Written evidence from Kawtar Najib, University of Liverpool [GIS0033]
I am a French geographer at the University of Liverpool (since 2022), and my area of expertise focuses on Islamophobia and its spatialization. I can therefore discuss Islamophobia at various spatial scales from a broader global scale to a finer emotional scale; hence my interest in providing written evidence to this inquiry. I have also suffered from intense institutional Islamophobia mainly in the job market in France, and this is why I decided to live and work in the United Kingdom which is considered more respectful of the plurality of multicultural identities. However, since the anti-Muslim pogroms in August 2024, I no longer see this country as safe for Muslim populations and buildings.
2. British Islamophobia and its understanding
Although ‘Islamophobia’ is seen as a contested concept, it is widely used in many circles (academic, political, activist, etc.) to refer to anti-Muslim racism. Influential academic work has been conducted that historically contextualises Islamophobia and intellectually engages with racist (and sexualised) theories such as Orientalism, which describes how the West portrays Eastern cultures. Islamophobia is a form of racism that has enabled the racialization and Othering of Muslims as a unique group classified as ‘subaltern’ and ‘outsider’ to dominant institutions. Thus, Islamophobia goes beyond the meaning of anti-Muslim hatred which focuses solely on the individual scale of Islamophobia and not on its structural dimension. Denouncing attacks on Muslim individuals is not sufficient to truly combat all forms of Islamophobia and particularly institutional Islamophobia, which can affect Muslims in their lives, work, freedom, opportunities, social progression, political weight, and so on. Islamophobia is therefore structurally grounded in systems of domination and can occur in places supposedly opposed to all forms of oppression, such as in the police, health services, the judicial system and education. While this type of structural racism may involve our employers and funders, it must also be denounced in a way that goes beyond merely condemning individualized Islamophobia committed by random perpetrators on the street.
That said, the individual aspect of Islamophobia is very important in the British context, as anti-Muslim incidents are mainly verbal aggressions in public areas and on public transport, thus describing a more public-attitude issue involving zones of contact and encounter. Public streets are potential sites of constant tension, where violent Islamophobia can erupt at any time. This is what we witnessed last summer with a very worrying form of Islamophobia coming from far-right groups, with individuals targeting and attacking mosques and Muslims as well as other racialized people on the streets of several UK cities. My work on the geographies of Islamophobia has shown that Islamophobia can be observed everywhere even if it manifests itself differently depending on its location. In various countries, anti-Muslim racism is always imbued with national historical narratives. In the UK specifically, these narratives usually portray Muslim men as savage and dangerous to young white girls, despite statistics demonstrating the opposite. Drawing on Islamophobic misinformation linking such negative representations to the Southport atrocities, a British-style Islamophobia was therefore able to emerge in the public sphere. It resulted in unprecedented violence in the form of Islamophobic pogroms that have revealed not only the presence of very dangerous hate groups, but also institutional dysfunctions that must be addressed.
3. Spaces of gendered Islamophobia
Women are the main victims of Islamophobia, while the perpetrators of Islamophobic acts are predominantly white men. Consequently, the gendered dimension of Islamophobia in the UK emerges as a matter of male domination and control in public spaces. Indeed, we know that public spaces are primarily understood and constructed as 'masculine spaces' where women are more frequently exposed to verbal and physical attacks. As a consequence, they conduct their daily lives while managing not only their interactions with others but also their perception of potential Islamophobic risk. For veiled Muslim women in particular, this notion of risk is compounded by their gender, race and religion, especially with the hijab representing a highly visible marker of Muslimness. That said, other markers exist, such as a name, skin colour, a religious practice (like praying, fasting, halal diet, etc.) or a political stance defending the Muslim identity. This means that even non-veiled Muslim women can also be victims of Islamophobia (as can men and children).
Gendered Islamophobic violence can be observed at all spatial scales. For example, on a global scale, negative representations of Islam and Muslims particularly portray Muslim women as oppressed, passive and in need of salvation from the West. Such narratives highlight their ‘vulnerability’ and fuel anti-Muslim attacks against them. At the national level, Muslim women are primarily targeted for their dress. Their body and outfit are at the centre of attention, and although no law governs the wearing of religious clothing in the UK, veiled Muslim women are still affected by national symbolisms of freedom and democracy that exclude them from 'Britishness' and feminism just because of their appearance.
