WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY HONG KONG DEMOCRACY COUNCIL

(TRUK0070)

Overview

Esteemed Chair Lord Alton and distinguished members of the Joint Committee: thank you for launching this crucial inquiry into the pressing issue of transnational repression and for your commitment to tackling this complex challenge.

While Hong Kongers are grateful to have called the United Kingdom (UK) our new home, recent years have seen a surge in intensified transnational repression efforts targeting the Hong Kong diaspora by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) governments on British soil. I have been a target of this new wave of transnational repression—I am wanted for alleged incitement related to casting a protest vote five months after I went into exile, and more recently, I have been targeted with a HK$1 million bounty for alleged ‘national security’ offences.

While the Joint Committee cannot look into individual cases, I wish to contribute to the inquiry as a civil society actor on behalf of HKDC through my experience as a state-targeted, exiled Hong Konger, with inputs from Hong Kong diasporic members in the UK.                           

This written evidence focuses on (i) the visualization of the concept of transnational repression in the context of Hong Kong, (ii) the Government and law enforcement responses and (iii) diplomatic decision-making and multilateral relationships.

HKDC urges the Government to assume a leadership role in the international community to hold human rights perpetrators accountable and take immediate action to curb their activities within the UK.

National Security Legislations as the Major Drive of Transnational Repression

In 2020, Beijing imposed the National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong to shut down the 2019 anti-extradition movement under the guise of safeguarding national security. In 2024, despite clear and urgent appeals from the international community, the HKSAR government moved to expedite the passage of the Safeguarding National Security Bill, commonly referred to as ‘Article 23’.[1]  A similar attempt was made in 2003 to impose the city’s homegrown security law, but the legislation stalled amid widespread public protests, which ultimately led to the resignation of the Chief Executive at the time.[2] However, after electoral changes in 2021[3] that wiped out opposition parties, the bill was fast-tracked through the legislature. This was reflected in the expedited process: a one-month consultation period followed by a review of 181 provisions in 43 hours, the waiving of multiple procedural rules, and the entire process—from consultation to passage—completed in just 50 days.

The legislation introduces harsh penalties which include life imprisonment for offences related to new crimes of treason, insurrection, incitement of Chinese armed forces to mutiny and acts of sabotage endangering national security in collusion with external forces.[4] Notably, the penalties for collusion with external forces have been increased across the board for all related offences, reflecting a significant tightening of legal measures in these areas.

The definitions of crimes under the law are intentionally vague and thresholds for prosecution are low. For instance, the crime of ‘espionage’ is broadly defined to include individuals who, ‘with intent to endanger national security’,[5] obtain, collect or even possess information deemed ‘directly or indirectly useful to an external force’.[6] Similarly, the law criminalises acts with ‘seditious intention’, encompassing any actions that could bring individuals ‘into hatred, contempt or disaffection’[7] against the PRC and HKSAR governments, their institutions, or the constitutional order. These ambiguous terms leave significant room for interpretation, enabling authorities to target a wide range of activities and individuals.

The legislation has an extraordinary extraterritorial reach, which applies to individuals anywhere in the world. This provision has fuelled the HKSAR government’s transnational repression efforts, enabling them to target dissenting voices far beyond Hong Kong’s borders. These efforts and their broader implications, including tactics of bounties, physical assaults, intimidation, mobility control, hostage-taking and surveillance, will be elaborated in the following sections.

Arrest Warrants and Bounties on UK-based Exiled Activists

Before dawn on Christmas Eve, I learned from the news that the HKSAR government had issued another warrant for my arrest.[8] This new warrant comes in addition to the one from 2021, but with more severe charges: two national security offences—‘incitement to secession’ and ‘collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security’—accompanied by a HK$1 million bounty. The authorities have also invoked the Article 23 legislation to issue a series of special orders against seven individuals who were part of the initial group wanted by the HKSAR government in July 2023, which included labelling these activists as ‘absconders’, and restricting their ability to travel by cancelling their passports. Among them are my dear colleagues—our Executive Director, Anna Kwok, and our Advisory Board member, Ted Hui.

