WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY LEIGH DAY
FLS0052
Legislative Framework
1. Are the obligations created by the Modern Slavery Act 2015 effective in preventing
goods with international supply chains linked to forced labour being sold on the UK
market? If not, what changes are needed to prevent goods linked to forced labour from
being sold in the UK market?
Tick-Box Compliance
Section 54(4) of the MSA mandates companies to publish statements each financial year to
state what steps, if any, have been taken to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not
taking place in any of its supply chain, or in any part of its business.
In practice organisations are likely to either make a statement under s.54(4)(a) or not make
one at all. Further, the statements that are made by a large majority of MNCs often reflect
vague, boilerplate statements that do little to improve supply chain transparency and even less
to ensure accountability for failures in addressing forced labour.
In terms of the context of private law claims, many statements in their current form act as a
shield which the MNCs can hide behind to say that they are acknowledging the existence of
forced labour risks, while they remain able to escape liability and maintain deniability of
knowledge of any known actual labour risks throughout their supply chains. At its worst,
Section 54 effectively allows corporations to distance themselves from supply chain abuses
by focusing on reporting measures rather than substantive accountability.
Unlike the French Duty of Vigilance Law or the German Supply Chain Act, Section 54 does
not impose a legal duty to prevent forced labour, it merely requires companies to disclose
what steps they have taken. This enables corporations to adopt a reactive approach, rather
than proactively ensuring human rights protections.
Flawed Auditing Mechanisms
Another significant gap in the MSA’s effectiveness is the failure to address weaknesses in
corporate social auditing. Social auditing is a relatively new phenomena to enter business
activities, auditing focuses on criteria set and agreed to between the client paying for the audit
and the auditor. The promise from corporations has been that self-policing through the social
audit process effectively roots out dangerous and exploitative practices. However, a growing
body of evidence points to the ineffectiveness of private regulation. There is little to show
sustainable improvement in labour standards in global supply chains, yet social auditing
continues to be relied upon despite the evidence showing that it does not work. The system is
designed to give the appearance of rigorous human rights due diligence with much made of
the public commitments and policies to protect those in its supply chain. In parallel, social
auditing companies profess to hold in-depth knowledge and skills to identify risks and
provide remediation plans. The reality is far from it.
The MSA does not specify how thorough a company’s risk assessment or audit should be.
Further, Section 54 does not define minimum standards for audits, leaving companies free to
set their own methodologies. Without legally enforceable audit standards, companies can
claim compliance without ensuring genuine protections for workers.
Under existing frameworks, many audits are limited by:
These deficiencies prevent audits from effectively identifying and addressing forced labour in
supply chains. Furthermore, the lack of deeply tiered audits means that forced labour may
remain hidden, particularly in lower-tier suppliers or in regions with weaker labour laws or
enforcement. The MSA does not mandate unannounced audits, and there is no regulatory
framework to ensure that audits are genuinely independent or effective. Without standardised
audit methodologies and penalties for deceptive audits, these issues will continue to
undermine efforts to eliminate forced labour from supply chains.
The Absence of a Civil Cause of Action for Victims
A significant limitation of the MSA is its failure to provide direct civil or criminal causes of
action for victims of forced labour to bring claims against MNCs. The MSA does not create
liability for companies that fail to prevent forced labour in their supply chains. Instead,
victims must rely on common law tort claims, such as through the tort of negligence, to seek
redress.
Modern slavery statements do not create a legal duty of care towards workers in the supply
chain. Without an enforceable duty of care, there is very limited effective deterrent against
forced labour goods reaching UK consumers.
As noted above, establishing a duty of care under current legal principles presents a high bar
for claimants. At present, we rely on tort law principles to demonstrate corporate
responsibility, requiring extensive evidence of knowledge, control, and assumption of responsibility by parent companies over their subsidiaries or supply chains. However, the
MSA misses a crucial opportunity to enshrine liability of MNCs for forced labour issues in
their supply chains into statutory law, leaving victims of forced labour to navigate complex
and costly litigation under common law principles.
The ultimate best practice would be the introduction of a "duty to prevent" forced labour and
other abuses within supply chains. Under this framework, the burden of proof would shift
onto MNCs, requiring them to prove they are not liable for harm suffered in any potential
allegations, rather than placing this burden on victims. This would significantly reduce the
legal and evidentiary hurdles faced by impoverished claimants, who often lack access to
critical documentation when seeking justice against powerful MNCs.
Recommendations
New legislation is necessary to address the limitations of the MSA and prevent goods linked
to forced labour from entering the UK market.
The UK should introduce penalties for companies that fail to produce meaningful modern
slavery statements, or deliberately produce deceptive auditing reports. This could include
financial fines or exclusion from public procurement contracts. A more robust enforcement
framework would encourage companies to take the MSA seriously and ensure greater
transparency and accountability.
