WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY MR MICHAEL POLAK AND MR ALI YILDIZ

(TRUK0151)

Introduction

1. Transnational repression is a recent term. In its report published in 2021, Freedom House presented the most comprehensive overview of transnational repression as a global phenomenon. According to the report, the following are the most common techniques used by perpetrator states:

▪         direct attacks by which “an origin State carries out a targeted physical attack against an individual abroad”: assassinations, assaults, disappearances, physical intimidation, and violent forced renditions);

▪         co-opting other countries, which is a situation where States manipulate other States “to act against a target through detention, unlawful deportation, and other types of forced renditions, which are authorised through pro forma but meaningless legal procedures”;

▪         mobility controls which are defined as tactics including “passport cancellation and denial of consular services, preventing the target from travelling or causing them to be detained”; and

▪         threats from a distance include “online intimidation or surveillance and coercion by proxy, in which a person’s family, loved one, or business partner is threatened, imprisoned, or otherwise targeted”.[1]

2. The Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (“PACE”) noted that there are four main methods of transnational repression:

▪         direct attacks by which an origin State carries out a targeted physical attack against an individual abroad, such as assassinations, assaults, disappearances, physical intimidation, and violent forced renditions;

▪         co-opting other countries to act against a target through detention, unlawful deportation, and other types of forced renditions, which are authorized through pro forma but meaningless legal procedures. This method includes misuse of Interpol Red Notices, extradition proceedings, and other forms of interstate legal assistance such as anti-money laundering and anti-terror financing measures;

▪         mobility hindrances such as passport cancellation and denial of consular services, preventing the target from travelling or causing them to be detained;

▪         threats from a distance, including online intimidation or surveillance and coercion by proxy, in which a person’s family, loved one, or business partner is threatened, imprisoned, or otherwise targeted.[2]

3. According to a statement of the FBI’s Assistant Director, when foreign governments reach beyond their borders to intimidate, silence, coerce, harass, or harm members of their diaspora and exiled communities in the United States, this amounts to  transnational repression. Foreign governments may use transnational repression tactics to silence the voices of their citizens (or non-citizens connected to the country), to prize information from them, or to coerce them to return to their country of origin. Transnational repression may take a number of difference forms forms including abusive legal practices (e.g. Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”)lawsuits, asset freezing, or the withholding of legal documents, such as passports). [3]

4. According to a memorandum of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security of the USA,, dated 5  January 2024, transnational repression (TNR) occurs when foreign repressive governments stalk, intimidate, or assault individuals beyond their borders, including within the United States. The repression by foreign governments , has at times, targeted individuals specifically because of their faith community affiliation. The objectives of those foreign, repressive governments that engage in this type of activity beyond their borders is typically to silence dissent, to obtain information, to intimidate community advocates, or to coerce individuals to return to their countries of origin.[4]

Türkiye

5. According to Freedom House, the most prolific perpetrators of transnational repression are the governments of China, Türkiye, Russia, Egypt, and Tajikistan.[5]

6. Türkiye is also one of the four states covered in a PACE report titled “Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights”. According to the report, dated 5 June 2023, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: “The Assembly is concerned about the fact that Türkiye has also used some of the tools of transnational repression, particularly following the coup attempt of July 2016 and its consistent policy of pursuing, amongst others, anyone allegedly related to the “Gülen Movement”, which is referred to as the “Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ)” by the Turkish authorities. The Turkish campaign has been found to rely on renditions, abuse of extradition proceedings, Interpol Red Notices and anti-terror financing measures, and co-opting other States to deport or transfer persons unlawfully.”[6]

7. The report also says: “It has also been reported that Türkiye is using anti-terror financing measures as a tool of transnational repression against persons allegedly affiliated with the Gülen movement. In 2021, the government adopted asset-freezing decrees targeting some of these persons living abroad, who as a result faced problems with their bank accounts or credit cards. Some reported that the Turkish embassy in their country of residence visited the banks and informed them about the decrees.” [7]

