Written evidence from Miss Lila Tamea, Tutor and Researcher at Liverpool John Moores University [GIS0023]

Author Biography & Introduction

My name is Lila Tamea, a British Yemeni Muslim woman based in the north of the UK. I am a PhD researcher and educator whose work explores the role and manifestations of Islamophobia in education, as well as its impact on Muslim students. Throughout my career, I have been an advocate for racial and religious equity in education, holding representative and advisory roles within my university as well as the university regulator, the Office for Students. I also advise and mentor young people at university, equipping them with the knowledge and confidence to recognise, challenge, and address racism and Islamophobia, while empowering them to understand their rights when navigating discrimination related to their race or faith.

Islamophobia - both lived and institutional - is a reality I have continually confronted, not only through personal experience but also in my research. In this submission, I draw upon personal accounts, critical reflections, and academic scholarship to examine the structural and institutional dimensions of Islamophobia. In particular, I focus on the growing anti-Muslim discourse proliferating in online, political and media sphere, especially in relation to Palestine advocacy and Muslim politial agency. I also highlight the role of misinformation campaigns and far-right conspiracy theories—such as the moral panic surrounding so-called "Muslim grooming gangs" and the "Great Replacement" theory—that contribute to the vilification and racialisation of Muslim communities, reinforcing harmful stereotypes and justifying discriminatory policies.

I welcome the opportunity to respond to this Call for Evidence and submit the following comments for your consideration.

Table of Contents

Author Biography & Introduction

Islamophobia: A personal account

What is Islamophobia and why does it exist?

Why are women more likely to be the victim of Islamophobia and what common forms does it take?

Intersectionality

What impact does Islamophobia have on women and girls, their communities and wider society?  

Are there any steps, including legislative, that the Government should take to help address Islamophobia? 

1) Countering Online Islamophobia

2) Islamophobia in Politics and the Media:

3) Accountability

What can schools, sports clubs and other community groups, trade unions, places of worship and workplaces do to help tackle Islamophobia and to support Muslim women and girls?

1) Education

2) Sustained Funding for Community-led Initiatives:

3) Muslim Women’s Safety & Self-defence Classes

4) Inclusive Health and Sports Initiatives:

6) Accessible funding for Mosque Security:

Conclusion

Islamophobia: A personal account

As a 27-year-old Arab Hijabi Muslim woman who grew up in a small northern town, it might come as a surprise that, for most of my life, I had not been faced with direct islamophobia. Once upon a time, for me, islamophobia was reserved to the unsettling and uncomfortable stares in the days and weeks following ‘Islamist’ terror attacks, which invoked a heightened sense of paranoia, fear and anxiety navigating public life.

I distinctly remember the days following the Manchester Arena bombing. I was on my way to university when a man, standing opposite me on an escalator, hurled the words "dirty Muslim" at me as he passed. This moment, though brief, left a lasting impact on me, highlighting the deep-seated prejudices that could surface in the wake of such tragedies.

Since 9/11 and the onset of the so-called "Global War on Terror", media and political representations of Muslims have become inextricably linked to notions of terror, violence and suspicion. Over time, the stereotype has taken root that only Muslims are capable of committing such acts, so much so that when a racialised man commits a violent crime, the immediate assumption is often that he is Muslim. This distorted narrative was starkly visible during the riots of August 2024, when the horrific stabbing on young girls found the perpetrator immediately labelled a Muslim—without any evidence to support this claim. Despite this, the targeting of mosques across the country unfolded.

In that period, I found myself coordinating responses to these attacks, particularly when rumours began of what might have been a violent protest outside the Abdullah Quilliam Mosque. What became evident during the protests was that they were no longer about the incident itself, but rather about confronting and perpetuating the conspiracies surrounding Islam and Muslims - an opportunity to openly manifest their hatred. In the days that followed, Muslims, and anyone perceived as Muslim, were subjected to verbal and physical attacks on the streets. Muslim women around me reported heightened fear, paranoia, and anxiety, with one woman even describing a sense of being "on lockdown" because she was too scared to leave the house.

For some, these feelings were dismissed as overly dramatic or imagined. At least until one evening when I was on a train home, and a group of elderly men subjected me to a vicious Islamophobic rant, joking about how they wanted to kill all Muslims - me included. When his tone began to get more serious, I discreetly took my phone out to record, and posted it on X[1], where I was then only subject to more horrible abuse, accused of being an agitator - a perpetrator and deserving of such abuse - rather than the victim.