The UK should regulate and standardise auditing practices, ensuring that audits are thorough,
independent, and unannounced. Additionally, penalties for deceptive audits should be
introduced, holding auditors accountable for failing to identify forced labour risks. There
should also be a requirement for companies to provide evidence of action taken against
suppliers found to be in violation of forced labour standards.
To allow victims of forced labour to seek redress, the UK should introduce a statutory duty of
care and duty to prevent harm as detailed above. This could allow victims to bring civil
claims against companies that fail to meet their obligations under the law.
In 2017, the Joint Committee for Human Rights (the “Committee”) recommended that the
Bribery Act 2010 be amended to introduce a duty to prevent human rights harm for
companies in the report titled ‘Human Rights and Business 2017: Promoting responsibility
and ensuring accountability’. At paragraph 193 of the Committee’s report it was
recommended that:
“We recommend that the Government should bring forward legislation to impose a
duty on all companies to prevent human rights abuses, as well as an offence of failure
to prevent human rights abuses for all companies, including parent companies, along
the lines of the relevant provisions of the Bribery Act 2010. This would require all
companies to put in place effective human rights due diligence processes (as
recommended by the UN Guiding Principles), both for their subsidiaries and across
their whole supply chain. The legislation should enable remedies against the parent
company and other companies when abuses do occur, so civil remedies (as well as
criminal remedies) must be provided. It should include a defence for companies
where they had conducted effective human rights due diligence, and the burden of
proof should fall on companies to demonstrate that this has been done.” (Emphasis
added).
We strongly recommend that the above recommendations of this Committee be adopted into
any new legislation relating to business and human rights matters that specifically address
forced labour in global supply chains.
The UK should also adopt a ban on the importation of goods linked to forced labour.
2. How effective is other UK domestic legislation in preventing goods with international
supply chains linked to forced labour entering the UK market? Are there any gaps? If
so, what legislative improvements could be made?
The UK Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime 2020 allows the government to impose
asset freezes and travel bans on individuals or entities responsible for human rights abuses,
including forced labour. Its limitation includes:
One of the aims of the Environment Act 2021 is to combat illegal deforestation in supply
chains. However, long-awaited subsequent legislation is required to operationalise these
provisions, and to determine the scope of which commodities it will apply to. For most
companies and institutions, aside from regulators, this Act has therefore not enforced any
immediate changes to the way in which supply chains are operated. Further, its limitations in
addressing forced labour include:
Part 1 of the MSA, which defines offences under the act, does not have extraterritorial effect,
i.e. it does not directly criminalise conduct carried out outside of the UK. However, s.340 of
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) defines “criminal property” by reference to the
term “criminal conduct” which includes conduct which “would constitute an offence in any
part of the United Kingdom if it occurred there”. That means that extraterritorial conduct that
would be an offence under the MSA if it occurred in the UK is criminal conduct for the
purposes of POCA, and the proceeds of that criminal conduct would be criminal property for
the purposes of POCA.
However, our experience is that UK authorities which are tasked with ensuring compliance
with the POCA regime are reluctant to investigate whether modern slavery and forced labour
in supply chains taints goods and money produced in that supply chain as “criminal property”
under POCA. For example, in R (World Uyghur Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024]
EWCA Civ 715, the National Crime Agency (NCA) had to be brought before the Court of
Appeal before it would investigate these issues in cotton from China.
It would be useful for government to produce guidance for public authorities such as the
NCA and FCA on the appropriate approach to investigating forced labour in supply chains
for the purposes of POCA offences.
3.Recent case law against the National Crime Agency suggests that British authorities
and courts can have a role in addressing instances of forced labour in supply chains
occurring outside the UK. What impact is this development likely to have on the way
that companies consider the risk of forced labour and human rights in their supply
chains, for example which suppliers they choose?
The Court of Appeal held in the World Uyghur Congress case that the NCA was wrong to
decline to investigate forced labour allegations in relation to cotton consignments from China.
MNCs and other companies may face a higher risk of prosecution, but at present we have not
observed in change in the approach of UK authorities.
4.What international legal obligations does the UK have in relation to forced labour in
supply chains? Is the UK’s current domestic approach compliant with those
obligations?
The UK has several international legal obligations regarding forced labour in supply chains,
primarily derived from treaties and agreements as set out below in our response to question 5.
While the UK broadly complies with its international obligations, it falls short in enforcing
measures and legal obligations to provide meaningful and genuine corporate accountability.
5.What, if any, obligations does international law place on corporations when it comes
to forced labour in their supply chains? Are these obligations effective?
