International Rescue Committee UK – Response to call for evidence on the FCDO's approach to displaced people

About the International Rescue Committee

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) responds to the world's worst humanitarian crises, including the conflict in Ukraine and the crisis in Gaza. We help to restore health, safety, education, economic wellbeing and power to people devastated by conflict and disaster. And we are proud to fight for a world where women and girls have an equal chance to succeed.

IRC is one of the leading providers of services for refugees, asylees and asylum seekers, victims of trafficking and other vulnerable immigrants. We facilitate resettlement and integration in host countries and work internationally to support communities at risk by delivering vital humanitarian and development assistance. 

The IRC is active in over 40 countries delivering vital humanitarian support. This response has been informed by IRC’s direct programmatic experience and policy expertise.

Overview

1.      123 million people are forcibly displaced worldwide, up from 65 million in 2015. At the same time, instability and scarcity continue to grow, with 256 million people experiencing crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (IPC 3+), up from 105 million in 2016. Increasing conflict, indiscriminate violence against civilians, and less support for poverty alleviation are among the key drivers of instability identified in IRC’s 2025 Emergency Watchlist. These trends all point to a world that is severely out of balance, in which conflict and displacement will increase drastically.

2.      Amid this challenging context, international development and humanitarian aid face an unprecedented crisis. The withdrawal of the United States’ humanitarian and development funding and the virtual closure of USAID have resulted in an enormous funding deficit that has left people and communities around the world in immense difficulty. The recently announced reduction of UK Official Development Spending (ODA) to 0.3% of gross national income further imperils the global aid system and the UK’s leading role delivering vital interventions to support communities around the world. This submission will outline how the UK can lead critical reforms of its own development spending, as well as multilateral development spending, to maintain value for money of ODA with a reduced budget in an increasingly unstable world.

3.      As a major donor of international humanitarian and development aid and champion of the multilateral development system,[1] the UK is in a unique position to take the lead in advancing sorely needed reforms to both tackling the root causes of displacement and supporting displaced communities. While the vacuum left by the USAID cuts is unlikely to be filled financially – especially in the context of the UK’s own ODA cuts – the UK can promote reforms to the ways in which existing aid and development financing are used to make up some of the deficit.

Summary of Recommendations

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)

Safeguard vital humanitarian funding and practice

• Ringfence its contributions to the 21st replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, a vital lifeline for communities vulnerable to fragility, conflict and violence.
• Maintain multi-year flexible grants for aid operations in fragile and conflict-affected states where needs are greatest and risks to global stability the highest.
• Prioritise principled and needs-based delivery through interventions that are evidence-based, cost-efficient and reach communities in the hardest to reach areas including displaced communities that may otherwise be left behind.
• Continue grant-based funding for basic services and transitional development interventions such as resilience building in fragile and conflict-affected states which is key to reducing humanitarian needs, strengthen the systems that provide vital services for host and displaced communities.
• Continue to support social inclusion policy reforms in countries hosting high numbers of refugees, or those impacted by displacement that support access to education, livelihoods, and jobs for communities affected by displacement.
• Increase the amount and proportion of funding allocated to refugee-led and women-led organisations, and lead calls for the World Bank to increase partnerships with such organisations.
• Coordinate with other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions to maximise the use of resources, avoid duplication of efforts and prioritise interventions that address the needs of displaced communities.

Lead reform of multilateral donors

• Continue to champion World Bank reforms to better support fragile and conflict-affected states, which will be critical in addressing the fundamental drivers of displacement. This should include:
• Continue to call on the World Bank to systematise partnerships with NGOs and CSOs in FCV countries to ensure continuity of service delivery even in the most complex settings and ensure that marginalised communities are not left behind.
• Further refine IDA’s political risk mapping tools to assess and predict where Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV), including unconstitutional transfers of power, could interrupt IDA funding for basic services. Qualitative triggers for the potential disruption of budget support should be set out and appropriate alternative delivery mechanisms established — including temporary NGO or UN partnerships — to enable where necessary the continuation of critical service delivery in sectors, such as healthcare, education and GBV prevention and response.

