WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY TACKLING TNR IN THE UK WORKING GROUP

(TRUK0154)

Introduction

1. We are a group of individuals and organisations working on Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK, with the ultimate aim of advancing the UK’s policy response. The Working Group was established in September 2024, following a workshop on TNR in the UK organised by the University of Lancaster’s Richardson Institute and The Foreign Policy Centre. The Group convenes to: research and monitor incidents and effects of TNR in the UK; support individuals and groups affected by TNR; and identify and shape the development of a comprehensive policy response to TNR in the UK.

2. Members of the Working Group Steering Committee are: The Foreign Policy Centre, Richardson Institute at Lancaster University, Index on Censorship, Reporters Without Borders, Azadi Network and The Rights Practice. The wider membership supporting this submission includes Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), China Dissent Network, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, FairSquare, Hong Kong Democracy Council, Hong Kong Watch, and Iran International.

3. This submission offers answers to a number of the inquiry’s key questions and highlights the Working Group’s suggested approaches to tackling TNR in the UK. Further detail about specific country contexts, perpetrators and instances of TNR can be found in member organisations’ individual submissions to the inquiry.

Summary

4. Transnational repression (TNR) is on the rise globally, fuelled by rapidly evolving technology, global authoritarianism and years of neglect by previous governments.[1] It is a major policy blind spot, resulting in significant constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights. Repressive actors, including powerful and hostile states, have a growing number of tools to surveil, threaten, harass and attack individuals in the UK, violating their fundamental rights guaranteed under international and domestic laws such as the Human Rights Act 1998. Political dissidents, exiled journalists and human rights defenders have traditionally been the main targets of TNR, but today a broader array of groups and individuals also find themselves subject to transnational human rights violations here in the UK.[2]

5. The UK’s responses to TNR to date have been sparse, incoherent and largely inaccessible to targeted communities and individuals. Law enforcement is an important part of the solution, but the cross-border nature of TNR demands a broader approach to protect the rights of those targeted. There has been a failure to effectively monitor the issue, with no clear strategy to respond to threats or support the needs of those affected by TNR, and in some cases UK actors are enabling or abetting TNR. TNR has often also been grouped with other hybrid threats without a proper analytical distinction.

6. TNR has a negative impact at every level of UK society, from individuals to communities, democratic institutions and national security. Responses must be similarly multi-layered and comprehensive. In addition to human rights defenders, exiled journalists and exiled political dissidents, TNR targets have included members of diaspora communities more broadly, academics, activists and lawyers in the UK, including British citizens.

7. By countering TNR, the UK will benefit from creating a more resilient democratic society, greater visibility on hostile state activities, improved government-community interfaces, and a more informed foreign policy. The new UK government has an opportunity to take the lead globally in ensuring democratic resilience against the cross-border political and technological challenges of the 21st century’s contested world.

Recommendations for the UK Government

8. The Working Group proposes a four-part approach for the UK Government to tackle TNR: Monitor, Respond, Support, Prevent. This approach is designed to improve democratic resilience, meet the UK’s obligations under international and domestic law, and take the lead in countering the global advance of authoritarianism. This approach is outlined below with specific recommendations detailed:

8.1.            MONITOR

1. Provide a clear, accessible and trusted contact point for lodging TNR complaints.
2. Collect data, research and reports on the prevalence and forms of transnational infringements of UK residents’ human rights, in a consistent manner that is regularly made public (e.g. through annual reports).
3. Play an active role within the international community (including through the Council of Europe, Interpol, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, OSCE and UN) to ensure information and data is shared to help combat TNR at a global level, while also protecting against international mechanisms being abused to further TNR.[3]

8.2.            RESPOND

1. Inform relevant UK government agencies (across all four nations) to ensure legal threats and actions, extradition, deportation and freezing of assets are not used to violate human rights.
2. Raise TNR cases, both individually and in aggregate, through diplomatic channels and in public statements.
3. Provide rapid response protection mechanisms for individuals facing serious threats, and ensure coordination between all relevant agencies to warn targeted individuals.

8.3.            SUPPORT 

1. Provide a clear, accessible and trusted point of contact for individuals experiencing TNR to access advice and support.
2. Support individuals, communities and family members to access legal assistance, humanitarian visas and temporary traveling documents, as well as other potential avenues of redress.
3. Provide appropriate physical or digital protections for victims or targets of TNR.

4. Develop national guidance and provide training for local and national law enforcement and first responders about transnational repression, including tactics that might not be criminal offences but warrant attention.

