Written Evidence submitted by Mitchell Gallagher (CAU0027) to the UK Parliamentary Committee’s inquiry on the Government's China Audit
Executive Summary
As the United Kingdom undertakes the sensitive task of recalibrating its relationship with the People’s Republic of China, this submission seeks to offer a measured and evidence-based assessment of where sustained engagement remains both prudent and productive, and where well-defined boundaries—ethical, legal, and institutional—must be upheld. These recommendations are grounded in my work in Sinology and informed by close observation of cultural, educational, and diplomatic intersections between Britain and China.
British policy towards China has oscillated between poles of assertive intervention and enthusiastic partnership. From the Opium Wars to economic optimism of the so-called “golden era” under the Cameron-Osborne administration, our bilateral relationship has been shaped as much by strategic interests as by normative assumptions. The historical volatility should caution us against adopting either a posture of indiscriminate decoupling or one of deferential accommodation.
Instead, I argue for a principled and pragmatic approach—one safeguarding Britain’s intellectual autonomy, academic freedom, and liberal-democratic values, but acknowledging China’s undeniable growing influence in global knowledge production, technological innovation, and cultural exchange. Constructive relations with China are necessary in certain domains, provided they proceed with strategic clarity, transparency, and ethical foresight.
I. Areas Where the UK Government Can and Should Engage with China
Academic Collaboration in Non-Sensitive Disciplines
The United Kingdom possesses a distinguished and enduring tradition of Sinological scholarship. From James Legge’s 19th-century translations of the Confucian canon at Oxford to Joseph Needham’s magisterial Science and Civilisation in China project, British academia has long served as a bridge between intellectual traditions East and West. These undertakings constituted rigorous activities with Chinese epistemologies, cosmologies, and civilisational contributions. This legacy offers a historical precedent and a compelling rationale for continued, warily structured academic cooperation—principally within the humanities and social sciences. Collaboration should be seen as the perpetuation of a scholarly lineage that has, for over a century and a half, illuminated Chinese thought and culture with intellectual integrity.
Certain disciplines lend themselves well to sustained and apolitical activities. Archaeological collaboration, for instance, stands out as a domain of genuine mutual benefit, largely insulated from the contentious currents of strategic competition. The British Museum’s partnership with the Shaanxi Provincial Institute of Archaeology—most notably their joint excavations of Tang Dynasty tombs—has yielded substantial contributions to the field. Likewise, the British Library’s digitisation initiative with the National Library of China, centred on the Dunhuang manuscript corpus, exemplifies best practice in cultural preservation and international scholarly cooperation. Rendering thousands of rare documents accessible to researchers worldwide, this project embodies the United Kingdom’s commitment to open intellectual inquiry and preserving global heritage. Even amid political uncertainty, the pursuit of knowledge and the conservation of human history remain domains where principled collaboration is possible and desirable.
Comparative education offers fertile terrain for constructive academic cooperation. The juxtaposition of China’s examination-driven educational culture with Britain’s pedagogical emphasis on critical thinking and liberal inquiry reveals philosophical divergence but potential complementarities. Both countries, however, confront analogous structural challenges, persistent rural-urban divides in educational opportunity, the integrating digital technologies into traditional classrooms, and the strain in standardisation and creativity.
Collaborative research advances comparative pedagogy and can inform policy development. The University of Bristol’s partnership with Beijing Normal University on rural education reform, serves as a model in this regard. This alliance has yielded substantive empirical findings, shaped curriculum innovation, and cultivated institutional bonds.
Climate humanities research constitutes a domain of urgency and intellectual promise. As the principal global emitter of carbon and a key actor in global climate negotiations, China’s environmental trajectory will profoundly influence our planet. Yet to respond effectively to this shared challenge, technical solutions alone are insufficient. Cultural, historical, and ethical dimensions must be interrogated. Here, British scholarship brings significant assets. A well-established tradition in environmental history, normative inquiry into climate justice, and interdisciplinary research into societal dimensions of sustainability transitions.
Collaboration with Chinese scholars in this field enables an understanding of China’s environmental governance, developmental constraints, and sociopolitical structures. The University of Exeter’s China Centre for Climate Change Leadership stands as a sterling example. By cultivating future environmental leaders and facilitating research into equitable transition pathways, the Centre exemplifies the kind of partnership that merges normative vision with contextual expertise. The collaborations reflect a sobering reality that our ecological interdependence surpasses geopolitical rivalries. If the United Kingdom is to remain a principled actor internationally, climate-focused academic cooperation with China ought to be actively encouraged—anchored in academic independence and ecological responsibility.
