Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy
● Significant Threats: The UK faces mounting disinformation threats from hostile state actors—primarily Russia and China—and non-state entities, which undermine democratic processes and electoral integrity.
● Global Impact: Disinformation campaigns are not confined to the UK; Europe, the Americas, the Indo-Pacific, and Africa also experience targeted efforts to polarise societies and erode trust in institutions.
● Tactics and Technologies: Malign actors utilise advanced tools such as AI-driven content, bots, deepfakes, and synthetic media to spread misleading narratives across mainstream and alternative digital platforms swiftly.
● Undermining Democracy: Past incidents—including interference in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the 2016 EU membership referendum, and recent electoral events—illustrate how disinformation disrupts public discourse and compromises democratic values.
● Countermeasures in Action: The UK has established specialised units (e.g. NSOIT) and collaborated with private sector partners like Google Threat Intelligence to detect, counter, and mitigate disinformation threats.
● International Collaboration: Effective responses have emerged through partnerships with the USA, Canada, and the G7 and initiatives such as the #TakenFromUkraine campaign, highlighting the importance of cross-border coordination.
● Learning from Allies: Best practices from NATO, the EU, Sweden, and Canada—such as whole-of-society strategies, evidence-based policymaking, and proactive public education—offer valuable insights for strengthening resilience against disinformation.
● Call to Action: There is an urgent need for enhanced legislative measures, improved digital literacy, and robust fact-checking to safeguard democratic integrity against evolving AI-powered disinformation campaigns.
● What are the actual and perceived threats to the UK and UK interests from state and non-state actor disinformation campaigns?
The United Kingdom (UK) faces significant threats from disinformation from hostile states, particularly Russia and China. Past interference through AI-enabled disinformation intended to disrupt elections underscores the ongoing risk of contributing to polarised political discourse and public opinion, ultimately compromising election integrity. Earlier disinformation efforts to undermine the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 European Union (EU) membership referendum aimed to spread false or misleading information to influence public opinion and disrupt the electoral process. Furthermore, there have been instances of social media bot accounts amplifying divisive information and narratives like climate denial and conspiracy theories and interacting with conspiracy-driven media to spread harmful content collaboratively.
The actual threats loom over in the form of election interference, attempts to discourage support to its key allies and partners, and instigate civil unrest. However, the very nature of disinformation, when weaponised by malign actors, presents more significant perceived threats like compromised information integrity, societal polarisation undermined trust in government, institutions, allies and partners, and an erosion in democratic integrity. Disinformation incurs long-term damage to society, whose effects linger on the fabric of societal cohesion and value-based systems. Such accrued effects would compromise the UK’s domestic and overseas interests and undermine public trust.
● What are the actual and perceived threats to Europe, the Americas, the Indo-Pacific, and Africa from state-sponsored disinformation campaigns targeting democratic values and institutions?
Europe faces threats from foreign actors, especially Russia and China, through systematic disinformation tactics, which have been incorporated as a strategic tool, particularly by Russia, to influence political outcomes, promote far-right parties, undermine public support for Ukraine and erode unity within the EU. This has led to heightened concerns about electoral integrity and preserving democratic values, especially as foreign actors exploit internal divisions and sow distrust in European institutions. This happens by leveraging existing internal vulnerabilities to disrupt the social cohesion and trust among member nations. By amplifying divisions, malicious actors can undermine confidence in European institutions and ignite political tensions, usually through narratives of anti-West and anti-NATO sentiments.
In the Americas, historically rooted scepticism towards the government and public institutions in the USA has allowed room for malign actors, both foreign and domestic, to manipulate public opinion, allowing hostile actors like Russia, China and Iran to amplify false narratives. This scepticism has also made room for ‘participatory disinformation’ where individuals unknowingly spread false narratives, which, alongside social factors like increased screen time and reliance on the internet or social media for news, makes the public more susceptible to manipulation, resulting in a vulnerable information ecosystem. Similarly, Canada has faced and countered disinformation challenges by foreign actors seeking political influence and strategic advantage. Moreover, in Latin America, social media’s prevalence allows room for disinformation, especially during elections and key issues. This dynamic, combined with the domestic socio-political challenges like poverty, inequality and corruption, creates a fertile ground for radicalisation and populism. Additionally, the negative perception of Western countries allows rival states, primarily Russia and China, to spread favourable narratives in pursuing their strategic interests and increasing influence in the region.