8.4.            PREVENT

1. Develop evidence-based proposals for necessary legislative and regulatory changes.
2. Develop legal and diplomatic mechanisms to penalise perpetrators of TNR.
3. Investigate and hold to account UK institutions, systems or professional industries complicit in TNR. 

Definition

Should the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression? What should be the key elements of a definition?

9. There is no official definition of TNR and there is no government mechanism to monitor TNR in the UK. The complexity of TNR issues and lack of legally binding definitions, both in international and domestic law, has made the phenomenon, and its effects, challenging to track and measure. At a basic level, TNR refers to violations of individual rights that originate outside the jurisdiction in which they take effect.[4]

10. The US human rights organisation Freedom House has defined TNR as ‘governments reaching across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, including through assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family intimidation’.[5]  However, we believe this definition to be overly narrow for a number of reasons, including:

10.1.            TNR does not only seek to silence ‘dissent’, it also seeks to silence independent voices such as journalists, writers, academics and bloggers - referred to as “public watchdogs” in established European jurisprudence.[6] TNR can also target other professionals such as lawyers and trade union members and officers.

10.2.            While governments may be the primary perpetrators of TNR, it can also be carried out by known or unknown proxies, agents or third parties.

10.3.            The list of TNR tactics is presented as exhaustive and so could limit the state’s understanding of the issue. TNR tactics evolve and could quickly require the definition to be amended. 

11. Any definition of TNR should consider the following conceptual aspects:

11.1.            Source - The body behind the threat or act of TNR. This can include state actors, proxies or other third parties connected directly or indirectly to a foreign state. TNR can also be facilitated by other actors in the target country such as lawyers, public affairs firms, private investigators and others.

11.2.            Tactics - How has the perpetrator pursued their act or threat of TNR? There is an expanding list of documented TNR tactics both online and offline. This includes but is not limited to digital surveillance, harassment and smear campaigns, attempts to access personal information or data, physical attacks, killings and attempts to render targets.

11.3.            Target individual/group - The person or group being targeted by the act or threat of TNR. While the motivation for each target may differ, the goal is the same - to shield the source from opposition or scrutiny, while also exerting control over the behaviour, thought, or identity of the wider population.[7]

11.4.            Cross-border nature of the act/threat - TNR is deployed by the source when the target is beyond their territorial reach and so cannot be targeted through conventional state means, for example domestic law enforcement agencies or agents. Often, the target may be in a country with an established diaspora or exile community and strong democratic protections in place.

Impact

How does transnational repression impact (a) those targeted and (b) their wider communities?

12. TNR is affecting the exercise of basic human rights for a diverse range of targets. The tactics used are diverse and rapidly evolving. The advance of digital technologies, particularly surveillance capabilities, has exacerbated TNR’s coercive effects on individuals and communities.

12.1.            Traditional techniques have included physical surveillance and stalking, overt harassment, intimidation, violence and murder.

12.2.            Modern TNR tactics often make use of rapidly developing technology. Digital surveillance, online harassment, unlawful access to sensitive data, coordinated online attacks and remote coercion can all be delivered via social media and other online platforms or technologies.[8]

12.3.            A common tactic is “coercion by proxy”, where a perpetrator targets UK residents indirectly via threats to other people, usually family members located outside the UK.[9]  This includes coercion of family members based overseas, using tactics such as arrest and detention, travel bans, economic pressure and legal intimidation.[10] The fact this often takes place outside the UK complicates efforts to use law enforcement, judicial penalties and the pursuit of redress.[11]

12.4.            The use of third party proxies including regime supporters and criminal gangs to conduct violence, harassment and intimidation, both online and offline, is an identifiable tactic and links TNR to various criminal networks.

12.5.            TNR tactics have been deployed against members of marginalised communities or against communities with a specific protected characteristic, such as religion or ethnicity. Other characteristics, such as gender or sexual orientation, have also been used by TNR perpetrators to target individuals or increase the impact of cross-border harm.

12.6.            Online TNR directed at women is often gendered or sexualised in nature, as are other proactive campaigns to damage the reputation of women.[12]

12.7.            TNR tactics also involve regime agents infiltrating professions such as journalism and academia, or infiltrating sports and arts institutions, to exert psychological pressure on activists and intimidate communities, leading to self-censorship and a decline in public discourse or trust in these professions.[13] 

12.8.            TNR is often facilitated and carried out by local intermediary actors including law firms, public relations consultancies, self-censoring public institutions, and supporters of repressive states.