That month, I featured in a short documentary with The Guardian[2] to share my experiences as a visibly Muslim woman in riots-inflicted Britain. Before it was published, that footage managed to make its way to the outro as a chilling affirmation of the very realities we had exposed throughout the 10-minute film, validating the fear, paranoia, and hypervigilance that defined our daily navigation of public space as Muslim women. Our phones became more than just devices; they were our shields, our evidence, and our only means of accountability in a reality where, if an incident was not recorded, it was easily denied.

In the period following the riots, the Muslim Women’s Network reported that more than three-quarters of Muslim women expressed concerns for their safety, compared to 16% before the riots. Nearly one in five reported encountering hostility in the aftermath[3], with a staggering 92% of Muslims feeling less safe following that period[4]. We know that such experiences are only the tip of the iceberg, with islamophobia most times going unreported.

As a community, I believe have become both resilient and desensitised to such experiences, and I welcome this committee’s focus on exploring the role and impact of such an issue. Before we can fully address the issue of gendered Islamophobia though, we must first ask: what is Islamophobia and why does exist in the first place?

What is Islamophobia and why does it exist?

Islamophobia, while often subject to contentious debate, is an undeniable and increasingly pervasive phenomenon. Many of its proponents, however, continue to deny its existence, rationalising it through intellectual discourse that serves to perpetuate its normalisation. This denial is not incidental; rather, it contributes significantly to the persistence of Islamophobia in contemporary society. Although defining Islamophobia could constitute the majority of this response, in order to address the committee’s questions more directly, I will present a concise yet comprehensive foreground of the subject, which will inform the subsequent discussion:

• As articulated by the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims[5], “Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness”. This definition encapsulates the racialised nature of Islamophobia, illustrating how Muslims, despite originating from diverse ethnic backgrounds, are frequently perceived as homogenous. Notably, White British women who convert to Islam and adopt the veil are often no longer recognised as ‘white’, subjected to racist remarks, and frequently told “go back to where you came from” despite being native to Britain.
• Islamophobia is systemic, institutional and interpersonal, operating “form above and below”[6]. In What Is Islamophobia?, Massoumi et al. (2017)[7] identify five key movements that actively contribute to the spread and entrenchment of Islamophobia:

1) The institutions and machinery of the state: This includes the formal policies and practices that institutionalise Islamophobia, often under the guise of national security, counter-terrorism, or integration efforts.

2) The far-right/counter-jihad movement: The likes of groups such as English Defence League who engage in anti-Muslim conspiracy theories and unsubstantiated divisive rhetoric

3) The neo-conservative movement: Neo-conservatives contribute to Islamophobic discourse, particularly in relation to foreign policy and cultural integration [ie, Policy Exchange, Henry Jackson Society].

4) Elements of the Zionist movement: Certain factions within the pro-Israel / Zionist movement perpetuate narratives that vilify Muslims as inherently violent and barbaric, often to justify and excuse occupation, apartheid and violence against the Palestinians of whom Muslims make up the majority. It is no surprise that many anti-Muslim figures are simultaneously avid defenders of Israel, even whilst it stands accused of genocide in the world’s highest courts. Aked describes there is an undeniable overlap between Zionism and Islamophobia[8].

5) Segments of the ‘left,’ including the pro-war left, secularists, and feminists: Islamophobia is not confined to the far-right or neoconservatives but is also embedded within more intellectually oriented, ‘progressive’ discourses, often justified and shaded by secularism, ‘freedom’ and feminism.

• Alimahomed-Wilson[9] proposed the Matrix of Gendered islamophobia where she argued that gendered islamophobia operates in 4 domains: structural (institutional islamophobia through media and politics, labour, legal systems), hegemonic (concerning culture and ideology: feminism and stereotypes of women as weak and oppressed), disciplinary (via state surveillance, counter terrorism and suppression of political dissent) and interpersonal (everyday experiences of anti-Muslim violence which Muslim women are more likely to be subject of)

• Islamophobia is a political, military, economic, social and ideological process rooted in colonialism and imperialism[10][11], and which produces and relies on misrepresentations of Islam and Muslims to achieve its ambitions

• This framework demonstrates that Islamophobia is not solely the product of extremist groups but is a broader, more globalised and coordinated, and intellectually legitimised phenomenon. Its intellectualisation serves to dehumanise Muslims, thereby justifying and perpetuating the violence and discrimination they experience on both a local and global scale.
• The politics of recognition - or non-recognition and misrecognition - is often cited as a crucial factor of why Muslims are subject to such fear and hatred[12]. Today, according to a 2022 report by the University of Birmingham, Muslims are the second most disliked group in Britain. [13]
• The media play a significant role in fanning the flames of Islamophobia: Writing on the rise of Muslim conspiracy theories in the media, Faisal Hanif wrote ‘islamophobia is a significant pillar in the Fox-ification of British television, one that is given a free pass’[14]. Such narratives are so normalised and prolific that I say in jest sometimes that if I was non-Muslim, and the only interaction I had of Muslims and Islam was the media, perhaps I, too, would be Islamophobic.