In the Indo-Pacific, states are subjected to state-backed disinformation threatening information integrity in the strategic discourse. For instance, the Philippines has seen a surge in disinformation campaigns since 2023; South Korea faced a deepfake video during the 2023 elections, while Taiwan experienced a dedicated campaign against it during the 2024 presidential elections. Moreover, China has actively spread a sense of scepticism in Taiwan and Japan regarding the USA’s security guarantees in potential conflicts in the region. Furthermore, efforts to undermine regional cooperation, such as the Quad being targeted with disinformation challenging its credibility, reflect China's seeking to imbibe a political discourse and sentiment that favours its interests with a more significant threat to electoral processes, weakened alliances, constant diplomatic tensions, regular foreign interference, compromised economic and national security and a more significant Chinese influence in the region.
In Africa, the rapid expansion of digital communications, increased internet users, and restricted press freedom have turned the continent into a battleground of narratives. External actors like Russia and China, in pursuit of their geostrategic interests, embed anti-west sentiments, promote themselves as a more reliable partner committed to Africa’s development, distort the public perception of democratic governance by spreading misleading narratives about the effectiveness of democratic systems and institutions, and highlight the flaws in western democracy to undermine citizens’ trust in democracy itself. Here, Russia has promoted narratives destabilising fair elections and rallying support for coups in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, eroding confidence in democratic values and shifting support towards authoritarian regimes. This undermines self-determination and political decision-making where foreign interests are promoted instead of local needs. Furthermore, disinformation deepens political and ethnic divides, weakens social cohesion and creates a propaganda-dominated discourse. Lastly, many African countries lack adequate expertise and resources to counter disinformation, weakening the continent's democratic resilience.
Impact of State and Non-State Actor Disinformation
● Who are the main state and non-state actors spreading disinformation?
Russia:
Russia has employed various disinformation campaigns, most notably using false news sites, Facebook pages and personas to create favourable perceptions of Russian activities in Syria and the 2014 Ukrainian conflict; apart from the GRU, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a “troll factory” founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2013 spread anti-Western narratives and conspiracy theories on social media. The IRA was active during the 2016 US Presidential elections, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Crimea crisis. Furthermore, the Doppelganger campaign, which has been active since at least 2022, has used cybersquatting tactics to create credible-looking fake websites to disseminate fabricated news. This campaign involved the Social Design Agency, Structura National Technology (Structura) and ANO Dialog, which allegedly, under the operational control of Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy chief of staff to President Vladimir Putin, disseminated propaganda to reduce international support to Ukraine, boosted pro-Russian interest and influence voters in the 2024 US Presidential elections. Other streams for Russian propaganda dissemination include Sputnik News, Russia Today (RT), (and its offspring now defunct ICYMI and In The Now). In Africa, Russia has also used paid influencers, and front organisations like PARADE and GPCI, established by Russian embassies. Furthermore, following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in 2023, newly established groups like Africa Initiative News and the Russian Africa Corps are continuing Wagner Group-linked operations.
Iran:
Iran is known to carry influence operations through disinformation tactics in the US, particularly during election cycles, targeting officials, media, NGOs and individuals. These efforts are usually linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). A prominent example is Endless Mayfly, an Iran-linked network of inauthentic social media accounts, websites and online personas amplifying false narratives against the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The modus operandi was to publish polarising content on impersonating websites, amplified by the online personas in social media conversations, often engaging with political dissidents, activists and journalists. Upon gaining social media traction, the content was deleted, and the link redirected to the impersonated domain, concealing the origin of the false news. This network has caused confusion and incorrect reporting, and despite exposure, the network remains active despite changes in its methods. Other documented efforts include deceptive websites like the Savannah Tim,e which claims to be of conservative orientation; Westland Sun, which appears to be friendly towards the Muslim community; and Nio Thinker, which claims to be a progressive outlet. Disgusting as outlets of differing political orientations are Iran-linked websites that intended to imbibe internal discord in the American community by spreading polarising content and influencing election outcomes.
