Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the UK’s Sanctions Strategy

Written evidence submitted by the APPG on Arbitrary Detention and Hostage Affairs[1]

1.      The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Arbitrary Detention and Hostage Affairs (‘the APPG’) was established in 2024 to address the growing phenomenon of arbitrary detention and hostage-taking as geopolitical tools. The APPG has conducted hearings into three high-profile cases involving British nationals arbitrarily detained abroad as part of an ongoing ad-hoc inquiry into the arbitrary detention of British citizens by foreign nations: Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, Ryan Cornelius in the UAE, and Alaa Abd El-Fattah in Egypt. These hearings have highlighted critical deficiencies in the UK’s sanctions strategy in relation to combatting the practice of hostage diplomacy, and in the level of scrutiny available into the sanctions regime as Parliamentarians call for the adoption of sanctions which goes unheeded.

2.      The UK adopted the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations in 2020, which allows the UK to target individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations and corruption worldwide. Despite having this sanctions framework, the UK has not provided for a clear and consistent approach to the designation of sanctions specifically for arbitrary detention or hostage-taking. While the UK Sanctions Act is broad enough to cover this, the bases of designation for the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime are limited to respond to serious violations of an individual’s (a) right to life; (b) right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and (c) right to be free from slavery, not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour.[2]

3.      This stands in contrast to allies such as the United States, EU, Canada, and Australia, who have demonstrated greater willingness to leverage sanctions proactively to provide accountability. Given the frequency by which British nationals are being held arbitrarily and hostage abroad, the arbitrary detention alone should be sufficient to designate sanctions.

4.      For example, under the US Levinson Act, the President is able to designative individuals to be sanctioned if they are “responsible for or is complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the hostage-taking of a United States national abroad or the unlawful or wrongful detention of a United States national abroad.”[3] The direct legislation outlaying this, also allows further oversight to parliamentarians and citizens alike in which instances sanctions may be designated. The Levinson Act operates within a broader sanction framework aimed at addressing hostage-taking and arbitrary detention as matters of national security, including Executive Order (EO) 14078, signed by President Biden in July 2022.[4] EO 14078, drawing on the authority of the Levinson Act, strengthens the US government's ability to combat these threats through sanctions, by authorising the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to impose blocking sanctions on individuals responsible for or complicit in hostage-taking or arbitrary detention. Additionally, it grants the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to impose blocking sanctions on those who provide material support to hostage-takers or sanctioned individuals.

5.      The EU also explicitly includes arbitrary detentions within the scope of its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR). The sanctions framework, introduced in December 2020, enables the EU to impose sanctions on individuals, entities, and bodies, both state and non-state actors, who are responsible for, involved in, or associated with serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide.[5]

6.      In the three hearings, APPG Chairs and Members heard directly from families, legal representatives, former diplomats, and human rights experts on each case. Their testimonies reveal systemic weaknesses in the UK's approach to sanctions. More specifically, a lack of transparency, inconsistent application of criteria, prioritisation of economic interests over human rights considerations, and an absence of proactive parliamentary scrutiny.

Individual Cases

Jimmy Lai:

7.      Jimmy Lai, a 76-year-old British citizen and pro-democracy newspaper publisher, has been detained in Hong Kong since December 2020 under the National Security Law (NSL). Lai founded Apple Daily, Hong Kong's largest pro-democracy newspaper, which authorities forcibly closed in 2021. He faces multiple charges including "collusion with foreign forces" and "conspiracy to publish seditious material,” effectively criminalising routine journalistic activities and meetings with international figures. In September 2024, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) ruled Lai’s detention as arbitrary and in contravention of articles 2, 9, 14, 19, 21 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[6]

8.      On 13th November 2024, the APPG heard from Sebastien Lai, the son of Jimmy Lai, Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC, Head of Jimmy Lai’s International Legal Team, Lord Patten of Barnes, former Governor of Hong Kong, and Ambassador James Cunningham, former US Consul General to Hong Kong and Chairman of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong, about Jimmy Lai. The hearing on Lai’s case revealed significant deficiencies in the UK’s sanctions response in this case.

9.      Ambassador James Cunningham testified: “Senior officials from Hong Kong are under sanctions so they can’t travel to the United States. But they do travel here. They try to portray the situation in Hong Kong as one of normalcy. Calling those people out when they are travelling and visiting here – and raising an issue of Hong Kong and its repression - is extremely important.”[7]

10.  The UK has failed to impose sanctions on any Chinese or Hong Kong official or individual in connection with the persecution and arbitrary detention of Jimmy Lai, or broader actions connected to Hong Kong’s crackdown on media freedom.[8] This is despite clear evidence that the officials overseeing and perpetuating Lai’s trial and detention meet the criteria for the Global Human Rights (GHR) sanctions regime, a clear indication that the UK is underutilising its sanctions regimes.[9] In fact, the current Government has deepened relations with the Chinese Communist Party and has endorsed a new embassy for the PRC despite Lai’s trial resuming.