8. The resolution of PACE read: “The Turkish campaign of transnational repression has been found to have recourse to rendition, abuse of extradition proceedings, INTERPOL Red Notices and anti-terror financing measures, and co-opting other States to deport or transfer persons unlawfully.” [8]

Scope of the Submission

9. This submission addresses the Republic of Türkiye’s misuse of anti-terrorism financing laws, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, and terrorism-related listings as instruments of transnational repression. It highlights how these measures have been employed to target individuals residing in or connected with the United Kingdom, who are perceived by the Turkish authorities to have affiliations with the Gülen Movement.

10. While this submission draws significantly on the findings of our 2022 report titled “Weaponization of Anti-Terror Financing Measures: The Turkish Government’s New Transnational Repression Tool to Silence Its Critics,” it is not limited to the scope of that report and incorporates additional evidence and analysis.

11. The objective of this submission is to elucidate how the Turkish authorities have systematically exploited the nation’s anti-terrorism laws and FATF standards under the pretext of combatting terrorism financing to target those who are dissidents or are considered to be acting against the current Turkish regime. This exploitation has been aimed at suppressing political dissent and financially incapacitating individuals and entities perceived as associated with the Gülen Movement, particularly those residing abroad, with a specific focus on the United Kingdom.

12. In practice, these laws are weaponised as instruments of oppression, targeting both individuals and legal entities perceived to oppose the Turkish government or to have connections with its critics. The application of these measures results in severe and often disproportionate consequences for the affected parties, both at the individual and institutional levels.

13. The Resolution 2509 (2023) of PACE read: “The Turkish campaign of transnational repression has been found to have recourse to rendition, abuse of extradition proceedings, INTERPOL Red Notices and anti-terror financing measures, and co-opting other States to deport or transfer persons unlawfully.” [9] According to the PACE report and resolution, the misuse on politically motivated grounds of interstate legal co-operation mechanisms such as anti-money laundering and anti-terror financing measures may result in violations of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention and the right to property guaranteed by Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention (ETS No. 9). This may in turn lead to financial exclusion of targeted individuals and NGOs and effectively prevent them from conducting their human rights activities and participating in economic and social life. [10]

Abuse of anti-terror financing measures by the Turkish government as a tool of transnational repression

14. In January 2021, Turkey amended the Law on the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism (Law No. 6415). Amnesty International at that time reported this law  to be highly problematic and abusive and that it did not offer any possible domestic remedy for those who might be wronged by a likely misuse of this law by the Turkish authorities. [11] Likewise, an NGO, Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, concluded that Turkey’s practices on anti-terrorist financing policies were not proportionate, disrupted legitimate civil activities, and therefore were a breach of FATF recommendations.[12]

15. Since the said amendment, the Government adopted four separate asset-freezing decrees (dated 7 April 2021, 24 December 2021, 31 August 2024, 7 January 2025) targeting 703 individuals and legal persons (relief organisations, human rights NGOs, private schools and other NGOs) who according to the Turkish government affiliated with the Gulen Movement that Turkish government calls FETO/PDY. [13] [14] [15]