13. The use of intermediaries and other TNR tactics, such as online smear campaigns, private surveillance and physical attacks can further obscure who is ultimately responsible. This is a central difficulty both for targets of TNR and for those responding.

14. A diverse and growing array of targets across UK society are affected by TNR. Exiles and diaspora members who have had to flee persecution are particularly affected.[14] For example, broad swaths of the Uyghur community continue to face stifling constraints from Beijing; exiles from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and Rwanda are subject to targeted digital surveillance, attacks and the threat of imprisonment should they return home; and the UK’s Eritrean communities face reprisals if they refuse to pay an enforced 2% tax on their income.[15] Beyond these examples, TNR can be deployed against a wide variety of individuals and groups including:

14.1.            Activists: Political activists and dissidents from places like China, Tibet, Iran, Rwanda and the Gulf face surveillance, cyber-attacks, intimidation and threats to family members. The Hong Kong Government has targeted a number of advocates for civil liberties, including British nationals, and issued arrest warrants and HK$1 million bounties for 19 exiled activists, of whom ten currently reside in the UK.[16] 

14.2.            Journalists: Journalists reporting on corruption and repression in countries such as Malaysia, Rwanda and Russia have been subject to coordinated online harassment campaigns, abusive lawsuits that threaten them with bankruptcy and expose them to serious psychological and professional pressure, and in some cases outright violence.[17] Hundreds of Iranian journalists in the UK have been subject to a long-running campaign of TNR which has included assassination plots and a stabbing in a London residential street.[18] Journalists exposed to TNR report self-censoring, psychological distress, hypervigilance, disruption to family life and isolation.[19]

14.3.            Lawyers: Lawyers who represent dissidents or journalists have also been the target of TNR. UK lawyers acting for publisher Jimmy Lai, a British citizen arbitrarily jailed in Hong Kong, have faced coordinated online threats and cyber-attacks.[20] The chilling effect of targeting lawyers could limit access to legal representation for other victims of TNR.

14.4.            Academics and students: Many students and academics studying authoritarian regimes report feeling a need to self-censor in the classroom.[21] UK-based academics have been subject to targeted sanctions, and UK PhD students have been arrested in the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia during fieldwork or family visits. A recent survey of 1500 UK social scientists found 67% considered academic freedom to be under threat, with one in five reporting having self-censored when teaching about autocratic countries.[22]

14.5.            Artists: Artists forced to flee due to the political nature of their work are susceptible to being denied access to UK venues, online harassment or hacking attempts due to their dependence on online platforms and social media to advertise their work.[23]

Government responses

What steps has the Government taken to address transnational repression in the UK?  What departments have been involved in these steps? How effective is coordination between departments?

15. Government responses to TNR have so far focused on threats to sovereignty and national security, rather than TNR’s impact on the exercise of fundamental rights and democratic resilience.[24] The Defending Democracy Taskforce, established by the previous government in 2022, acknowledged the issue of TNR within its broad remit, taking some important initial steps to raise awareness among law enforcement agencies.[25]

16. However, due to the lack of public communication or action, especially following the change of UK Government in 2024, the current status of the Taskforce and its work - including its objective to respond to TNR – remains unclear.  In the last Parliament, the National Security Strategy (Joint Committee) was supposed to review the work of the Defending Democracy Taskforce as part of its inquiry into Defending Democracy, but TNR was not explicitly included in the inquiry’s terms of reference.[26]

17. Given the cross-border nature of TNR, law enforcement can only provide part of the solution. The widespread use of coercion of family members, and the use of proxies and digital methods of repression, mean criminal prosecution is often not plausible. A broader approach centred on protection of targets’ rights regardless of whether a criminal case can be actioned in the UK judicial system, is necessary.  

Lessons from other countries

Several allied countries have taken action in relation to transnational repression in recent years. What could the UK Government learn from other countries’ legislative and policy responses to transnational repression?

18. Sweden’s criminal code includes a charge of refugee espionage, which refers to intelligence activities directed against opposition figures, regime critics and other minority groups in Sweden. Cases brought using this provision include a 2019 charge against a Swedish-Iraqi citizen who was monitoring members of the Iranian diaspora with the “intention of conveying the information to the government of Iran”.[27] Such cases are included in the security service’s annual reports, helping to raise public awareness.[28]

19. In Finland, a similar approach has been supported by the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, which includes public information on its website regarding the actions of “authoritarian regimes … to spy on citizens who have emigrated to Finland and engage in activities that these regimes consider a threat”.[29] Finland has signposted the risks from Russia and its influence on refugees in Finland as a justification for bringing in this provision.