Although I was a former elected official in Hong Kong, the arrest warrants issued against me were not tied to any of my actions in Hong Kong. The regime sought to persecute me politically for exercising my political rights on British soil. The allegations of secession and ‘colluding with foreign forces’ target my engagement with democratic allies and my calls to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms while residing in the UK. These international warrants and bounties have been directed against individuals across a broad political spectrum globally. Among the 19 wanted individuals, ten reside in the UK. In addition to activists like Chloe Cheung, Finn Lau, Nathan Law, Simon Cheng and Tony Chung, the warrants also target me, a former elected official; Christopher Mung, a trade unionist; and Chung Kim Wah, a pollster. The regime is widening its crackdown to suppress all forms of dissent abroad, sending a clear signal that, regardless of our location or occupation, we can be targeted under the sweeping authority of the NSL and Article 23 if deemed a ‘threat’ to the regime’s authoritarian control.

These recent NSL warrants are a clear attempt of transnational repression—to intimidate and silence Hong Kongers abroad, and to fracture the pro-democracy movement.
 

Harassment of Wanted Individuals’ Family Members and Associates

As I write this, three of my extended family members have faced harassment by the Hong Kong National Security Police. On 10 February 2025, right after I co-organised the protest against the Chinese Super-Embassy at the Old Royal Mint Court, my aunt and uncle were taken in for interrogation. Within a 7-day period, on 17 February 2025, my other aunt was also interrogated by the police. According to a report by state-owned media Wen Wei Po, the interrogations and questioning were to ‘assist in an investigation of my personal connections and financial contacts’.[9]

The HKSAR government defaulted to these attempts of psychological intimidation after failing to silence me with the arrest warrant and bounty. It is a retaliation against my continuous advocacy efforts, such as speaking at the Royal Mint Court protest and attending numerous meetings with members of Parliament, including the high-profile meeting with the Foreign Minister and the Indo-Pacific Minister.

The HKSAR government is adopting the PRC’s longstanding practice to suppress dissent by intimidating family members and associates of wanted individuals. These tactics have been used to harass, interrogate and even arrest or detain individuals connected to overseas activists. To date, at least 39 friends, colleagues and family members of ten overseas targeted individuals have been interrogated at Hong Kong police stations. Additionally, seven former associates have been arrested, while four others were detained for allegedly providing financial assistance to two wanted activists.[10]

The HKSAR government has systematically deprived Hong Kongers of their civil and political rights within the city. As of September 2024, over 150,000 Hong Kongers have resettled in the UK through the BN(O) visa scheme.[11] While most are in search of a place free from oppression, it has been proven that repression does not stop at the border. Instead, these arrest warrants and bounties that target overseas activists demonstrate a staggering overreach by the HKSAR government, aiming to erode people’s rights and fundamental freedoms even beyond its jurisdiction.

These escalations highlight how Hong Kong is rapidly assimilating into the PRC’s notorious law enforcement system, fundamentally compromising its rule of law. The UK Government and British businesses must carefully reassess any illusions that Hong Kong remains autonomous or serves as a buffer zone between mainland China and the free world. It is crucial to question whether the notion of ‘business as usual’ in Hong Kong stands in light of these developments.
 

Online Harassment, Death and Rape Threats

It is not atypical to have trolls or bots flooding my social media accounts with hate speech and gender-based body-shaming as a former woman political figure in Asia. Since I had been elected in 2019, there have already been organised trolls harassing me. However, the online harassment intensified after my advocacy work was ‘recognised’ by the regime. In addition to accusations of being state-funded agents, I encountered death and rape threats for the first time following the issuance of bounty. One such comment reads, ‘[a] bitch like you will be raped and killed’ and ‘[a] bitch like you must be hanged’.