Wider UK Government (e.g. Home Office)

Reduce spending on in-donor refugee costs

• Significantly reduce current ODA spend on in-country refugee costs to free up scarce resources and reallocate these funds toward supporting FCAS states, which are most prone to displacement.
• Set a firm cap on ODA spending for domestic asylum and refugee costs and develop alternative funding sources for these expenses and develop a clear roadmap for reducing the use of ODA on in-donor refugee costs.

Reform the refugee and asylum system

• Safe routes should form part of the UK’s response to forced displacement, to create more order in the protection system, and to demonstrate global cooperation and leadership. This can be done through:
• A robust and efficient resettlement programme that offers a lifeline to the most vulnerable.
• An expanded family reunion policy that allows refugees to reunite with a wider range of family members, keeping families together and facilitating smoother integration.
• The implementation of a Refugee Visa scheme, providing a safe route for asylum seekers to reach the UK without risking their lives on dangerous journeys.

Response to specific terms of reference

What assessment has been made of Government efforts to tackle the drivers of displacement?

4.      The current drivers of displacement include conflict, violence, human rights violation, persecution, as well as climate related factors. Through its development and diplomatic strengths, the UK has been able to provide critical support for major crises such as the war in Sudan and provide hundreds of millions of dollars in relief to displaced Rohingya people in Bangladesh. The previous government also made important efforts to galvanise action on displacement at the multilateral level, highlighting the need for support for displaced communities in Bangladesh and Sudan, for example

5.      More recently, the Government’s significant contribution to the 21st replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA21) was highly welcome, as was the Government’s decision to double aid to Sudan in November 2024. Crises and instability can rarely be effectively tackled unilaterally, and it is essential to ensure the UK does not diminish its role in multilateral development work. The role of multilateral development spending in addressing displacement was directly acknowledged in the government’s announcement of its contribution.

6.      As such, it is critical that the UK’s contributions to IDA from 2027 onwards are protecting from the reductions in ODA spending. The Government should ringfence its contributions to the 21st replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, a vital lifeline for communities vulnerable to fragility, conflict and violence.

7.      The UK can do much more to champion the strengthening of multilateral development banks such as the World Bank to better support states experiencing fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) and, by extent, build community resilience and minimise displacement. As one of the World Bank’s largest contributors and shareholders, the UK has significant influence within the Bank and should use this influence to push for reforms that will better serve countries and communities experiencing fragility, conflict, and violence. Championing such reforms will be vital in improving the UK’s efforts to support communities at risk of displacement.

Where could the Government better focus its attention and ODA to prevent the drivers of displacement, including conflict and destabilisation?

8.      The UK can use its role as a leading bilateral donor and champion of the multilateral development finance system to spearhead much-needed reforms that will lead to greater support for communities affected by fragility, conflict, and violence.

9.      Extreme poverty is increasingly concentrated in crisis-affected communities facing a combination of constrained governments, protracted conflict and climate vulnerability. By 2030, 60% of people living in extreme poverty will be in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence. As well as this, 77% of people displaced were in countries identified in IRC’s 2025 Emergency Watchlist, further evidencing the concentration of crises within specific contexts, which require much greater assistance. To properly address this challenge – and with it, minimise the causes of displacement – reform within the World Bank is needed.

10.  As a champion of the multilateral development system, the UK has a key role to play in driving further reforms and efficiency of IDA. IDA is one of the few lifelines available to conflict-affected least-developed countries (LDCs) and is increasingly called on to fill the gap left by other development and climate funds. But IDA investments are lagging due to low-risk thresholds and a delivery model that prioritises working with governments, which means they cannot always reach marginalised populations.

11.  IRC’s assessment of the World Bank’s performance — including via IDA — in these crises identified disruptions in programmes linked to an overreliance on stretched or absent governments for delivery, insecurity and the rise of de facto authorities as barriers to effectively reaching marginalised communities. These gaps in IDA’s approach risk leaving millions behind, in danger of slipping deeper into poverty, hunger and instability – key drivers of displacement.

