Written evidence submitted by Sir William Browder KCMG (DIS0031) for Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry on Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

1. My name is Bill Browder, CEO of Hermitage Capital Management and Head of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign. Until 2005, I was the largest foreign investor in Russia, where my firm uncovered and exposed widespread corruption in Russian companies. In retaliation, Russian authorities declared me a threat to national security and barred my entry to the country. 

2. In 2007, the Russian authorities, working alongside organized criminals perpetrated a massive fraud against the companies of the Hermitage Fund which my firm, Hermitage Capital Management, advised, and stole $230 million that our companies had previously paid in taxes to the Russian government.

3. Sergei Magnitsky, my lawyer and tax attorney, uncovered and testified about the $230 million Russian government corruption scheme. Soon thereafter, in November 2008, he was arrested by the Russian officials that he had implicated in his testimony, held in torturous conditions for 358 days and killed at the age of 37. He left a wife and two children.

4. With no possibility of justice within Russia, I began advocating for the Magnitsky Act—legislation imposing visa bans and asset freezes on human rights abusers. Since its adoption in 35 countries, including the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, and European Union, it has become a critical tool for holding corrupt officials accountable. 

5. The Russian government has used systematic disinformation tactics to discredit the Magnitsky Act and its advocates. This includes falsified media narratives, legal harassment, and misinformation spread through state channels. These tactics aim to weaken global support for Magnitsky sanctions and protect those implicated in human rights violations and corruption.

6. The UK faces direct and indirect threats from state-sponsored disinformation, which seeks to undermine democratic principles, discredit human rights campaigns, and deter accountability measures such as the Magnitsky Act. Specific concerns include:

State-Sponsored Networks:

7. Authoritarian regimes like Russia weaponize the authority of sovereign states to direct disinformation campaigns that distort facts, attack critics, and shield corrupt officials from accountability. These efforts often combine state-sponsored propaganda with politically motivated criminal cases, exporting fabricated allegations alongside false narratives to undermine international accountability mechanisms like the Magnitsky sanctions.

8. These disinformation efforts emanate directly from senior leadership and Russian state officials, including the President, Prime Minister, the Prosecutor’s Office, Foreign Minister, and others who use their positions to disseminate false narratives through public statements and press conferences. These false narratives tend to involve a variety of baseless and often contradictory allegations, accusing me of financial crimes and even of being involved in or orchestrating the death of Sergei Magnitsky.

9. Russian embassies play a central role in further spreading these false narratives internationally, and often act as hubs for amplifying Kremlin-aligned propaganda. For example, in 2021, the Russian embassy in Romania sought to delegitimize the Magnitsky sanctions regime by portraying Sergei Magnitsky as a criminal and me as a fraudster.[1]

10. In May 2023, when faced with a question from Evgenia Kara-Murza, wife of then-imprisoned Russian activist and Magnitsky Act advocate Vladimir Kara-Murza, about the use of repression against Russians who oppose official narratives, while on BBC’s Sunday with Laura Keunssberg, Russian Ambassador to the UK Andrei Kelin repeatedly touted Russian government narratives, saying Kara-Murza deserved to be in prison.[2]

11. The Russian government has also used state-funded “news outlets,” such as RT and Sputnik, as state vehicles to widely distribute government narratives. In addition, between 2013 and 2016, Russian state media released five propaganda movies about me aimed at discrediting myself and Sergei Magnitsky.[3]

12. This pattern of disinformation is not limited to Russian narratives but extends to other authoritarian regimes seeking to shield themselves from scrutiny. In early 2024, I was named by the Chinese government a co-conspirator[4] in the Jimmy Lai case, in a coordinated campaign targeting the British-Hong Kong democracy advocate and journalist. Despite the fact that I have never spoken to or met Mr. Lai, Chinese state media outlets published fabricated claims to try and support the Chinese prosecutor’s case, suggesting that my advocacy for global Magnitsky sanctions was part of a broader Western conspiracy to destabilize China.[5] These narratives were amplified by pro-Beijing social media accounts and think tanks posing as independent commentators. The timing coincided with Lai’s trial under Hong Kong’s draconian national security law, demonstrating how disinformation is weaponized in an effort to delegitimize human rights defenders and distract from state abuses.

