WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN ERITREA (HRC-E) AND CSW

(TRUK0017)

While there is no agreed international definition of transnational repression (TNR), those that exist coalesce around describing the phenomenon whereby extraterritorial actions are undertaken by repressive states targeting opponents real or perceived, whether members of diaspora communities or citizens of the nations where these actions occur, in order to intimidate, penalise, coerce, and even harm them, with the ultimate aim of silencing them. Targets of such human rights violations generally include religious activists, dissidents  journalists political opponents or religious or ethnic minorities. However, not all coercive actions occur extraterritorially; repressive states also undertake actions internally to impact and intimidate individuals in the diaspora.

TNR can include harassment, stalking both physical and cyber,  violence, abduction and  enforced repatriation (as occurred in the extraordinary renditions of prominent Rwandan activist Paul Rusesabagina in 2020, and the leader of the separatist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) Nnamdi Kanu in 2021, abusing legal mechanisms in the host country by targeting individuals with false allegations (e.g., terrorism or corruption); intimidation of family members and friends (both in the host country and any in their country of origin); and even assassination – as occurred in the case of Jamal Khashoggi, whose murder brought the issue of transnational repression to the fore internationally.

The Case of Eritrea

In 2016, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (COIE) ‘found reasonable grounds to believe’ crimes against humanity, had been occurring there in  a ‘widespread and systematic manner’ since 1991, committed largely but not exclusively in the context of the country’s indefinite military service regime. Eritreans have been described as a people under siege by their own government. In addition to possessing a myriad of official and unofficial detention facilities, the nation itself is effectively an open air prison, with a comprehensive system of repression that extends beyond its borders to control and extort the diaspora.

In his June 2024 report the UN Special Rapporteur on Eritrea highlighted ‘evolving patterns of transnational repression’ designed to ‘counter the work of pro-democracy activists, journalists, political opponents and human rights defenders, including by

resorting to kidnappings and enforced disappearances, unlawful removals, surveillance, violence, intimidation, harassment, smear campaigns, social isolation and the refusal of consular service.’ 

Eritrea’s ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) trains cadres from communities in the diaspora, including in the United Kingdom (UK), selecting individuals from diverse backgrounds and embedding them within the community to monitor and report on fellow Eritreans.

Additionally, trained operatives are deployed to Eritrean embassies to intimidate, monitor and coerce exiles. Former spies have informed Human Rights Concern Eritrea (HRCE) that the PFDJ actively recruits members of the diaspora to gather intelligence on their communities. This information, and particularly any criticism of the regime, is sent to Eritrea, where it can be used against individuals, potentially resulting in their disappearance or imprisonment when they visit the country.

Supporters of the regime in the UK  target dissidents, activists, exiled opposition figures and even critics who are not Eritrean nationals through harassment, surveillance, intimidation and even physical attacks. Tactics include online threats, defamation through  false accusations and smear campaigns, stalking, and exerting pressure on family members in diaspora and in Eritrea in order to silence critics. Such actions, which also undermine free expression, create a climate of fear leading to a reluctance to speak openly of atrocities witnessed, experienced, or which are still underway in Eritrea.

Possibly the earliest examples of TNR in the UK occurred publicly, after the Eritrean government launched a brutal crackdown on political dissent in September 2001, arresting 11 of the high-ranking officials known as the G-15 who had openly criticised President Isaias Afwerki and called for democratic reforms. The regime also shut down all independent media and arrested journalists, at a stroke ending free press and political opposition.

Alarmed by these developments, eleven Eritreans residing in London organised a meeting where former Minister of Defence Mesfin Hagos, a member of the G-15 who had escaped imprisonment as he was abroad for medical treatment, would discuss the arrest of his colleagues and the deteriorating rule of law in Eritrea.

The meeting, which was held on 28 September 2001 at Islington Green School, was disrupted violently by over two hundred supporters of the Eritrean regime, who assaulted the organisers and the guest of honour, hurling chairs onto the stage at them while six privately hired security guards did their best to protect them. The main objective of this attack was to prevent Mr. Hagos from speaking about his imprisoned colleagues and the dire political situation in Eritrea. It was  also intended to intimidate and instil fear in the diaspora to inhibit the organisation of similar meetings.

