Written evidence submitted by Loughborough University (DIS0009)

Who we are

• Sabina Mihelj is Professor of Media and Cultural Analysis at the Centre for Research in Communication and Culture, Loughborough University. Her research focuses on the role of media and culture in transitions to and from democracy.
• Václav Štětka is Reader in Comparative Political Communication at the Centre for Research in Communication and Culture, Loughborough University. His research focuses on news consumption, polarization, social media and disinformation, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.

Our rationale for submitting evidence to this inquiry is to share relevant research findings and recommendations from our two successive ESRC-funded research projects – The Illiberal Turn [2019-2022] and PANCOPOP [2022-2024]. Among other topics, these projects have examined the spreading, perception and impact of disinformation in the context of rising populism, polarization and illiberalism in Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Serbia) and beyond (Brazil, the U.S.). The PANCOPOP project was focusing on health-related dis- and misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Both projects relied on quantitative and qualitative methods (population and expert surveys, interviews, media diaries, or content analysis). 

Further details on our methodology, findings and recommendations can be found in our final reports (Štětka et al., 2021; Mihelj et al., 2024), and in a policy brief published in the Academy of Social Sciences IAG briefing series (Mihelj, 2024). Hard copies are available on request.

Summary

• In countries where illiberalism gained substantial prominence in political and media systems, domestic political leaders and mainstream media outlets are often just as prominent disinformation actors as foreign entities. They play a crucial role in both producing their own disinformation and in amplifying disinformation originating from abroad.
• In Eastern Europe, in particular, digital platforms are not necessarily the only—or even the most important—part of local disinformation ecosystems. Mainstream media channels, including tabloid newspapers and websites, commercial broadcasters, as well as state-captured public service broadcasters, play an equally important role.

• Our results call for a more differentiated approach to assessing the role of social media and highlight important differences between various types of digital platforms and between different political contexts. In countries where the quality of democracy and media freedom have declined, digital platforms can provide vital channels of resistance to disinformation.
• False and misleading information spread by domestic actors can be particularly detrimental during a major crisis. It undermines the effectiveness of crisis communication and weakness the capacity for societal consensus and solidarity, thereby increasing societal vulnerability to foreign interference. 

Who are the main state and non-state actors spreading disinformation?

Debates on information manipulation in the UK and Europe predominantly focus on foreign actors (especially Russia) as the main producers and disseminators of disinformation. However, our research highlights the equally significant role of domestic actors who are actively involved in spreading falsehoods, conspiracy theories and rumours to mobilize voters and advance political agendas that are weakening or even subverting the core values and institutions of liberal democracy. These actors include, first and foremost, far-right nationalist and/or illiberal politicians and parties, many of whom have been strategically employing disinformation and conspiracy narratives aiming to spread fears and sow societal divisions around polarizing topics such as immigration or LGBTQ+ rights (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024: 119-147; Mihelj et al., 2022; Mihelj et al., 2023). Depending on context and topic, other types of domestic actors can play a role as well, including religious and cultural institutions or grassroots organisations (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024: 119-147).

While such actors initially tend to spread disinformation using their own (mosty digital) channels and likeminded grassroots organisations, their influence increases significantly when rising to positions of power and subjecting mainstream media channels to state control. For instance, government parties in both Hungary and Serbia have repeatedly instrumentalized mainstream media to spread conspiracy stories about the US philanthropist George Soros, and as our survey shows, such theories are now endorsed by 37% of Hungarians and 45% of Serbians (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024: 181-212). Likewise, in Poland, the government led by the conservative-nationalist party Law and Justice (2015-2023) has been fuelling the conspiracy about the third-party involvement in the 2010 Smolensk plane disaster, which is believed by 47% of people (ibid.).

Disinformation circulated by domestic actors can be particularly detrimental in a major crisis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, political leaders and government figures in Brazil and the U.S. have amplified false or misleading information about the virus and preventive measures, including vaccines, while political leaders in Eastern Europe often did too little to actively counter such information (Hallin et al., 2024). The uncertainty generated by such behaviour contributed to undermining the integrity of evidence-based decision-making, the effectiveness of emergency risk communication, and the ability of society to move toward the consensus and solidarity necessary for effective action in the face of a common threat (ibid.).

Recommendation based on our evidence:

• Counter-disinformation efforts should pay close attention to the role of domestic actors, especially political actors, including those in government positions.
• Key stakeholders involved in public communication should develop and implement an integrated strategy for combatting disinformation during a crisis, designed to coordinate counter-misinformation efforts at transnational, national, regional and local levels.

What channels and technologies are state and non-state actors using to spread disinformation?