Non-Governmental Enablers:

13. State-sponsored disinformation campaigns often enlist non-governmental actors—such as journalists, academics, or public figures—who may knowingly or unknowingly propagate these narratives. By co-opting individuals in Western democracies, authoritarian regimes lend credibility to their false claims while obscuring their origins.
14. For example, Kremlin-linked lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya—who was indicted in 2019 for obstruction of justice in relation to the US Magnitsky case[6]—played a key role in exporting Russian disinformation narratives abroad.
15. Veselnitskaya represented Denis Katsyv, whose company paid $6 million to the US government to settle a money laundering lawsuit connected to the $230 million fraud Sergei Magnitsky uncovered.[7] On her client’s behalf, Veselnitskaya hired a number of journalists, lobbyists, lawyers, and public relations executives to assist in the effort to export Russian disinformation abroad.[8][9] In an attempt to add legitimacy to her efforts, Veselnitskaya created a fake NGO called the Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation (HRAGI), which operated under the guise of promoting Russian adoptions,[10] but whose true sole purpose was to spearhead lobbying efforts[11] to repeal the Magnitsky Act.
16. After the European Parliament cancelled a planned screening[12] of Andrei Nekrasov’s defamatory film The Magnitsky Act – Behind the Scenes, Veselnitskaya organized a screening[13] at Washington’s Newseum in June 2016.
17. Such efforts demonstrate how authoritarian regimes use intermediaries to infiltrate Western institutions and manipulate public opinion under the guise of legitimate discourse.

Media Manipulation:

18. The Kremlin has systematically used state-controlled media to produce disinformation narratives aimed at undermining the Magnitsky Act. These campaigns, often launched in direct response to global efforts to hold Russia accountable, seek to distort facts, attack critics, and shield corrupt officials. These efforts are not limited to state-sponsored propaganda but extend into Western media, where narratives are manipulated to serve authoritarian agendas.

19. In 2016, the Kremlin exported its disinformation abroad through The Magnitsky Act – Behind the Scenes,[14] a film by Andrei Nekrasov that parroted Kremlin narratives and sought to discredit Sergei Magnitsky’s whistleblowing. The film falsely claimed that Sergei was not beaten in custody, that he never testified against police officers involved in corruption, and that Hermitage orchestrated the $230 million fraud.
20. In order to disseminate and provide a platform to these false claims, Nekrasov used his then-girlfriend, MEP and former Vice-President of the European Parliament Heidi Hautala to attempt to organize a screening of the defamatory film in the EU Parliament. The European Parliament cancelled the planned screening of the film after Magnitsky’s family protested its defamatory content.[15]

Usage of Artificial Intelligence and Deepfakes:

21. In recent years, advances in artificial intelligence have enabled new forms of disinformation through deepfake technology weaponized by Russia. In May 2023, I was targeted by a deepfake video call purporting to be from former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko.[16] I was invited to discuss “anti-Russian sanctions” but was then asked whether wealthy Russians should be “let off the sanctions list in exchange for giving money to Ukraine.” At one point, I was even asked to perform a salute to a rap song performed by Ukraine’s current president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
22. The call initially fooled my team and me into believing it was authentic until closer analysis revealed it originated from a domain registered in Russia. The same people who orchestrated this deepfake have also approached senior officials in the US, UK, and EU with a similar technique.[17] With future improvement in AI tools, the use of deepfake technology to spread disinformation and amplify false narratives will only get more difficult to detect.

Social Media:

23. Social media platforms have become central battlegrounds in the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns, enabling the rapid dissemination of false narratives and the harassment of critics. These efforts are particularly intense during critical moments, such as parliamentary debates on Magnitsky sanctions or geopolitical crises like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

24. The Russian government allocates substantial resources to manipulate social media through troll farms and bot networks. During my 2018 testimony to the UK Parliament’s Fake News Inquiry, I highlighted how easily malign actors exploit platform vulnerabilities to create fake accounts and spread disinformation.[18]

25. For example, Kremlin-linked networks amplify false narratives by flooding platforms with pro-Russian propaganda, such as claims that Sergei Magnitsky was a criminal or that Western sanctions are illegitimate.

26. They also direct harassment at individuals and organizations advocating for Magnitsky sanctions, including spamming their social media profiles with pro-Kremlin comments or fake accusations.

27. The Kremlin’s investment in social media disinformation underscores its strategic importance. The weaponization of media narratives, through traditional propaganda or new social media platforms and artificial intelligence, poses a significant challenge for democracies like the United Kingdom. Without robust counter-disinformation mechanisms and greater accountability for platforms amplifying disinformation, malign actors will continue exploiting Western institutions to further their agendas.