International law imposes several obligations on corporations concerning forced labour in
their supply chains through various frameworks, including ILO conventions, UN guiding
principles, OECD guidelines, and global compacts. While these instruments establish
standards and expectations, their enforceability remains weak, largely relying on voluntary
compliance and soft law mechanisms.
ILO Conventions
The ILO has established core binding treaties related to forced labour:
The UK has ratified both conventions and is obligated to ensure national legislation aligns
with their provisions. While the MSA partially reflects these commitments, enforcement is
weak, particularly concerning corporate responsibility beyond reporting obligations.
Ultimately, the ILO Conventions rely on state-level implementation, rather than focussing on
corporations as primary duty-bearers, meaning they are only indirectly bound.
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”)
The UNGPs establish a three-pillar framework:
1. State duty to protect human rights.
2. Corporate responsibility to respect human rights, including avoiding forced labour in
supply chains.
3. Access to remedy for victims.
In 2013, the UK endorsed the UNGPs and incorporated elements into the UK National
Action. However, there is no legal obligation on UK companies to comply with the UNGPs.
While MNCs may hold themselves out to voluntarily comply with UNGPs, this often results
in superficial and performative statements of commitments, rather than any meaningful or
tangible actions.
UN Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”)
Goal 8.7 of the UN SDGs commits states and corporations to take immediate measures to
eradicate forced labour, modern slavery, and human trafficking. While the UK government has expressed support for SDG 8.7, they do not create direct legal obligations on businesses. Further there are no legal consequences for MNCs failing to
comply.
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
The OECD Guidelines provide recommendations for responsible business conduct, including
preventing forced labour in global supply chains. The guidelines encourage:
The UK supports the OECD Guidelines, and the UK National Contact Point (“NCP”) handles
complaints about corporate human rights abuses. However, NCP decisions are not legally
binding and an MNC’s involvement in a complaint is entirely voluntary, limiting their
effectiveness.
Conclusion
While international law sets important standards for corporations regarding forced labour,
these obligations remain largely unenforceable in the UK. The lack of binding corporate
liability, enforcement mechanisms, and mandatory due diligence requirements has led to
weak compliance and continued corporate impunity. Strengthening UK domestic law through
mandatory human rights due diligence, financial penalties, and import bans would help
bridge the enforcement gap and ensure meaningful corporate accountability in preventing
forced labour in supply chains.
6.Where should the responsibility lie for preventing products linked to forced labour
from entering the British market? E.g. government, regulation, business, consumers,
others?
Preventing the entry of products linked to forced labour into the British market requires a
shared responsibility between government, businesses, and consumers. However, the primary
focus must be on corporate accountability as the corporate centre exercises ultimate control
over supply chain operations.
MNCs typically structure their supply chains to maximise profit, often outsourcing
production to third-party suppliers in jurisdictions with weak labour protections. However,
ultimate control and decision-making power often remains with the parent company, which
sets operational standards, approves suppliers, and benefits financially from the supply chain.
Parent companies must be legally accountable for human rights abuses within their supply
chains, as established in cases set out above (Vedanta, Okpabi).
Existing voluntary reporting obligations under the MSA are insufficient as they do not create
legal liability in the event they are not properly adhered to. New legislation should be
introduced, to include clear legal liability for parent companies, moving beyond mere
transparency requirements.
Enforcement and Corporate Activity
7.In the UK, there are three public bodies which may potentially have a role in
addressing goods linked to forced labour: the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner,
National Crime Agency, and Border Force.
a. What role, if any, does each body play in detecting and preventing goods produced
using forced labour being available on the UK market?
b. Do these bodies have sufficient powers? If not, what other powers should they have?
c. How could these bodies work together most effectively?
We do not comment on the different roles that these bodies play. However, we believe that
other authorities also play a role. In particular financial and trading authorities, such as the
FCA, LSE and trading standards, also have a role to play, in particular in ensuring that UK
markets are not used for the purposes of financial crime.
8.Are any sectors serving the UK market at particular risk of forced labour in their
international supply chains?
Several sectors serving the UK market are at particular risk of forced labour in their
international supply chains. The most notable industries facing these challenges include:
The garment industry has been highlighted for its high risk of forced labour,
particularly in countries with lower labour costs where workers are vulnerable to
exploitation. Workers, including children and migrants, are often subjected to long
hours, low wages, and unsafe working conditions. This is exemplified in the case
against Tesco and Intertek as set out above.
Similar to the garment industry, electronics manufacturing relies heavily on global
supply chains, particularly in regions where labour protections are minimal. In
countries such as China, Vietnam, and Malaysia, forced labour has been identified in
the production of electronics products. Migrant workers are especially vulnerable, as
they may be subject to deceptive recruitment practices and poor working conditions.