16. Those 703 persons include dual British Turkish citizens, journalists, academics, authors, teachers, and lawyers, most of whom have been granted residence permit or asylum by democratic Western countries because of their politically motivated persecution by the Turkish government. Targeted journalists currently live in the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada. The first decree dated 7 April 2021 also targeted journalists, columnists, authors and academics living abroad. Of those individuals and legal persons, at least 29 live or based in the United Kingdom, and this again includes British citizens.
17. Türkiye has also targeted the United Kingdom based relief organisation Time to Help UK despite the fact that Time to Help UK[16] has never been active in Türkiye, and the Government of Türkiye therefore has had no jurisdiction over its activities anywhere. 
18. One clear example shows that the purpose of the measures in question has nothing to do with countering terrorism-financing, but that on the contrary, the measures are aimed at the repression of dissidents living abroad. Decrees dated 7 April 2021 and 24 December 2021 targeted those living abroad whose assets in Turkey have already been seized by the judicial authorities. However, financial repression of journalists and other government critics has long been in the repression toolbox of the Turkish government. In December 2016, Istanbul Criminal Peace Judgeship froze the assets of 54 journalists in a single order.[17] The very same journalists, targeted with Istanbul Criminal Peace Judgeship’s order of December 2016, have now been targeted with an administrative asset freezing decree. As any assets of theirs within Turkey had already been seized or frozen as per a judgeship order, there was point to an administrative decree to do the same. That being said, it appeared that two concerned administrative decrees of 2021 aimed to persecute them abroad through the international mechanism that are supposed to be focused upon fighting terrorist financing.

How these politically motivated measures inflict harm upon those targeted

19. There are several multinational financial intelligence and due diligence companies that have branches in Turkey. For instance, multinationals such as Refinitiv-World Check and Lexis-Nexis have branches or partners in Turkey, who collect and process data, including the personal data of individuals, and share it with their customers across the world. The data on the Turkish authorities’ political persecution measures against its critics are included into the databases of these banks and companies and transferred abroad and can be incorporated into databases of foreign countries.
20. Within the scope of the report mentioned at § 10, we surveyed 34 individuals who were targeted with the first twoaforementioned decrees and are currently living abroad. Of those, 13 participants are academics, 6 are journalists in exile, 2 are human rights defenders (staff of human rights NGOs), 1 is a lawyer, 2 are university students, and 10 are from other professions. 20 participants have been recognized as political refugees, 10 are immigrants living abroad because of the fear of political persecution, and 4 are dual national Turkish citizens. 17 participants live in the European Union, 9 in the United Kingdom and 8 in the USA and Canada.
21. 17 participants out of the 34 do not have any assets in Turkey, while the other 17 do. 12 of 17 who have assets in Turkey have already been subjected to asset freezing measures by judicial warrants. Therefore, if the purpose was not related to targeting them abroad, there would be no point in including 29 of those 34 participants in these decrees as the individuals either do not have any assets in Turkey or have already been subjected to asset freezing measures with judicial warrants.
22. 19 participants stated that they faced one or more adverse outcomes immediately after the respective decree became public. 9 participants were denied the opening of a bank account, 3 participants’ banks closed their accounts, the credit cards of 2 were cancelled, and 3 participants’ accounts on online payment platforms were closed. Further, 5 participants’ banks requested an explanation to decide whether to keep him/her as a client.
23. This problem was also covered in June 2024 report of UK think-tank, The Royal United Services Institute. It found, similarly to our report, that persons who reside outside their home country can also be denied access to financial products and services they are targeted through the weaponization of FATF standards.[18] It said that “This is most common when data providers incorporate domestic terrorism lists into the data packages they sell to financial institutions for conducting customer due diligence screening. Where terrorism designations are politically motivated, their effects on victims/survivors are inadvertently amplified by these data providers, with accounts being closed on the basis of this risk screening. Existing AML rules for the private sector mean that victims have no right to know the information (or its source) that may have led to account closures or refusals.”[19] It also found that “Asset freezing makes living an ordinary life next to impossible for any individual, effectively kicking them out of the financial services sphere. Individual victims/survivors have trouble securing employment in the formal economy or elsewhere unless salaries are paid in cash, and they are ineligible for loans, mortgages and other financial services. Some are forced to seek and complete work contracts under the names of friends or family members.”
24. Individuals targeted by the Turkish government’s measures, when seeking to mitigate or end the harm caused by such actions, have approached due diligence companies operating in the United Kingdom, the United States, or the European Union with requests for the deletion of data relating to them. These companies, however, routinely dismiss such requests, asserting that the data in question is sourced from open sources, is merely relayed to their clients without modification or interpretation, and that they are therefore neither obliged to delete the data nor liable for any resulting harm.
25. Consequently, the Turkish government has effectively utilised due diligence companies based in the United Kingdom, the United States, or the European Union as unwitting instruments of its transnational repression. These companies have inadvertently become vehicles for the Turkish government’s efforts to perpetuate harm against its critics and dissenters. The legal mechanisms for challenging these companies are complex and outside the financial reach of many dissidents who have had to flee with little resources and whose finances have been restricted or frozen.

