Written evidence submitted by Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)(BSE0124)

IPPR is an independent charity working towards a fairer, greener, and more prosperous society. Working across the UK, IPPR, IPPR North, and IPPR Scotland, and through our pioneering participative research, we are deeply connected to the people of our nations and regions, and the issues our communities face. We have helped shape national conversations and progressive policy change for more than 30 years.

Summary of evidence:              

The public remains pro-climate action and the energy transition is widely supported. Whilst issue salience has fallen on climate, the UK public remains concerned about climate change and are ‘green-supporting’, and this cuts across demographics. However, net zero scepticism is being driven hard by right-wing populists and parts of the media, and this has had some (though limited) cut through.

Identifying and mobilising trusted messengers and building feelings of agency and autonomy can be an effective antidote to a deficit in trust in politics and policy makers. Localised messages are particularly powerful. Issue salience builds policy support and salience can be raised by repeating the messages that resonate, attuned to people’s core values, such as concern for future generations, fairness, civic-mindedness, compassion and national pride. 

Public opinion on climate change is complex, with individuals differing on: belief and concern, issue salience, and support for government action – with the third where there is most variation and risk. Support for the transition overall could be derailed here.

Some people are concerned about how the energy transition will affect their finances. This needs to be tackled by a combination of a strong communication strategy and policies that minimise disruption, reduce points of friction, and ensure those with lower incomes are supported to maximise the potential benefits to household finances.

1. Has the Government properly explained the potential benefits of the energy transition to the average citizen?

1.1            Benefits from the transition range from global to national to household. The energy transition reduces emissions; it increases energy independence; it has the potential to reduce household costs. The term “energy transition” may need unpacking for some audiences, but the general principle that there is a need to shift away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy sources is well understood. People are particularly motivated by climate impacts and concern for future generations. Energy security is also a priority.

1.2            Generally, people see renewable energy as cheaper and more secure. A poll in April 2024 (Climate Barometer, 2024) found 57 per cent of the public thought renewable energy was better for the country’s energy security, with only 17 per cent giving the answer “Don’t know” and 16 per cent choosing coal, oil and gas as more secure. 42 per cent thought renewables were “cheaper”, with 25 per cent unsure; 33 per cent either thought that coal, oil and gas were cheaper or they were the same. Coal, oil and gas were, however, seen as “more reliable” by 40 per cent, in contrast to the 25 per cent who picked renewables. Reliability of renewable energy sources is an area where public confidence needs to be built. A significant number of people also believe that the transition to renewable energy will have a negative impact on the cost of living (Climate Outreach, 2024).

1.3            This public understanding of the benefits of the transition translates into support for government action. Climate Outreach have found that people are more supportive than not of “their local authority giving permission to new local solar or wind projects” (average score of 6.5 out of 10; where 0 means feeling very negative about the policy and 10 means feeling very positive about the policy) and “the UK government committing to spending billions of pounds on expanding renewable energy” (average score of 6.1 out of 10) (Climate Outreach, 2024).

1.4            Renewable energy infrastructure is popular among the public, including when it is built locally. Despite media prominence, concerns about energy infrastructure are in the minority. As Climate Barometer have found, majorities of the public across political lines show support for building new pylons carrying renewable energy in their local area. Even Reform UK voters, who are more likely to differ from the mainstream on climate issues, show high levels of support compared to opposition. 73 per cent of Labour voters say they have “total support” for “new pylons and power lines for carrying renewable energy…being built in your area”. This is in contrast to the 17 per cent of Labour MPs who thought their constituents would support this (Climate Barometer, 2024).

1.5            Our deliberative research with members of the public, for example through the Environmental Justice Commission, consistently finds that people wish they knew more about the climate crisis and its impacts and would like to know more about what the government is doing about it (see: Fairness and opportunity: A people-powered plan for the green transition | IPPR). There’s an opportunity for government to say more about how a transition to renewable energy plays a part in tackling this crisis.

2. Is there a clear understanding of the costs of the energy transition to householders and businesses?

2.1            It is a challenge to maintain a clear public understanding of the costs of the transition when there is concerted misinformation on this.

2.2            IPPR’s research engaging citizens through focus groups and deliberative events, and through commissioned polling, finds that the public are concerned about upfront costs for new technologies.