The organisers hired a new venue in Islington and convened another meeting two weeks later, this time with a police presence both in and outside the building. They also compiled  the names and details of the 19  ringleaders of the violence meticulously. Given the large number of perpetrators, a lawsuit was not feasible. However, MI5 intervened and issued formal warnings to the 19 individuals. News of the MI5 visits spread among the regime supporters, and as a result, these disruptions ceased, and Eritrean activists were able to continue their work without experiencing further violence.

This event illustrated the lengths to which the Eritrean regime and its supporters will go to suppress dissent. It also highlighted not only the resilience of Eritrean activists committed to stand for justice, but also the effectiveness of interventions by the forces of law and order, namely, the police and MI5, in subduing recurrences of violence.

However, intimidation and harassment by cadres of the rest of the diaspora continued.

Cultural Festivals

Particular avenues of intimidation are community organisations and the so-called cultural festivals that are held by Eritrea Embassies across the world, which often involve special appearances by officials who may be complicit in the commission of international crimes, and which, reportedly, are utilised to extort, intimidate and radicalise the diaspora.

Consequently, many Eritreans in the diaspora live in fear, hesitant to openly criticise the government even after finding refuge in democratic countries, dreading potential repercussions on family members remaining  in Eritrea should they engage in activism. Thus some choose to self-censor or avoid activities that could be construed as being political in order to protect themselves and their loved ones. Thus Eritrea’s TNR remained shrouded in a secrecy born largely of fear.

Over three decades of relentless repression has resulted in the flight of 17% of Eritrea’s population, many of them youth escaping the inhumane military service regime. As Eritrean diplomatic missions have continued organised  these festivals in democratic nations without hinderance, with some who have claimed or have received asylum in attendance, the anger of genuine asylum seekers and refugees has spilled over, and violent incidents have begun to occur between government supporters and opponents in cities across the world, with some resulting in deaths, injuries, arrests and destruction of property.

Arrests of Non-violent Asylum Seekers

On 4 September 2023 Eritrean government supporters took to the streets in protests outside the Embassy, angered after campaigning by human rights activists had successfully resulted about the cancellation of a festival, broadcasting their protest on social media, spewing hate speech and incitement. Soon around 40 counter-protestors had gathered, many of them young Eritrean asylum-seekers, some of whom had escaped after being conscripted forcibly to fight in the war in Tigray.

While the police allowed the pro- government-protest to continue despite being informed that the speeches and songs slogans that  shouted through a megaphone and broadcast on social media were inflammatory, hateful, and provocative, the counter-protesters were dispersed forcefully by riot police. Twenty-one people were arrested, including  16 asylum-seekers.

In response to concerns raised by CSW and HRCE, among others, the Metropolitan Police said in a statement that its officers had been called to reports of ‘fighting’ near the embassy. ‘Local officers attended and found a number of groups involved in a confrontation. Specialist officers were also called to assist. Twenty-one people were arrested for offences including public order and wilful obstruction of the highway.’

In an environment increasingly hostile to immigration, the anti-government protesters were misrepresented by elements of the British media as being ‘a mob’ and ‘rioters’, amid claims that they ‘clashed’with police officers. Government supporters reportedly assisted in spreading this disinformation, with the Eritrean Embassy claiming they ‘Tigrayan terrorists.’ However, video footage illustrates that the counter protestors, who were demonstrating against what they termed ‘the long arm’ of the Eritrean ruling party, and who had stated they would leave as soon as pro-government supporters dispersed, did not target the police with violence.  

Further Examples of TNR

Over time Eritrea’s efforts to coerce and control its diaspora have become more visible and more brazen, and have even affected non-Eritreans.

In November 2018, former BBC journalist Martin Plaut was lured to a café close to the British Library and assaulted by an Eritrean Government Supporter named Yacob Ghebremedhin. The assailant had colleagues film the encounter and post it on social media. Mr. Ghebremedhin was arrested, charged, brought before Highbury Corner Magistrates Court, found guilty, and fined. However, in an indication of the degree to which such violence may enjoy official sanction, the Eritrean Ambassador to Japan applauded the assault in a Tweet dated 2 December 2018, while an Eritrean diplomat in charge of Public and Community Affairs at the embassy in Sweden called Mr. Gebremedhin ‘the Eritrean Hero’ in a Facebook post.

