WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY DR JOHN MCDANIEL
(TRUK0149)
Q.3 (Law enforcement and support for victims): How effective is the support and security assistance offered to (a) individuals and (b) communities that are the targets of transnational repression? What guidance is provided to victims and how is it tailored depending on the state perpetrating the attack?
Though Freedom House (2022) has lauded the UK for its 'best practice' in response to transnational repression, including recognising risk-to-life threats and warning targets, the extent to which transnational repression affects individuals living in the UK is almost impossible to gauge at present. It is also extremely difficult to understand and assess the UK’s official approach to transnational repression.
Much of what we know about transnational repression is drawn from the work of non-governmental organisations and non-profits such as Amnesty International and Freedom House rather than official or governmental sources.
NGOs and non-profits are able to gather information on transnational repression, in part, because when victims of transnational repression seek out information online they find the NGOs and non-profits. It is conceivable, for example, that a UK-based Chinese activist writing about abuses in China (including the oppression of Uyghurs) would conduct a search online when they become a victim of transnational repression. On 23 February, when I typed the following words into Google: ‘a family was contacted and harassed in China following social media posts’, the first two search returns were for Amnesty International. The rest of the search returns on the first Google page concerned news stories published by the New York Times, The Guardian, the BBC and outlets such as Radio Free Asia. The second page of search returns included ProPublica, the Washington Post, Al Jazeera (all news/ investigative journalism outlets) as well as Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and the Uyghur Human Rights Project (NGOs and non-profits).
I went through eight pages of search returns and did not come across a single website run by a governmental department or police force. When I substituted ‘China’ for ‘Belarus’, the result was much the same, though a US Embassy 2022 report on the country’s human rights practices appeared at the bottom of the first page. The second page contained a UK Government (gov.uk) 'Joint Statement to the OSCE on Repression in Belarus'.
No search returns guided the user to an official government website or police force where an activist could register a complaint or find out, in detail, what state resources are available. There is a paucity of governmental and official information on resources and ongoing efforts to counteract transnational repression in the UK.
Various NGOs and non-profits also work with activists to build their networks outwards, to find more people affected. Reports containing dozens of interviews have been published by Freedom House, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch among others. They tend to report a high level of anxiety and concern amongst victims about tactics of transnational repression, such as the harassment of family and friends in activists’ home countries and the imposition of travel bans, asset seizures and arbitrary detention.
However, a comparable collation of evidence does not appear to exist on governmental or police force/ agency websites in the UK. For example, whether and to what extent police forces/ agencies in England and Wales are cooperating with Chinese and Belarussian requests for assistance or taking steps to protect UK-based activists is remarkably opaque. We can assume that the UK is doing the right thing but it is almost impossible to confirm. For many years, I have been calling for greater transparency in cross-border police cooperation and the development of ‘transnational police accountability’ as a public good, but to little avail (McDaniel, 2015; McDaniel and Lavorgna, 2019).
Q.1 (International cooperation): What steps can the Government take to prevent these mechanisms being misused against people in the UK?
The National Crime Agency (NCA) contains the Interpol National Central Bureau (NCB) and the Europol National Unit. It is a central hub for cross-border/ transnational policing in the UK. However, its National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2024 does not mention the term 'transnational repression' or the word 'repression', neither does its Annual Report for 2024. The extent to which the NCA cooperates with foreign and authoritarian states remains shrouded in secrecy.
To enhance transparency and the combatting of transnational repression, the NCA could consider the following:
1) Publishing an annual report on transnational repression, with a particular focus on countries that are deemed to be frequent users of techniques of transnational repression. Freedom House has compiled a list of dozens of countries engaging in such techniques, and its most notorious offenders. An NCA report could outline the following:
It is anticipated that arrest rates, passport confiscation and asset freezes following requests from authoritarian countries known to use techniques of transnational repression are likely to be low, or non-existent, but there is presently no way of knowing, short of sending voluminous freedom of information requests (which can be rejected for national security reasons or if the data is not categorised in an accessible way).
Interpol has been accused of leaving itself open to being weaponised by authoritarian governments who are trying to oppress dissent outside their borders (Jacobs, 2021; Freedom House, 2025). It has also been secretive about its treatment of red notices and for traditionally assuming that its members were working in good faith when providing it with information (ibid).