Examining islamophobia through these paradigms captures the diversity of the project of islamophobia, where unsurprisingly women - as visible flagbearers of Islam bear the brunt of it.

I will now address the committees’ specific questions.

Why are women more likely to be the victim of Islamophobia and what common forms does it take?

It will be nothing new to hear that Muslim women are often described as the flagbearers of Islam. Whilst not all women choose to veil, the Hijab is commonly understood as a mandatory part of our faith. Unlike Muslim men, who unfamiliar to some, too have Islamic dress codes, theirs allow them to navigate society without presenting their face on the forefront of everyday day.

Because of this, Muslim women – namely those who veil - are not able to conceal their faith, forcing them into a responsibility which can be both a ‘beacon and burden’, as one respondent to my research put, of representing our faith.

This penalty affects us navigating our everyday lives, through interactions on the train, in the shop, through to our experiences in education and institutions. This was captured by a recent Al Jazeera documentary exploring the lives of 5 Muslim women in England which investigated their lived experiences of islamophobia[15] and its impact in education, work and day to day life.

• In education, Muslim women who veil face islamophobia in the form of bullying or comments from other students, but also from their teachers. Some of this is direct, but it is often in the form of microaggressions and biases.
• At work, Muslim women who veil are less likely to be afforded opportunities, facing a ‘triple or quadruple jeopardy’, where some employers discriminate based on Hijab[16]. This is highlighted in the aforementioned documentary where one journalised described how her interviewer was transparent about rejecting her for her hijab.
• In leadership and politics, Muslims as a whole, and Muslim women in particular are vulnerable to harassment and abuse they would not have faced otherwise, faced with suspicion and accused of representing foreign interest. My own research on sabbatical officer experiences show how Muslim women are constantly asked to justify and explain themselves and when they run for elected roles, sometimes even asked to compromise their faith[17].
• In healthcare, pregnancy and childbirth, Muslim women are less likely to be afforded the proper care and support they need by doctors and nurses. According to a Muslim Women’s Network (2022) report, Muslim women from racialised minority communities were:
• 1.6 times more likely to have their labour induced
• 1.5 times less likely to be given an epidural for pain relief
• 1.4 times more likely to have an instrumental birth
• 2.4 times more likely to have postpartum haemorrhage
• 2.1 times more likely to be in prolonged labour
• 1.3 times more likely to have an emergency caesarean[18]
• Even within the health and fitness in industry, Muslim women struggle to find appropriate and faith friendly services to be able to exercise comfortably, leading to disparities in health and wellness. A 2023 report on Muslim women in sport found[19]:
• 97% of British Muslim women surveyed wanted to increase their current participation in sports
• 43% of Muslim women do not think current sports facilities are appropriate to them.
• 33% say previous experiences have negatively impacted their participation in sport.

The Why

As highlighted in my conceptualisation of islamophobia, unlike - in most cases - other forms of xenophobia, islamophobia is a normalised phenomenon, acceptable currency[20], which Seyda Warsi famously said in 2011 ‘passed the dinner table test’. As she put 13 years later, in 2025, Muslim lives simply do not matter[21]. Scholars commonly attribute increasing negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims to political and media narratives: when Muslims are permanently demonised in the media and politics, sensationalised and vilified, is it no surprise that we see later an eruption of hate crime against them?

A case study of which can be the 335%+ rise of islamophobia since October 7, as reported by TellMama[22], and the continued rise following the horrific Southport stabbings.

In the context of Palestine, government leaders frequently label and vilify pro-Palestine activists as ‘Islamists’ and extremists, with peaceful protests as ‘hate marches’. This has been parroted by both the mainstream media and large social media influencers.

Online islamophobia

Perhaps a more developing manifestation of islamophobia is its uncontrolled and unfettered proliferation in the online space, which is contributing to a dangerous climate of islamophobia as a lived reality. Media Matters for America recently found that one of the explanatory factors for much of the discourse we see today are due to right wing narrative dominance[23], which can be seen to constantly frame and position Islam and Muslims as a threat to civilisation, reinforcing conspiracies of a ‘Muslim takeover’ and the notion of the Replacement Theory, fanning the flames of islamophobia. It is no surprise that the key actors who push divisive rhetoric against Muslims are also those who are stark defenders of Israel and its war crimes against the people in Gaza[24],[25],[26],[27],[28]. This unrivalled media anti-Palestinian, anti-Muslim narrative dominance impacts Muslims day to day, at home, as I have found in my research, where many pro-Palestine Muslims on campus have been subject to physical and verbal abuse. In a Freedom of Information Request on 136 universities, I have found a similar 350% rise of islamophobia since 2023/2024, with reports of Muslim women at one London university having urine sprayed in their face.