11.  The UK has also failed to leverage its economic and diplomatic influence to secure Jimmy Lai’s release. Unlike Australia, which successfully conditioned ongoing trade negotiations on the release of arbitrarily imprisoned Chinese-born Australian journalist Cheng Lei, the UK has not used similar strategies to progress in securing the release of Jimmy Lai. The UK has not taken appropriate action in these violation of Lai’s human rights, highlighting a lack of strategic coordination and willingness to apply meaningful pressure on the Chinese Government in defence of a British citizen arbitrarily detained abroad, despite consistent pressure from Parliament.[10] The application of targeted sanctions to provide accountability for his ongoing detention could effectively raise the cost against the perpetrators with a view to securing his release.

Ryan Cornelius:

12.  Ryan Cornelius, a 70-year-old British businessman, has been wrongly imprisoned in Dubai since 2008 following a false accusation of fraud linked to a corporate raid by Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB). Cornelius was developing a $500 million real estate project when DIB executives orchestrated his arrest on fabricated fraud charges. Despite completing his original 10-year sentence, Cornelius’s detention was unexpectedly extended by an additional 20 years in 2018 through the retroactive application of a UAE law. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) declared his detention unlawful in 2022, finding that his detention was in contravention of articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[11] The Working Group noted denial of legal representation, prolonged solitary confinement, failure to allow appeals, and evidence of judicial collusion with DIB to seize assets worth billions. Despite the UAE constitution stating that prisoners should be released at age 70, Cornelius remains in Al Awir Central Prison where he has contracted tuberculosis and suffers from high blood pressure.

13.  On 12th February 2025, the APPG held a hearing on Ryan Cornelius’s case with testimony from Chris Pagett, brother-in-law of Ryan Cornelius, Sir William Browder KCMG, a prominent campaigner for Ryan Cornelius, and Joey O’Shea, a researcher focused on Saudi Arabia and the UAE at Human Rights Watch.

14.  Sir Bill Browder testified: “The most meaningful thing we can do is to call for individual Magnitsky sanctions on the individuals who are responsible for Ryan’s hostage taking. Even if there is a small chance that sanctions will be imposed on the people responsible for Ryan’s hostage taking. This is not a judicial proceeding - this is hostage taking. Then, there is a small chance that the board of directors of the bank might think the benefits of keeping him hostage are not enough.”[12]

15.  Despite compelling evidence of corruption and human rights abuse over 17 years, the FCDO has failed to designate sanctions against UAE officials or board members of DIB who are responsible for the continued arbitrary detention of Ryan Cornelius. In 2022, an application for sanctions under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations and the Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations regimes was submitted by Ryan Cornelius’s legal team to the FCDO, supported by a group of cross-party MPs and peers.[13] The application has not received a response to date.

16.  In December 2024, another sanction application, documenting how DIB executives orchestrated Cornelius’s detention to seize his assets, was submitted to the FCDO, which also has not been followed by any response or meaningful action, despite meeting sanctions criteria.[14] On 13 March 2025, the APPG coordinated a joint letter of 40 parliamentarians again calling for the designation of sanctions in his case.

17.  The Ryan Cornelius case exposes critical weaknesses in the UK’s sanctions implementation. DIB executives implicated in his detention hold billions in UK property assets, including prime London real estate. However, the FCDO is reluctant to freeze these assets, reflecting the prioritisation of UAE-UK trade relations over individual justice.

18.  Whereas the US and EU use UN Working Group opinions as evidentiary bases for designating sanctions, the UK has demonstrated no meaningful action after the 2022 UN Working Group opinion and provided no public explanation for their inaction on sanctions implementation. This opacity acts as a wall to accountability.

19.  The FCDO has repeatedly cited that they cannot interfere with a foreign judicial process, as a justification for their inaction on the Cornelius case.[15] This reflects a misplaced reliance on the UAE’s “judicial process,” which prevents timely action. The FCDO’s stance of awaiting trial outcomes feeds into autocratic states’ tactics of prolonging detention until global attention fades. In such cases, the FCDO policy approach of relying on the integrity of judicial processes should not be applicable in non-rule-of-law compliant states like the UAE.

Alaa Abd El-Fattah:

20.  Alaa Abd El-Fattah, a prominent British Egyptian writer, democracy activist, and software developer, has been arbitrarily detained in Egypt since September 2019. Despite completing his five-year sentence for "spreading false news" for resharing a social media post about torture in September 2024, he remains imprisoned under Egypt's "rotation" tactic, in which new charges are added to indefinitely extend arbitrary detention, in a continued effort to silence dissent.[16] Abd El-Fattah gained British citizenship in 2021 through his British mother, but Egypt has refused to recognise this status or grant consular access.[17] During his detention, he has endured prolonged solitary confinement, medical neglect, and a 200-day hunger strike that nearly claimed his life during COP27.[18] In November 2023, an urgent submission was filed to the UNWGAD.[19] However, no response has been received yet.

