WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY UK-CHINA TRANSPARENCY
(TRUK0044)
As outlined in the information hub we host on our website, transnational repression related to China on UK campuses:
“is not a marginal issue. Rather, it has the potential to affect tens of thousands of people. In the UK, there are estimated to be (round figures):
(I strongly suggest you read our information hub on CCP interference on campus, as it contains much information that will be useful for your inquiry.)
I am aware of individuals in most of these categories, including those born in the UK with full British citizenship, who have suffered from what might be termed transnational repression because of a connection to China. Forms of interference or repression include being subjected to abusive language, warnings from Chinese officials, visits to family members in China by Chinese police, being followed, harassing phone calls, and interference in academic work either as a student or staff.
The story of one such person, a prominent activist, is reproduced on our website and may be instructive (at https://ukctransparency.org/projects-2/ccp-on-campus/china-deviants/). This person was involved in the White Paper protests in London and has since been targeted by the Chinese state.
Most of those we speak to do not want to publicise their stories for fear of further consequences. Correspondingly, many of those who fear transnational repression (though they might not use that exact phrase) pre-emptively avoid behaviours that might lead to consequences. This is relevant for any discussion about defining transnational repression. Should we view transnational repression as a phenomenon that manifests in the odd case, here and there, affecting those who have chosen to say or do something persistently and as a result faced intervention from an authoritarian state? Or should we view transnational repression as a systemic phenomenon, acknowledging that only a few people need to be made an example of, for a far larger number of people to pre-emptively alter their behaviour or words to avoid such consequences?
I would suggest the latter understanding is more holistic and captures the full breadth of experiences, as well as allowing us better to understand evidence and conceive of appropriate responses.
I am aware of several people who have at first dabbled in, for example, pro-democracy activism, only to decide to cease their activities and censor themselves after seeing the consequences wrought upon their co-activists, friends or colleagues. I know many people who quietly contribute to their cause whilst going to extreme lengths to protect their own anonymity. Many more people never speak up at all, because they know what could happen. This is plainly repression, and all these kinds of people are collectively its victims. It would be foolish to define transnational repression in a way that excludes this breadth of impact.
Many important points flow from this observation that transnational repression is a systemic phenomenon that affects a much larger number of people than the smaller subset of victims of documented, clear and specific intervention from the Chinese state. I will expound on just two points here.
The first is that transnational repression likely cannot be dealt with through government action or law enforcement alone. It is a matter of common sense that, if the phenomenon is to be addressed meaningfully at all, universities must take action.
All the evidence suggests that the Chinese government and the CCP invest significant resources in monitoring Britain’s Chinese communities – including the China-connected academic communities which are the subject of this submission – for anti-CCP activism, and significant resources to interfering with the few brave enough to speak out persistently.
Doubtless the new National Security Act will lead to prosecutions for transnational repression as executed by state actors and those working on their behalf. But the British state has relatively limited resources to put towards investigation and enforcement, and this is likely to continue to be the case, in part because it is not in the nature of a democratic state to have the means, let alone the desire, to sweep through communities plucking out and prosecuting every person who may be complicit in helping an authoritarian power project its restrictions beyond its borders. We must therefore ask whether such an Act, given the limited resources and in spite of the powerful disincentives it puts in place, is sufficient to address the broader problem.
(It is worth noting as an aside that these are very new questions, and the British state has never in its history been confronted with such a large number of people living in Britain who are the subjects or potential subjects of transnational repression by foreign states. It is a matter of fact that this state of affairs is a product of unprecedented globalisation, internationalisation and multiculturalism, and that new thinking is required to address it.)
It might be suggested that a wider cast of non-governmental institutions and actors need to get involved in dissuading complicity in transnational repression, publicising the risks of complicity, challenging it ethically, supporting victims, investigating the exact contours of the issues, etcetera.
British universities have done next to nothing to acknowledge publicly the role of the CCP in transnational repression on campuses. I am aware of only one university that has named the Chinese government as a culprit and warned members not to become complicit in transnational repression.
Chinese students with anti-CCP feelings or beliefs interpret the sector’s silence as a function of universities’ financial dependence on Chinese student fees. If one is considering becoming involved in protests or some other form of activism, the message one infers from, say, images circulating online of one’s Vice-Chancellor or other university officials fraternising in a very positive way with the Chinese ambassador in the UK or other Chinese officials (for example, on university trips to China) is not likely to be ‘my institution will protect me above these relationships’. Indeed, anecdotally, I have heard that, on some occasions, following incidents of unrest, British universities have passed names of students involved in activity seen as anti-CCP to Chinese diplomats themselves. It does not appear that dissidents amongst Chinese students have confidence in their universities.
