WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY BIRD

(TRUK0168)

Executive Summary

1. Since 2011, Bahrain has used TNR to extend its reach beyond its borders to target dissenting voices, maintain control, and instil fear among its critics in the exiled Bahraini community living abroad—often in blatant violation of UK and international law. Bahrain has been a less visible perpetrator of TNR than other perpetrator states, but a significant one nevertheless.

2. Bahrain’s acts of TNR on UK soil have routinely targeted human rights defenders, pro-democracy advocates, political opponents, bloggers and other prominent political dissenters in exile. The frequent use of these TNR tactics, compounded by the lack of any consequences or accountability, has a chilling effect of intimidating and silencing its broader diaspora community, which underscores the insidious nature of these repressive measures.

3. The submission provides detailed evidence in response to the following questions:-

●       How does transnational repression impact (a) those targeted and (b) their wider communities?[1]

●       What are the main methods employed by such actors in the UK?

●       Are multi-lateral police and judicial cooperation mechanisms, such as Interpol red notices, being misused by perpetrators of transnational repression? What steps can the Government take to prevent these mechanisms being misused against people in the UK?

●       How is the UK’s response to transnational repression affected by its diplomatic relationships with perpetrator states, and how does transnational repression factor into the UK’s diplomatic decision-making?

4. The submission also touches upon other questions that are of interest to the inquiry, including:

●       What steps has the Government taken to address transnational repression in the UK?

●       What departments have been involved in these steps?

●       Are there further steps, including legislative, that the UK should take to give effect to those [international] obligations?

●       How effective is the support and security assistance offered to (a) individuals and (b) communities that are the targets of transnational repression?

5. Section I examines Bahrain’s most well-documented misuse of digital technologies: monitoring, surveilling, and engaging in targeted harassment and intimidation campaigns beyond its borders using Pegasus (NSO Group’s spyware) and FinSpy (FinFisher’s surveillance software).

6. Section II details the direct TNR acts which underscore the immediate threat Bahrain’s repression poses on UK soil, including revocation of citizenship and physical attacks targeting UK-based activists and dissidents. It also evaluates the Government’s approach and actions that exacerbate the suffering of victims under false justifications for enforcing immigration policies or protecting national security.

7. Section III outlines Bahrain’s use of reprisals against activists’ family members as a method of proxy coercion, demonstrating how TNR tactics targeting high-profile individuals may deter others from future public advocacy and political involvement. This creates a chilling effect that threatens freedom of expression in the UK and shields these states from legitimate and necessary scrutiny.

8. Section IV evaluates how the UK's relationship with Bahrain shapes its responses to acts of transnational repression, often prioritising bilateral interests over accountability. It critiques the Government’s approach to prioritising economic and diplomatic considerations over human rights concerns, an approach which risks undermining victims' confidence in the British system's commitment to addressing threats against them seriously.

9. Section V examines Bahrain's misuse of international policing mechanisms, notably Interpol Red Notices, to extend its reach against dissidents abroad. It further discusses necessary UK government responses and safeguards to prevent these mechanisms from being weaponised against activists.

10. The Government’s failure to effectively tackle acts of transnational repression carried out on British soil sends a demoralising signal to the exiled community that the UK is willing to intervene and condemn these acts of reprisals. To safeguard exiled Bahraini activists from these abuses and, in some cases, prevent the UK’s active obstruction of their rights, the Government should:

1. Actively engage with victims of TNR to understand if they seek representations, private or public, on behalf of their family members.

2. Raise the issues diplomatically with perpetrator states and report to Parliament annually with information on acts committed against individuals on UK soil, documenting the serious violations and actions taken by the Government.

1. A good model for an annual report would be an adaptation of the United Nations Secretary-General's annual report, which documents a country-by-country breakdown of the key acts of reprisals against those seeking to cooperate with or have cooperated with the United Nations. The report also highlights activities, policy developments and good practices within the United Nations system and beyond to address intimidation and reprisals against those in the field of human rights.[2]

3. Alert the exiled community about the misuse of Interpol red notices so they can make informed travel decisions and what reprisals they may face.