On the urban level, Islamophobia is linked to visible markers of Muslimness which can lead to greater concerns and even moral panics fuelling anti-Muslim rejection of the hijab, the full-face veil, mosques, street prayers, halal shops and restaurants, etc. In London for example, anti-Muslim acts occur both in inner and outer London, but the mapping of Islamophobia traces a worrying line from Newham to Hounslow where Islamophobia appears more prevalent, targeting not only Islamic buildings but also Muslim women mainly around major shopping and tourist areas with good transport links. The urban pattern of Islamophobia in London seems to highlight major roads and transit zones, including multiple bus stops or Tube stations as well as busy streets with a high level of pedestrian activity. Therefore, as soon as there is a form of commuting and mobility (especially to reach the influential centre), then the risk of discrimination and aggression increases.
At the neighbourhood level, victims of Islamophobia notice specific areas where they feel unwelcome and unsafe. Their ability to move safely within certain parts of the city is affected, revealing complex mapping systems of where they feel they can safely go and can bond within supportive communities. The spatial mobility of veiled Muslim women is therefore severely limited, as they must constantly negotiate the boundaries of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. In London, they tend to avoid non-diverse areas, especially predominantly White areas, as they feel less comfortable there. They also avoid areas with many bars and pubs and prefer going to well-known big chains rather than an unfamiliar restaurant or café.
In the end, Islamophobia is first felt and experienced in women’s bodies and minds, and this is why they develop behavioural strategies in response to anti-Muslim reactions. Veiled Muslim women adopt strategies of invisibility by trying to conceal their religious identity. For example, they try to be as discreet as possible in their workplace. They are also careful about how they dress in public areas, preferring to wear a hat over their hijab and avoiding traditional dresses (such as abayas) especially on public transport. They may also mainly use their car to avert potentially life-threatening violence on the bus or the metro. They are often accompanied by a relative or a friend and avoid going out for several days immediately after a terrorist attack or any important geopolitical event. They also explain that they no longer pay attention to acts considered "minor," such as nasty looks, comments, sighs, or whispers. Such a normalisation of Islamophobia has also led them to perform strategies of normalcy to show that they are ‘normal’ and well-integrated citizens.
4. Pushing Muslim women to the margins
The exclusion of veiled Muslim women can lead to a collective damaged and biased sense of belonging in certain areas. Depending on their own circumstances of discrimination, victims feel safer at the finer scales, challenging their other sense of belonging to larger entities. These feelings can push them towards more familiar spaces such as their residential neighbourhood which represents a more inclusive and secure space for them. Since the majority of them live in marginal and enclaved spaces, they are therefore pushed to the margins and hidden from mainstream society. Worse yet, some even are pushed to stay at home as often as possible. The problem is that the home space can also be a space where a more intimate Islamophobia manifests itself, involving certain family members who use their influence to impose their anti-Muslim views. This is particularly the case with families of Muslim converts who do not tolerate this conversion, but also with certain Muslim families who can have differing interpretations of Islam. Here, we clearly see how worldwide Islamophobia (spread by the media and political discourse) has even managed to penetrate Muslim homes. Although Islamophobia is a pervasive phenomenon sparing no space or place, Muslim populations are willing to be included into society because it is impossible to live in a world where people do not cross paths. Everyone has the right to be a full member of British society, and the spatial exclusion of these veiled Muslim women calls into question their right to exist, to appear, to dress, to move, to the city, to centrality and to dignity – a right that should be incontestable in a democratic and multicultural society.
5. The importance of protecting British Muslims
Islamophobia is both individual and structural and can manifest itself in verbal and physical attacks, damage to buildings, Islamophobic literature, institutional discrimination, demonstrations and marches, hate speech and intimidation. Muslims in Britain need robust protection against an Islamophobic industry (estimated to be worth several hundred million dollars). Funding (primarily from pro-Zionist sources) is provided to far-right groups and political organisations to promote anti-Muslim narratives through mainstream media. Muslims therefore need a firm response from their own government, especially because all the tools exist in the UK to ensure such a protection and to adopt a legal definition of Islamophobia that recognises the racialization of the Muslim identity. In the same way that laws protect anti-Jewish and anti-Sikh racisms, Muslims also need laws against anti-Muslim racism. Islamophobia has become the new face of contemporary racism, but it is also the only acceptable form of racism today. To counter this and better understand that Islamophobia is as unacceptable as any other form of racism, the UK government should accept the APPG (All-Party Parliamentary Group) definition which explains that Islamophobia “is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.” This will also help to understand that power forces have served to racialize Muslims and present them as inferior groups. Processes exploiting such a categorisation are racist, and that is why this notion of racism needs to be mobilised to better monitor and impose sanctions on all forms of Islamophobia.