China:
China widely uses disinformation tactics as a larger strategy to promote both pro-Chinese rhetoric and disruptive disinformation. An example of the former is the 50 Cent Party online commentators paid by Chinese government officials tasked with spreading propaganda in favour of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the latter case, the influence operation called Spamouflage involved fake social media accounts posting on socially and politically provocative issues like support for Ukraine and policy towards Israel, as well as targeting pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. The posts also praised China’s handling of COVID-19 and the CCP. Such efforts indicate China’s willingness to adopt deceptive tactics exploiting social rifts in foreign lands. In Africa, China conducts multi-regional disinformation operations through organisations like the United Front and China Media Group known for often amplifying Russian narratives and sedimenting CCP narratives through licensing and training agreements with African media.
Furthermore, in Asia-Pacific, known Chinese disinformation efforts are Operational Naval Gazing and DRAGONBRIDGE. The former aim against the Philippines involved criticising US military presence in the Asia-Pacific, praising political figures who did not oppose China’s position in the region and applauding Chinese naval accomplishments in the South China Sea. The latter was aimed at discrediting pro-independence Taiwanese political leaders alongside US counterparts.
Terrorist/Extremist groups:
Terrorist groups are now increasingly using Generative AI for disinformation or propaganda purposes. For instance, Islamic State affiliates have used Generative AI for translation of ISIS speeches into different languages and scripts as well as for creating posters and imagery. Moreover, al-Qaeda has shown interest in AI chatbots, voice cloning, and image generators with an al-Qaeda affiliate group announcing online AI workshops, and partnering with other such affiliate groups to release a guide to use AI chatbots providing ChatGPT’s basic overview. Furthermore, during the Israel-Gaza conflict, Hamas-affiliated groups spread disturbing content on the internet using AI-manipulated pictures of young children or babies injured in the war as a means to instigate violent sentiments online and simultaneously undermine Israel.
Non-state actors and groups:
There is a surge in private firms offering disinformation services to prospective clients. An Israeli contracting group dubbed Team Jorge (named after its leader Tal Hanan’s operating pseudonym - Jorge) has been particularly active in disinformation operations in 30 elections worldwide, providing services in the manipulation of public opinion using the Advanced Impact Media Solutions (AIMS) software that allowed them to manage fake social media accounts across platforms. Some other known firms are Faze, a London-based influencer marketing agency and a subsidiary of AdNow, a Russian marketing firm which propagated false narratives about the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine; CLS Strategies, a Washington-based firm that propagated support for the Bolivian government with similar work undertaken in Mexico and Venezuela. Furthermore, a Bangladeshi content farm was uncovered supporting the Chinese Spamouflage network.
● What channels and technologies are state and non-state actors using to spread disinformation?
State and non-state actors increasingly rely on social media platforms and the internet as primary channels for spreading disinformation as it allows continuous large-scale and swift dissemination of targeted disinformation through synthesised texts, manipulated images/videos, memes, parodies, etc. Some prominent methods are using conspiracy theories to confirm existing biases, leveraging distrust of the government, emotion-driven arguments, political polarisation, cognitive and confirmation biases, and information overload into discussions to confuse the audience.
Disinformation is carried out using bots (automated social media accounts disseminating particular false information), sock puppets (fake accounts controlled by one person impersonating someone else), and trolls (accounts intentionally invoking negative emotion in discourse). Other than the most popular social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok, disinformation actors are likely to use any alternative platforms with limited user protections, content moderation and means to remove inauthentic information. In addition to social media, disinformation actors run fake websites, blogs, personas, and media outlets that fake legitimacy and credibility. Their impact is further exacerbated by AI, ML, LLMs, big data, geofencing, deepfakes, deep video portraits, and voice cloning.
