Written submission from the Campaign Against Arms Trade (ECO0031)

 

Introduction

  1. Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) is a UK organisation working to end the international arms trade. This trade has a devastating impact on human rights and security, and damages economic development. CAAT believes that large scale military procurement and arms exports only reinforce a militaristic approach to international problems.

 

  1. As an organisation with a specific mandate and expertise, Campaign Against Arms Trade’s submission will focus on the role of UK arms exports in the context of the questions posed by the inquiry.

 

  1. This inquiry will address three of the questions posed by the Committee: 

 

Economic security:

●        How should the UK Government define “economic security”, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of particular definitions?

 

Working across Government:

●        How should work across multiple Government departments and public bodies be co-ordinated to achieve economic security objectives?

 

International partnerships: 

●        How should the UK ensure that economic security factors into decisions around international partnerships, including trade agreements and security co-operation?

 

Economic security and Working across Government

 

  1. CAAT is concerned by the remit of the newly established Sub-Committee on Economic Security, Arms and Export Controls. Accepting that the focus of the current inquiry is economic security, neither the inquiry questions, nor the material explaining the focus of the Sub-Committee, sufficiently explain how the UK’s arms export regime can be suitably scrutinised under this mandate.

 

  1. The material explaining the focus of the Sub-Committee sets out a reasonable case for the need for the Business and Trade committee to examine the issue of economic security, but apart from the title of the Sub-Committee, arms export and arms controls are not addressed. We urge the Committee to publish the rationale for placing these two distinct areas within the remit of one Sub-Committee, along with a programme of action for scrutinising the UK’s arms export regime.

 

  1. We welcome that the Business and Trade Committee, under the stewardship of the current Chair, has conducted some effective and critical scrutiny into UK arms exports through its non-inquiry session on UK arms exports to Israel, and ongoing correspondence with Government Ministers on the issue. However, the remit of the new Sub-Committee appears to hinder rather than to support this work, and in both the medium and long term ad hoc inquiries into the UK’s arms export regime fall below the level of scrutiny and accountability that the UK public should be afforded.

 

  1. The announcement launching the Sub-Committee on 6 March 2025 asked ‘how does Government use and coordinate economic sanctions, investment and export controls and trade agreements as the tools available to it to enhance economic security?’ This question implies that the Sub-Committee’s mandate is one in which arms export controls are simply a tool used to deliver ‘economic security’, rather than a distinct issue that needs urgent ongoing parliamentary scrutiny and accountability.

 

  1. The former Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) was mandated to examine arms exports from the perspective of four different Committees corresponding to four different departments, including Foreign Affairs, Defence, Development, and Trade. While accepting that CAEC was not functioning effectively before it was dissolved, it would be a mistake not to explicitly mandate any future arms export oversight bodies within Parliament to look at arms exports holistically from each of these angles. This is firstly because each of these departments (FCDO; MOD; Business and Trade) are involved in issuing arms licences, and secondly because UK arms exports are used on people, including killing and injuring people, outside of the UK. The current mandate of the Sub-Committee appears to conceptualise economic security and arms exports in terms of their domestic impact only, and it is unclear how - or if - human rights, development and peace and conflict perspectives will be applied.

 

  1. Our concern is further raised by the Government’s explanation of ‘economic security’ published in “Invest 2035: The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy” October 2024, which does not mention arms exports. On page 15 of the report the economic security objectives for the Industrial Strategy are:

 

“a. Promote key sectors in the economy which drive growth and strengthen economic security.

b. Reduce supply chain and other vulnerabilities in growth-driving sectors which could harm their long-term growth or ability to deliver critical outputs.

c. Ensure national security risks inform the approach to driving growth in these sectors.”

 

  1. The current inquiry questions appear to show a relatively limited overlap between economic security and arms exports. Only one question out of sixteen mentions ‘defence production’, and that is in the context of governance mechanisms needed to respond to national security threats, not arms exports.

 

 

International partnerships: 

 

  1. The key issue with international security co-operation agreements relating to arms exports is if these agreements are executed in line with the UK’s international legal obligations. Any discussion on economic security should be secondary in cases where such agreements are in breach of foundational international legal obligations such as the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and the Arms Trade Treaty. The most urgent example is the F-35 programme.