Personal Experience of Receiving Support from the Government and Law Enforcement

On the day that my warrant and bounty were issued, I was contacted by my local police through the Strategic Migration Partnership team. Since then, members of the local police have paid two visits to my residential address. I was advised to dial the emergency number (999) if I encounter any danger, and my phone number has been flagged in the system. The police officers also provided the following advice typically given to women experiencing domestic abuse or stalking, which includes purchasing a personal alarm and installing a doorbell camera.

It was reassuring to have law enforcement reach out and to know that support is accessible in my neighborhood if any incidents occur. However, I was quite surprised that the officers in charge were unfamiliar with the context and would still address me as ‘Chinese’. It would be ideal for t officers to be briefed on the political situation before they take on my case or any other cases involving transnational repression.

The following day, the Metropolitan Police also reached out to collect my personal information and advised me on online security. The officers shared The Blue Book: A Guide to Personal Security[12] with me. While the guidance in the Blue Book is useful to a certain extent, it is not tailored for transnational repression victims, nor does it include information specific to perpetrating countries.

The most recent round of arrest warrants with bounties announced by the HKSAR government is the third time overseas activists have been targeted with such measures, yet, law enforcement agencies in the UK still lack a standard set of protocol to address these transnational repression efforts. Moreover, based on my communication with other wanted individuals, I realised that there was a discrepancy between the immediacy of support offered by law enforcement officers as most were not offered the immediate support that I received. The timing matters, as does coordination across different law enforcement departments.

While transnational repression efforts may not, and usually do not, constitute criminal activity —making it difficult for law enforcement to intervene in certain circumstances—there is still no legal definition of transnational repression. Therefore, in my experience, other departments within the Government may find it difficult to intervene, resulting in limited support for targets of transnational repression and placing the burden solely on law enforcement.
 

Transnational Repression Impacting Hong Kongers’ Resettlement in the UK

While not all members of the Hong Kong diasporic community are directly affected by transnational repression, the chilling effect it generates is both disproportionate and far-reaching. This atmosphere of fear has fueled self-censorship, mistrust, hesitation and a pervasive sense of insecurity within the community.

With 19 overseas activists now officially wanted with bounties by the HKSAR government, activists, community organisers and even the broader diaspora community are acutely aware that they, too, could become targets of the regime’s overreach. This fear extends to individuals whose work may not even be overtly political, discouraging them from exercising their freedom of expression, freedom of speech and civil rights—even in the UK, where such freedoms are ostensibly safeguarded.

A survey report[13] published by the Vote for Hong Kong 2024 campaign highlights that UK-based Hong Kongers who are eligible to vote prioritise policies that address transnational repression and adopt substantive measures to tackle transnational repression, such as sanctioning PRC and HKSAR officials responsible for human rights abuses and shutting down the Confucius Institutes in the UK. The report emphasises the community’s call for the UK Government to ‘protect UK Hong Kongers’ political freedoms from various sources of Chinese influence and transnational repression’.[14] Ironically, the campaigners noted that some eligible voters were hesitant to visit polling stations, fearing potential reprisal from the PRC and HKSAR governments.

Incidents involving suspicious individuals photographing community events, surveillance, and physical assaults[15] allegedly orchestrated by United Front networks and government-affiliated networks have exacerbated growing feelings of mistrust and insecurity within the community. Some notable incidents that targeted Hong Kongers in the UK include the Manchester assault in October 2022,[16] the Southampton attack in June 2023,[17] and the Leeds harassment incident in November 2024.[18] These actions threaten to undermine the open communication and trust necessary for fostering cohesion among newly settled Hong Kongers in the UK. The psychological burden created by transnational repression efforts risk fragmenting the community, which would ultimately hinder the ability of community members to establish a secure and unified presence in their new home.
 

PRC’s Influence Campaigns Operated by HKSAR Foreign Representatives and Networks

The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) in London plays a crucial role in promoting the PRC’s interests within the UK, serving as an active conduit for a wider United Front network. Using its extensive consular privileges and immunities granted through the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Act 1996 and provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the office has increasingly engaged in activities aimed at suppressing pro-democracy movements and advancing Beijing’s political agenda, including surveillance and intimidation of Hong Kong activists.