Student Mobility
Student mobility has formed the backbone of UK-China relations since the first Chinese students arrived at British universities in the late 19th century. Today, approximately 150,000 Chinese students study in the UK annually, contributing over £4 billion to the economy. However, this relationship demands recalibration than continuation on autopilot.
The UK should increase opportunities for British students to develop China literacy. The current asymmetry—where Chinese students gain familiarity with UK society with most British graduates ignorant of China—represents a vulnerability. Programs like the Wilson China Fellowship, which funds mid-career professionals to develop China expertise, provide models worth expanding. The UK should establish a "China Knowledge" initiative, supporting language study, cultural immersion, and research for British students across disciplines. This need not entail uncritical engagement; indeed, British students studying Chinese history, politics, and society from Taiwan or Hong Kong institutions gain valuable alternative perspectives. The University of Nottingham's exchange with National Taiwan University demonstrates how the UK can diversify its China knowledge pipeline outside PRC institutions.
Forums
The Pugwash Conferences during the Cold War enabled Soviet and Western scientists to discuss nuclear risks despite ideological divides. Contemporary challenges in climate change and pandemic prevention require similar pragmatism. The UK should establish a dedicated "Global Challenges Dialogue" bringing together researchers from democratic and authoritarian states to address shared threats, with transparent ground rules protecting academic freedom.
Climate change, pandemic prevention, antimicrobial resistance, and population aging represent existential challenges transcending ideological discrepancies. The UK's credibility as a convenor of international expertise positions it to facilitate multilateral academic and policy dialogues that include Chinese perspectives without being dominated by bilateral tensions. The University of Edinburgh's Global Health Governance Programme demonstrates this approach, bringing together global public health experts to address pandemic preparedness in ways that diplomatic channels often cannot. These forums recognise that excluding China from global scientific collaboration endangers collective security.
II. Red Lines
Academic Freedom
The naive assumption that academic engagement would inevitably liberalise Chinese universities has proven false. Instead, we've witnessed what Perry Link calls "the anaconda in the chandelier"—a system of self-censorship where explicit restrictions prove unnecessary because scholars internalise political boundaries. The UK must recognise this reality when supporting Chinese academics who resist these pressures.
The UK's academic ties with China occurs against a backdrop of deteriorating intellectual freedom within Chinese universities. The situation has dramatically worsened since Xi Jinping's 2013 Document No. 9, which explicitly targeted "Western concepts" in higher education. The dismissal of outspoken professors like Xia Yeliang from Peking University, the imprisonment of Uyghur scholars like Ilham Tohti, and the erosion of Hong Kong's academic autonomy demonstrate systematic constraints on free inquiry. The UK must establish non-negotiable standards for institutional partnerships. Universities receiving UK funding, research grants, or academic accreditation must demonstrate commitment to basic academic freedoms: faculty autonomy in research topics, protection from political interference, and absence of punishment for scholarly conclusions. These standards should be codified in formal partnership agreements with compliance processes and regular review.
The consequences for violations must be meaningful. UK universities should suspend partnerships with institutions that dismiss faculty for political reasons, restrict classroom discussion of sensitive topics, or participate in surveillance of student expression. Recent cases like Oxford's suspension of funding ties with Huawei following security concerns demonstrate that British institutions can make principled choices despite financial implications.
Reciprocity must become a central principle. Chinese scholars enjoy nearly unfettered access to UK archives, fieldwork sites, and research participants. British researchers face growing restrictions in China, from denied archive access to fieldwork limitations and visa denials. All institutional agreements should include enforceable reciprocity clauses ensuring UK researchers receive comparable access to Chinese research environments.
Identifying and Restricting High-Risk Partnerships
China's formal Military-Civil Fusion strategy, elevated to national policy in 2015, deliberately obfuscates boundaries between civilian research and military applications. This whole-of-society approach targets precisely the dual-use research areas where UK universities excel: artificial intelligence, advanced materials, quantum computing, and biotechnology. The UK must respond with sophisticated risk assessments. Specific institutions warrant scrutiny. The "Seven Sons of National Defense"—universities directly administered by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology—maintain explicit military research missions. These include Beihang University, Northwestern Polytechnical University, and Harbin Institute of Technology. UK universities should avoid joint laboratories, research partnerships, or student exchanges with these institutions in sensitive fields. Partnership risk assessment must consider multiple factors, research area sensitivity, institutional governance structures, and connectivity to defense establishments. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's "China Defence Universities Tracker" provides a model for assessment, mapping relationships between Chinese universities and military or security entities. The UK should develop its own assessment framework, regularly updated and publicly available to guide universities.