The Committee should not that there is ongoing uncertainty about the extent to which the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act may result in steps taken to address this issue, requiring as it does institutions to take ‘reasonably practicable steps’ to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom. UKCT has been closely involved providing information to the Office for Students as it grapples with the new legislation amidst a lack of clarity about the current government’s willingness to see it enter force. Certainly, the Committee must investigate the relevance of the Act to their inquiry, and may consider asking whether the Department for Education and the Minister are appropriately abreast of the reality and extent of transnational repression, how the Act relates to it, what steps have been considered or taken, what communication there has been with universities and industry bodies about this, etc.
I am due to speak to the Office for Students about this again in early March. I would be happy to explain further to the Committee the relationship between the Act and transnational repression related to China on British campuses.
The second point is that it is also a matter of common sense that, if transnational repression in academic communities is to be addressed meaningfully at all, universities must have a dialogue with those communities. This dialogue must address the issue of informants. This refers to certain members of a community that endures transnational repression themselves informing on other members of the community.
There have long been concerns, and scraps of evidence, that Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), which are CCP-controlled or -influenced student unions and are present at many British universities, are involved in informing in this way. For example, a recent academic mini-article (https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/2025/02/13/why-become-a-student-cadre-overseas/ , a precursor to a full paper by one of the authors) was based on interviews with CSSA leaders and contains the following piece of evidence:
“A London-based university CSSA leader we interviewed mentioned that when the embassy asks them the names of students who take part in protests, especially the events organised in London in the context of the White Paper movement, they try to remain as vague as possible as it is “very tricky to deal with that”.”
It should not be surprising to learn that, whilst some China-linked university members may be fervently pro-CCP and inform with enthusiasm, it is likely that many informants are acting under duress.
Encouragement to inform may well be targeted at groups, like CSSAs, which have a formal relationship with the Chinese embassy / Chinese state. CSSAs describe themselves as a branch of a central CSSA-UK, which is effectively part of the Chinese embassy and indeed has described itself as a branch of a part of the United Front Work Department of the CCP. Other firm links to the authorities include via Confucius Institutes, 30 of which are based in British universities and most of which have a ‘Chinese director’ who is seconded from China.
CCP members constitute another link. It is surprisingly often possible to establish that a visiting academic or seconded member of staff at a British university is a CCP member, because such and such a person’s Chinese university biographical page will often reference membership, or even member of a CCP committee. Most ‘Chinese directors’ of Confucius Institutes are likely to be CCP members.
CCP members have a formal obligation to obey requests for information, report anti-CCP activity, support the CCP in all its activities and indeed keep all this secret if required, on pain of potentially severe punishment or sanctions. UKCT would be happy to provide evidence of these rules to the Committee. CCP membership accordingly is not akin to membership of a democratic political party and is unlikely to constitute a protected characteristic under UK law. The presence of CCP members on campus raises quite profound questions for universities, including legal questions, and has obvious consequences for our understanding of transnational repression. To my knowledge, UKCT is the only organisation in the UK talking about this issue.
What can be done about all this? I and UKCT do not have strong answers to offer, and we try to steer away from campaigning for policies or specific measures. Our mission is to find and present facts and make sense of them. However, I would suggest again that the facts suggest that whilst law enforcement and central government action are a necessary part of our response, they may not be sufficient to address transnational repression, a broad and systemic phenomenon that reaches to the grassroots.
The Committee might wish to consider whether the evidence is strong enough that universities ought at this stage to heed the arguments being made in some quarters that they should:
a) Acknowledge transnational repression and publicly and explicitly name the CCP/Chinese government as a culprit (either in particular or named as one of various authoritarian states involved);
b) Urgently investigate the risk that may be posed to their members by the likes of CSSAs, Confucius Institutes and CCP members, all of which have formal official connections – including by having frank dialogues with these groups and individuals, and by taking legal advice about the obligations upon CCP members;
c) Make clear, for example in orientation or induction material or lectures for staff and students, what transnational repression is, and that complicity in transnational repression will not be tolerated, will lead to institutional sanctions, and may be illegal;
d) Institute secure discussion fora or channels where fears can be reported by members who may be targeted and those who may be complicit. These could be regular, or be activated at moments of tension, e.g. the Hong Kong protests in 2019, or the White Paper movement in 2022.
(Feb 2025)