Faced with such an intense Islamophobic threat, Muslims in Britain also need increased economic, social and political support. Empowering spaces such as anti-racist and feminist associations and NGOs must receive more funding to promote the inclusion of Muslim voices in British politics and society. Stronger engagement with academics and policymakers is necessary to improve public understanding of Islamophobia and combat far-right Islamophobic groups. Thus, the UK government needs to show Muslims that individual and structural Islamophobia is taken seriously by also exposing and reviewing any government practices and policies (such as Prevent) that have intensified the stigmatisation of Muslims. If government officials present themselves as anti-racists, feminist and in favour of greater social justice, then they must show that they want to promote a sense of justice that includes all kinds of knowledge, even those that denounce the comfortable laissez-faire and silence of many people who have high responsibility within institutions.
6. The dangerousness of British Islamophobia after Gaza
Islamophobia projects a reality from the global scale to the local scale, thus impacting the everyday lives of Muslims living in a specific context. The ongoing genocide of Palestinians affects Muslims all around the world, as the dehumanisation of Palestinians echoes the dehumanisation of Muslims. Such a genocidal context can only reinforce intense physical violence against local Muslims, particularly in Britain where Islamophobia is primarily a matter of attacks taking place in public spaces. Indeed, we know that Islamophobic acts have tripled since 7 October 2023 and that anti-Muslim pogroms took place in the summer of 2024 after ten months of genocidal attacks against Gazans. British Muslims have been targeted to such an extent that many Muslim women have expressed on X (formerly Twitter) their refusal to leave their home to enjoy sunny days with their children in a public park, for example. So, what does this reveal about British society? Is it a violent society? Is it an unequal society? Is it a racist society? I am not sure about the situation of British society, but it is precisely anti-Muslim propaganda and racial-colonial logics that have allowed in 2024 the development of racist checkpoints in crossroads, the degradation of mosques and Islamophobic attacks on individuals.
Therefore, we all need to stand up against this public extreme violence by putting an end to the normalisation of stigmatising and dehumanising Muslims and racialized people. If we fail here, these processes could one day be legalised, as was the case with the Nazi pogroms against Jewish communities in 1930s Europe. In this current era of genocidal Islamophobia, the recent anti-Muslim pogroms on the UK streets are deeply alarming. That is why it is imperative to deconstruct this racist hierarchy and dismantle any groups that promote it. Finally, Islamophobia must be clearly criminalised and recognised as a racist criminal offense in order to concretely combat the institutional dysfunctions which leads to Muslims being unsafe on British soil (or even elsewhere). My French friends and I living in the UK are grateful to live in a country where we are free to display the distinctive markers of our Muslim identity and practice. However, we also need to feel safe and share multicultural values that can overcome murderous Islamophobic violence.
7. Conclusion
Islamophobia is a global problem that even affects non-Muslims in the UK (e.g., Romanian Christian populations in Hull, Brown and Black refugees and asylum seekers in UK hostels, Sikh men wearing turbans, Christian Arabs, etc.). Therefore, the fight against Islamophobia is part of a broader anti-racist struggle that will require not only localised resistance in mosques, neighbourhoods or town halls, but also globalised resistance against all forms of racism and sexism. The significant mobilisation of anti-racist movements in the UK was crucial in ending the 2024 anti-Muslim pogroms, with impressive local initiatives such as human chains protecting mosques and refugee centres or post-riots clean-up efforts. Here, we can see that there is already a powerful collective solidarity, and the UK government also needs to make its valuable contribution.
8. References
This written evidence is based on various sources (academic, governmental, activist, etc.) which can be provided if necessary.
April 2025