Overseas Development Institute – Written evidence (AFG0028)

TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE’S INQUIRY

INTO THE UK AND AFGHANISTAN

ABOUT ODI

ODI is a leading international development and global affairs think tank. We harness the power of evidence and ideas through research and partnership to confront global challenges, develop solutions and create change.

The submission draws on insights from ODI’s Lessons for Peace: Afghanistan[i] project and complements oral evidence given to the Committee by Mark Bowden, Senior Research Associate, and Ashley Jackson, Co-Director of the Centre for the Study of Armed Groups.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The government should maintain its support to Afghanistan and continue to make long-term commitments. Discussions on whether pledges at the 2020 Conference in Geneva should be short-term pending the outcome of the current peace process are misguided. 

2. In particular, the government should continue to be a consistent and critical supporter of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund.

3. Greater efforts should be made to constructively engage Iran and Pakistan through joint diplomatic efforts.

4. The US plays a dominant role in Afghanistan’s peace process and domestic security, but implementation of the US-Taliban peace agreement will clearly be a long process and not without challenges.

5. Afghan National Security Forces continue to suffer high and unsustainable casualty rates and police and local militias are often at the forefront of the conflict. However, few resources have gone into police training, support or management.

6. The Taliban is comprised of a series of internal groupings and alliances, as well as having several smaller groups of foreign fighters associated with them including Uzbeks, Chechens and some Al Qaeda fighters. While the numbers of foreign fighters are relatively small, the Afghan government has placed emphasis on these groups as a means of sustaining external military support.

7. While uncertainty remains over the relationship between ISIL and the Taliban, the presence of ISIL remains a major concern. The increasing number of young educated urban Afghans becoming radicalised and joining ISIL is of great concern and widely underreported.

8. Over half of Afghanistan is now under the Taliban’s influence, which has led to deeper engagement from the Taliban in governance at both provincial and district level. The development of more extensive Taliban governance brings with it the need for new dialogue on their commitment to Afghanistan’s development.

9. The challenge for Afghanistan to successfully operate as a multi-ethnic state arises from the 2001 Bonn Agreement and the constitutional arrangements agreed therein. Securing a successful multi-ethnic state will require both constitutional reform and more devolved local government.

10.                     Efforts to build and strengthen Afghanistan's institutions (including the judiciary and the rule of law) have been amongst the least successful areas of international engagement.

11.                     The Taliban has benefitted by promoting their development of a justice system as meeting more immediate community needs and serving as a protection against government corruption.

12.                     The Afghan government’s approach to civil society and NGOs appears increasingly hostile and the response to Covid-19 has heightened tensions.

13.                     Afghanistan remains a predominantly agricultural economy in a country that is viewed as one of those most vulnerable to climate change. Greater emphasis must be given to the development of markets and the creation of value chains.

14.                     National economic plans have demonstrated overreliance on the development of the extractive industry sector, but growth from extractive industries can only be achieved once a more stable security environment has been secured.

15.                     Afghanistan now has one of the world’s largest internally displaced populations, with little hope of reintegration or return, and the ability of Afghanistan’s host communities to support returnees continues to diminish as economies decline.

SUSTAINING LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN

16.                     The UK government has provided more than £1 billion in development assistance to Afghanistan since 2001. Over 50% of the government’s aid is directed to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), 12% to humanitarian assistance and 9% to education – with the remainder split between different initiatives.

17.                     Established in 2002, the ARTF is a World Bank managed multi-donor trust fund, which serves as Afghanistan’s main multi-donor mechanism for non-security assistance.

18.                     The government should continue to support the ARTF, which has advantages in terms of low aid transaction costs and the management of risk through being part of a pooled development fund.

19.                     Moreover, the ARTF is essential in maintaining and developing basic services as well as supporting extensive community development activities. However, there is scope to improve the ARTF in terms of effectiveness.

20.                     Many of the ARTF’s programmes in health, education and service delivery are increasingly dependent on NGOs for their implementation. Yet, NGOs are increasingly vulnerable due to the nature of the contracts and terms under which they operate. This situation has exacerbated tensions between the Afghan government and civil society.

21.                     The UK’s presence through DFID has been critical in terms of supporting NGO functions within the ARTF; and it has been an effective member of the ARTF strategy and accountability framework.