A New York Times article in November 2023 revealed how antisemitic and Islamophobic hate speech proliferated since October 7[29]. Only the former has been subject to government response [albeit much of what has been positioned as antisemitism is instead antizionism], whilst the latter is ignored or rejected and denied.

As an X user, since Musk’s takeover, I have noticed the increasingly divisive nature of the platform. Today, whenever I express sympathy or support for Palestine, I find a barrage of Islamophobic abuse. Just this month, one tweet had 23 replies, with most of which negative, some invoking Islamophobic tropes: ‘you have a headdress because your husband will beat you’[30], ‘in the Muslim world, female opinions don’t matter, know your role’[31].

Intersectionality

Question: In what ways does gendered Islamophobia have an intersectional dimension? Are some women more likely than others to be subject to this abuse and prejudice and if so, why? 

Gendered Islamophobia has a clear intersectional dimension, shaped by various factors such as race, gender, class, dress, and religious characteristics. These factors intersect to define how individuals experience Islamophobia, with the severity and frequency of abuse often depending on how outwardly religious a person appears, particularly in terms of their dress and adherence to Islamic norms.

This discussion primarily relates to the hijab and niqab, but even these descriptions do not fully capture the complexity of the issue. For example, a person who wears the hijab but adheres to Western modes of dress, such as a blazer or suit, is more likely to be accepted by society. However, a hijabi or niqabi who embraces more modest forms of clothing, such as the abaya or baggy dresses, is more likely to encounter challenges and discrimination.

A recent paper examining attitudes towards the "turbanisation" of the hijab connects the negotiation of Muslim dress to a "politics of respectability", where Muslim women modify or obscure their religious identity in an attempt to gain respect and acceptance within modern society[32]. This adjustment, however, often means not adhering to the traditional or "proper" form of the hijab, thus compromising our religion. The effort to present a more palatable version of Islam fits within the Islamophobic narrative of the "moderate Muslim," which demands that Muslims present themselves in a way that is more easily accepted by mainstream society.

The demand for “palatability” is not limited to dress but extends to ideas and politics. While there may not be any empirical research on this yet, I theorise that there is a higher presence of Islamophobia in the political and leadership spaces. Muslim women who are unapologetic about their faith and Muslim identity, especially those who engage in political advocacy, are more likely to face challenges and penalties than non-Muslims. One such example of this is the way hijabi Muslim women who express support for Palestine are often subjected to greater discipline and penalty, whereas a non-Muslim expressing the same view may not face the same consequences.

The case of Shaima Dallali’s appointment to the National Union of Students I 2022 exemplifies this. As a Black Muslim hijabi and longtime advocate for Palestine, she was immediately framed as a threat, where even just the idea of her election triggered a large-scale smear campaign, false accusations, and weaponised antisemitism, ultimately leading to her unjust dismissal. She was later vindicated but only after her horrible public ordeal.[33]

I might argue though that dress and visibility remains a more significant factor. This can be seen in the example of Sir Mufti Patel, who has been subjected to a barrage of abuse, suspicion, and criticism, mostly because of his outward appearance and role as a leader in the Muslim community. Despite his political stance not aligning with far-right accusations of being a "hardline Muslim", he is still perceived as extreme due to the way he dresses and his role as a leader for Muslims. This clearly illustrates the lack of acceptability of any form of Islam or Muslim representation in public life, which Muslim women are more vulnerable to.

This phenomenon aligns with what Islamophobia scholars conceptualise as the 'disciplining of Muslimness’ wherein Islamophobia operates as a mechanism to regulate, contain, and render Islam invisible within everyday life. My research on Muslim students also further evidences how Islamophobia is structurally embedded, manifesting through disproportionate scrutiny, double standards, and a climate of surveillance which lowers the threshold for Muslims to be penalised, where they are easily subject to investigation based on baseless complaints.

What impact does Islamophobia have on women and girls, their communities and wider society?  

As Ruth Gilmore aptly stated, racism is an exposure and vulnerability to premature death[34], where we see how structural Islamophobia limits access to opportunities and quality of life, ultimately affecting one’s life chances.