Diasporic community members, including myself, have been photographed by individuals either inside or exiting the London HKETO while attending rallies or participating in interviews outside the building. Additionally, there were instances where HKETO staff approached community organisers, seeking to obtain information about specific targeted organisations or advocates.

In addition to these intelligence-gathering activities, the HKETO is involved in lobbying and disinformation campaigns that target politicians and media outlets in order to promote pro-Beijing narratives. These campaigns are aligned with a broader PRC strategy to silence dissent and discredit Hong Kong's pro-democracy advocates. Similar tactics have been employed in the United States, where HKETOs have spent over £12 million, lobbied against human rights legislation,[19] and attempted to influence subnational politics,[20] offering a template for operations in the UK.

In the past year, an increasing number of secret law enforcement operations,[21] spying and intelligence-related cases in connection with the PRC[22] [23] and the HKSAR Government[24] have been uncovered in the UK, further highlighting the growing nexus between outposts of the PRC and HKSAR Government and their intelligence operations. These actions reflect the PRC’s ongoing efforts to suppress dissent and undermine democratic freedoms worldwide.

Conclusion

The evidence outlined in this submission highlights the urgent need for the Government to take decisive action to safeguard the UK’s longstanding democratic values, protect its residents, and uphold international human rights standards. To address these challenges, HKDC recommends the Joint Committee urge the Government to consider the following recommendations:

Strengthen protections against transnational repression

●       Train law enforcement officers and first responders at all levels to respond to transnational repression, using country-specific information and formulate a standard protocol for dealing with transnational repression cases;

●       Tailor safety guidelines for victims of transnational repression;

●       Utilise the Defending Democracy Taskforce to identify transnational repression activities and establish a reporting mechanism to close the gaps of documenting non-criminal transnational repression activities;

●       Implement additional vetting for diplomatic visas issued to PRC and HKSAR applicants and additional screening for applicants connected to transnational repression activities;

●       Perform thorough due diligence to identify and avoid astroturf groups that pose as grassroots diaspora organisations, ensuring they are not inadvertently endorsed;

●       Instruct the intelligence community to identify perpetrators of transnational repression and their tools and strategies, as well as share relevant information with like-minded partners;

●       Enforce stricter oversight of foreign representatives in the UK by implementing the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme without delay, and designate China and Hong Kong as part of the “enhanced tier” in the scheme to allow an advanced monitoring.

Enhance diplomatic coordination with like-minded allies

●       Impose targeted sanctions against individuals who direct or engage in transnational repression and human rights abuses;

●       Acknowledge transnational repression as a distinct human rights threat and formulate norms for multilateral responses to the issue; adopt a resolution to mandate a Special Procedure on Transnational Repression.
 

Uphold human rights as a core principle in UK-China relations

●       Reassess the Government’s engagement with Hong Kong to reflect the reality that the city no longer autonomous;

●       Refrain from economic trade-offs at the expense of human rights;

●       Clearly communicate that addressing ongoing human rights abuses and political repression is a prerequisite for meaningful engagement with Beijing. Without such guarantees, the UK risks legitimising the PRC’s authoritarian actions and enabling further abuses.

The PRC’s growing authoritarianism, coupled with the HKSAR government’s complicity in implementing repressive measures, poses significant challenges not only to the UK but also to the broader international community. Any engagement with China must be predicated on its willingness to make verifiable and enforceable improvements to its human rights record, particularly concerning the treatment of Hong Kongers, Tibetans and Uyghurs. Without addressing the PRC’s ongoing human rights abuses and transnational repression, the UK must resist any inclination to engage in ‘business as usual’ or compromise its values for economic gain.

The Hong Kong diasporic community is looking forward to the UK reaffirming its commitment to justice, freedom, and human dignity on the global stage.

(Feb 2025)