Conclusion and Recommendations

26. The evidence presented in this submission highlights the systematic misuse of anti-terrorism financing laws and FATF standards by the Turkish government to repress political dissent and silence critics, including those residing in the United Kingdom. These actions represent a clear violation of international human rights standards and undermine the intended purpose of counter-terrorism frameworks. It is critical that such abuses are addressed to safeguard the rule of law, protect human rights, and maintain the integrity of international legal and financial systems.
27. The United Kingdom should adopt robust safeguards to prevent the misuse of international co-operation mechanisms, ensuring that such requests are rigorously assessed for their adherence to human rights standards.
28. The UK government should collaborate with FATF and other international bodies to reform and strengthen regulations, to prevent their exploitation for politically motivated repression.
29. The UK government should oblige financial institutions and due diligence companies to implement stringent procedures to avoid amplifying the effects of politically motivated actions, ensuring that individuals are not wrongfully excluded from financial systems.
30. The UK government should set up a free or low-cost mechanism by which individuals affected by measures targeted at them because of the political views, which are implemented by UK financial institutions and due diligence companies, can challenge such implementation.  This must be an objective body, with no link to the financial institution or due diligence companies, that has the power to order the UK institutions and due diligence to make corrections and pay damages if measure have been improperly implemented.

Authors of Submission

Michael Polak

Michael Polak represents clients in the most high profile and important cases before international courts, United Nations bodies, in human rights related arbitrations, in proceedings around the world, and before the courts of England and Wales.

Michael’s work covers public international law, international crime, human rights, fraud, private prosecutions, strategic litigation, and serious criminal offences. Michael’s work often has an international element, and he was awarded the prestigious International Bar Association’s Outstanding Young Lawyer in 2021. This award is given to one young lawyer every year in recognition of their ‘excellence in their work and achievements in their career to date, but also a commitment to professional and ethical standards as well as a commitment to the larger community.’ Michael was recognised as the most outstanding young lawyer in the world for his ‘commitment to defending human rights across the globe through his professional practice and personal endeavours’.  Michael was described as ‘relentless in the pursuit of justice’ and IBA President Sternford Moyo stated the following:

‘As the global voice of the legal profession, the IBA recognises the importance of celebrating lawyers who go above and beyond the call of duty. Mr Polak is undoubtedly one such lawyer. In a relatively short period, he has demonstrated an extraordinary level of commitment to humanitarian causes and an unrivalled determination to make a positive impact on the legal world. It is my sincere hope that Mr Polak’s work serves as inspiration to other young lawyers and encourages them to fight against injustice, wherever they see it.

Ali Yildiz

Ali Yildiz is the founder of Ali Yildiz Legal, a member of the Ankara and Brussels Bar Associations, has been practicing law since 2004.

He is also founder of the Arrested Lawyers Initiative; a Brussels based human rights group.

Ali is a member of Fair Trials Legal Experts Advisory Panel and Lawyers Against Transnational Repression. He has successfully advised and represented the victims of INTERPOL abuse. He holds an LLB degree from the University of Ankara and an LLM degree in International and European Law from Vrije Universiteit Brussel. His articles are published on Verfassungsblog, Just Security and The International Association of Constitutional Law. He is regularly consulted by the media, including The Wall Street Journal, Al-Monitor, Balkan Insight, Turkish Minute, Ahval, Free Turkish Press, and The National.

(Feb 2025)