Written submission to the International Development Committee inquiry: Women, peace and security

Evidence submitted by ActionAid UK 

1. About ActionAid

1.1.            ActionAid is a global federation working with more than 41 million people living in more than 71 countries. We want to see a just, fair and sustainable world, in which everybody enjoys the right to a life of dignity, and freedom from poverty and oppression. We work to achieve social justice and gender equality and to eradicate poverty, including by shifting power to local organisations and movements. Women are disproportionately impacted by disasters, conflicts and crises; that’s why we have a particular focus on women’s rights and cultivating women’s leadership in emergencies.

1.2.            Our human rights-based approach aims to ensure that people are drivers of their own change and are able to claim the rights they are entitled to. We focus on women and girls because the denial of their rights is a grave injustice and one of the underlying causes of poverty worldwide. By working directly with communities, women’s movements, activists, groups and networks, social movements, and other allies, we aim to tackle the structural causes and consequences of poverty and injustice.

2. Summary & background

2.1.            ActionAid welcomes this inquiry and the decision of the International Development Committee to examine the UK’s implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The UK has a specific and self-imposed responsibility to champion and implement the WPS agenda because it is a signatory to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, and is a penholder for WPS at the UN Security Council. This responsibility must not be taken lightly as 612 million women worldwide are currently living in or proximate to active conflict zones[1]. However, women are not passive victims, but agents of change. UNSCR 1325 lays out a framework for how signatories should approach WPS and so the UK should be referring to this and meeting this standard as a minimum.

2.2.            The UK government must allocate a dedicated budget for implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS so that WPS efforts can be properly resourced. Funding must go to proximate women’s rights organisations (WROs) in fragile and conflict-affected states and contexts (FCAS). The burden of ODA cuts should not fall on these incredible organisations.

2.3.            The UK government must meaningfully consult and involve WROs and WPS activists from FCAS in all strategy development, programme design and policy implementation, throughout the whole process.

2.4.            The UK government must increase transparency by tracking and publishing the proportion of ODA funding reaching WROs for WPS programming, with 25% going to local organisations as per their commitments under the Grand Bargain.

3. National Action Plan

3.1.            A core aspect of the UK’s implementation of the WPS agenda is through the National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS. The current NAP has many improvements on the previous iteration, including a joint ownership by more departments[2] and a domestic angle for the first time. The stated intention to have a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) framework is positive, however this framework has not been published or made available externally, even though it has been two years since the launch of the NAP. It is therefore impossible to externally and fully assess any impact of the NAP, as the intended impact measurements and progress are not publicly available, included to WROs in the focus countries.

3.2.            ActionAid UK notes that under previous iterations of the NAP, the UK government produced annual written reports assessing their progress on the NAP which provided a crucial opportunity for accountability by civil society and WROs. The government reports were supplemented by an external, independent annual shadow report collated by the Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS) network, to which ActionAid UK and other network members contribute. GAPS continues to publish a shadow report, but since the fifth NAP was published, this key accountability mechanism—in the form of a annual written government report—has been absent. This is a serious regression in the quality of the UK’s WPS practice.

3.3.            Other key forms of accountability and support have been diminished in recent years, for example the Cross-Whitehall Working Group on WPS has changed the format of their meeting which has reduced the amount of time for civil society scrutiny and discussion. The working group has also expanded to include academics and other stakeholders, which in theory is more inclusive, but in practice, having more attendees reduces the time for interventions. Holding more frequent, longer or separate meetings would be an improvement.

3.4.            The NAP also does not include a dedicated budget for the implementation of the NAP, which means that it cannot build and maintain capacity for monitoring and evaluation, cross-departmental training, coordination and other key processes required for successful delivery of the NAP. Developing a plan with no financial commitment for its execution is short-sighted and prevents meaningful implementation.

3.5.            While the UK’s NAP on WPS outlines a comprehensive set of commitments, its implementation is often concentrated on a limited number of “focus countries”, selected based on strategic interest, partnership potential, and capacity for engagement. While this targeted approach can allow for deeper investment and coordination in specific contexts, it also presents significant limitations, particularly when it comes to ensuring that WPS principles are applied consistently across all relevant settings. One major concern is that conflict-affected or fragile contexts not formally designated as “focus countries” may fall outside the scope of WPS-informed policy and programming, despite the clear applicability of the agenda (for example the occupied Palestinian territories). This gap not only undermines the UK's stated commitment to a rights-based and inclusive foreign policy, but also weakens its ability to act consistently as a WPS leader on the international stage. This creates a two-tiered approach in which only select contexts benefit from the full framework of the WPS agenda, leaving women and girls in other crisis settings—including in contexts where the UK has strategic, diplomatic, or humanitarian engagement—without the protections or participation mechanisms that the NAP seeks to promote.