20. In the United States, the FBI includes a dedicated TNR page on its website, which features resources such as a Threat Intimidation Guide and profiles of those sought in relation to acts of TNR.[30] Crucially it also includes a hotline and email address for anyone in the US (irrespective of citizenship) to report TNR, though this is a pre-existing mechanism for reporting complaints rather than a service set up specifically for TNR. While the hotline could be a vital tool for those being targeted to seek investigation, protection and prosecution, the degree to which it can offer support outside criminal investigation processes is unclear.

21. A similar approach has been taken by the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI) in France, which includes public information including case study examples on its website.[31] It has also established an email and phone helpline for those targeted by TNR to report incidents or threats. As with the FBI hotline, this is not limited to French citizens, and is a pre-existing mechanism used for other incidents as well.

22. There are examples of local authorities in other countries seeking to push back against TNR. For example, when the Chinese embassy in Italy warned that an exhibition in Brescia of work by artist and CCP critic Badiucao would “endanger the friendly relations between Italy and China”, Brescia’s mayor released a statement stating Brescia had “always championed freedom of expression and would continue to do so. Art should never be censored.”[32] Despite his intervention, however, there were reports of surveillance of attendees by unknown third parties and of vandalism of promotional materials.[33]

UK legal obligations

What international legal obligations does the UK have in relation to transnational repression? Are there further steps, including legislative, that the UK should take to give effect to those obligations?

23. TNR results in severe constraints on the exercise of fundamental human rights. Governments have a responsibility to protect individuals from such constraints and to provide individuals with access to redress where possible. As a signatory to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), for example, the UK is obligated to ensure to all individuals in its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant, such as freedom of expression, assembly and association.[34]

24. Under the Principles Relating to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions, or the Paris Principles, the UK’s National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) are responsible for providing “opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters concerning the promotion and protection of human rights”.[35] To date, the three NHRIs across the UK have not addressed TNR.

Police and security responses

How effective are the police at recognising and dealing with instances of transnational repression? Is a consistent approach offered by different police forces across the UK?

25. Testimony from victims of TNR suggests there is little consistency in the way police forces deal with reported cases.[36]

26. A central difficulty for targets of TNR is ensuring police have the necessary understanding and knowledge related to TNR, and the broader nature and context of the threats.[37] Oftentimes it is the responsibility of the target to make the case that an isolated act, such as online harassment, is part of a broader campaign supported by a foreign state or state actor.  

How effective is the support and security assistance offered to (a) individuals and (b) communities that are the targets of transnational repression? What guidance is provided to victims and how is it tailored depending on the state perpetrating the attack?)

27. There is no dedicated mechanism for reporting TNR violations at either a national or local level. A lack of institutional support leaves targeted individuals and communities more vulnerable. There is also no clear, accessible point of contact, leaving those targeted hesitant to report or seek help. This leads to a very low number of TNR cases being recorded, obscuring the severity of the issue.

28. There is a critical need for a national and local-level police response mechanism to effectively address threats of transnational repression. The Home Office’s reliance on existing reporting methods (999, 101, or local police stations) fails to address the lack of specialised training and coordination required to recognise and respond effectively to these threats. The lack of a dedicated reporting pathway increases the risk that police fail to identify TNR and react accordingly , particularly when incidents appear isolated rather than part of a broader campaign. Victims may also fear retaliation from the perpetrating state if their report is mishandled by police who lack the necessary expertise.

29. Additionally, there is no formal guidance for officers on how to assess TNR-related risks, including early warning signs such as intimidation of family members abroad. Establishing a specialized unit or dedicated officers trained in TNR would ensure uniformity in response, improve victim trust and reporting rates, and provide targeted communities with clear expectations about law enforcement intervention.

Misuse of multi-lateral cooperation mechanisms

Are multi-lateral police and judicial cooperation mechanisms, such as Interpol red notices, being misused by perpetrators of transnational repression? What steps can the Government take to prevent these mechanisms being misused against people in the UK?

30. As highlighted by Freedom House, “Interpol Red Notices are often treated by governments and law enforcement as international arrest warrants even though the accusations and information they contain are not independently verified and do not necessarily meet due process standards.”[38] This has allowed the Red Notice process to be weaponised by states behind TNR.

31. As Red Notices relate to alleged violations of national laws, public watchdogs, political opponents, human rights defenders and members of diaspora or exile communities can easily be targeted by states with weak rule of law protections, where criminality may be asserted on the basis of laws that do not meet international legal standards.