22.                     DFID has also been one of Afghanistan's main humanitarian donors and a consistent contributor to the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF). Indeed, DFID has been one of the few donors to provide multi-annual support to the AHF.

23.                     This support has been critical in terms of addressing longstanding humanitarian concerns (including support to Internally Displaced Persons) and enabling a more strategic and effective use of funds.

24.                    Going forward, it is critical that the UK government maintains current spending and continues to make long-term commitments.

25.                    Discussions on whether pledges at the 2020 Conference in Geneva should be short-term pending the outcome of the current peace process are misguided.

26.                     As Mark Bowden explained in oral evidence to the Committee: ‘We should not hold out any hope for a peace dividend from the current aid configuration… it is critical… that longer-term commitments are made. Holding up aid commitments on the basis of the peace process could be very destructive.’ [ii]

SECURING REGIONAL AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

27.                     Insufficient attention has been given to the role of regional actors (including Iran and Pakistan) in shaping Afghanistan’s political and security environment. Yet, both countries have considerable economic and trading power and influence; host large refugee populations; and draw heavily on Afghanistan for migrant labour.

28.                    Greater efforts should be made to constructively engage Iran and Pakistan through joint diplomatic efforts.

29.                     The UK government may not be best placed to engage Iran, but the Iranian government has looked towards the UN to establish a better regional dialogue. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s internal politics, the legacy of the Durand Line and security concerns over FATA areas mean that joint diplomatic efforts will be required to ensure that it continues to play a constructive role.

30.                    Amongst international actors, the United States plays a dominant role in Afghanistan’s peace process and domestic security; and the peace agreement signed between the US and the Taliban in February has progressed, albeit slowly.

31.                     Implementation of the US-Taliban peace agreement will clearly be a long process and not without challenges.[iii]

1. The first key challenge is addressing the issue of a ceasefire: it is unlikely that the Taliban can or will want to agree to this, although they may accept a reduction in hostilities.

2. The second key challenge is establishing a political agenda for the peace process: the Taliban does not have a clear governance agenda and President Ghani fears the potential establishment of an interim or transitional government.

COUNTERING CONFLICT AND YOUTH RADICALISATION

32.                     Afghan forces continue to suffer high and unsustainable casualty rates. The issue of sustainability is more for the Afghan National Security Forces than the Taliban due to the differences in recruitment. The Afghan National Army plays a more defensive role in the current conflict.

33.                     Due to the nature of conflict, police and local militias are often at the forefront of the conflict and suffer the greatest casualties. Few resources have gone into police training, support or management. Some support is being given to local militias by the US, although this is scheduled to end shortly leading to a further decline in capacity.

34.                     The Taliban is comprised of a series of internal groupings and alliances, as well as having several smaller groups of foreign fighters associated with them including Uzbeks, Chechens and some Al Qaeda fighters.

35.                     While the numbers of foreign fighters are relatively small, the Afghan government has placed emphasis on these groups as a means of sustaining external military support. For example, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated in September that there were fewer than 200 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.[iv]

36.                     Nevertheless, the presence of ISIL remains a major concern, primarily in Nangarhar. ISIL also has increasing influence in Jalalabad and Kabul.

37.                     Uncertainty remains over the relationship between ISIL and the Taliban, with some recent NGO reports of the two working more closely together in Badakhshan. It is likely that these are based on local family affiliations and ties.

38.                    Of greater concern is the increasing numbers of young educated urban Afghans becoming radicalised and joining ISIL. The challenges of youth radicalisation remain underreported and are more significant than relationships with foreign and domestic political actors.

DEVELOPING DIALOGUE WITH THE TALIBAN ON DEVELOPMENT

39.                    Since 2011 the area under Taliban control and that contested by the Taliban has increased, with over half of Afghanistan now under the Taliban’s influence.

40.                     This has brought with it a deeper engagement from the Taliban in governance at both provincial and district level and the deployment of Taliban officials from its various commissions.

41.                     The 2012 opening of the Taliban’s office in Qatar was a significant extension of the role of the Taliban’s Political Commission and followed a gradual process of structuring the Taliban’s governance functions which had been ongoing for two years.

42.                     It made it possible to have a more structured and transparent dialogue on humanitarian issues with an open recognition and welcome by the senior Taliban leadership.