4. Funding

4.1.            A major shortcoming of the UK’s approach to WPS is that there is still no dedicated budget for WPS or any commitments made within the NAP, and so implementation is not built into the NAP and tangible progress cannot be made. This has made it difficult to track progress, monitor impact, or ensure accountability across government departments.

4.2.            There is no clear reporting on actual WPS spend by the UK government and even external analysis in 2022 found that “it is impossible to establish how much the UK government has spent on WPS in the last fifteen years”[3]. Therefore, it is unclear how the UK Government integrates WPS principles across its Official Development Assistance (ODA) funded programming. ActionAid does not receive any ODA funding for WPS programming. Without more transparent reporting, it is difficult for civil society to assess the UK’s implementation of the WPS agenda. The UK government must increase transparency by tracking and publishing the proportion of ODA funding reaching WROs for WPS programming, with 25% going to local organisations as per their commitments under the Grand Bargain.

4.3.            The recent announcement of further cuts to the overall ODA budget—to 0.3% just of GNI—will have harmful effects on the implementation of the WPS agenda. The previous cuts instigated by the last government resulted in a reduction of funding to WROs by two-thirds[4]. With the additional context of the USAID funding cuts, the decision to cut the UK ODA budget even further than before will have widespread impacts for the implementation of the WPS agenda globally. This runs contrary to the UK’s commitments under UNSCR 1325. The UK government must reverse the cuts and return to the UK’s 0.7% target, and in the meantime undertake gender/equalities impact assessments to ensure the cuts do not disproportionately impact women and girls. .

4.4.            Additionally, 28% of the total ODA budget is spent on in-country refugee costs[5]. Not only is this budget that is not available for WPS programming in fragile and conflict-affected countries, but the UK’s approach to asylum seekers and refugees contradicts the principles of the WPS agenda. Reports have shown how women asylum seekers in the UK are subject to harassment and humiliation, not unlike the dangerous and violent situations that they have fled[6]. The asylum system is not gender-sensitive and can retraumatise the survivors of sexual violence[7]. The decision-making process is invasive, is incredibly slow and during this period asylum seekers face significant challenges accessing services and housing[8]. Meanwhile, the UK NAP on WPS mentions the disproportionate impact that conflict and insecurity have on women and girls and commits to empowering them and standing up to those who violate their rights. Once these women and girls reach the UK and claim asylum, they are not treated with this level of respect and care.

5. Women’s voices

5.1.            The meaningful participation, consultation and collaboration with women, girls and people of marginalised genders who live and work in conflict-affected contexts are a core principle of the WPS agenda and must be central in the UK government’s implementation. This is crucial as it is the right of women to be deeply involved in making decisions and designing programming that will impact them. Women deserve to be included and heard; they are best placed to understand the specific and contextual needs of their communities and how to respond. ActionAid has found that WROs have adopted nuanced ways of linking response, preparedness and long-term sustainability while also addressing structural inequalities and developing peace and recovery processes within their communities[9].

5.2.            However our research shows that WRO are not given the recognition they require. While the UK Government has highlighted the necessity for gender-sensitive peacebuilding and improved coordination, current policies and siloed approaches of short-term planning often focuses on immediate relief rather than long-term resilience.[10] Furthermore, the perspectives and experiences of all people impacted by conflict must be considered in all policy related to them, so that it can be truly responsive to the whole community. When the UK government refers to ‘women’s voices’, this is how it must consider it—not a tick-box exercise or as an instrumentalist factor for more sustainable peace, but as core and central partners in all strategies, policies and programming.

5.3.            ActionAid’s research with WROs and youth-led organisations who work on WPS efforts in Northern Uganda found that over half of the research participants reported having insufficient engagement with international actors during conflict emergencies[11]. This also reflects the experiences of our colleagues and partners in different regions who have tried to engage with the UK government on their WPS policy. The development of the NAP itself involved lots of civil society consultation which was reflected within the NAP, referring to civil society as ‘key strategic partners’[12]. However, since then WROs from FCAS have not seen that level of consultation and active collaboration; while the same NAP stands, continued engagement is necessary for successful and inclusive implementation. Meaningful consultation is rare and when it occurs, it is often last minute and favours global north NGOs.