The tobacco industry has also been associated with forced labour risks, particularly in
countries where tobacco farming is common. In regions like Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, workers on tobacco farms may face debt bondage, exploitative recruitment
practices, and lack of legal protections. Many of these workers, including children, are subjected to hazardous working conditions, low wages, and long hours. This is
exemplified in the case against BAT and Imperial as set out above. Similar issues are
present in the agricultural industry more widely.
We have received many concerning reports of forced labour across multiple industries,
including the fishing sector and domestic work. These allegations are not limited to overseas
but also occur within the UK, and urgent, comprehensive action is required to confront and
eradicate this exploitation.
9.Should companies of all sizes be required to manage the risk of forced labour in their
supply chains? How could such an obligation be delivered in a manner which is
proportionate to a company’s exposure to forced labour risks, number of employees,
and annual turnover?
Companies of all sizes should be required to manage the risk of forced labour in their supply
chains. Small factories and fishing companies operating in the UK are often able to avoid
transparency because the MSA does not currently mandate them to provide modern slavery
statements. Additionally, some factories circumvent accountability by closing and reopening
under new names, further evading scrutiny. To ensure proportionality, obligations could be
tailored to a company’s specific exposure to forced labour risks, its number of employees,
and annual turnover. This would allow for a more targeted approach, ensuring that businesses
with greater risk and capacity are held to higher standards of accountability.
10.What could be done to improve corporations’ ability to identify forced labour risks
in supply chains, and select suppliers that meet government’s expectations?
While the MSA fails to enforce any meaningful legal accountability, there is limited incentive
for corporations to identify and prevent forced labour.
In addition to the proposals suggested above to introduce civil liability for failures to address
forced labour issues in supply chains, the MSA should mandate risk escalation protocols
requiring corporations to take immediate action when sourcing from high-risk regions. This
should include automatic risk flagging, mandatory supplier remediation plans, and, where
necessary, supplier disengagement to prevent continued exploitation.
To improver transparency and accountability, stricter reporting requirements must be
enforced, ensuring that these protocols are publicly disclosed and that corporations provide
detailed reports on their efforts to mitigate forced labour risks. Additionally, robust
enforcement mechanisms should be implemented to hold companies accountable for noncompliance and to prevent superficial or performative commitments.
11.Where forced labour is a risk, what level of investigation/due diligence is it
reasonable to expect from companies and public sector buyers before deciding whether
to contract with suppliers?
Setting a “reasonable” standard for investigation and due diligence should stem from an
updated MSA (or new legislation) that sets minimum standards for evaluating the risks of slavery and human trafficking in supply chains, along with requiring clear statements to that
effect. Currently, MNCs often shift the responsibility of due diligence onto auditing companies.
Therefore, these requirements should apply to both MNCs and auditors, with both held
equally accountable for conducting thorough and proper assessments before contracting with
a supplier.
To move audits beyond superficial “tick box” exercises, companies and public sector buyers
should be encouraged to actively investigate, verify, and address risks before entering into
contracts with suppliers. Rather than the industry self-regulating, there should be a regulatory
body created that has oversight of the auditing industry and company supply chains.
Finally, it is important that investigation and due diligence findings and reports are made
public so that there is transparency, oversight and accountability.
12.How can a level playing field be achieved, where companies who operate supply
chains free from forced labour are not at financial disadvantage?
The baseline position should be that business models should not rely on exploitation to
generate profits. This means that companies must operate with ethical and sustainable
practices that do not involve forced labour or exploitative working conditions. Profit-making
should not be contingent on cutting corners with workers' rights. Businesses should focus on
models that prioritize fair wages, ethical sourcing, and transparency.
A key step in levelling the playing field is introducing and enforcing legislation that makes it
illegal for British companies to profit from cheap, exploitative labour; which we believe
could be achieved most effectively through new legislation that establishes a clear duty of
care and duty to prevent harm on companies (as detailed above in our response to question 1).
13.How effective are the UN Guiding Principles at encouraging corporations’
consideration of the human rights impacts of business decisions? Please provide
examples or evidence.
While the UNGPs are helpful in raising awareness and setting standards for MNCs, they fall
short when it comes to ensuring that these principles are actually realised in practice,
particularly in global supply chains. The lack of enforceable accountability and the gap
between corporate commitments and real action are major challenges that need to be
addressed to make the UNGPs more effective in driving genuine corporate responsibility for
human rights. Many companies state that they adhere to the UNGPs, however, if they fail to
do so there is limited ability to hold them accountable for doing so given that they are ‘soft
law’. Enshrining the UNGPs in UK legislation by way of new legislation that also introduces
a duty of care and duty to prevent harm on companies, would go a considerable way to
making the UNGPs effective and enforceable against MNCs.
(FEB 2025)