The impacts of Islamophobia are multidimensional - physical, mental, economic, and spiritual. Physically, it exposes individuals to the risk of verbal or physical violence. Mentally, it isolates them, fostering a sense of unbelonging and internalised stigma. As a Muslim woman, I am all too accustomed with anxieties and paranoia navigating public life, and this baggage no doubt can impact wellbeing over time. Economically, it creates barriers to education, employment, and opportunities, reducing access to pathways for advancement. Spiritually, it forces individuals to make painful compromises, such as altering their religious practices or removing their hijab for safety - choices Muslim women should not have to make.

Are there any steps, including legislative, that the Government should take to help address Islamophobia? 

There are three areas I urge government to address:

1) Countering Online Islamophobia

The rise of online Islamophobia, particularly on X (formerly Twitter), is a pressing concern that must be effectively addressed. Digital platforms serve as amplifiers of anti-Muslim rhetoric, often emboldening individuals and groups to engage in offline violence. Research has demonstrated a direct correlation between online hate speech and real-world hate crimes, highlighting the urgent need for government intervention to regulate and counteract harmful digital discourse. This includes enforcing stricter content moderation policies, holding platforms accountable for the spread of Islamophobic content, and ensuring transparency in algorithmic amplification that may disproportionately target marginalised groups.

2) Countering Islamophobia in Politics and the Media:

Muslim organisations have long called on the government to consider an independent Leveson-style enquiry into media coverage of Islam and Muslims. A Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM) report finds that GB News disproportionately focuses on Muslims, mentioning them over 17,000 times - almost 50% of all mentions on UK news channels[35]. Covering October 2022 - September 2024, the report highlights GB News' role in amplifying anti-Muslim narratives, often framing Muslims as a threat, echoing far-right conspiracy theories, and downplaying Islamophobic hate crimes. Despite its 14 recorded Ofcom breaches, none have addressed the channel’s Islamophobic content, raising concerns about regulatory bias.

3) Accountability

Furthermore, greater accountability is needed for political leaders who amplify anti-Muslim sentiment and scapegoat Muslim communities and refugees. We have recently witnessed heightened conspiracies relating to ‘Muslim grooming gangs’ which politicians and media have engaged with, with dangerous sensationalised narratives going unchecked. These false or exaggerated reports contribute to increased discrimination, social division, and direct acts of Islamophobic violence. It is essential that regulatory bodies enforce ethical journalism standards, hold political figures accountable for inflammatory rhetoric, and challenge misinformation that exacerbates anti-Muslim sentiment in public discourse.

What can schools, sports clubs and other community groups, trade unions, places of worship and workplaces do to help tackle Islamophobia and to support Muslim women and girls?

Due to the systemic barriers and injustices faced by Muslims have faced, there is a deep-rooted mistrust surrounding institutional initiatives, particularly relating to the conditions of funding and individuals leading them. As a result, any efforts to support Muslim women and girls must be led by grassroots individuals and organisations with strong ties to local communities, such as mosques and women’s groups and networks. Without such, there may be hesitancy to engage in such initiatives. These are some initiatives I propose:

1) Education: Schools must ensure that PSHE and citizenship classes comprehensively address racism, Islamophobia, as well as other forms of discrimination. An equitable and historically informed curriculum is essential in challenging stereotypes. Outside of mainstream education, grassroots level programmes aimed at empowering Muslims should be funded to develop soft skills such as political, advocacy and legal training etc. to enhance their consciousness and awareness of the tools they can use to recognise and call out islamophobia, as well as protect themselves.

2) Sustained Funding for Community-led Initiatives: Community organisations[36] actively tackling Islamophobia and providing support services must receive adequate and long-term funding to continue their work in advocacy, support services, and legal assistance for victims of discrimination and hate crime.

3) Muslim Women’s Safety & Self-defence Classes: given the rising prominence of islamophobia, mosques and community groups should receive funding to deliver safety and self-defence classes, particularly for women.

4) Inclusive Health and Sports Initiatives: funding directed to campaigns inviting gym providers to develop Muslim-friendly sports initiatives (such as women’s only lots) can improve participation for Muslim women and girls.

6) Accessible funding for Mosque Security: mosques faced direct and violent targeting over the riots in the summer. Many mosque leaders I met spoke of the inaccessibility of funding to help secure their community places of worship, so a more accessible, less bureaucratic process is needed to ensure they are protected from future targeting and attacks.

Conclusion

Islamophobia, and by extension, gendered Islamophobia, is a deeply complex and multifaceted phenomenon, affecting all aspects of our lives. As such, this submission may not have been able to fully address all the questions in the depth they warrant. I trust the committee will consider this piece of evidence, and I am more than willing to engage in further discussions to elaborate on this important issue.

April 2025