecosystems.
• Leveraging the public sector to support businesses to manage and mitigate the risks associated with innovation can incentivise global private sector investment in UK R&D. There are several mechanisms for this, including public procurement, business advice and support, and incentivising corporate venture capital investment. This should go hand in hand with a simple interface between investment and R&D that is easy for global investors to navigate.
• To remain an attractive destination to conduct research and innovation, the government should build on and add to the strengths of the UK visa regime and reduce barriers to access. This will further entice global talent to the UK and enhance its reputation as the best place in the world to carry out impactful, inclusive research on key emerging technologies. Targeted initiatives to support universities in attracting top talent in areas of UK research strength should also be considered and will work to address current national skills gaps.

1)       To what extent is the UK considered a global leader in science and innovation and how does this contribute to its soft power on the global stage?

The UK ranks highly among the world’s leading nations in quality and quantity of research. In 2023, publications affiliated with UK institutions accounted for 5.9% of global publications, and received 8.4% of global citations[1]. 15.7% of UK publications were among the top 10 most cited worldwide[2]. It has consistently ranked highest of the top 20 research producing countries in the proportion of total publications with an international co-author, reflecting the diversity of its research base and the strengths of its international links, particularly in the US, EU and China: in 2023, nearly 61% of papers authored at a UK institution had an international co-author. In STEM fields, the proportion is generally higher, with 85% of UK energy research conducted with international collaborators[3].

The UK’s reputation is enhanced by its openness to international talent and students; in 2024, the ONS estimated that 17% of all R&I workers in the UK were non-UK nationals.[4] In the 2010s and early 2020s, large research and innovation funds for international collaboration with developing and emerging economies have been successful in projecting an image of UK research as responsible, globally engaged, and challenge focused.

DSIT[5], UKRI and others have invested much in improving the working environment in UK universities and are continuing to build an open, tolerant research and entrepreneurship culture that has helped to make the UK an attractive place to live and work for researchers from all backgrounds; this diversity in turn acts as an attractor for additional collaboration and talent. An additional emphasis on issues such as diversity, circularity, sustainability and global responsibility are also perceived as UK strengths among our community. More could be done to market the UK internationally as the best place to carry out impactful, inclusive research, innovation and entrepreneurship in emerging technologies in a volatile world, differentiating it from competitor hubs.

UK universities’ financial precarity in large part resulting from their dependence on international student income creates systemic risk for much of the research and innovation ecosystem. The resultant strategic uncertainty and negative media attention leaves the UK poorly positioned to attract international capital and talent at a time when other European countries are aggressively pursuing research talent, particularly from the US. Thought should be given to a dedicated fund to support universities in targeting top talent in areas of UK research strength, including climate science, vaccine and other biotechnology.

The UK has not always fully capitalised on its expertise in standards and regulation as a mechanism for soft power and strategic influencing; instead, standards and regulation bodies were often encouraged to view international engagement primarily as a revenue generation opportunity. While this is improving, in part through the enrolment of public sector research establishments delivery partners for the International Science Partnership Fund (ISPF), there should be greater deployment of regulatory diplomacy to build soft power and to encourage an international environment that is receptive to UK values, particularly in emerging technologies.

Other sources of UK soft power include the reach of international graduates of UK universities within research, business and politics, the networks of UK researchers based overseas, the roles UK researchers play in leading or supporting international research projects and collaborations, as well as the advantage conveyed by having a UK partner in structuring papers and reporting research in global English language publications. Additional assets such as National Health Service datasets also enhance the UK’s attractiveness as a research and innovation partner.

2)       How has this agenda been impacted by the current geopolitical environment, including the international activities of Russia and China?

The Royal Society/AAAS report ‘Science Diplomacy in an Era of Disruption’[6] describes a retreat from broad based research collaboration on global challenges or the appropriate development of new technologies, underpinned by agreed rules and regulatory frameworks, in favour of transactional alliances and competition for strategic advantage in compute, technology, talent and critical materials. The UK needs to position itself to be resilient to the threats from an increasingly chaotic and dangerous global environment, while retaining the tactical flexibility to take advantage of opportunities that emerge to build its own strategic advantage in key technology areas[7].