12.  There are still ways in which the effectiveness of multilateral development work and support for communities most at risk of displacement can be strengthened. The FCDO can help to drive this change.

13.  To do this, the Government should champion World Bank reform to better support fragile and conflict-affected states, which will be critical in addressing the fundamental drivers of displacement:

• Continue to call on the World Bank to systematise partnerships with NGOs and CSOs in FCV countries to ensure continuity of service delivery even in the most complex settings and ensure that marginalised communities are not left behind.
• Further refine IDA’s political risk mapping tools to assess and predict where Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV), including unconstitutional transfers of power, could interrupt IDA funding for basic services. Qualitative triggers for the potential disruption of budget support should be set out and appropriate alternative delivery mechanisms established — including temporary NGO or UN partnerships — to enable where necessary the continuation of critical service delivery in sectors, such as healthcare, education and GBV prevention and response.

14.  As a bilateral donor, the UK should better focus its attention and ODA in countries that face conflict, climate crises and with high levels of extreme poverty. To address the drivers of displacement, including conflict, the UK should:

• Maintain multi-year flexible grants for aid operations in fragile and conflict-affected states where needs are greatest and risks to global stability the highest.
• Prioritise principled and needs-based delivery through interventions that are evidence-based, cost-efficient and reach communities in the hardest to reach areas including displaced communities that may otherwise be left behind.
• Continue grant-based funding for basic services and transitional development interventions such as resilience building in FCAS which is key to reducing humanitarian needs, strengthen the systems that provide vital services for host and displaced communities.
• Continue to support social inclusion policy reforms in countries hosting high numbers of refugees, or those impacted by displacement that support access to education, livelihoods, and jobs for communities affected by displacement.

What is the role of local and civil society organisations in supporting displaced people? How could the FCDO better support these organisations?

15.  Local civil society organisations are critical to the effective delivery of humanitarian and development projects. Local organisations have established community relationships, access, knowledge and expertise to offer on the needs of a population. Strengthening partnerships with local and community-based organisations with deep connections into affected populations is key to identifying communities that may be left behind and to designing and implementing conflict-sensitive and context-appropriate programming. This should include increasing formal project delivery partnerships, consultative processes, and the level of funding provided.

16.  Providing greater long-term, flexible funding and resource is the most effective way for the FCDO to support organisations working with displaced people. Supporting refugee-led and women-led organisations is key, as these organisations have the strongest expertise and first-hand experience needed to provide effective support to displaced people and communities.

17.  As well as this, effective partnerships with civil society organisations can help donors like the UK and institutions like the World Bank remain active in contexts where national governments can no longer be worked with – for example, during coups or other spikes in insecurity. By working with NGOs that include women- or refugee-led organisations, the FCDO and the World Bank can ensure that project design is informed by the views of communities, particularly those most marginalised, even in the most challenging settings.

18.  The FCDO should increase the amount and proportion of funding allocated to refugee-led and women-led organisations, and lead calls for the World Bank to increase partnerships with such organisations.

What role can the FCDO play in facilitating the return home of displaced people?

19.  The international legal principle of non-refoulement should be the first consideration in the FCDO’s approach to returning displaced people. It is vital that any returns are done so on a wholly voluntary basis, and that no displaced people are returned to countries or locations where there is the risk of harm. Given that voluntary returns should be the bedrock of any returns policy, the FCDO’s role is best placed in ensuring that as much as possible is done to bring stability and relief to countries experiencing fragility, conflict, and violence.

20.  It is encouraging to see the FCDO reaffirm its commitment to voluntary repatriation and the principle of non-refoulement in its response to this inquiry. The FCDO should ensure to advocate for this approach across Whitehall departments and between other governments, amid strong anti-refugee and anti-migrant sentiment in public, political, and media discourse.

To what extent are the international laws regarding the treatment of refugees fit for purpose?