Consequences for violations should include funding restrictions, security clearance implications, and potential exclusion from sensitive UK research projects. The precedent exists in the US Department of Commerce's Entity List restrictions on certain Chinese universities. Though the UK need not adopt identical measures, it should establish clear penalties for institutions that ignore security guidelines in pursuit of Chinese funding or prestige partnerships.
Confucius Institutes
The Chinese government's external propaganda system has evolved from crude Maoist-era approaches to sophisticated influence operations leveraging Western academic openness. As Anne-Marie Brady's research demonstrates, Confucius Institutes represent one component of a United Front strategy targeting overseas Chinese communities and educational institutions.
Confucius Institutes operate on UK university campuses, ostensibly providing Chinese language teaching and cultural programming. Unlike comparable institutions like the British Council or Goethe-Institut, these organisations are embedded within host universities, raising concerns about academic freedom and institutional autonomy. The UK should require comprehensive transparency from all Confucius Institutes. This includes public disclosure of funding agreements, staffing decisions, and curriculum content. Host universities should preserve exclusive authority over hiring decisions, teaching materials, and event programming. Current practices often grant Hanban (the Chinese agency overseeing Confucius Institutes) inappropriate influence over these academic functions. The Committee may wish to consider: How does the Government intend to enforce transparency and institutional autonomy in Confucius Institutes while preserving Chinese language instruction and cultural engagement in UK universities? Examples from other countries provide instructive models. Sweden closed its Confucius Institutes following transparency concerns, New Zealand's institutes operated under enhanced oversight. The University of Chicago terminated its institute after Hanban attempted to interfere with an academic conference on Chinese politics.
Confucius Institutes must be administratively separated from academic departments, especially China Studies programs; all funding agreements must be publicly disclosed; and host universities must maintain sole authority over curriculum, events, and personnel.
Protecting Chinese Students
Approximately 150,000 Chinese students study at UK institutions, contributing invaluable perspectives to campus life and revenue to university budgets. Evidence indicates some face monitoring by Chinese authorities through embassy-connected student associations, creating a chilling effect on free expression. The UK government has both moral and legal obligations to protect students from transnational repression.
UK universities should implement specific protective measures, anonymous assessment options for politically sensitive topics; clear protocols for reporting intimidation; and orientation programs explicitly addressing academic freedom expectations. These measures should be developed in consultation with Chinese student representatives and providing appropriate confidentiality.
The UK should increase scrutiny of Chinese Students and Scholars Associations when they demonstrate direct embassy control. Although most operate as legitimate cultural organisations, documentation shows some receiving funding and direction from Chinese diplomatic missions. These organisations should be required to declare foreign funding and influence, with consequences for non-compliance.
Preventing Research That Enables Repression
UK researchers must not become unwitting contributors to technologies enabling surveillance, censorship, or human rights abuses. This risk is acute in artificial intelligence, facial recognition, speech analysis, and big data applications—areas where UK universities excel and Chinese entities actively seek partnerships.
The UK should establish mandatory ethics review for research partnerships with China in sensitive technology areas. This review should consider potential dual-use applications, end-user concerns, and protections against misappropriation. Researchers should sign declarations acknowledging these risks and implementing protective measures, with robust whistleblower protections for those reporting concerns.
Consequences for violations should include research funding restrictions, mandatory remediation measures, and potential limitation of future collaboration opportunities. The precedent exists in export control regimes for physical technologies; similar principles should apply to research partnerships with potential security implications.
Publishing Integrity
Academic publishing represents a critical battlefield in the struggle to preserve research integrity. Chinese authorities have increasingly pressured international publishers to censor content for the Chinese market, threatening the universal accessibility of scholarship. UK publishers and journals must resist these pressures to sustain academic credibility.
The 2017 case of Cambridge University Press initially removing over 300 China Quarterly articles from its Chinese website at government request exhibited these challenges. While CUP ultimately reversed this decision following academic outcry, similar pressures continue across academic publishing. Chinese importers have demanded content removals from books, digital databases have been filtered for Chinese users, and translation rights have been denied for politically sensitive scholarship.
UK publishers should adopt clear principles. No content alterations for market access; identical global editions rather than censored Chinese versions; and transparent disclosure of any government censorship requests. These standards protect academic integrity and commercial interests, as reputation damage from censorship compliance often exceeds short-term market gains. UK Research and Innovation should establish guidelines prohibiting research funding recipients from publishing in journals that practice politically motivated censorship. This creates appropriate incentives for publishers and protecting academic freedom.
