WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS

(TRUK0119)

We have focused on the issues raised in questions 12, 13 and 14 regarding INTERPOL abuse.

Question 12: Are multi-lateral police and judicial cooperation mechanisms, such as INTERPOL red notices, being misused by perpetrators of transnational repression? What steps can the Government take to prevent these mechanisms being misused against people in the UK?

International police cooperation mechanisms, particularly INTERPOL's Red Notice system, are being systematically abused by authoritarian states as tools of transnational repression. What should be a vital law enforcement mechanism has increasingly become weaponized against dissidents, human rights defenders, and businesspeople who have fallen out of favour with their home governments.[1]

The evidence of systematic abuse is compelling and widespread. Russia has consistently used Red Notices to target critics and businesspeople, including well-known cases such as Sir William Browder and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. China's Operation Skynet/Foxhunt program explicitly uses INTERPOL mechanisms as part of its global campaign to pursue dissidents to return voluntarily rather than arrest and extradite.[2] Voluntarily usually means, in reality, threats of arrest and torture of relatives. Turkey has issued thousands of Red Notices, particularly after 2016, targeting alleged Gulen supporters. It continues to abuse the red notice system but also reports passports of those who are Kurdish or tangentially linked to the Gulen movement stolen – this renders individuals liable to a significant risk of deportation to Turkey.[3] The UAE regularly misuses the system for both debt collection and political purposes. Bahrain continues to pursue political dissidents through the Red Notice system. More recently, concerning patterns have emerged from countries like Georgia, which has begun threatening Red Notices in corporate disputes and political cases.

Abusing states have developed sophisticated methods of abuse. They frequently disguise political persecution as financial crimes and/or corruption making it harder for INTERPOL to identify abuse. The Red Notice system is used not only to restrict travel but as part of a broader campaign of harassment. States often coordinate their efforts, with multiple countries supporting each other's abusive requests (UAE and Bahrain or Kazakhstan and Russia for instance). This manipulation is made possible by significant structural weaknesses in INTERPOL's systems.

The current safeguards are woefully inadequate. Very few Red Notices are properly assessed before publication, and the Commission for Control of Files (CCF), INTERPOL's appeals body, dealing with challenges after publication of a red notice, is severely understaffed. Victims facing politically motivated notices must wait between 9 months and sometimes over 2 years for appeals to be heard, during which time they face severe restrictions on travel and the risk of detention. There is no compensation mechanism for victims of abuse, and the entire system lacks transparency.

The impact on victims is severe and multi-faceted. Beyond the obvious restriction on international travel, individuals facing politically motivated Red Notices often have their assets frozen, suffer significant reputational damage, and face business disruption. The psychological impact of living under the constant threat of arrest and potential extradition cannot be understated.

To address these challenges, we recommend the UK Government take the following actions:

• Establish enhanced screening mechanisms for incoming Red Notices in the UK
• Provide comprehensive support and guidance for victims of wrongly issued notices
• Work with democratic allies to reform INTERPOL's governance
• Support increased funding for proper vetting of notices
• Push for greater transparency in INTERPOL's procedures
• Advocate for sanctions against systematic abusers

At the institutional level, the UK should support reform of INTERPOL's funding model to reduce the influence of authoritarian states and advocate for stronger vetting of INTERPOL leadership candidates.

The challenge lies in maintaining the effectiveness of legitimate international police cooperation while protecting individuals from abuse. The UK government has an opportunity to take a leading role in addressing this systematic abuse of international law enforcement mechanisms. This requires a coordinated approach involving diplomatic, legal, and institutional reforms, working alongside other democratic nations to strengthen the integrity of international police cooperation.

Question 13: How is the UK working with other democracies to tackle transnational repression? How can it do better?

The UK's cooperation with other democracies to tackle transnational repression, whilst developing, requires significant strengthening. Current cooperation occurs primarily through established international mechanisms and bilateral relationships, but there remains considerable scope for improvement, particularly in coordinating responses to emerging threats.

Democratic nations face common challenges from authoritarian states that are deploying increasingly sophisticated methods of transnational repression. The UK collaborates with partners through intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation and diplomatic channels. However, this cooperation has often proved inadequate when confronting systematic abuse of international mechanisms. In relation to INTERPOL Cooperation can be very poor, especially in seeking reform of the institution. This was particularly evident in recent INTERPOL leadership elections where European nations failed to coordinate effectively to promote democratic candidates, potentially allowing representatives of authoritarian states to gain influence.