The UK government has made little attempt to demonstrate that police forces and agencies within its jurisdictions have not been similarly weaponised. They may be placing blind faith or trust in foreign police forces or agencies in the interests of furthering cooperation and good relations. For transparency and reassurance purposes, the NCA should publish these sorts of figures, as well as informative case studies and detailed descriptions of its oversight and scrutiny processes, at least annually (or biennial/triennial). Democratic governments, such as the UK, should seek to hold countries using repressive tactics accountable.
2) The NCA alone, or in liaison with the Home Office, could also host a website that explains to potential UK-based victims of transnational repression how to complain, who to contact, and how to find an extradition lawyer and immigration lawyer etc. Victims reportedly experience significant psychological distress and mental health problems before they find appropriate legal assistance (Jacobs, 2021). Victims of transnational repression can also be denied consular services by an authoritarian government, and should know how to avail of UK consular assistance in such circumstances (including possibilities to apply for long-term travel documents to facilitate freedom of movement if their passports have been revoked) (see Freedom House 2024). The lack of official public outreach (including public preventative outreach) related to transnational repression has been criticised (Freedom House, 2022).
3) The NCA/ Home Office could maintain a list of people granted refugee status and if an Interpol notice about a person is under review, the NCA could ensure that Interpol is provided with this information. If the notice is issued and there are reasonable suspicions that it is politically motivated, the NCA should ensure that a notice is immediately withdrawn. It is unclear what kind of system the NCA uses for this purpose at present. It should not require an application from a political refugee to ensure removal. The UK does not need to rely on or wait for Interpol to institute reforms. Interpol’s Commission for the Control of Files has been criticised for being ill-equipped to deal with the large number and growing complexity of requests it receives (Fabritius, 2017).
4) The NCA alone, or in liaison with the Home Office, could also maintain a voluntary register of UK-based political activists who are concerned about transnational repression. If, for example, Interpol receives uploads from a country that a passport has been cancelled or stolen, the UK could send them a written notice (since it has some of their details). In 2016, officials at the UK border confiscated the passport of Zaina Erhaim, a Syrian journalist and activist, when her passport had been reported stolen as a form of transnational repression (Freedom House, 2022). Six UK-based Hong Kong pro-democracy activists have also had their passports cancelled (Freedom House, 2024). The same has reportedly happened to dissidents, human rights activists and journalists from Myanmar, Nicaragua, Bahrain, Egypt, Turkey and the UAE among others (ibid). Once passports are cancelled, people are not only prevented from travelling but may be unable to open new bank accounts or apply for credit. They may also be arbitrary detained at the border.
5) Connected to the above, the NCA alone, or in liaison with the Home Office, could have a process for contacting UK-based political dissidents and refugees to inform them that they are subject to an Interpol red notice or travel ban. Many people do not know they are subject to a red notice until they cross a border, at which point it may be too late to prevent detention. The same is true of travel bans, which can be used to prevent people from leaving once they arrive in a repressive country (Freedom House, 2024). To do this, the NCA or Home Office could, for example, host a website/ registry where political activists can upload details to check whether they are subject to an Interpol notice and whether UK has rejected a request/ diffusion for intelligence or extradition for political reasons. Letters could also be sent to registered users to confirm in writing that (bogus) information about them has been removed from the national police computer system following refusals.
6) The NCA could strive to publish and provide official information about repressive regimes, and research collating information from international and regional human rights bodies and NGOs. This information could assist the Home Office with asylum application, it could assist lawyers taking extradition cases and help the Foreign Office when screening applications for diplomatic visas. The Home Office reportedly uses an independent external body to produce 'country policy and information notes' which are used by officials in asylum decisions. However, they are reportedly limited in detail and awareness about transnational repression is lacking within the UK’s migration system (Freedom House, 2022). The NCA, as the home of the Interpol NCB and other mechanisms of transnational policing, is well placed to produce more detailed, comprehensive and streamlined reports on transnational repression.
7) The precise nature of the above disclosure arrangements (including disclosure arrangements with Interpol) and relevant legal protections, could be set out in guidance or legislation.
(Feb 2025)