III. Policy Recommendations
The UK should establish a dedicated Centre for Academic Security and Ethics in China Engagement, modelled partially on Australia's University Foreign Interference Taskforce but with broader scope. This centre would:
This Centre should operate independently from both government and universities, perhaps as an independent trust with representatives from academia, security services, and civil society. Its funding should derive from multiple sources to ensure independence. The Centre would publish annual risk assessments of Chinese institutions, identifying those with concerning military ties, academic freedom violations, or security risks. The precedent exists in Finland's Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which addresses similar challenges across domains. The UK's version would specifically focus on academia, providing specialised expertise this area requires.
Multilateral Approaches to Educational Diplomacy
The UK should reframe its China educational strategy past bilateral ties, within multilateral frameworks. Three specific approaches merit consideration:
Firstly, trilateral academic partnerships involving UK institutions, Chinese counterparts, and third countries from across the Commonwealth, Indo-Pacific, or Global South. For example, joint research on sustainable agriculture involving British plant sciences, Chinese agricultural engineering, and Kenyan implementation expertise. Collaborations distribute influence, addressing development challenges. The existing Newton Fund could be reconfigured to prioritise trilateral partnerships.
Secondly, the UK should initiate a "Democratic Science Partnership" with like-minded nations including Japan, Australia, Canada, and European partners, establishing principles for research security and maintaining appropriate scientific openness. This coalition could develop common standards for research partnerships with non-democratic states, preventing a "race to the bottom" where individual nations compromise security for competitive advantage.
Thirdly, the UK should diversify its Asia knowledge base beyond mainland China, expanding academic partnerships with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations. The current concentration of UK Asia expertise in China-focused scholars creates strategic vulnerability and intellectual narrowness. Expanded language training in Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Bahasa Indonesia would produce graduates with wider regional perspectives.
Support for Academic Freedom Advocates
The UK has moral and strategic interests in supporting Chinese scholars facing persecution for their academic work. The assault on academic freedom under Xi Jinping has forced numerous scholars into exile, from economics professor Xia Yeliang to Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti (currently imprisoned). Britain should establish itself as a refuge for intellectual freedom.
A dedicated "Academic Freedom Fellowship" program should be CREATED, providing temporary or permanent positions for Chinese scholars facing political persecution. This program would operate similarly to existing initiatives like the Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA) but with specific focus on China. Universities, think tanks, and research institutes would host these scholars, benefiting from their expertise but providing safe havens.
The UK should also establish specialised visa pathways for persecuted academics and their families, recognising that conventional refugee processes may not adequately address their circumstances. These scholars often face travel restrictions, passport confiscation, and other barriers to traditional asylum seeking. Support systems for these scholars should include language training, academic mentorship, and integration into British research communities. The University of Chicago's Scholars at Risk program provides a model, offering comprehensive support beyond mere employment.
Britain's reception of scientists fleeing Nazi Germany transformed British science while saving lives. Similarly, the UK's welcome of Hungarian academics following the 1956 Soviet invasion demonstrated humanitarian principles while benefiting British intellectual life. Today's persecuted Chinese scholars deserve similar protection.
V. Conclusion
The UK's approach to China requires neither wholesale decoupling nor uncritical embrace. History demonstrates that periods of complete isolation proved counterproductive. The evidence presented here supports a principled middle path. Constructive in low-risk, high-benefit areas, with clear boundaries protecting core values and security interests. This acknowledges legitimate Chinese contributions to global knowledge production and upholding non-negotiable academic freedoms. It recognises China's cultural importance and resists instrumentalisation of culture for propaganda purposes.
Implementation requires institutional architecture—the proposed Centre for Academic Security and Ethics—and cultural change in UK universities. Senior leadership must prioritise values alongside commercial interests when evaluating partnerships. Researchers need better training in recognising security risks without succumbing to paranoia. Chinese students deserve protection from surveillance while remaining welcomed as valuable community members.
The UK has navigated thorny relationships with non-democratic powers throughout history. Today's China challenge requires analogous nuance, avoiding confrontational rhetoric and naive accommodation. The recommendations here provide a framework for what serves British interests and upholding enduring values of academic freedom, human dignity, and intellectual integrity.
This evidence submission was prepared by Mitchell Gallagher, Ph.D. Candidate at Wayne State University.
5th May 2025