32. Often, confusion as to whether a Red Notice or Diffusion has been lodged can exert significant pressure on the target, leaving them unsure whether they can travel without risking detention.[39] For instance, in 2015, civil society organisations had to intervene in the case of British journalist Clare Rewcastle Brown after she was charged with ‘activities detrimental to parliamentary democracy’, which led Malaysia to lodge a Red Notice.[40] Only after the NGO Fair Trials communicated with Interpol did the agency confirm “that although a Red Notice request had been received, it was refused by the General Secretariat”. However, six years later, in 2021, fourteen organisations had to communicate again with Interpol to clarify whether another Red Notice had been lodged against Rewcastle Brown.[41]

33. Countries such as Canada, responding to this risk, have established a process of secondary vetting carried out by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police when responding to a Red Notice.[42]

34. In the UK, the Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Act 2020 allows for the provisional arrest of those who have an Interpol Red Notice or Red Diffusion lodged against them by countries listed in Schedule A1 of the Act.[43] However, this only takes place once the request has “been reviewed and, if considered appropriate, certified by the National Crime Agency (NCA). Certification by the NCA is therefore required before an arrest or provisional arrest can be made.”[44] This establishes a process by which the UK can guard against the abuse of the Interpol process. The UK should continue to monitor and review this process to ensure it is able to respond adequately to TNR deployed through the abuse of extradition requests and Interpol notices. Dedicated funding and training should be made available to the NCA and other relevant parties to ensure they have the resources and expertise to respond adequately to this complex issue.

35. While Interpol has been reforming its processes and protocols to prevent abuse of its platform, and following the election of Interpol’s Secretary General in 2024, the UK, as a member state, has a vital role to play to ensure any reform protects against the misuse of the agency to facilitate TNR.

International cooperation

How is the UK working with other democracies to tackle transnational repression? How can it do better?

36. In 2023, the Council of Europe passed a resolution acknowledging “Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights”.[45] The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) approved a report authored by Sir Christopher Chope, a UK representative on PACE, looking at this topic and steps the Council could take to tackle TNR.[46]

37. As an active member of the Council of Europe, the UK could continue to inform and shape collaboration across Council of Europe member states. This includes resolutions and ways in which information and best practice can be shared effectively.

38. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) can be deployed as part of a TNR strategy. In 2024, the EU passed the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive, which includes explicit legal protections against SLAPPs, or abusive legal threats or actions aimed at protected speech.[47] Crucially for TNR, the directive is in force for cross-border cases. It also allows for member states to refuse to recognise and enforce third-country judgments made against someone inside the member state if they fit the EU’s definition of a SLAPP, while also allowing the target to seek compensation for damage and costs.[48] These could establish meaningful protections against abusive legal threats brought as a TNR tactic in EU member states. While the UK is not covered by the directive, this highlights a significant step that can be explored and a process that can be learnt from to ensure British courts cannot be abused by TNR perpetrators.

39. At the 2023 Summit for Democracy, the Resisting Authoritarian Pressure cohort, established by Freedom House, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Alliance of Democracies established the Declaration of Principles to Combat Transnational Repression.[49] The declaration called on “democratic governments to acknowledge and commit to addressing the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of transnational repression”.[50] The declaration was signed by six nations, including Australia, Germany, Chile, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and the USA. While the UK Government was present at the Summit it is not a signatory of this declaration. The cross-border nature of TNR makes such collaboration with other democratic states even more important. While this submission is not an endorsement of the declaration, the UK’s participation in public collaborations such as this would signal to TNR targets and the broader civil society its willingness to engage on this topic.

Diplomatic relations

How is the UK’s response to transnational repression affected by its diplomatic relationships with perpetrator states and how does transnational repression factor into the UK’s diplomatic decision-making?

40. Complicity and inaction of host states and other actors is a central enabling factor for TNR. The UK has often prioritised relationships with state perpetrators of TNR, especially allies and security partners such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and trading partners such as China. This undermines our espoused values as a democratic country that respects the ‘rule of law’.

41. Powerful states with established trade or diplomatic ties to the UK are able to use their relationships to dissuade more robust state action in response to acts of TNR. Saudi Arabian satirist Ghanem al-Masarir is currently bringing legal action against Saudi Arabia in relation to digital surveillance and a 2018 physical attack he faced in London. Last year, media reporting on a meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the former Foreign Secretary, David Cameron held in Riyadh highlighted how the Crown Prince and his team “warned the issue could have ‘implications for existing and future Saudi investment in the UK which we are told is more than £100bn’, according to a summary prepared by British officials.”[51]

(Feb 2025)