Legal Harassment:

28. Part of the Kremlin’s disinformation strategy is weaponizing legal systems in democratic countries through Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). These lawsuits are designed to intimidate, silence, and financially exhaust critics of authoritarian regimes, and are used as a tool by these regimes to spread false narratives. My own experiences with SLAPPs in the UK demonstrate how these cases are used as tools of harassment, often with the backing of malign state actors.

29. After weaponizing legal systems in countries like the UK, representatives of authoritarian regimes will often amplify their baseless claims in the media, constructing a guise that their accusations are merited and legitimate.

30. In 2013, Pavel Karpov, former Russian Interior Ministry investigator implicated in Sergei Magnitsky’s death, filed a libel lawsuit[19] against me in London’s High Court. The lawsuit sought to discredit my advocacy efforts. However, the case was dismissed[20] and was ruled an abuse of court process. The judge found that Karpov had no genuine connection to the UK.

31. These lawsuits are often funded through opaque channels, raising strong suspicions of state involvement. In Karpov’s case, there was significant doubt that he personally financed the litigation, suggesting that the Russian state or its proxies were behind the claims.

32. In 2023, the UK added anti-SLAPP provisions to the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act. However, without stronger protections—such as full cost recovery for defendants or penalties for lawyers enabling SLAPPs—activists and journalists will remain vulnerable to lawsuits designed solely to silence them.

UK Progress in Countering Disinformation:

33. The UK has increasingly recognized the systemic threat posed by Russian disinformation campaigns. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the government adopted a proactive stance against Kremlin-backed propaganda, marking a significant shift from earlier reluctance to publicly counter Russian falsehoods.

34. The UK government now routinely debunks false Kremlin narratives, such as claims that Ukraine provoked the war or that NATO expansion justified Russian aggression. This contrasts with earlier hesitancy to directly confront Russian disinformation throughout the Magnitsky case.

35. The UK has also strengthened its legal and sanctions toolkit to counter state-backed disinformation. For example, in October 2024, the UK sanctioned the founders of Social Design Agency and Structura National Technologies for orchestrating the “Doppelganger” network, which spread fake news and deepfakes to undermine European support for Ukraine.[21] This operation included over 120 spoofed news sites and targeted audiences in English, German, and French.

Lessons from Allies in Countering State-Sponsored Disinformation:

36. The United States and European Union offer examples of additional measures that have been implemented to counter state-sponsored disinformation.

37. Recognizing the threat posed by such disinformation campaigns, the US incorporated sanctions provisions in the 2012 Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act not only for those directly involved in human rights abuses but also for individuals disseminating false narratives about the Magnitsky case.[22] This framework acknowledges the role of disinformation as a tool of repression and establishes a clear methodology for holding perpetrators accountable.

38. Later in 2024, the US Department of Justice charged Dmitri Simes, a former Trump campaign adviser, for violating sanctions by working for Russia’s state-controlled Channel One.[23] Simes received over $1 million in payments for spreading Kremlin propaganda narratives, demonstrating how financial incentives drive disinformation efforts.

39. The Simes case underscores the need to systematically track, investigate, and prosecute financial enablers of disinformation. By exposing monetary flows and holding individuals accountable—as demonstrated by the US prosecution—authorities can disrupt the economic infrastructure sustaining state-sponsored propaganda.

40. The EU’s East StratCom Task Force provides another model for combating state-sponsored disinformation. Its EUvsDisinfo project[24] identifies and debunks Russian propaganda while building public resilience against false narratives. The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA)[25] also mandates social media transparency on state-backed content, requiring them to label such material and disclose algorithms that amplify them.
     

Recommendations:

41. To effectively counter the growing threat of state-sponsored disinformation, the UK must adopt a comprehensive strategy that addresses the systemic vulnerabilities exploited by malign actors.

1. The UK should allocate dedicated resources to investigate and track the financial incentives and monetary networks enabling disinformation campaigns. Allocating resources to investigate such payments would deter enablers and expose the financial networks behind disinformation operations.

2. The UK should establish a legal framework that makes disseminating state-sponsored disinformation a sanctionable offense under existing sanctions regimes. A clear legal procedure for designating propagandists as sanctionable would provide a strong deterrent against disinformation campaigns.

3. The UK should mandate transparency for foreign agents, introducing a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme requiring individuals or entities acting on behalf of foreign states to disclose their affiliations. This includes public declarations of conflicts of interest when commenting on geopolitical issues, and penalties for non-compliance.

4. The UK should launch public education campaigns on disinformation tactics of malign states, building resilience through programs like the EU’s EUvsDisinfo, which debunks foreign propaganda and disinformation in real time.

24 February 2025