The most significant risk to democratic values and institutions stems from AI-powered disinformation. While disinformation is not new, the scale and sophistication of modern campaigns are unprecedented. AI can create psychological profiles based on user data and then use generative AI to craft individual messages tailored to each user's psychological profile. The danger of these combined methods is greater than the sum of its parts. Though these do not specifically need to target democratic values, inherently, they undermine democratic processes. They attempt to manipulate individuals' cognitive processes to elicit political actions such as participating in a demonstration or voting. This way, they compromise democratic decision-making processes and the ability of democracies to manage any other challenge, be it the climate crisis, the rise of China, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, or anything else. Notably, this type of algorithmic cognitive warfare can also be used by actors seeking to destroy democracy from within.
Countermeasures: Cross-sector coordination and Effectiveness
● The effectiveness of cross-departmental and inter-governmental coordination, alongside the private sector in countering state-sponsored disinformation?
In a government capacity, dedicated units like the National Security and Online Information Team (NSOIT), previously known as the Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU), demonstrate the proactive approach to counter-disinformation. The CDU was able to counter Russian disinformation about the illegal invasion of Ukraine. This included the denials of the Bucha massacre and the maternity hospital bombing Mariupol, which the Russian embassy accounts deemed hoaxes. 95% of the referrals made by then-CDU post-Russian invasion of Ukraine were connected to Russian state-backed disinformation.
Regarding coordination with the private sector, Google Threat Intelligence and the UK government were instrumental in monitoring, identifying and countering information threats, especially regarding interference in the 2024 UK General Elections. However, from the government’s end, despite establishing security measures like the Joint Election Security Preparations Unit, gaps in public awareness, delayed implementation of the Online Safety Bill, and inconsistent enforcement of platform policies exacerbated risks.
Regarding inter-governmental coordination, several instances showcase the UK’s capacity and effectiveness to work alongside its counterparts. For example, the FCDO effectively countered Russian disinformation efforts to influence Moldova's 2024 presidential election outcome by setting up a cross-government task force alongside the USA and Canada. In another instance, following the 2018 Salisbury poisonings, the UK was instrumental in working alongside the EU East StratCom Task Force, where the FCDO coordinated across the UK government and international partners, enabling a coordinated counter-disinformation effort.
● How effective has the FCDO been in working with allies, and multilateral security organisations, to combat the spread of state-sponsored disinformation in Europe, the Americas, Indo-Pacific, and Africa regions seeking to interfere with democratic institutions and democratic values?
The FCDO has addressed the impending threats from disinformation and has voiced measures against it. In November 2024, the UK Statement at the UN Fourth Committee on Information Integrity reiterated support for the UN’s Global Principles for Information Integrity and commitment to the UN Pact for the Future and Global Digital Compact. Advocating a human rights-based approach to protect information integrity, it highlighted the Online Safety Act, which mandates the removal of AI-generated disinformation and the Foreign Interference Offence, which forces tech companies to counter state-backed disinformation. Furthermore, the UK, working alongside the G7, seeks to deliver a Collective Response Framework to expose influence operations and is contributing funds to the Mis- and Disinformation in Peacekeeping Settings Project in light of disinformation targeting UN peacekeepers.
FCDO worked alongside the USA and Canada to expose Russian attempts to influence the 2024 Moldova election outcomes and responded directly to Russian disinformation against Ukraine through the #TakenFromUkraine campaign highlighting the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children. Earlier in the aftermath of the 2018 Salisbury poisoning, the UK countered false narratives by working alongside the EU East StratCom Task Force, which published a Disinformation Review highlighting the evidence of disinformation tactics like fabrications, memes, trolling and malign rhetoric. Here, the FCDO coordinated across international partners, ensuring a collective response.
Beyond such efforts, FCDO is also involved in building resilience, for instance, by assisting regional digital newsrooms in India in using AI to counter fake news, supporting the development of fact-checking tools, delivering digital literacy courses, and training journalists on conflict-sensitive reporting to ensure information integrity. Furthermore, FCDOs extend global coalitions like the Media Freedom Coalition, UNESCO’s Global Media Defence Fund, and BBC World Service. As part of the Integrated Review Refresh 2023, additional funds were allocated to safeguard all World Service language services and support counter-disinformation.
Learning from Allies: Best Practices in Countering Disinformation
● What lessons can the UK learn from allies in countering state-sponsored disinformation targeting democratic values and institutions?