43.                    The development of more extensive Taliban governance brings with it the need for new dialogue on their commitment to Afghanistan’s development.[v]

44.                     In 2018, ODI research noted that: “the Taliban are using humanitarian access and development interventions for political and military ends, and agencies are increasingly being forced to react to this reality. They often do so unilaterally or are caught on the back foot in negotiations. This has enabled the Taliban to set the rules and parameters of negotiation. The challenge for the international community now is to figure out how to engage with the Taliban on these issues in a politically feasible and strategic way.”[vi]

STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

45.                    The challenge for Afghanistan to successfully operating as a multi-ethnic state arises from the 2001 Bonn Agreement and the constitutional arrangements agreed therein.

46.                     The constitution favours the Pashtun majority in terms of the election of President and it remains difficult to ensure diverse ethnic representation under current constitutional arrangements.

47.                     Following Afghanistan’s 2014 elections, the agreement reached on the National Unity Government was an attempt to create space within the constitution for a prime ministerial position that would allow a degree of power sharing.[vii] However, subsequent cabinets continued to favour the Pashtuns.

48.                     The current government (in part due to concerns over the strength of local and regional power brokers) has also adopted a strong centralising approach which has not allowed for sufficient devolution.

49.                    Securing a successful multi-ethnic state will require both constitutional reform and more devolved local government.

50.                     Efforts to build and strengthen Afghanistan's institutions, including the judiciary and the rule of law, have been amongst the least successful areas of international engagement. As the 2020 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report on anti-corruption[viii] highlights, intentions and policy commitments have not been achieved.

51.                     The Taliban has benefitted by promoting their development of a justice system as meeting more immediate community needs, with those living in Taliban areas having little choice but to pursue legal claims through Taliban courts. [ix]

52.                    The Taliban have used their courts not only to delegitimise the state and erode state justice provision, but also to disempower and replace customary dispute resolution. This has undoubtedly helped them to consolidate control over territory and compel civilians to follow their rules. 

53.                     In many areas, the Taliban has worked to co-opt development activities and service delivery and present its engagement with governance as a protection against government corruption.

54.                     To meet its commitments on anti-corruption, the Afghan government should staff anti-corruption institutions, improve investigative capacity and competence, strengthen the Attorney General’s Office and demonstrate a commitment to addressing longstanding concerns over major procurement and financial cases that have been outstanding since 2016.

55.                     The most significant progress on rights and freedom of expression has been through the Freedom of Information Act. Nevertheless, the government’s approach to civil society and NGOs appears increasingly hostile.

56.                     If implemented, proposed new NGO regulations would cause the closure of many organisations; and the response to Covid-19 has highlighted tension between Afghan government and NGOs as a competition for resources and legitimacy.[x]

DEVELOPING AFGHANISTAN’S ECONOMY

57.                     Afghanistan remains a predominantly agricultural economy in a country that is viewed as one of those most vulnerable to climate change.[xi] The economy is characterised by cycles of bumper harvests that bring modest economic growth and poor harvests at times of low snowfall. 

58.                     The concentration on cereal production, fruit and nuts and the lack of agricultural diversification has resulted in Afghanistan having very high food import requirements. International assistance to the agricultural sector has been criticised for being too projectised with poor coordination among donors.

59.                     Greater emphasis needs to be given to the development of markets and the creation of value chains.

60.                     National economic plans have demonstrated overreliance on the development of the extractive industry sector as proving the engine for economic growth and recovery.

61.                     However, evidence suggests both physical and political insecurity have deterred long-term investment and economic growth from extractive industries can only be achieved once a more stable security environment has been secured.

SUPPORTING INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS

62.                     The return of refugees from Pakistan is a more complex issue than return from Iran.

63.                     In part, this is the result of the arbitrary nature of registration of Afghan refugees in Pakistan where members of the same family can often include registered refugees and other family members who were not included in the registration.

64.                     Previous efforts at returning Afghans have both added to the pressures of urbanisation and increased the numbers of internally displaced living in absolute poverty.

65.                    Afghanistan now has one of the world’s largest internally displaced populations, with little hope of reintegration or return.[xii]

66.                    The ability of Afghanistan’s host communities to support returnees continues to diminish with the decline in the economy.

67.                     On the other hand, Iran has supported refugees with a higher level of service and emphasised access to all levels of education as a means of enabling return with increased skills.

Received 2 November 2020