2.3            For example, IPPR’s research with Persuasion UK on the public’s views on the transition to electric vehicles found that electric vehicles are increasingly seen as ‘for normal people’ and that instinctively people are positive towards electric vehicles, underpinned by the desire to do the right thing for the planet and their children’s future. However they have highly pragmatic and practical concerns about upfront costs and charging (IPPR, 2025).

2.4            Climate Outreach find that a majority of people push back on the idea of ‘expecting everyone to pay for new low-carbon technologies themselves’ (Climate Outreach, 2024).

3. Is there a need for public campaigns to counter the anti net zero narrative?

3.1            The anti-net zero narrative is a fringe narrative that has had limited cut through. However, it is being amplified in some parts of the press with a significant number of UK newspaper editorials opposing climate action (Carbon Brief, 2024). The leader of the Conservative’s party’s vocal scepticism of the net zero target is out of step with mainstream opinion, but there has been a drop in support for government action on climate amongst right-leaning voters. 61 per cent of Conservative voters and 78 per cent of Reform voters think that the transition to renewable energy will make the cost of living worse, in contrast to only 23 per cent of Labour voters (Climate Barometer, 2024).

3.2            The anti-net zero narrative is a populist narrative. It is a presentation of net-zero policies as unfair, undemocratic, and acting against the interests of ordinary people. Decarbonisation is painted as a top-down policy that drives up people's bills and alters lives and livelihoods, where people are asked to do things differently but don’t feel brought along or empowered. Specific net zero policies are at risk of being weaponized, and used as a wedge issue that then adds ballast to broader anti-net zero campaigns. This needs to be tackled in a range of ways:

3.3            The design and delivery of fair and effective policy: net zero policies must design out higher costs for those who can’t afford them, limit disruption, and ensure positive social and economic benefits, such as warmer homes, affordable travel, and new employment opportunities. Communicating about these policies is fundamental, but the policies themselves also need to be done well.

3.4            Recognise that the UK public is ‘green-supporting’: Messages should recognise people’s commitment to action on climate for the sake of future generations and desire to increase energy security now. For example, IPPR and Persuasion UK’s recent public opinion research on electric vehicles found these were the most resonant pro-EV messages (IPPR, 2025).

3.5           Trusted messengers: Capitalise on high trust where it can be found. There needs to be a plethora of voices on the key issues, reinforcing common narratives through slightly different frames that will speak to different audiences. For EVs, for example, the best messengers are consumer voices and working class messengers who have embraced EVs (IPPR, 2025).

3.6            Build agency and autonomy and focus on local, tangible progress: Ordinary citizens can feel that the climate crisis is too big, overwhelming, remote and hard to tackle. These feelings can be challenged by messages that show what can be achieved, and by building opportunities for people to experience positive changes for themselves. Support can be built by showing what can be done, using relatable stories from people’s everyday experiences and local examples of progress.

4. How should the Government be more positively engaging the public with this goal? 

4.1            A permanent Citizens’ Panel. The last five years have seen an upsurge in the use of deliberative methods such as citizens’ juries in the context of climate policy and governance in the UK. This reflects growing appreciation of the importance of effective public engagement to achieve net zero emissions in a time frame that keeps the Paris Agreement alive.

4.2            Climate juries can help policymakers understand which policies work best for people at a practical level and which have greatest public acceptability. They can give policymakers increased confidence and build trust in decision-making institutions. The insights of everyday people can make climate policy more robust; it can challenge embedded inequalities; help break political deadlocks; increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of social action on climate, and promote a more climate-aware and politically-confident citizenry.

4.3            In the UK, these processes have generally been commissioned as one-off events that feed into policy formulation in an advisory capacity. In many cases, however, there has been no clear process to ensure meaningful contribution towards government policy, due to a lack of integration into governance processes and a failure to achieve a clear mandate from commissioners. There has also been a fairly low impact on wide public discourse in the UK, in contrast to the Irish and French national assemblies which provoked considerable public debate.

4.4            A permanent Citizens’ Panel could provide an effective mechanism for the public to engage with parliament and government on how to meet net zero goals. It would be a strong signal of intention around citizen engagement, and provide ballast to a government setting out to provide international leadership on climate action.

4.5            The Climate Change Committee, who act as independent advisers on the Climate Change Act, have also made clear that they see the need for greater involvement of the public. A Citizens’ Panel could work alongside the CCC to a) provide input into the annual scrutiny of the Climate Change Act, b) advise on priorities for public engagement in the year ahead, and c) provide detailed input to specific policy challenges.

April 2025