1. Spyware and cyber intrusions

10. Bahrain’s authoritarian use of digital technologies includes a diverse and complex range of tools and practices that create interconnected and advanced infrastructures designed to exert social and political control over society, undermine the rule of law, and normalise the surveillance of communities and individuals at risk.

11. In recent years, Bahrain has deployed tools like malicious spyware and conducted information manipulation operations on social media platforms—all of which present a pervasive threat to fundamental freedoms and safety of UK-based individuals and erode the norms around privacy and security.

12. Bahrain’s cyber intrusions have targeted numerous influential activists, bloggers and opposition members using the NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware and FinFisher’s spyware (Finspy). These individuals, many of whom have been vocal about human rights abuses in their home countries, were hacked and monitored while on UK soil.

Bahrain’s use of FinSpy

13. FinFisher is a surveillance software suite developed by the UK-based Gamma International and distributed through its German subsidiary, FinFisher GmbH. The software was originally intended for law enforcement but has been widely misused by authoritarian governments to monitor dissidents, journalists, and activists beyond its borders. Its key capabilities and functionalities include conducting real-time monitoring and data extraction without user awareness and bypassing antivirus systems to avoid detection.[3]

14. Bahrain has used FinFisher spyware to target Bahraini lawyers, activists, and politicians, both in Bahrain and abroad.[4] Moosa Mohamed and Saeed Shehabi are both UK-based dissidents who were victims of the FinSpy attacks in 2011. They have been vocal critics of Bahrain and have campaigned for democracy and equal rights and exposed human rights abuses in Bahrain while in exile.[5] In Mr Mohamed’s case, a Bahraini agent hijacked his online presence for about eight months and gained access to his accounts, emails, documents, and a massive trove of videos.[6]

15. Gamma International denied selling FinSpy to Bahrain, suggesting that if Bahraini authorities possessed the software, it was an illegally obtained demonstration copy.[7] However, data leaks in 2014 revealed direct correspondence between Gamma and Bahraini officials, showing Bahrain contacting Gamma at least five times between 2011 and 2012 requesting technical support for FinSpy products and a list of 77 surveillance targets.[8]

Bahrain’s use of Pegasus:

16. Pegasus is a spyware developed by the Israeli cyber-arms company NSO Group which allows undetected hacking of mobile phones, enabling its operators to access encrypted messages from apps such as WhatsApp and Signal, remotely control a phone’s camera and microphone, turning it into a surveillance tool, and track a target’s location in real-time.

17. While NSO Group claims Pegasus is only sold to governments for tracking criminals and terrorists, independent investigations have revealed systematic abuse of the technology to target journalists, activists, and dissidents.[9]

18. In 2020, a leaked list of over 50,000 phone numbers, allegedly selected for surveillance by NSO Group clients, was obtained by Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories and shared with 17 media outlets, leading to a major global investigation known as The Pegasus Project.[10] Over several months, more than 80 journalists carried out a joint investigation that identified Bahrain as one of 10 governments suspected of using Pegasus against human rights activists.[11] One of the more than 400 UK numbers identified belonged to BIRD’s advocacy director, Sayed Ahmed Alwadaei, who was selected by one of the NSO Group’s clients - the United Arab Emirates (UAE), presumed to be acting on behalf of Bahrain.[12] His phone was hacked around 2018. 
     