 

F-35 programme

 

  1. The F-35 is an advanced stealth fighter aircraft produced primarily by Lockheed Martin in the US. It is the most expensive military programme in history. The US is the lead producer and other partner countries to the programme include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK. Around 20 countries use the F-35, including all the above – and Israel.

 

  1. The UK is the only ‘Tier 1’ country partner with 15% of the value of every F-35 made in the UK, led by primary contractor BAE Systems. Described by their lead manufacturer Lockheed Martin as “the most lethal fighter jet in the world”, every Israeli F-35 fighter jet depends on parts, including spare parts for maintenance, from the partner countries listed above.

 

  1. In addition to the jets Israel already has, Israel’s Defense Ministry signed a new deal with the United States in June 2024 to procure a further 25, which would bring the total to 75 when all remaining jets are delivered. The new order is set to begin to be delivered starting in 2028.

 

  1. Governments from a number of F-35 partner countries – namely Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK – have restricted some arms exports to Israel due to the risk of these weapons being used by Israel to commit violations of international law in Gaza. In September 2024, the UK government found that it was “unable to conclude anything other than” that for certain UK arms exports to Israel, including F-35 jets, there is a clear risk that they might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law in Gaza. Alarmingly, despite these irrefutable admissions, there has been a concerted effort to sustain the transfer of components to the F-35 programme, allowing for ongoing direct and indirect transfer to Israel.

 

  1. These jets have been operating in Gaza armed with munitions, including 2,000 lb bombs – explosives with a lethal radius up to 365 m, an area the equivalent of 58 football pitches. In June 2024, a UN report identified these bombs as having been used in “emblematic” cases of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on Gaza that “led to high numbers of civilian fatalities and widespread destruction of civilian objects”.

 

  1. A number of incoherent positions have been put forward by F-35 partner countries allowing for the continued export of F-35 parts and components to Israel, including stating that arms licences to Israel have been suspended while allowing transfers under existing licences or supplying “indirectly” via the US or other F-35 partners. The UK has argued that for reasons of international peace and security it has disregarded its own arms export licensing criteria and international legal obligations to continue exporting components to the F-35 programme, allowing for onward transfer to Israel, claiming that it is a “matter of such gravity that it would have overridden any […] further evidence of serious breaches of IHL”. Effectively, there are no circumstances in which this supply of F-35 components would be suspended.

 

Legal obligations

  1. All partners to the F-35 programme are States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), with the exception of the United States, which is a signatory. State Parties to the ATT are required to prevent both direct and indirect transfers of military equipment and technology, including parts and components, where there is an overriding risk that such equipment and technology could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law.

 

  1. These and other binding obligations are contained within Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT. States are also bound by the obligation to ensure respect for IHL under Common Article 1 to the Geneva Convention and customary IHL, which requires states “to refrain from transferring weapons if there is an expectation, based on facts or knowledge of past patterns, that such weapons would be used to violate the Conventions”. Additionally, all F-35 partners have ratified or acceded to the Genocide Convention, and have committed to “prevent and punish” the crime of genocide.

 

  1. These obligations are reinforced by pronouncements of the ICJ, including where the Court reminded States Parties to the Genocide Convention of their international obligations regarding the transfer of arms to parties to an armed conflict, to avoid the risk that such arms might be used to violate the Convention in April 2024 (para 24). In July 2024, the ICJ clarified that states must not aid or assist Israel in its unlawful occupation of occupied Palestinian territory, including through economic or trade dealings.

 

  1. The F-35 exemption is unprecedented. No other government has admitted that there is a clear risk that UK arms exports might be used to commit serious violations of IHL, and continued to allow UK parts for export. The Government is continuing to supply UK made parts to Israel's F-35s, including for repair and maintenance via the global F-35 programme.

 

  1. The rationale put forward by Government in relation to the F-35 programme argues that the UK cannot implement any export controls for any end user of F-35s due to the programme's structure. As such the Government is effectively admitting that it is not able to implement its own domestic and international legal obligations for UK made arms and components where they are part of an international security cooperation agreement. 

 

Conclusion

 

  1. The UK Government should immediately suspend all arms transfers to Israel, directly and indirectly, including F-35 fighter jets, components, and spare parts thereof. We urge the Sub-Committee to investigate and report on the risks associated with such international security cooperation agreements, in the context of arms exports, particularly as it appears that the current position from Government is that it is not possible to bring any such programme in line with its legal obligation for any end user of UK made arms or arms components where there is a co-production agreement.

 

April 2025