Submission by NGO members of the Tri-Sector Group to the International Development Committee Inquiry on humanitarian access and adherence to International Humanitarian Law

March 2025

Introduction

1. The Tri-Sector Group (TSG) for NGO operations in high-risk jurisdictions is a multi-stakeholder dialogue chaired by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Home Office and involving international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), financial institutions and government departments. It was established in 2017 following a recommendation by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Its objective is to create a safe space for open dialogue to consider how to reduce barriers to the work of NGOs while ensuring compliance with counter-terrorism legislation and domestic or international sanctions. This submission is made by the NGO members of the TSG: Bond, Christian Aid, Conciliation Resources, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Norwegian Refugee Council UK, Oxfam, Save the Children UK and Tearfund.
2. We welcome the opportunity to submit evidence to the International Development’s inquiry. Our submission covers the impact of sanctions and counterterrorism regulations on humanitarian access, progress in creating humanitarian ‘carve outs’ and remaining challenges. We also make recommendations across five areas:

• Policy coherence
• Scope of the exemptions
• Ownership and control
• Improved guidance
• Global coherence

Background: the regulations and humanitarian assistance

3. The impact of sanctions and counterterrorism regulations on humanitarian assistance depends on:

• who is subject to sanctions;
• the degree to which aid agencies need to interact with designated or proscribed entities;
• the nature of the sanctions;
• whether the regulations include a humanitarian exception or exemption[1]; and
• who and which activities are covered by the exception / exemption.

4. Some countries facing humanitarian crises are subject to substantial sanctions across government, business and economic sectors. These countries might also have proscribed terrorist groups active in their territory, or who might form part of a formal (if unrecognised) government, and with whom organisations might have to negotiate access. For example:

• Syria is subject to multiple forms of sanctions on government ministries, state institutions, banks, fuel and is now governed by Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS), a proscribed organisation;
• Yemen is subject to a wide range of sanctions and the US has proscribed the Houthis;
• In Somalia Al Shabaab, a proscribed organisation, still controls access to many parts of south/central Somalia;
• In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), M23 have recently taken control of eastern DRC and are subject to United Nations (UN) sanctions incorporated into UK law;
• In Myanmar the regime, and multiple areas of the economy are subject to sanctions.

5. These contexts and many others are affected by humanitarian crises[2] to which international donors and humanitarian actors are mandated to respond. To manage and mitigate the risk of breaching sanctions and counter-terrorism regulations, organisations undertake detailed risk analysis and take mitigating measures which requires specialist capacity and resources.

Impact of sanctions and counterterrorism regulations on humanitarian assistance and access

6. The impact of international and domestic sanctions and counterterrorism measures on principled humanitarian action and humanitarian access is well documented[3] and is felt primarily in the following areas:
7. Financial access due to bank ‘de-risking’: Financial institutions are caught by the regulations, and often decide to avoid providing services to high-risk contexts (i.e., where the risk of sanctions breach is higher). This results in difficulties obtaining or retaining bank accounts, delays in or freezes on financial transfers via correspondent banks, which in turn creates security risks for humanitarian personnel if they are unable to pay suppliers, salaries or taxes, or if they opt to transfer funds outside formal banking routes where these are not available;
8. Disruption and distortion of programming: the imposition of new sanctions, without immediate assurance of a humanitarian exemption, can disrupt humanitarian programming by creating uncertainty about what is and is not permissible. It can lead NGOs to ‘self-censor’ – make programming decisions based on compliance risks (due to the complexity of the regulations), rather than need. Other key service providers are also caught by the regulations, such as logistics, shipping and insurance companies;
9. Cost: Operational costs are high for organisations operating in areas subject to sanctions and can be beyond the overhead levels allowed by donors. Costs include specialist staff, due diligence assessments, engagement with banks, screening software and insurance premiums. Obtaining useful legal advice can be difficult as law firms are unwilling to allow their advice to be shared beyond the client, and only a few agencies have access to pro bono advice. Legal advice can be vague or conflicting due to difficulties in interpreting the law.
10. The impact is felt due to: 

• In some cases, no or only limited exceptions or exemptions available within the regulations;
• The opaque nature of the regulations: offences under the regulations are broadly drafted and can apply to low value remote transactions; the broad definition of ‘ownership or control’ adopted by Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (SAMLA) in 2018, under some circumstances may catch everyday transactions with public utilities, administrative functions of government and municipalities;
• The multiplicity of regulations and corresponding ministerial responsibilities: multiple layers of regulations criminalise a wide range of transactions and types of engagement with sanctioned or proscribed entities; regulatory and policy responsibility sit with different ministerial leads and mandates making a coherent approach to humanitarian ‘carve outs’ difficult.[4]

Progress in creating humanitarian ‘carve outs’

