Written evidence submitted by Andrea Knapp (UKU0001)

Call for Evidence: The UK at the United Nations Security Council

About the author

Andrea Knapp is a PhD Candidate at the University of Bologna (Italy) and will be a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Potsdam (Germany) starting September 2025.

In my work, I focus on the role of individual states in determining the outcomes of decision-making processes at the UNSC. Between 2023 and 2025, I interviewed 75 diplomats from over 50 different delegations that have served the Council since the end of the Cold War on topics like penholding, influence and agency. In addition, I have recently published the United Nations Security Council Resolution Authors (UNSCRA) dataset in the academic and peer-reviewed Journal of Peace Research (https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251315634). This dataset identifies all sponsors (since 1990) and lead negotiators (since 2008) for 2,179 drafts at the UNSC.

These combined insights inform the evidence on the UK at the UNSC. I intend to submit this evidence as an individual and do not request confidentiality.

Background information on the evidence

This evidence engages with the following questions:

1. How effectively has the UK used its position as a Penholder at the UN to push for an end to conflict? In which cases has the UK not used this position sufficiently enough? 
2. How fair is the system of allocating Penholder-ship at the UN? Does the UK have tangible leverage and influence to bring about positive outcomes in countries for which it is a Penholder?
3. Is the idea of a Penholder at the UNSC symbolic and performative? In what cases has this mechanism resulted in change for the territory in question? 

In this evidence, I prefer the notion of “lead negotiators” to the one of “penholders”. Not all country situations have penholders (e.g., Middle East peace process), but the UK could technically draft resolutions also on these agenda items. In addition, many cross-sectional thematic files have never seen a stable penholding distribution. The lead negotiator notion is supported by the related academic literature.

Evidence: The UK at the UNSC

Quantitative drafting trend

This section presents a longitudinal and cross-sectional overview of the UK’s engagement at the UNSC based on the UNSCRA dataset. For the statistical evaluation, all tabled drafts since 2008 are considered (i.e., even if they are later vetoed or not adopted because they did not reach the necessary votes). Only resolutions with known lead are included.

Key insights:

1. Significant drafting leadership: The UK has demonstrated substantial influence on several files at the UNSC. Since 2008, the UK has drafted 181 drafts as the sole lead. It includes Bosnia-Herzegovina (3), Colombia (12), Cyprus (19), Eritrea-Somalia (6), Iraq (15), Israel-Palestine (1), Lake Chad Basin (1), Libya (37), Myanmar (1), Nepal (7), Sierra Leone (4), Somalia (48), Sudan (14), Yemen (18) and Zimbabwe (1). This adds up to three thematic resolutions (e.g., on conflict prevention).
2. Focus on strategic regional interests: The UK’s drafting history reveals a strategic concentration on regions of historical, colonial and geopolitical interest.
3. Comparable Western influence: The engagement by the UK matches the two other Western states of the permanent five (P5) Council members: France has drafted 115 resolutions and the United States 187.
4. Increasing engagement over time: The number of drafts composed by the UK has increased over time (from 8 in 2008 to 18 in 2023). In 2023, 28.12% of all drafts with a known lead negotiator are UK-led. It indicates the expanding role in Council affairs over time.
5. Selected collaboration patterns: In addition, the UK has also cooperated with other states in writing 44 drafts. The dominant partners are the United States and France (16 drafts), but cooperation with states from the Western Europe and Others Group (12 drafts) is common. Contrarily, the UK has co-drafted only 5 resolutions with Asian delegations (Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon and United Arab Emirates), 5 with African delegations (Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Tunisia) and 4 with East European delegations (with Albania and Poland). Engagement with China and the Russian Federation is also almost non-existent in the drafting (5 drafts all on Cyprus), but this can be partially explained by the latter’s passive attitude to drafting altogether.

Influence of the penholder on the drafting

In a working paper that is currently under review in the academic peer-reviewed Journal of Conflict resolution, I demonstrate using statistical tools that being a lead negotiator is not only a symbolic role but carries significant strategic advantages. Policy preferences of the drafters are frequently implemented in the final resolutions, although the text is subsequently negotiated with the other Council members.

Key insights from the interviews:

1. First-mover benefit: Early involvement in drafting provides a critical agenda-setting power that allows the lead negotiators to frame issues, establish initial language and embed national interests from the outset of the negotiation process.
2. Strategic control mechanism: Composing drafts allows states to maintain strategic control over the development of files on the agenda. The UK only delegates the lead negotiator role to the elected members if it lacks direct interest in an issue (e.g., piracy in the Gulf of Guinea) or when power politics among the P5 risk deadlocking the Council from decision-making (e.g., the Syria humanitarian file). In files of primary interest, the UK seeks to draft all texts.
3. Process management benefits: Lead negotiators shape more than just the content of the draft resolutions. They also influence the negotiation tone, maintain privileged access to UN bureaucrats and strategically affect the timing of submission.

Other states’ perception of UK leads

Several respondents have criticized or contested the UK’s lead on the agenda items.