NATO
NATO’s strategy encompasses short-, medium-, and long-term actions based on four key functions - Understand the information environment, Prevent the effectiveness of threats, Contain and mitigate specific disinformation cases, and Recover through lessons learned. Furthermore, NATO anticipates potential threats, proactively shares correct information to ‘pre-bunk’ false narratives, and directly engages with the public through education campaigns. Beyond this, it maintains expert networks with stakeholders through the NATO Rapid Response Group (NRRG), complementing mechanisms similar to those of the EU Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM). Lastly, learning from experiences, NATO refines its strategies to improve future responses.
European Union
The EU's counter-disinformation efforts include a ‘whole-of-society’ approach encompassing tech companies, media outlets and public awareness to tackle disinformation. This includes strengthening democratic institutions supporting media pluralism and independent journalism, ensuring adequate media and public literacy towards disinformation threats, adaptation to evolving disinformation tactics and a coordination framework encompassing government authorities, tech firms, and civil society to ensure a unified response. The EU’s approach also encompasses proactive legislative action in response to foreign actors seeking to manipulate elections in the EU, such as the Digital Servies Act, new transparency rules for political advertising and AI regulations to ensure transparency. Furthermore, scenario-based testing ahead of critical events like the European Commission’s ‘stress test’ with tech firms and social media platforms before Germany's 2024 election ensures resilience towards disinformation and readiness to mitigate potential harm, reinforcing the need for ongoing cooperation and accountability in safeguarding democracy.
Sweden
The Swedish approach focuses on evidence-based policymaking and empowers many actors by analysing domestic vulnerabilities as disinformation exploits existing societal attitudes and divisions. This research trains government officials, civil society and relevant industries. Journalists are taught through an intermediary organisation to avoid government influence, while high-ranking government officials participate in exercises that simulate responses to disinformation. Transparency is key to the Swedish approach, with research results shared in public awareness campaigns and the authorities being transparent about their activities to establish trust and avoid perceptions that the government controls the information space.
Canada
The Canadian approach displays several aspects similar to the Swedish approach, notably transparency, journalism support, and whole-of-government simulations. Additionally, Canada has tried to protect counter-disinformation from politicisation by involving all federal political parties in preparations to protect the 2019 elections and established key decision-making functions with senior civil servants rather than politicians. This is crucial in the sense that anti-disinformation measures are not misused to control opinions. Here, the UK’s decentralised approach with anti-disinformation teams across departments is advantageous as it enhances resilience and preserves institutional integrity.
Bios:
Charles Bauman is the Director of London Politica’s Europe Programme. Charles joined London Politica's Europe Desk in 2023 and has been with London Politica since 2022, having previously worked on the Conflict and Security Programme, bringing extensive experience in geopolitical analysis, policy research and consulting. Previously, Charles was a Consultant at the Public Affairs and political consulting firm H/Advisors Cicero in the Research and Campaigns team, advising clients on their strategic communications and political engagement campaigns. Before that, Charles worked as a consultant at the research and advisory firm Verdantix, focusing on public policy, sustainability, and tech and business strategy. Charles deeply understands European and UK political landscapes, legislative processes, and international relations, which he applies to client-facing projects and thought leadership. A London School of Economics graduate with a master's in Theory and History of International Relations, Charles also holds a master's degree in Medieval History from King’s College London. His work has been published on leading platforms, reflecting his expertise in international relations, politics, and governance.
Ridipt Singh is the Programme Director of Emerging Technologies at London Politica. His research focuses on strategic affairs, international security, emerging technologies, and disinformation.
Hendrik A. Pasligh is the Assistant Programme Director of Emergent Technologies at London Politica. His research interests include disinformation, AI, space, technology transfer, and renewable energy. 9DashLine, The Defence Horizon Journal, The Kiel Seapower Series, the East Asia Forum, and the Security Distillery have published Hendrik’s analysis. Before joining the Emergent Technologies Programme, he was a Research Analyst at London Politica’s Geopolitics on the Periphery Programme. Hendrik is a Young Leader at the Pacific Forum.
24 February 2025