21.  As a drafter and signatory to the Refugee Convention, the UK has a strong tradition of offering refuge to those fleeing persecution and conflict. It has stood in solidarity with refugees and crisis-affected communities globally for decades. However, recent years have brought about challenges in living up to this tradition. The UK itself has, under previous governments, challenged, questioned, and even contravened the Refugee Convention. The current government can rectify this by championing international law relating to refugees and implementing an ambitious, compassionate new system for asylum seekers and refugees.

22.  In the face of national governments implicitly and explicitly challenging the relevance and practicality of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the IRC believes the core rights and obligations laid out in the Convention are more important than ever, and seeks to create and support new solutions to meet challenges in implementation. 

23.  We welcome the FCDO’s acknowledgement that the Refugee Convention “is as valid today as ever before”. The Refugee Convention continues to define fundamental legal protections which can mean the difference between safety and forcible return to life-threatening situations. Instead of replacing the Convention, leaders should work together to increase global cooperation on effective, resourced, and orderly implementation. Hard conversations about the status quo and failures of existing structures ought to be welcomed. 

24.  Under these responsibilities, the UK should work to expand the protection it offers to displaced people.

To what extent does ODA spent on housing displaced people within the UK represent value for money?

25.  As the Committee will be aware, in-donor refugee costs in 2023 amounted to £4.3 billion (£4,273 million), a staggering 28% of total UK ODA, which has raised concerns around value for taxpayers’ money and alignment of this spending with the UK’s development objectives. Worryingly, in 2023, wealthy donors on average spent almost as much on aid for hosting refugees domestically (USD 32.5 billion) as on bilateral aid targeting Low-Income Countries (USD 36 billion).

26.  Spending such a large proportion of the overall ODA budget within the UK does not represent value for money for the UK’s ODA spend. It is less effective and less ethical than spending the money on directly supporting communities at risk of displacement. As the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) says, use of ODA in this way has “wrought havoc on the UK’s development work overseas”. For example, the scale of in-donor refugee costs in 2022 required the FCDO to pause all ‘non-essential’ ODA funding for four months, severely impacting the UK’s development effectiveness.

27.  It does not support advancing the Government’s various foreign policy priorities, such as modernising international development, developing strong partnerships with the Global South, and leading an overall ‘reconnecting’ of Britain to world affairs.

28.  In an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, the UK should significantly reduce current ODA spend on in-country refugee costs to free up scarce resources and reallocate these funds toward supporting FCAS states, which are most prone to displacement. The government should set a firm cap on ODA spending for domestic asylum and refugee costs and develop alternative funding sources for these expenses and develop a clear roadmap for reducing the use of ODA on in-donor refugee costs. 

29.  Third-country resettlement is an established durable solution by which the UK would accommodate a number of refugees who have already completed the refugee status determination process in another country. Evidence from IRC’s decades of experience as a resettlement and integration agency demonstrates that a holistic resettlement process, including the delivery of quality integration support drives self-reliance, benefitting both refugees and their new communities. Data from other countries has shown that safe routes can offer orderly alternatives to irregular journeys.

30.  Strikingly, in the US, the percentage of nationals from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela (CHNV) crossing the border irregularly dropped from 95% to 22% in just two years following the introduction of a safe route for them, known as CHNV Parole. The Department for Homeland Security also reported that the CHNV Parole programme, combined with CBP One – an app for applicants to submit information remotely – resulted in a 98% decrease in border encounters with Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan and Venezuelan nationals.

31.  An expanded formal resettlement programme would allow the UK to meet its responsibilities around international protection while providing greater integration, reducing the need for asylum seekers to undertake ‘small boat crossings’, and lessening the need for the government to fund protracted hotel stays once they arrive.  

32.  Safe routes should form part of the response to forced displacement, to create more order in the protection system, and to demonstrate global cooperation and leadership. This can be done through:

• A robust and efficient resettlement programme that offers a lifeline to the most vulnerable.
• An expanded family reunion policy that allows refugees to reunite with a wider range of family members, keeping families together and facilitating smoother integration.
• The implementation of a Refugee Visa scheme, providing a safe route for asylum seekers to reach the UK without risking their lives on dangerous journeys.

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