19. Forensic analysis carried out by Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, Canada, further confirmed that nine Bahraini human rights defenders, bloggers, and opposition figures had been hacked using zero-click iMessage vulnerabilities, meaning their iPhones were hacked without needing to click on a malicious link.[13]

20. Among those identified by Citizen Lab included Yusuf Al-Jamri, a prominent blogger who first experienced arbitrary detention and torture in Bahrain at the age of 16 and fled to the UK, where he has been granted political asylum since 2017.[14] Citizen Lab revealed that Mr Al-Jamri’s iPhone was infected by Pegasus in August 2019, shortly after he got over 2 million viewers on his Twitter account as he was streaming live coverage of a protest in London to raise the alarm about executions in Bahrain. The attack was linked to an operator in Bahrain that has been active since July 2017.[15]

Evaluating the Failures of the UK Government Response

21. The UK Government’s response to TNR, particularly Bahrain’s use of spyware against UK-based individuals, has been inconsistent and inadequate. While acknowledging the risks posed by commercial spyware, the Government has failed to impose measures against Bahrain or publicly condemn cyberattacks on UK-based dissidents. This inaction risks Bahrain’s continued subversion of the rules-based order and the erosion of privacy and security protections.

22. The Government’s failure to regulate spyware and introduce meaningful safeguards was evident in its handling of Privacy International’s 2013 complaint against Gamma Group, which accused the company of selling FinFisher spyware to Bahrain. Instead of imposing penalties or sanctions, the National Contact Point merely stated that Gamma’s failure to engage left it open to further complaints.[16] Meanwhile, Germany’s OECD Contact Point refused to investigate the allegations, offering only mediation on risk management.[17]

23. More than eight years later, this passive stance has persisted. Following the former US President Biden’s administration’s decision to blacklist NSO Group in November 2021, a group of ten cross-party parliamentarians sent a letter to then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson on 11 November 2021, urging the UK Government to “take similarly robust action” by sanctioning NSO Group and introducing measures to protect people in the UK from further cyberattacks.[18] However, rather than taking decisive action, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) responded by stating that the UK does not issue export licences where there is a “clear risk” of internal repression.[19] While this response acknowledges the dangers of spyware, it fails to implement enforcement measures against Bahrain or condemn cyberattacks on UK-based dissidents. 

2. Direct threats, assaults and reprisals against UK-based individuals

24. The British Government signals tolerance for Bahrain’s extraterritorial repression when it is unwilling or unable to protect the right of people in exile to protest and carry out human rights work on UK soil without fear of reprisals.

1. Revocation of citizenship

Barriers to mobility, safety and citizenship

25. Bahrain has systematically used citizenship revocation as a tool against critics and dissidents to limit their ability to advocate for human rights, disrupt their lives, and pressure them into silence. Most denaturalisation cases from the last decade in Bahrain were based on terrorism charges and handed down by royal decree or through unfair trials by the courts and anyone perceived to be “disloyal” to the monarchy or have “harm[ed the interests of the kingdom” can be stripped of their citizenship.[20]

26. BIRD’s research suggests that about 300 individuals remain denaturalised, many of whom were rendered stateless by Bahrain and are in exile. On 31 January 2015, Bahrain’s Interior Ministry revoked the nationality of 72 Bahraini citizens, including human rights defenders, journalists, religious scholars, and political activists.[21] Among them were two UK-based individuals who were stripped of their citizenship in absentia and rendered stateless for several years. They are unable to return to Bahrain for fear of further persecution, meaning that they have no legal recourse or appeal process to challenge this decision.

Impact on UK-born children

27. One of the individuals arbitrarily stripped of his citizenship is BIRD’s Advocacy Director, whose daughter was born stateless in November 2017. Without a passport or travel document, she was unable to leave the UK for nearly four years until she became a UK citizen.[22]

28. The other case is of a Bahraini political and human rights activist, who was granted asylum in the United Kingdom in 2012 and was convicted in absentia to 15 years imprisonment following an internationally criticised unfair trial on 29 September 2013.[23] His daughter was born a few days before his citizenship was revoked in 2015 and has since remained a stateless child.

29. Norway made a recommendation (124.126) calling on Bahrain to “[...] reinstate Bahraini citizenship to all individuals whose citizenship has been revoked as a reprisal for human rights activities” during Bahrain’s Fourth UPR cycle.[24]   However, Bahrain ‘noted’ this suggestion, emphasising that “there are no “stateless persons” in the country” and failing to acknowledge that their actions have caused statelessness for Bahrainis outside their borders.[25]

30. Under Bahrain’s law, a woman can pass on her Bahraini citizenship to her child when the father of the child is stateless. However, to BIRD’s knowledge, this has not been used to grant citizenship to any of the children of individuals who have been stripped of their citizenship.