6. Increased securitisation and militarisation

6.1.            The Integrated Security Fund (ISF) is a cross-governmental fund which replaced the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). The UK NAP committed to 15% of CSSF funding in NAP focus countries to be spent on WPS programming, through the CSSF Gender, Peace and Security portfolio[13]. However, since the evolution of the CSSF to the ISF, it is unclear if this objective will continue. Furthermore, the ISF has shifted to having a greater focus on threats to UK national security which is less aligned with the WPS agenda and has deterred WROs and proximate organisations from applying for funding.

6.2.            The announcement of increased defence spending in February 2025[14] also runs counter to core WPS principles. The UN Secretary General highlighted the negative impact of increased military spending in his 2024 annual report on WPS, stating that “Surging military spending is not in line with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, which envisages promoting the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources. If not halted, the spread of militarization, weapons and ammunition could lead to an even more dangerous and violent decade, in which civilians continue to bear the brunt of harm.”[15] He recommended several pledges for member states & signatories to adopt for the 25th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, including one specifically to reduce military spending. By increasing defence spending, the UK government has chosen to reject the Secretary-General’s guidance.

6.3.            Additionally, there has been a noted risk of UK-supplied military equipment being used by Saudi Arabia and Israel[16]. Through direct arms exports, contributions to the global F-35 programme and direct UK military intervention, the UK government puts itself at serious risk of complicity in the violations of international law perpetrated by other states such as the Israeli government[17]. The military actions by these states cause further insecurity and instability for women and girls, and the UK’s continued arms exports contribute to this, contrary to WPS commitments.

7. Holistic and comprehensive approach

7.1.            For the UK’s WPS implementation to be truly successful, it must take a more consistent gender-transformative approach to all policy areas, ensuring that they comprehensively and coherently apply the principles of the WPS agenda and consult with WROs. This includes the UK’s involvement in the international arms trade, humanitarian responses, long-term development programming, refugee and asylum policy, defence spending, trade and diplomatic relations, and more.

7.2.            As explored above, there are significant concerns of the risk of complicity in violations of international humanitarian law, which could have been avoided if there was a more holistic and comprehensive approach to all UK policy which considers the WPS agenda. The actions of the UK in relation to the conflict in Gaza have not reflected the commitments made under the WPS NAP, and have not been consistent with usual foreign and diplomatic policy, for example the rapid and unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian invasion.

8. Sustainable WPS efforts

8.1.            In order to ensure that its WPS efforts are sustainable and long-term, the UK will need to shift its WPS approach. Currently, there is an over-prioritisation on the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative and other responses to SGBV, which does not fully reflect all four pillars of the WPS agenda. Addressing participation and relief & recovery, in addition to protection and prevention, is crucial for more sustainable WPS efforts.

8.2.             ActionAid works directly with WROs and women-led organisations (WLOs) in FCAS as part of our Humanitarian Signature[18] and supports proximate women to lead the response to conflict, humanitarian crises and disasters. The UK must also recognise the role of WROs and WLOs who are the experts and are the first responders to active conflicts. ActionAid has seen how WROs and WLOs are often first responders, mobilising to provide shelter, distribute food, deliver psychosocial support, and respond to rising rates of gender-based violence. They do so under immense pressure, frequently without access to adequate funding, security, or decision-making power within the formal humanitarian system. One example from ActionAid UK’s research shows how WROs in Somaliland, who were providing GBV services to survivors, were able to mobilise and train community members during Cyclone Sagar in 2018 which meant that they were able to share vital information with community members with disabilities or those who live in rural areas.[19] Despite their essential contributions, WROs and WLOs are still vastly underfunded, with estimates suggesting that less than 1% of global humanitarian assistance reaches local women’s organisations directly.

8.3.             Despite their important role, WROs and WLOs are often left out of the conversation. The UK should ensure accessibility of WROs and WLOs to international conversations, invest in capacity building around longer-term and sustainable opportunities and respect the authority and credibility of WROs and WLOs. The UK Government must acknowledge that local women-led organisations are not peripheral actors - they are humanitarian responders, peacebuilders, and frontline defenders of human rights. As such, their leadership should not only be recognised rhetorically but embedded structurally within funding mechanisms, coordination systems, and policy frameworks.

8.4.            The UK government must also ensure that their reconstruction efforts are gender-sensitive, and that they use their diplomatic position to encourage other states to meaningfully involve women in all peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. For example, the UK applied pressure to ensure that women and WROs were represented in talk about reconstruction in Ukraine. The UK must take the same approach with the occupied Palestinian territories and Afghanistan.

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