While our research confirms that social media are among the main channels of disinformation in all countries studied, it reveals that disinformation is also being spread through other media types, including mainstream media such as major tabloids and associated websites, commercial broadcasters, and state-captured public service media. The relative importance of mainstream media in the local disinformation ecosystem grows in parallel with the level of advancement of illiberalism and with the extent of media capture by illiberal actors. In Hungary and Serbia, mainstream media serve as the main pillar of the disinformation ecosystem, acting both as amplifiers and as producers of propaganda and false narratives, including conspiracy theories (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024). In Poland, the public service broadcaster TVP has been considered the main carrier of disinformation during the government led by the Law and Justice party (ibid.).

Apart from mainstream news media, our research points to another communication technology that has been playing an important role in the dissemination of disinformation, namely old-fashioned email. Being virally shared across networks of family members, friends and acquaintances, especially among the elderly, these so-called “chain emails” with political content – often featuring polarizing subjects such as immigration – have been particularly prominent in the Czech Republic, where they are received by 39% of the population (and by nearly half of those above 56 old), the majority of whom (53%) are forwarding them to other recipients (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024).

With regards to digital platforms, our work demonstrates the need for a more granular approach, which distinguishes between social networking sites and messaging apps. The latter – that is, the “closed/private” platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Viber or Telegram – appear to be more closely associated with users’ susceptibility to dis/misinformation than the “open/public” platforms such as Facebook, Instagram or YouTube. Furthermore, our data also points to podcasts as an additional—hitherto unrecognized—influential source of misinformation in several of the countries we studied (Štětka et al., 2024). Furthermore, our research also shows that the role of digital platforms in the disinformation ecosystem can change over time and vary with political context. As the influence of illiberal actors over the media system increases, and the quality of democracy and media freedom decline, digital platforms can provide vital channels of resistance to disinformation (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024: 153-180)

Recommendation based on our evidence:

• Policies aimed at countering disinformation need to broaden their scope to channels operated by legacy news organizations, including tabloids, commercial broadcasters and public service media. This is particularly important in countries where illiberal actors have risen to positions of power, and where the combined impact of such mainstream channels may prove to be more detrimental than the effects of digital disinformation.
• Counter-disinformation efforts targeted at digital platforms should take into account differences between types of platforms and acknowledge that the role of digital platforms in the disinformation ecology can shift as quality of democracy and media freedom decline.
• Media literacy projects need to broaden their scope to a wider range of media types and platforms, both online and offline, and incorporate more complex strategies for fighting disinformation in a high-choice but increasingly government-controlled media environment.

References

Hallin, D., Mihelj, S., Klimkiewicz, B., Rothberg, D., Štětka, V., Ferracioli, P., Rao, N., Vanevska, K., and Stojiljković, A. (2024) ‘Pandemic Communication in Times of Populism: Politicization and the COVID Communication Process in Brazil, Poland, Serbia and the United States’, Social Science & Medicine. 

Mihelj, S., Kondor, K., & Štětka, V. (2022). Audience engagement with COVID-19 news: The impact of lockdown and live coverage, and the role of polarization. Journalism Studies, 23(5-6), 569-587.

Mihelj, S., Kondor, K., Štětka, V., & Tóth, F. (2023). The ambivalences of visibility: News consumption and public attitudes to same-sex relationships in the context of illiberalism. European Journal of Communication, 38(6), 571-590.

Mihelj, S. (2024) “Crisis communication in times of political instability and misinformation”, UK Academy of Social Sciences IAG policy briefings series, October 2024.

Mihelj, S., Hallin, D., Klimkiewicz, B., Laruelle, M., Rothberg, D., Štětka, V., Kiriukhina, M., Stojiljković, A., and Vanevska, K. (2024) Engaging in effective health crisis communication in times of populism: Actionable insights from the PANCOPOP project. Loughborough University.

Štětka, V., & Mihelj, S. (2024). The Illiberal Public Sphere: Media in Polarized Societies. Palgrave.

Štětka, V., Brandao, F., Tóth, F., Mihelj, S., Rothberg, D., Hallin, D., Klimkiewicz, B., & Ferracioli, P. (2024). Beyond social media: the influence of news consumption, populism, and expert trust on belief in COVID-19 misinformation. The International Journal of Press/Politics.

In addition to the research mentioned above, we are about to conduct a comparative study of audience reception of Russian disinformation in three Eastern European countries – Poland, Romania and Serbia. This project is funded by the AHRC and ESRC, and will be based on population surveys and qualitative interviews in all these countries, with the data to be collected between April and June. In case of interest, we would be happy to present the results of this project to the Committee later this year.

21 February 2025