Arbitrary delays and detention at UK borders

31. Despite being a recognised political refugee and being granted indefinite leave to remain, Mr Alwadaei also faced harassment at UK borders. On 29 September 2023, following his return from a UN Human Rights Council session in Geneva, UK Border Force officers detained him at Gatwick Airport, stating he was “liable to be detained.”[26] Following a legal challenge, then-Home Secretary James Cleverly apologised, and the Home Office admitted that his detention was unlawful and offered compensation.[27] Another case of mobility impediment was when Bahraini human rights defender Maryam Al-Khawaja was prevented from boarding a British Airways flight from Heathrow to Bahrain on 15 September 2023.[28]

Unlawful delay in granting citizenship

32. Official documents obtained through a Subject Access Request (SAR) revealed that the Foreign Office actively discouraged the Home Office from granting Mr Alwadaei British citizenship, citing “bilateral implications” with Bahrain. The Foreign Office warned against granting Mr Alwadaei citizenship due to its impact on Bahrain-UK relations, despite the Home Office concluding that there were no grounds to reject the application in early 2023. Even though this was communicated clearly to the Foreign Office, it sought advice from the Home Office in April 2023: 

“If the HO were to deny the application and S[ayed] went to appeal it through the courts, would the FCDO’s formal advice be permissible as a part of any proceedings? Is there a significant risk that FCDO advice will be made public?” 

33. While Mr Alwadaei was ultimately granted British citizenship in June 2024, it was only after prolonged legal pressure and media scrutiny, which raises serious concerns about whether diplomatic relations with Bahrain influenced the Government’s handling of Mr Alwadaei’s citizenship application.[29] Daniel Carey, partner at Deighton Pierce Glynn and legal representative for Mr Alwadaei, stated to the Independent:

“‘Bilateral’ concerns associated with the Bahrain government […] raise troubling questions about the extent to which foreign persecution of human rights activists is permitted to interfere in the UK government’s own immigration decisions.”[30]

2. Physical attacks

On UK soil: Alleged murder attempt of activist in Bahrain’s Embassy

34. XXXX

35. On 26 July 2019, Mr Mohamed went to the roof of the Bahraini Embassy in London to protest the impending execution of two men in Bahrain who were sentenced to death amid allegations of torture and coerced confessions.[31] He unfolded the banner, which read, “I am risking my life to save 2 men about to be executed in the next few hours.”[32] 

36. Video footage showed that Bahraini embassy staff beat Mr Mohamed with a wooden baton on the roof, and he could be heard shouting for help. Protesters outside raised the alarm, with one saying, “They will kill him as they killed Khashoggi in Istanbul.”[33] Police officers and firefighters, who were monitoring the situation outside, forcibly entered the Embassy after Mr Moosa was dragged inside and saved his life.[34] 

37. Mr Mohamed’s testimony revealed that Embassy staff attempted to murder him, first by trying to throw him off the roof and then by attempting to suffocate him with a t-shirt soaked in water inside the Embassy.[35] One perpetrator told him that he would be the “third execution to take place that day,” alluding to the two political prisoners - Ali Al-Arab and Ahmed Malali - who were extrajudicially executed later that day in Bahrain.[36]

38. In November 2019, Mr Mohamed filed a formal complaint with the Metropolitan Police, accusing Bahrain’s Embassy staff of severely beating him, attempting to push him off the roof and threatening to execute him.[37]
     
39. Mr Mohamed’s case underscores the urgent need for stronger UK oversight of diplomatic immunity to prevent embassies from being used as tools of transnational repression.

40. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, embassies are sovereign territory of the sending state and law enforcement officers of the host country are barred from entering the premises without the consent of the Ambassador (article 22). It also grants inviolable diplomatic immunity to diplomatic agents (Article 31), meaning they cannot be prosecuted by the host country, even if they commit serious crimes—including human rights violations—inside an embassy. However, this does not mean embassies are free zones for illegal acts. Bahrain is still responsible for ensuring its diplomats respect UK law, as stipulated in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which obliges diplomats to respect UK law and regulations.[38]

41. Moreover, diplomatic immunity only applies to embassy staff formally registered with the UK Government. If the Embassy staff involved in Mr Moosa’s assault were not officially notified to the Foreign Office, they could face criminal prosecution under UK law.

42. Although Mr Mohamed’s lawyers called for a “robust investigation” and urged the Foreign Office to cooperate with the Metropolitan Police’s investigation, the Government did not publicly address the attack or confirm any diplomatic action against Bahrain.[39]

On Bahrain soil:

43. In October 2016, the wife of BIRD’s Director Advocacy Director was unlawfully detained and abused by officials at Bahrain’s International Airport. She was forcibly separated from her 18-month-old son and threatened with facing imprisonment on fabricated criminal charges during her seven-hour interrogation. Moreover, Bahraini authorities also threatened to imprison her family members in Bahrain if she were to “speak out” and if her husband continued his activism.[40] In March 2018, a Bahraini criminal court convicted her to two months in prison on charges of insulting a public official in absentia.[41]

3. Proxy coercion

44. Bahrain has frequently sought to constrain, coerce and punish those who exercise their fundamental human rights in the UK by proxy, targeting their family members and relatives who are based in Bahrain and subjecting them to harassment, threats, arbitrary detention and arrests, and torture. The transnational dimension is also more broadly intended to intimidate and threaten the broader Bahraini diaspora community.

In reprisal for human rights work with BIRD

45. Bahrain’s corrupt criminal justice system perpetuates systematic human rights violations and has been weaponised to the detriment of the work of human rights defenders. The family members of BIRD’s Advocacy Director (Mr Alwadaei) who are based in Bahrain, including XXXXXXXX have endured serious human rights violations because of their connection with his human rights work.[42] 

46. All three were arbitrarily arrested in March 2017 after Mr Alwadaei attended the 34th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva. During interrogations, they were pressed for information on Mr Alwadaei, including where he lived and worked and his working hours. The UN Working Group on arbitrary detention reported that officials used threats like they “take revenge” for  Mr Alwadaei’s activities and that “we will come after your brother-in-law very soon.”[43]

47. All three were sentenced to prison terms on 30 October 2017 on charges of planting a fake bomb, even though the public prosecution was unable to establish any forensic evidence linking them to the alleged crimes in a trial marred by due process violations, including allegations of torture and coerced confessions.[44] The accusations against Mr Alwadaei’s family members were fabricated in a clear act of reprisal for Mr Alwadaei’s “work exposing human rights abuses in the country as director of the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy,” as described by the Times.[45]

48. Bahraini authorities tortured Hajar Mansoor after Mr Alwadaei briefed MPs ahead of a debate in the House of Commons on human rights abuses and UK assistance to Bahrain, and was seen hospitalised just days after the debate was held on 11 September 2018.[46]

49. In an opinion published on 7 January 2019, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) declared their detention arbitrary, concluding that Mr Alwadaei’s family were “deprived of their liberty, interrogated and prosecuted for their family ties with Sayed Ahmed Alwadaei and that these were acts of reprisal”.[47]

50. After the WGAD opinion, Bahrain responded with a smear campaign of false and misleading information about Mr Alwadaei and his family. In a letter to the British Government, a group of NGO representatives, lawyers, and over 80 cross-party parliamentarians raised concerns about Mr Alwadaei's family members and called on the government to defend him. However, the Foreign Office failed to send a countervailing signal that it was willing to address acts designed to intimidate and threaten a human rights defender based in the UK.