On 26 November 2019, Mr Ghebremedhin was among four government supporters who attacked Amanuel Eyasu, the founder of a popular Satellite TV station, Assena, who had been lured to Putney Bridge Station by an Eritrean female residing in London who claimed to have information on the human rights situation in Eritrea. Mr. Ghebremedhin was arrested, convicted once again, and sentenced by the Isleworth Crown Court to a 16-week suspended sentence, a £600 fine, and a 30-day 7.00 pm to 7.00 am curfew. He was also given a restraining order that prohibited him from contacting Mr Eyasu for five years.

However, in June 2022 Mr. Ghebremedhin telephoned Mr.. Eyasu from Eritrea, where he was reportedly receiving military training. During this call, which was recorded, he swore he would kill him and bury him underground. Mr Eyasu reported the threat to the police, and Mr. Ghebremedhin was arrested upon arrival at Heathrow Airport on 28 May 2023. He subsequently pleaded guilty to ‘Threatening to Kill, and Breaching a Restraining Order,’ was found guilty, was jailed for 22 months and also received a 10-year restraining order.

Other incidents of TNR include:

• The case of an Eritrean musician, former conscript, husband, and father of six who defected in 2014 while on a visit to Europe, where he had been brought by the Eritrean government  to perform at festivals. Seizing the opportunity, he escaped and sought asylum. His defection enraged pro-government supporters, who began a live discussion on Paltalk, an online chat platform. They insulted him, issued threats, and called him derogatory names. Government supporters from around the world participated in these attacks. It was clear that he had sparked

• such a strong reaction because he was deemed to have committed treason. Among them was a prominent female regime supporter based in London who harassed him for four years. Every time she saw him, she would remind him of his family in Eritrea, warning him to stay silent and not speak against the regime. These threats were intended to intimidate him into silence. Fearing for his family's safety, he complied and refrained from speaking out, until they were able to flee Eritrea in 2018. The pressure the government supporter exerted on the musician was relentless, but his priority was ensuring his family's escape.

• Eritreans living abroad are obliged to pay a 2% tax on net income from the moment they are in employment or lose consular assistance and face a series of penalties which could impact family members who are still in the country.  A young Eritrean man reached out to HRCE in 2022 for advice on paying the 2% diaspora tax and obtaining a clearance letter from the Eritrean Embassy. He had arrived in the UK as an unaccompanied minor and had been unaware of the 2% tax. His motivation for paying it was his father’s death – his mother in Eritrea was required to present a tax clearance letter from each of her children living abroad to process the family’s inheritance. Having grown up in a foster home with a British family, he lacked the financial means to pay the backdated taxes plus additional payments for the war efforts, all of which was necessary to obtain the clearance letter for his mother.

• In 2023 an Eritrean activist living in Coventry shared how a pro-government supporter, angered by his activism and criticism of the Eritrean regime, launched an online smear campaign against him. The supporter spread false accusations, made intrusive comments about his personal life, and even threatened to travel to Coventry to kill him, either by running him over with a car or shooting him. The activist reported the threats to the police and submitted evidence, but after a year, the case was closed without any action being taken.

Recommendations

The Council of Europe has termed TNR ‘a  growing threat to the rule of law and democracy.’  An  holistic approach is necessary, which should include the creation of  a specialist office or department to accumulate and aggregate the expertise necessary to counter what is a rapidly emerging threat.

The specialist office should include point persons from, or  regular interactions with MI5 and MI6;  the police forces; the Home Office and the FCDO.

The Home Office should be assisted to develop the expertise needed to review the status of, and discern between, asylum seekers and recipients who attend government functions out of coercion and fear, and those who are de facto government operatives who gained or are seeking asylum under false pretences. It may be worth considering the creation of  a database consisting of Eritrean NGOs and individuals with genuine and long term commitment to human rights and justice, who are security-vetted and can be trusted to assist with this challenging endeavour. The Home Office should  also ensure thorough vetting of Tigrinya interpreters.

The expertise from a specialist office focused on TNR could be utilised by the FCDO to formulate a response to TNR at international level, including at the Security Council and Human Rights Council, coordinating action by like-minded, while highlighting the ongoing human rights violations occurring inside Eritrea, that are foundational to its TNR, with a view to holding the regime to account, including by championing the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry and successive special rapporteurs.

Finally, while appreciating the pressures they are under, police forces and security services must offer immediate and effective security assistance and support to victims of TNR, holding perpetrators to account, as occurred in September 2001 and in the case of Mr Ghebremedhin. Consistent intervention and accountability can be highly effective deterrents.

(FEB 2025)