11. Significant progress has been made in the UK and internationally over recent years to protect principled humanitarian action from adverse effects of sanctions and counter-terrorism regulations. In the UK, through the work of the TSG, general licences for humanitarian action have been introduced within some key domestic sanctions regimes.
12. Despite the absence of a licencing provision within Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), there has been extensive discussion on the viability of using section 21ZA (whereby the National Crime Agency can provide consent to transactions otherwise prohibited by TACT). We understand that the Home Office is now considering options for licencing within TACT. Canada’s introduction of an exemption to its Criminal Code in 2023 for humanitarian aid offers a helpful example.[5] Guidance on ‘genuinely benign’ meetings with proscribed terrorist groups exists for TACT, but is not integrated into the legislation.[6] The TSG also engaged with the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) on publishing guidance for the sector on the potential use of s21ZA and factors the CPS might consider if there was sufficient evidence to initiate a prosecution.[7]
13. At the global level, a standing humanitarian exemption for UN agencies and their implementing partners from UN sanctions regimes was introduced through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2664 in December 2022. This offers substantial protection and sets a new standard in mechanisms to safeguard humanitarian action. The UK worked with the Security Council to achieve this exception and has since incorporated this exception into UK law via the Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, otherwise known as ‘CT2’ and the ISIL (Da’esh and Al-Qaida (United Nations Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019). The Government has also confirmed their interest in extending this UN exception to domestic sanctions regimes which would further extend the beneficial impact of the UN exception.[8]

Remaining obstacles

14. Policy coherence: The current regulatory framework does not have a coherent approach to the provision of humanitarian exceptions or exemptions, as noted by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.[9]
15. Scope of the exemptions: Currently exceptions and exemptions are restricted to a relatively narrow range of humanitarian actors (for example UNSCR 2664 only applies to UN agencies and their implementing partners working on UN response plans and through UN clusters). This excludes many highly professional, but smaller, specialist humanitarian agencies, as well as peacebuilding organisations, who may not work within the UN framework, but who are widely recognised as providing essential services such as de-mining, specialist health care, community resilience, mediation and conflict resolution and children’s services.
16. Many UK exceptions and exemptions also only apply to ‘UK funded’ programmes. This creates difficulties when UK funding comes to an end, but the programme continues with other forms of funding. It also excludes many trusted organisations who have received UK funding in the past or continue to receive funding from the UN or other donors who have undertaken appropriate funding risk/compliance assessments to validate their integrity and ability to manage risk.
17. Ownership and Control:  Section 7(4) of SAMLA is so widely drafted as to potentially include political control of a public body by a sanctioned person (or a sanctioned person’s appointee) therefore prohibiting the payment of everyday taxes or fees. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has raised concerns about this interpretation[10] and the FCDO has made clear this is not the intent of their policy.[11] However, this position needs to be adopted across all government departments.
18. Improved guidance: While the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) have published general guidance for charities on sanctions, given the breadth and complexity of the regulations there is scope for more guidance to be given on how OFSI interprets and applies them. The approach and format taken by the US Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a model that is helpful to both NGOs and banks; where OFSI have done this, it has been welcomed.
19. Global coherence: Banks and NGOs face similar challenges when dealing with transactions that cross borders due to the plethora of sanctions and counterterrorism regulations published by the UN, regional bodies and states, as well as the range of approaches taken to humanitarian exceptions and exemptions. The UK is well placed to take a lead on establishing a common international approach to humanitarian exceptions and exemptions and to simplifying their application; through the UN, the OECD or the Good Humanitarian Donorship group, or a combination of all three.
20. The UK was the first government to establish a multi-stakeholder dialogue involving government, financial institutions and NGOs – the TSG - which has become a model now replicated in other countries. A framework for global cooperation between national multi-stakeholder dialogues was established through an international dialogue, hosted by the Overseas Development Institute and funded by USAID. This has been suspended due to the USAID funding pause. The TSG itself operates without dedicated resourcing – its ability to disseminate information, offer guidance and training to the wider NGO sector, and anticipate and prepare for future crises is therefore limited.  

Conclusion

21. The use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has increased over recent years as more countries, regimes, individuals and entities are made subject to an ever-increasing range of sanctions. Many humanitarian crises occur in those countries subject to sanctions and/or where proscribed groups operate, and there has been growing awareness of how sanctions and counter-terrorism laws impact the ability to respond. Mitigating measures have been integrated into the regulatory framework, as outlined above, and many NGOs have strengthened internal control frameworks to accommodate the heightened risks. Yet, more can be done to enable them to operate in a more secure legal environment when delivering humanitarian assistance and to reduce the ‘chilling effect’ of the regulations. The recommendations we put forward have this objective. 
22. Finally, we would like to formally acknowledge the positive engagement we have had with UK Government officials and financial institutions that we have had through the TSG and to thank them for their work on these issues. 

Recommendations

1. Policy coherence  

The Government should:

• take a more coherent and facilitative approach to the creation of humanitarian exceptions and exemptions, with a presumption that humanitarian exceptions and exemptions should be the norm rather than negotiated on an ad hoc basis once a crisis has emerged;
• implement the exemptions created under UNSCR 2664 into UK autonomous sanctions;
• create exceptions or exemptions within TACT for aid of a humanitarian nature;
• integrate guidance on ‘genuinely benign meetings’ into TACT.

2. Scope of the exemptions

• The Government should adopt an inclusive approach to exceptions or exemptions that can encompass a broad range of humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations;
• Exceptions and exemptions should be de-linked from ‘UK funding’; other criteria for inclusion should be found to validate that humanitarian agency is a bona fide actor with an appropriate internal control framework.

3. Ownership and Control

• The Government should clarify its position on the application of section 7(4) of SAMLA on the political control of public bodies by sanctioned individuals.

4. Improved guidance

• OFSI should publish more guidance on the application of regulations, similar to the approach taken by OFAC.

5. Global coherence

• The UK should take an international lead in establishing good practice in creating humanitarian exceptions and exemptions within sanctions and counterterrorism regulations that optimises humanitarian action across a range of sectors and actors;
• The UK should provide dedicated funding to the work of the TSG, and support the international dialogue.

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