In reprisal for protests in the UK

51. In May 2017, Bahraini security forces detained the family members of three UK-based activists because the activists had protested against King Hamad's attendance at the Royal Windsor Horse Show.[48]

52. The Royal Windsor Horse Show is the UK's largest outdoor horse show and was patronised by the late Queen Elizabeth II. The Royal Family of Bahrain have attended the Royal Windsor Horse Show for many years and has even sponsored some of the events at the show. Several organisations, including the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) and the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), have raised concerns that Bahrain is using the Royal Windsor Horse Show to distract from human rights abuses in the Kingdom and that by rolling out the red carpet for the Bahraini royals, the UK is legitimising these abuses, which include the detention of political prisoners who continue to suffer ill-treatment and false imprisonment.

53. The concerns raised by BIRD and CAAT have also been echoed by MPs, with Andy Slaughter, Labour MP for Hammersmith and Chiswick, commenting in 2018: “The Bahraini government uses sponsorship of prestigious events like the Royal Windsor Horse Show to distract from its appalling human rights record and whitewash its continued collaboration with the UK on security and criminal justice.”[49]

54. The May 2017 example, in which Bahraini security forces detained family members of three UK-based activists, is yet another example of transnational repression and proxy coercion. While not directly targeting individuals on UK soil, the detention of family members has a chilling effect on those protesting in the UK and potentially risks restricting the universal right to freedom of expression and assembly.

4. Key Concerns about the UK-Bahrain Relationship

55. The UK Government’s diplomatic and economic ties with Bahrain have significantly influenced its response to TNR, often prioritising trade and security interests over protecting dissidents targeted on UK soil. Rather than addressing Bahrain’s systematic repression of exiled activists, the UK has repeatedly overlooked, enabled, or actively obstructed avenues for accountability.

56. The Government’s foreign policy decisions, security cooperation, and economic engagements with Bahrain have weakened its response to transnational repression, contributing to a climate of impunity for human rights abuses.

Downgrading Bahrain’s Status as a Human Rights Priority Country
 

57. In July 2023, the Foreign Office removed Bahrain from its list of human rights priority countries,[50] just days after Bahrain announced a £1 billion investment in the UK economy. Government officials justified the decision by citing Bahrain’s alleged human rights progress despite ongoing violations.[51]

58. The decision signalled a shift towards the Government’s prioritisation of economic ties over human rights concerns, and despite parliamentary scrutiny of this decision failed to result in a policy reversal, reinforcing fears that economic interests dictate the UK’s response to human rights abuses.[52]

59. Similar concerns have been raised about the UK government's relationship with one of Bahrain's neighbours, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with leading international law, extradition, immigration and human rights barrister Ben Keith writing in The Telegraph:

“Britain’s continued arms sales to the UAE, despite evidence of their use in conflicts with severe humanitarian consequences, have drawn criticism from human rights organisations. This ongoing military trade, worth billions annually, potentially implicates the UK in breaches of international humanitarian law.”[53]

Ignoring human rights concerns in high-level engagements

60. High-level diplomatic engagements where human rights are not mentioned have been perceived by victims and the broader exiled Bahraini community as legitimising Bahrain’s leadership, which continues to persecute and target them.

61. In August 2024, Prime Minister Keir Starmer met with Bahrain’s Crown Prince at Downing Street, reaffirming the UK-Bahrain strategic partnership. However, no mention of human rights violations was made during the meeting, despite Bahrain’s continued persecution of dissidents, political prisoners, and activists.[54]

62. On 11 November 2024, Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa was awarded the Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order (GCVO)—the highest honour granted by the British monarchy.[55] Journalists revealed that the award was conferred with the knowledge of the British government.[56]

63. Exiled human rights defenders and activists who personally suffered under the Bahrain King’s reign expressed “profound dismay” and urged King Charles to rescind the award.[57] In their letter, sent on 13 November 2024, the persecuted exiles stated: “We are part of a broader community that continues to bear witness to arbitrary imprisonment, brutal torture, unfair trials and extrajudicial executions of innocent individuals under the self-acclaimed monarch of Bahrain’s rule.”[58]

Technical assistance to Bahrain

64. Since 2012, the UK has spent millions in taxpayer funds on technical assistance programs that fund abusive institutions and Bahraini oversight bodies that have done little to prove their efficacy and, if anything, contribute to the abusive practice in the Kingdom. 