To counter the threat of Russian aggression and hybrid warfare, the UK should seek realignment with Europe on defence and security, including more active participation in Horizon Europe, ESA and other strategic partnerships. The threat from Russia and competition with China means that approaches to strategic advantage in technologies such as cybersecurity, AI, quantum and space need to be reconsidered within the UK and across Europe to avoid unnecessary competition and to ensure impact is scaled. In this respect, we welcome the EU’s agreement to remove potential barriers to UK participation in quantum, AI and telecoms calls in Horizon Europe in 2025.

The UK has made progress in a short space of time developing a research security culture among internationally active researchers and creating appropriate interfaces between the research community and national security stakeholders. While it is salutary to think about potential dual use applications of a broader range of technologies than had been previously considered, we should be careful not to depend upon tools like export controls, which have not been designed for the research context, to manage a high proportion of our international research activity. In the longer term, we hope to see a culture change within the research community, empowering researchers to incorporate research security concerns from the outset of their projects as an element of their broader thinking about the impact of their work.

Engagement with China on research and innovation is critically important but can be focused on global challenges of common concern, such as climate change response and resilience and decarbonisation technologies. The government should draw upon other UK stakeholders, including national academies, to complement its own relationships, knowledge and networks within China.

The reduction in funding of ODA for research and innovation is likely to diminish the UK’s soft power in science and engineering in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa at a time when other countries, including China and Russia are increasing their programmatic activity and influence in the region.

In the longer term, geopolitical developments are heavily influenced by the impacts of changes in climate, demographics and technology. Engineering can play a role in sensing, mitigating or driving these changes, and the UK should strive in its science and technology diplomacy to apply an engineering lens to geopolitical stresses.

3)       How effective is the UK Government’s strategy for positioning the UK as a global leader in science and technology and what role does the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) play in advancing this agenda?

a)       Does the UK need an International Science Strategy and what would it contain?

The 2021 Integrated Review[8] marks a break with the UK’s traditional policy of using its openness to Science and Technology (S&T) collaboration as a general-purpose lever to generate goodwill that can unlock unrelated trade or diplomatic wins. Since then, DSIT has increasingly reflected growth and resilience priorities in its cultivation of international partnerships, especially through the country and theme selection for the first rounds of ISPF. More alignment between the priorities of technology specific teams within DSIT, especially the digital teams recently moved from the Departure of Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS), and the international research and innovation teams can improve information sharing from the Science and Technology Network (STN) and prioritisation for international and European funding programmes.

Any international strategy should be a Science and Technology Strategy, which should focus our international engagement on areas of strategic advantage, clearly mapped onto industrial strategy areas of focus, in order to reduce the communications and alignment burden of multiple strategies. The international strategy should reflect clear regional prioritisation within the UK as well as geographic prioritisation of international partners, and should be a whole of government strategy, with strong alignment between DSIT and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and a consistent approach to defence, energy, health and transport. Inward investment as well as outward-facing partnership should be a priority. Opportunities for co-funding of technology in areas where the UK is not competitive with global leaders should be highlighted, and technology collaboration should be linked to natural scale up and adoption mechanisms such as standards and intellectual property rights (IPR) collaboration. The strategy should be supported by resource for international collaboration – e.g. a further iteration of the ISPF.

b)      What are the key international scientific relationships for the UK?

The list of priority partner countries for the ISPF[9] functions as a good proxy of the most important international research and innovation relationships for the UK. If necessary, these could be further prioritised using a tiered system. Bilateral partnerships should be complemented with engagement with strong mechanisms for collaboration such as NATO, ESA and Horizon Europe, and strong projects in areas where the UK has a strategic interest, including CERN and SKA. Within these frameworks, the UK should retain some flexibility in its thinking on where the greatest innovation around use of emerging technologies may be happening, noting that creativity can also flourish in places with low resources and pressing use cases. The emergence of a creative entrepreneurial community developing unexpected applications for digital and AI in Kenya is a case in point[10].