21.  On 26th November, 2024, the APPG heard from Laila Souief, mother of Alaa Abd El-Fattah who is currently on a 160+ day hunger strike in protest of his ongoing detention, Omar Robert Hamilton, Alaa's cousin and campaigner, John Casson, former British Ambassador to Egypt, James Lynch, formerly British diplomat and Amnesty deputy director, currently Director of FairSquare, and Richard Ratcliffe, husband of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe about Alaa Abd El-Fattah and the UK response to his ongoing detention.

22.  The APPG hearing on Abd El-Fattah’s case revealed systemic failures in the UK Government’s approach. The FCDO has still not taken any action, including sanctions, against any Egyptian authorities responsible for Abd El-Fattah’s continued detention, even after he has completed his 5-year sentence.

23.  Despite the UK being Egypt’s largest foreign investor, with the UK-Egypt trade relationship valued at £4.7 billion annually, economic leverage remains unused even considering Egypt’s denial of consular access, a violation of international law.[20]

Systemic Deficiencies in the UK’s Sanctions Policy:

24.  The APPG hearings have identified several systemic weaknesses in the UK’s sanctions strategy that undermine its effectiveness in addressing arbitrary detention cases, undermining the credibility of the UK’s sanctions regime. These deficiencies extend beyond individual cases and reflect broader policy shortcomings that require urgent reform.

25.  The UK lacks transparent, publicly accessible criteria for sanctions designations under the GHR and GAC regimes. Even when cases clearly meet published criteria with credible evidence, the FCDO often fails to impose sanctions, and subsequently does not provide explanations of non-action. In the case of arbitrary detention, it is apparent that targeted sanctions are not consistently applied in instances of British citizens being arbitrarily detained or held hostage. This lack of transparency suggests that sanctions decisions are often instead influenced by political considerations. This inconsistency undermines the credibility of the UK sanctions framework and its intended deterrent effect.

26.  Economic interests consistently take precedence over human rights considerations in sanctions decision-making. The APPG hearings revealed a pattern of reluctance to impose sanctions in arbitrary detention cases involving countries with which the UK has close diplomatic or economic relationships, something particularly evident in the Ryan Cornelius, Jimmy Lai and Alaa Abd El-Fattah cases. The UK has significant economic leverage in these cases, but without the use of sanctions, countries will continue to engage in human rights violations and arbitrary detention, without any fear of impunity or sense of deterrence, as the legislation that was created for the purpose of deterrence, is repeatedly not being used in blatant cases of abuse.

27.  The UK’s sanctions approach is also predominantly reactive rather than proactive or preventative, as demonstrated in cases such as Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s or Vladimir Kara-Murzas,. In the case of Ryan Cornelius, if the FCDO did designate sanctions on the DIB executives responsible for his detention, it would come 17 years after his initial arbitrary imprisonment — this would show the British Government not to be using sanctions as a deterrent measure. This reactive approach defeats the true purpose of sanctions as a preventative deterrent, if the majority of abuse has already occurred, at the knowledge of the British Government.

28.  There is an absence in proactive parliamentary scrutiny or insight into sanctions designations. Leaving these decisions solely in the hands of the FCDO has led to inefficiencies and the underutilisation of the sanctions regime. Without parliamentary involvement in the sanctions process, the FCDO’s sole discretion has made UK sanctions policy more of a political act than an objective application of policy.  

Recommendations:

29.  The UK needs a systemic change in its approach to sanctions designation, sanctions criteria, and overall sanctions policy approach to reestablish the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations regime as being the effective human rights abuse deterrent it was established to be. This can be achieved with greater parliamentary oversight of the UK’s sanctions policy.

a)      The UK should create a separate, security-cleared cross-party committee in Parliament to be able to hold inquiries into and have statutory power to make recommendations for sanctions designations – perhaps a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee with standing invites to one representative from the Defence, Trade and International Development or alternatively the JCNSS.

b)     The FCDO should be required to respond within a designated amount of time to the committee’s sanctions recommendations, and provide formal explanations when sanctions are not imposed in high-profile cases that appear to meet published criteria. This enhanced transparency would ensure that diplomatic or economic considerations that override human rights concerns are subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

c)      Clear timelines should be established for the designation of sanctions, or a formal response by Government, following significant events such as rulings or opinions from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, denial of consular access to British nationals abroad, credible evidence of torture or mistreatment, or completion of judicial proceedings where due process violations occurred. Arbitrary detention should be explicitly recognised as sanctionable conduct under the Global Human Rights (GHR) regime.

18th March 2025