65. Despite repeated calls from parliamentarians and civil society groups, the Government continues to lack transparency on how these funds are used. As Bahraini oversight bodies receiving UK support have failed to hold perpetrators accountable, the UK has reinforced a culture of impunity.

“Sportswashing” and Formula 1

66. On 21 March 2024, the House of Lords debated the UK’s role in sportswashing - an internationally recognised phenomenon used by authoritarian governments seeking to utilise sporting events to launder their reputation - and here Bahrain was mentioned in the briefing produced beforehand by the House of Lords Library.[59] One month before the debate,  16 cross-party parliamentarians sent a letter to Formula One (F1) and Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) senior management, raising serious concerns about human rights violations associated with F1’s presence in Bahrain over the past 20 years.[60]

67. Despite Formula 1’s claims that it upholds human rights, Bahrain continues to use the Grand Prix as a tool for repression. In 2023, four individuals were unlawfully detained for peacefully protesting near the Bahrain International Circuit during the race,[61] contradicting F1’s assurances that the right to freedom of expression and assembly would be respected.[62] Another recent example is of BIRD’s advocacy director’s brother-in-law Sayed Hashem Alwadaei, who was arrested on 22 February 2024 in a house raid,[63] believed to be in retaliation for his mother, Hajer Mansoor’s activism and her protests during the 2023 Bahrain Grand Prix, and subjected to physical and psychological abuse.[64] UK member of parliament Kenny MacAskill tabled a written question in Parliament, and six UN special procedures mandates also sent a communication to Bahrain expressing concerns about his treatment, including ill-treatment and detention.[65]

V. Misuse of Interpol to Target Activists on Foreign Soil

68. Governments and law enforcement often treat Interpol Red Notices as international arrest warrants even though their accusations and information are not independently verified and do not necessarily meet due process standards. As red notices depend on violations of national laws, those trying to flee and those living in exile become easy targets of authoritarian regimes, which assert criminality based on procedures, legislation, and practices that fail to adhere to international law and standards.

69. Bahrain has a history of successfully using red notices to track down and extradite dissidents, concerns about which have been raised by Parliamentarians.[66] In January 2022, Bahrain unlawfully extradited a political dissident from Serbia despite the European Court of Human Rights' interim measures.[67] Lawyers representing Ahmed Jaafar filed a civil lawsuit against Interpol in a French court in November 2023 alleging that Interpol's issuance of a 'red notice' led to Mr Jaafar’s unlawful arrest and subsequent extradition to Bahrain, where he was tortured and imprisoned on two life sentences.[68]

70. While each country has an obligation to protect itself and fight the onslaught of terrorism, Bahrain has weaponised counterterrorism laws to target individuals who are not terrorists and encourage judicial proceedings that deprive defendants of their international human rights, including their right to due process.

71. Bahrain’s counterterrorism laws are transnational in scope, constituting a threat to the security of the international community and establishing penalties that are commensurate with the seriousness of the crime.[69] It has extensively used anti-terrorism laws to persecute human rights defenders, journalists and civil society organisations for exercising their fundamental rights. Conclusion

Conclusion

72. If the UK is perceived as tolerating violations of its sovereignty domestically to protect political and economic relationships, it risks signalling to other governments that they can arbitrarily detain British citizens without facing diplomatic or other repercussions. The consequence of the UK’s silence is that victims of transnational repression by these countries do not receive government validation of their experiences, causing them to lose confidence in the British system's willingness to treat threats against them seriously. Some victims from these countries worry that British officials may adopt a laissez-faire attitude towards partner states, assuming these states will respect certain boundaries within the UK.

(Feb 2025)