4)       How does science and technology innovation contribute to the UK’s national security?

5)       How well positioned is the government to link scientific and technological progress with enhanced global and UK security?

The announcement of the government’s ambition to pursue strategic advantage through Science and Technology in March 2021 as part of the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, was very welcome.

It is our view that strategic advantage through science and technology should be defined as science and technology being harnessed purposefully to achieve defined outcomes for security, prosperity, resilience, international influence, and people and environment; with the aim of conferring comparative advantage for the UK[11].  Security outcomes are defined as ensuring the UK stays aware of threats and ahead in technologies important to UK security, including through sovereign capabilities when necessary. Resilience outcomes are defined as having science and technology capabilities to anticipate, resist, absorb, recover, and adapt to shocks and stresses in the system with agility to enable continuity of delivery of critical needs such as safety, food, water, energy, and healthcare.  

This requires strategic direction from informed choices about the outcomes and advantages the UK wishes to achieve by harnessing science and technology, made by leaders who set out a plan for delivery and direct resources to achieve it. Multiple stakeholders and systems are needed to support strong leadership to make informed decisions to set goals that will determine our future and courses of action where impact may be far off, uncertain and require significant investment and long-term commitment. Strategic direction provides the foundation for harnessing strategic advantage through science and technology by elevating being good at doing science and technology to reaping the benefits from harnessing science and technology.

The identification of five critical technologies from the Science and Technology Framework from the Sunak Conservative government, went someway to setting strategic direction[12]. A strategy or equivalent was published for each critical technology, but action has not been consistent and at times has been slow and piecemeal. For example, the long-awaited semiconductor strategy was published in May 2023, an action from that was to commission a study to consider a UK Semiconductor Infrastructure Initiative. In May 2024, it was announced that there would be a new independent institute, however since then, there has been no further information. Without interventions that accelerate progress towards outcomes, strategies alone cannot deliver results. There is also evidence of security becoming more of a focus with the AI Safety Institute being renamed as the AI Security Institute.

The assumption and hope is that the forthcoming Industrial Strategy will define outcomes and set strategic direction for strategic advantage through science and technology and be accompanied by resourced interventions that accelerate progress towards outcomes. To do this well requires the following things to happen[13]:

• The UK does not operate in isolation; it is fundamental to monitor and understand the actions of international stakeholders and identify areas of economic or security-related comparative advantage. This is an area the UK needs to improve in. The UK is vulnerable to falling behind in science and technology intelligence gathering and needs to improve its capabilities in this area.
• It is likely that trade-offs will be required, for example if reshoring is needed in the pursuit of sovereign capabilities to achieve outcomes in security, there may be unfavourable international impacts. Tensions and trade-offs will inevitably arise when choices are made on the outcomes we want to achieve for strategic advantage. Understanding and managing the tensions and trade-offs is integral to the strategic advantage approach and sets it apart from ‘business as usual’.
• A public sector that is confident and proactive in managing the risks associated with late-stage R&D and market creation when in pursuit of strategic advantage. Close-to-the-market interventions also mean creative and coordinated actions around demonstration, follow-on funding, infrastructure, manufacturing, procurement, standards and regulation, and technology adoption.

Strategic advantage through science and technology is not about only pursing sovereign capabilities. Much of science and technology is a global endeavour and the UK cannot lead on everything. We also regard the UK being a partner of choice for mutually beneficial collaborations and influential in global technology development through international standards and regulations as a positive outcome from strategic advantage in science and technology. The UK has a long track record of collaborating with European partners through the EU research and innovation framework programmes.

A better understanding of critical strategic engineering capabilities is needed, both infrastructure and expertise. Once identified, these then need to be monitored and maintained, potentially as sovereign capabilities. Given the financial sustainability crisis facing UK universities, this is an urgent task. More broadly, more attention, and potentially interventions, are needed to ensure the UK has the supply of skilled engineers it needs to meet its security needs.

a)       What role should the new defence innovation unit play in this agenda?