Key insights from the interviews:

1. Contestation of drafting monopoly: While the dominance of the Western powers of the P5 is publicly rationalized through claims of superiority in institutional knowledge and institutional capacity, the elected members (E10) have increasingly challenged this monopoly to advocate for their direct involvement in the drafting. The have expressed dissatisfaction with the UK’s negotiation style and the current power distribution.
2. Exclusionary consultation practices: A Latin American delegation that chaired a subsidiary sanctions committee on a file penned by the UK revealed serious procedural shortcomings, with the UK failing to consult key stakeholders and imposing time frames that disadvantaged the elected members by adequate preventing consultation with their capitals.
3. Strategic use of penholding: Both France and the UK are accused of strategically using their penholding positions as mechanisms to maintain control over the UN to compensate for their waning international influence. The two delegations are believed to project their power disproportionate to their contemporary geopolitical standing, leveraging the drafting process to preserve their international relevance at the world stage. This criticism is important in light of increasing calls for UNSC reform, where a drafting monopoly can create dissatisfaction by the elected members and risks bloc-building that renders the organization less efficient.
4. Rigid negotiation stance: Multiple diplomatic sources indicated that UK-drafted texts exhibit a concerning inflexibility, where states not involved in the drafting have almost no possibility to apport later changes. It suggests a procedural approach that undermines the collaborative intent of Security Council deliberations.
5. Pressure on the elected members: Elected members reported that the UK exercised pressure in their respective capitals, directing their votes in support of drafts proposed by the British delegation. This has been described as a form of “bully diplomacy” by some elected members. Similar patterns are also reported for France and the United States.
6. Perceived US dependency: The UK’s efficiency as an independent lead is undermined by what multiple delegates characterize as an excessive dependency on the United States. This calls into question its ability to serve as a drafting power.
7. EU-UK relations: Further clarification is warranted on the interaction between the UK and its partners from the European Union after Brexit.
8. Accountability through pressure: As demonstrated in the Yemen file, the elected members have found that applying direct pressure tactics (“Either you do it or we do it”) can successfully force the UK to fulfil its responsibilities as the lead negotiator. It indicates systematic issues with accountability in the penholder system, suggesting that the UK does not carry out its role in line with the expectations from the wider UN membership.
9. China-UK relations: The UK has been found to not table draft against China’s interests (e.g., on Myanmar) even when it was the lead negotiator of the file. This Chinese accommodation due to a “veto threat” has been heavily criticized.

Key recommendations

Improving consultation practices

1. Establish more inclusive consultation protocols to ensure that relevant stakeholders (e.g., subsidiary committee chairs, host nations but also regional neighbours) are consulted early in the drafting.
2. Circulate all the resolution drafts with sufficient advance notice (i.e., minimum 24 hours as requested by UN procedures) to allow the elected members adequate time for consultations with their respective capitals.
3. Establish regular dialogues with regional organizations for files where the UK serves as the lead negotiator. Regional buy-in for drafts is essential for mandate success, even if the draft is eventually submitted only under the UK’s name.
4. Maintain and share records of which states were consulted during the drafting to enhance accountability with other UN members.

Strategic approach to lead negotiator role

1. Focus on lead negotiator roles only on situations where the UK has genuine expertise and influence rather than maintaining legacy files based on colonial relationships. The existence of colonial ties undermines the legitimacy of drafts.
2. Develop more distinct positions from the United States on key files to address perceptions of dependency and enhance the UK’s diplomatic credibility.
3. Pro-actively seek co-penholding arrangements with the elected members, particularly from the Global South. Such power-sharing not only increases the legitimacy of the drafts, but also allows the UK to benefit from its partner’s capacities (e.g., local knowledge).
4. Establish clear internal guidelines for when to initiate new drafts on files where the UK is the lead, preventing the accountability gaps highlighted in the Yemen case. In addition, propose drafts also when they are likely to fail (e.g., Myanmar) as a chance to express the UK’s public viewpoint on the conflict. If pressure for action is executed by the elected members that force the UK “to do something”, it has a negative effect on its reputation in the UN system.
5. Better use specialized UK diplomatic or technical expertise in areas of comparable advantage to justify lead negotiator positions.

Procedural flexibility and responsiveness

1. Demonstrate a greater receptivity to substantive amendments from elected members during the negotiations. When elected members are approached for their input, language should not be set in stone.
2. Create a formal procedure to track and respond to input from other delegations, documenting how suggestions are considered. Helping other delegations understand why their input was not includes in the resolution can lead to positive feedback and learning mechanisms.
3. Host drafting workshops for complex resolutions where interested delegations can contribute more directly to the text development.

Capacity building and knowledge sharing

1. Offer drafting support and mentorship to interested elected members to build broader Council drafting capacity. As a matter of legitimacy, it is beneficial for the UK if not only the P5 draft resolutions. Increased agency by the elected members must be actively fostered.
2. Systematically share institutional knowledge about files with incoming Council members.
3. Share specialized UK expertise and research on relevant files with Council members to foster more informed deliberations.

22nd March 2025