Written evidence submitted by Professor James Hammond

Director, Mount Paektu Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London (SDY0005)

Background: I am a Professor of Geophysics at Birkbeck, University of London and Director of the Mount Paektu Research Centre.  This centre, established in 2020 has the aim of facilitating science collaboration with North Korea in areas of mutual interest between the UK and North Korea. The Mount Paektu Research Centre has led geoscientific collaborations with DPRK scientists for over 13 years. This work has achieved many successes, with high profile co-authored research publications, research visits to North Korea and reciprocal visits to the UK and a number of workshops in North Korea, China and UK[1]. This has been achieved despite considerable political flux on the Korean Peninsula, showing that science is a good vehicle to build relationships and trust during times of political strain.

The work, supported by the Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is often cited as an example of science for diplomacy, where science can help improve trust and understanding with countries in which official diplomatic relationships are lacking[2]. Some specific examples include events hosted by the MPRC providing opportunities for the UK Embassy in Pyongyang and North Korean Embassy in London to engage directly over positive topics in which they share a mutual interest. It is also an example of diplomacy for science, where diplomats have actively worked to create the space for our project to succeed. This has included the UK Government directly engaging with the UN Security Council to help us comply with increased sanctions following DPRK nuclear tests.

Over the years the MPRC has worked to highlight how science engagement during geopolitical strain can help improve trust and relationships[3]. We participated in recent European Commission Working Groups[4] to inform their future direction on Science Diplomacy and our work is referenced in the recent Royal Society/AAAS report on science diplomacy in an era of disruption2.

In this submission, we will focus specifically on the lessons learned from our project for science diplomacy, and how the UK Government can continue to play, and enhance its role in using science as a tool to build relationships with countries in which it faces significant geopolitical strain.

I would of course be happy to discuss any of the points raised here with the committee.

To what extent is the UK considered a global leader in science and innovation and how does this contribute to its soft power on the global stage?

The UK can play a crucial role in science collaboration during geopolitical strain.  The UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.  This means it has a strong voice when it comes to setting the agenda for sanctions and for global security.  It also means that UK officials have a strong understanding of what can still be achieved within the most extreme of sanctions.  This led the UK Government to seek approval for our work to continue even when all science collaboration with the North Korean state was sanctioned in November 2016[5].  This has set a precedent for others to follow in future.  It is a direct example of the leadership the UK plays in soft power and science diplomacy.

How has this agenda been impacted by the current geopolitical environment, including the international activities of Russia and China?

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a number of restrictions and sanctions were placed on science collaboration with Russia and Belarus.  The International Science Council (ISC) pointed out within 4 days of the Russian invasion that any restrictions would have significant impact on Arctic research[6]. This has proven to be true, with recent studies showing that our ability to predict the impacts of a changing climate on permafrost being weakened due to a lack of access to monitoring data from Russia[7]. Like all nations, the UK’s national security is tied up with our ability to adapt to a changing climate, and so it can be argued that, despite geopolitical tensions and even in the face of conflict, there are areas of scientific collaboration that are of strategic importance and are mutually beneficial and so should be maintained. Health related issues, such as global pandemics are another example. These are rightly two areas of priority for the renamed Science and Technology Unit[8], showing their strategic importance to the UK.

Our work in North Korea, which has relied on the strong support of the UK Government (see above), shows that it is possible to maintain scientific collaboration in strategic areas and comply with international sanctions.  This has also been true, in a limited way with Russia. For example, large infrastructure projects such as ITER, the ISS and to a limited degree CERN are examples of where collaboration is maintained.  We argue that this should be extended to cover global scientific challenges, such as adapting to climate change and global pandemics. However, we acknowledge that managing this is more complicated as it needs multiple smaller projects to be reviewed and monitored rather than single large projects as in the case of the large infrastructure projects listed above.

What are the key international scientific relationships for the UK?

In terms of solving global challenges, such as climate change or global health, it is imperative that all nations are involved. This is why we argue for the identification of strategic areas of science that can be prioritised during geopolitical tensions.

Does the UK need an International Science Strategy and what would it contain?

The UK Foreign Policy of critical engagement with North Korea, where it seeks forms of engagement while resolutely maintaining a robust critical stance on areas such as weapons of mass destruction and human rights[9] has been crucial to our ongoing engagement. Critical engagement aims to build better relationships with countries, but this can only be achieved if projects bring continued and consistent engagement.  It allows the trust to be established that can open up doors for other forms of engagement.

This means that all Government departments should embrace this foreign policy objective. When facing provocations and the resultant imposition of sanctions and restrictions, there should be wide recognition that it is beneficial to identify areas of mutual interest with the targeted country in areas of science that are relatively safe from the areas targeted by sanctions. These areas can then be prioritised for strategic review by the relevant Government Departments to allow crucial long-term monitoring, or scientific research to be maintained. The UK Government is well placed to lead such a review, having science advisors in all key Government Departments.

A UK International Science Strategy is a logical place to identify these priorities to the wider community. It would allow the Government to specify the areas of science it sees as crucial to maintain with all nations. With a clear steer, all Government Departments from DSIT, FCDO, Defence (including the Defence Innovation Unit) and the Science and Technology Unit can help maintain strategic projects, while still complying with any restrictions imposed.

A UK International Strategy that identifies strategic areas of science that are prioritised during geopolitical strain would also offer guidance to funders and research institutions that collaboration in certain areas, while not exempt from sanctions, is encouraged. This means that universities have more confidence that they can maintain key scientific projects while complying with government regulations on trusted research. This has been a major issue for our work in North Korea where, despite us having export licences and approvals from the UK Government, US Government and UN Security Council, a number of collaborations have faltered due to universities risk-averse policies.

How can the impact of science diplomacy activities be measured, particularly in terms of enhancing national branding, fostering international influence, and contributing to conflict resolution?

We have tried to quantify the impacts of sanctions on engagement with Russia in previous publications3, and other groups have detailed the impacts of losing data on bias in scientific studies7. However, understanding the contribution to conflict resolution of science engagement is more complicated.  One way could be to build into projects opportunities for scientists and diplomats to engage. For example, we recently hosted an event at Birkbeck to launch 4 Korean translations of books on Disaster Risk Reduction aimed at school Children.  Attending this event were the acting UK Ambassador to DPRK and acting DPRK Ambassador to UK. It presented a chance to engage in a positive way around topics of mutual interest.  Tracking if this leads to other opportunities, and if it reduces tensions through Embassy contacts would be an interesting idea to develop.

To what extent are science and technology innovation activities supported through UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending?

ODA assistance projects are useful avenues to develop projects and through the GCRF scheme, we have held events with North Korea.  They can help identify areas of mutual interests; a key step when trying to build long-term relationships in difficult times. In countries where trust between partners is limited, science diplomacy tends to be more successful when the scientific objectives dominate any diplomatic goals.  It means that carefully designed projects, that focus on the underlying science are important when using ODA spending for science diplomacy objectives in countries with strained diplomatic relationships. An example would be using natural science to understand an environmental hazard (e.g., volcanic eruption, flood, landslide etc), or social science to map out a community’s vulnerability to a hazard. These are good science diplomacy initiatives that can help underpin the ODA goal of building resilience to a future occurrence of the hazard.

7th May 2025

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