DASA, NSSIF and the DSTL, as well as other national laboratories all play important roles in supporting and funding research and innovation relevant to defence and security. A new defence innovation unit should be complementary to these activities.

We believe a defence innovation unit should learn from the engineering communities thinking on radical innovation[14]. An engineering proposal could be a funding mechanism that delivers innovative answers to solve ambitious real-world defence and security challenges. Bringing together and developing breakthrough research and technology, it would provide ample funding, flexibility, skills, a high-risk appetite, close collaboration with end-users and deliver through strategic alliances between industry, academics and public sector agencies. Independence and autonomy to facilitate fast decision-making, flexibility and the freedom to allocate and release funds should be priorities. It should be focused on integration and driving development towards application, with the customer providing a pull as an end-user for the technological solution being developed and is prepared to try innovative solutions in the early stages of development. The market is not the primary target; there are however means to exploit commercial opportunities as they arise. Lessons should be learnt from HMGCC[15] and Skunk Works at Lockheed Martin[16].

6)       What impact will the rebranded Science and Technology Network have on the UK’s global position?

a)       Are the thematic areas selected by the Network the right ones to prioritise?

b)      What areas or sectors should the Network prioritise in the coming years?

The rebranding is welcome, but it must be more than a name change and ideally should be accompanied by changes in operation as well as strategy. STN should deliver on behalf of all of government, not just partnership teams within FCDO and DSIT, and it will be most successful when it receives joined up inputs from across government.

STN engagement with global business and with sources of investment in tech innovation needs to be improved; STN and DSIT need to collaborate more closely on the role that the UK’s science and technology strengths can play in bringing in and supporting a diversity of mechanisms for investment. Equally, there is a need to work closer with the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) in mission on support for UK entrepreneurship on the global stage. Disruptive tech-based businesses can be very well supported by the kinds of S&T connections that STN cultivates.

The Royal Society[17] points towards the emergence of multinational corporations as science diplomacy players with agency equivalent to or greater than nation states. STN and the UK should have diplomatic resource equivalent to an Embassy dedicated to understanding and engaging with each of the tech giants. There is a particular need for the UK to have a better understanding of how decisions are made within these organisations.

The selection of a smaller number of technology priorities for STN is helpful but should be adjusted to align with Industrial Strategy technology and growth priorities once they emerge. In larger missions, the three priority areas of critical technologies, climate and nature, and health should not be seen as separate siloed portfolios for staff members or mini-teams but as cross cutting priorities. As soon as the Industrial Strategy is agreed, priorities should be locked in for at least the lifespan of the government; consistency of internationally facing policy messages is crucial for STN and the international stakeholders they engage with.

It is helpful to see a greater focus on information gathering and intelligence on science and technology within STN’s 25-26 priority framework. STN should aim for greater complementarity with other UK stakeholders both inside and outside of mission, including UKRI, UUKI and national academies, in building networks and gathering information. Priorities for information gathering should be developed across government annually or bi-annually and communicated clearly to STN.

STN’s country portfolio should be kept under review, to track whether it is attempting to cover too many countries at the expense of scaling impact within priority partner countries. While soft power is valuable, this can be achieved in many ways. Clearer, well-defined priorities will help ensure that STN achieves and exerts soft power in ways that are laser-focused on value brought back for the UK. Thought should be given to the creation of an advisory task force, including sector champions, tasked to work with STN on implementation of the new priorities. These could help STN with strategic join up, navigate working with industry and finance, and in dealing with research at a higher technology readiness level (TRL) than they are used to.

7)       How can the impact of science diplomacy activities be measured, particularly in terms of enhancing national branding, fostering international influence, and contributing to conflict resolution?

a)       To what extent are science and technology innovation activities supported through UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending?