The current framework for cooperation focuses primarily on information sharing about threats and actors, coordinated diplomatic responses to specific incidents, and joint law enforcement operations. Whilst these mechanisms have some utility, they often prove insufficient when confronting sophisticated, state-sponsored transnational repression. The lack of coordinated response to the abuse of INTERPOL mechanisms by states such as Russia, China, and Turkey, demonstrates the limitations of current approaches.

The effectiveness of any international cooperation will depend on sustained commitment and resources from participating nations. It requires recognition that transnational repression represents a fundamental challenge to democratic values and institutions, demanding a coordinated response from democratic nations. The UK's role should be to lead efforts to build this coordination, whilst ensuring that legitimate international law enforcement cooperation can continue effectively.

In relation to INTERPOL specifically, this means lobbying for reform and transparency. Cooperation with other diplomatic states (especially those which pay the loans share of funding, including the USA and other European states) in order to prevent abuse and to reform the institution to make it more transparent. Conversely INTERPOL faces some criticism from Russia and Belarus who are trying to circumvent INTERPOL using its own system. The Riyadh agreement on judicial cooperation between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council means that travel in those states whilst there are investigations in another state are risky.[4]

In relation to domestic actions, it requires significant education and coordination. From our experience the Home Office and the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office deal with this topic poorly. There is little education or knowledge in much of the Home Office immigration section about this issue. Therefore, claiming asylum or obtaining visas in the face of a Red Notice (or even the suggestion there is a red notice or foreign prosecution) can result in refusal. There is significant and problematic check run by the FCDO which are described as “background checks” however, our experience and on obtaining disclosure this more often relates to not wanting to upset an autocratic state by allowing asylum or nationality.

Question 14: "How is the UK's response to transnational repression affected by its diplomatic relationships with perpetrator states and how does transnational repression factor into the UK's diplomatic decision-making?"

The UK's response to transnational repression is significantly complicated by its diplomatic and economic relationships with perpetrator states. This creates a challenging balancing act between protecting individuals and communities within the UK whilst maintaining necessary diplomatic and trade relationships with states known to engage in transnational repression.

The complexity of these relationships is particularly evident in the UK's interactions with states such as China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which are simultaneously important trading partners and significant and aggressive perpetrators of transnational repression. For instance, whilst the UAE is a major strategic partner in the Gulf region, evidence shows it systematically abuses international mechanisms like INTERPOL to pursue dissidents and resolve commercial disputes. Similarly, while China represents a crucial trading partner, its Operation Skynet/Foxhunt programme actively targets individuals within the UK.[5]

The impact of these diplomatic relationships on the UK's response to transnational repression is complex. When dealing with countries that are both strategic partners and known perpetrators of transnational repression, the UK must balance multiple competing interests. We have seen clear examples of this with countries like China, where Operation Skynet/Foxhunt actively targets individuals within the UK, while China remains a major trading partner. Similarly with the UAE, despite documented evidence of their abuse of INTERPOL systems to pursue dissidents and commercial disputes, they remain an important strategic ally in the Gulf region. Turkey remains a strategic partner whilst hunting political dissenting voices including journalists and lawyers.[6] 

These diplomatic considerations can affect operational responses to transnational repression. The government faces political pressure to maintain cooperative relationships with counterparts in perpetrator states, even when these same states are known to abuse international police cooperation mechanisms. This creates particular challenges for agencies attempting to protect vulnerable communities whilst maintaining necessary international security cooperation.

The UK should consider developing a formal framework for evaluating and responding to transnational repression by diplomatic partners. This could include:

• Regular assessment of transnational repression activities by partner states
• Clear diplomatic consequences for states engaging in transnational repression
• Consular assistance for Uk nationals and those granted asylum
• Enhanced protection for vulnerable communities regardless of diplomatic considerations

The challenge moving forward will be to develop diplomatic responses that effectively deter transnational repression whilst maintaining necessary international relationships. This requires careful calibration of diplomatic, economic, and security considerations, alongside a clear commitment to protecting individuals and communities within the UK from foreign state harassment.

The UK's diplomatic approach must evolve to recognise that allowing transnational repression to continue unchallenged ultimately undermines both our security and our values, regardless of the diplomatic costs of confronting it. This could be assisted by proper education of civil servants at the Home Office and FCDO about the risks of transnational repression.

(Feb 2025)