The Academy has been a delivery partner of several ODA funds for research and innovation, including Newton Fund, the Global Challenges Research Fund and the ODA components of ISPF. Its portfolio has a particular focus on research, innovation and entrepreneurship capacity building. The impact of these activities in supporting science and technology innovation within partner countries has been well evidenced in multiple evaluations carried out at programme and fund level[18]. The benefits to UK research and innovation are systemic. Funds like Newton Fund and GCRF have sensitised the entirety of the UK’s research and innovation base to global challenges and the needs of people in the most affected countries and communities. This enhances the reputation of the UK as an equitable and globally responsible partner and improves the UK’s global standing. It also improves the network and reach of UK researchers and innovators and helps them to embed concepts like circularity, global responsibility and diversity in their work. It finally prepares the next generation of UK researchers for innovating and decision making within tighter constraints than those that currently prevail in the West and helps them pilot solutions to problems of resilience and resource allocation that could be of increasing relevance to the UK in decades to come.  However, the recent cuts in ODA for research and innovation make these outcomes less likely in the long term.

8)       How can the UK be made an attractive destination for global R&D investment, and how can the benefits of this investment be maximised locally and nationally?

R&D is an inherently global activity and attracting investment is crucial to fostering a vibrant, productive R&D system. The UK is already an attractive place for global investment – in 2022, the proportion of UK Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) financed by the rest of the world was 10.3%[19], higher than the USA (8.5%[20]) and OECD average (8.1%[21]). Despite the UK’s comparatively good performance in this regard, Brexit has led to a significant decrease in foreign direct investment in the UK[22] and a sharp decline in SME exports to the EU[23]. This reduction in international investment and trade reduces the incentives for UK businesses to compete in the European market. To keep pace, there is a compelling case for leveraging the public sector to further support businesses to manage and mitigate the risks associated with innovation to incentivise further global private sector investment in UK R&D[24].

The UK provides a strong suite of offerings to support R&D, most notably the world-class excellence of its academic institutions. The high quality of UK research and an academic system that produces a highly skilled workforce are major incentives for international investment, although workforce quantity is a limiting factor: more engineers are needed in the UK, particularly in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence (AI) and software engineering.

With strong international competition, many countries are increasingly prioritising R&D investment and creating supportive policy frameworks to attract global talent and investment. In a global economy, we must consider the advantages that businesses may gain in comparator countries with well-established government support for R&D along the entire pipeline through to commercialisation. 

While support in the UK is excellent for research and good for S&T startups, support for late-stage R&D is less attractive[25]. Where support does exist it is effective, but it does not currently have capacity to meet business needs relative to comparator countries. This can result in a support gap for high-tech innovative firms, which can be incredibly frustrating and makes it difficult to cross the final hurdle (the ‘Valley of Death’) to deliver products to market and attract global investment. Germany benefits from the Fraunhofer, an institution whose mission is to bridge the ‘Valley of Death’, and the USA with the world’s most developed VC infrastructure supporting scale-up funding[26]. To prevent companies moving out of the UK, government should strengthen and expand on its offering, prioritising the provision of high-quality, diverse, clearly signposted support mechanisms for companies to develop, test and demonstrate their technological innovation.

The current R&D system in the UK is complex, and at times disconnected, which can deter investors. The government should aim to simplify this system and ensure that the interface between investment and R&D is easy for investors to understand. Navigating the UK R&D landscape is often the first hurdle to overcome, so provision of support for this can be transformative and lead to investment in the UK through long-term strategic partnerships[27].

Policy stability and cohesion are also essential for consistently attracting international investment. Government sets the tone and direction with strategies and policies that provide certainty to businesses and create greater opportunities for commercialisation. To foster a supportive environment for R&D, all government organisations must share a clearly defined vision of success and be well coordinated. This will provide a long-term stable backdrop for business decisions and investment, something currently lacking due to considerable churn in science and technology strategies. Maintaining initiatives like competitive R&D tax reliefs will signal to investors a commitment to upholding a competitive, consistent and stable tax environment that enables global companies to make long-term investment decisions in the UK. We expect that the upcoming Industrial Strategy will also play a key role in ensuring much-needed policy stability. This should be marketed as part of a joined-up UK innovation pitch to international investors.

Corporate venture capital (or CVC) is a type of venture capital (VC) that comes from large corporates, who invest in smaller businesses that are relevant and beneficial to the parent group. There is an opportunity for the UK to increase the amount the Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) investment coming into the UK as it is at lower levels than comparator countries. This will require efforts to increase conventional VCs’ and entrepreneurs’ understanding of the role and motivation of CVC, which is often more to do with technology synergies rather than control or acquisitions. Government should incentivise CVC investment from both UK and global corporates.

Public sector procurement can be leveraged to stimulate both global and domestic private investment, transforming R&D investment in the UK and driving innovation across supply chains. By acting as a customer and awarding contracts for emerging technologies, the government provides clear demand signals and technology validation, unlocking global investment for new businesses. Effective procurement requires strong leadership, robust planning, intelligent client involvement, incentives for desired behaviours, and good risk management[28]. While the need for improved public procurement processes to stimulate R&D investment is well-recognised, there remains significant potential for transformational change to attract global investors.

The UK needs to do more to understand how investment decisions are made in major multilateral corporations, and it should dedicate resource within the STN network and FCDO to engaging with and understanding the global giants.

a)       How can the government ensure leading scientific researchers continue to view the UK as an attractive place to base themselves?

Engineering in the UK is undertaken by an international workforce, so visa regimes need to be proportionate, especially for small engineering technology companies. Accessing, attracting and retaining the skilled talent companies need is a major challenge. There are a multitude of reasons for this, from startups unable to compete with big tech salaries, skills shortages and frequent changes to visa policies that risk deterring international talent. Coordinated public and private initiatives are needed to increase the level of digital skills in our domestic skill base.

The Academy is an endorsing body for the UK’s Global Talent Visa and engages directly with internationally mobile researchers working across engineering and technology. The Global Talent Visa scheme remains a core strength in the UK’s offer to international researchers. In feedback from our Global Talent community, applicants consistently highlight the flexibility and prestige of the visa as critical factors in choosing the UK. The UK’s visa system needs to contain within it the flexibility to attract and retain global talent which fills the skills and knowledge gaps in the growth-driving sectors such as engineering, AI and biotechnology[29]. This is echoed in the Home Office’s Wave 2 Evaluation of the visa[30], which found that its flexibility, such as the ability to work across sectors and change employers without further permission, was a key draw for applicants. The UK’s visa system must continue to offer this flexibility to attract and retain global talent. The simplification of the visa system which has taken place over the last five years must be consolidated and better promoted (e.g. through an improved Talent is GREAT portal). The UK’s high numbers of international students can be tapped more intentionally to fill research skills gaps, particularly in key emerging technologies, and thought should be given to targeted visa routes to retain graduates in strategically important technologies from the world’s leading universities.

The cost of immigration remains a concern. Researchers have reported that visa fees and the Immigration Health Surcharge present a significant financial burden, particularly when compared with competitor nations. The Royal Society’s 2024 analysis found that the UK’s upfront immigration costs are the highest among leading science nations, with the Global Talent Visa costing up to 17 times more than comparable visas elsewhere.[31] A more proportionate cost model, spreading costs across a longer period, or waiver, especially for highly skilled researchers, would support the UK’s global competitiveness. Beyond visa routes, researchers also require support with housing, schooling, financial systems and adapting to UK culture. Partnering with universities, national academies and local authorities to deliver settlement support would greatly enhance the UK’s attractiveness; building supportive communities of visa awardees can also help new arrivals understand the UK system and settle quickly.

The UK must ensure that its immigration system, research environment and diplomatic relationships work together to attract, welcome and retain leading international researchers. The Academy remains committed to supporting this goal through our visa endorsement work, policy leadership and engagement with global engineering talent.

8th May 2025

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