Save the Children Submission: International Development Committee Inquiry on FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People

7 February 2025

  1. Introduction

 

1.1.   Last year, Save the Children’s humanitarian portfolio set out to assist approximately 27.4 million people, including 15.9 million children, across 46 countries. Alongside our local and national partners, we responded to emergencies in five regions with a funding target of $1.3 billion. Our humanitarian programs work across all sectors, and for displaced families and children we ensure access to healthcare, education, protection, psychosocial support and livelihoods.

1.2.   The world is witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record, and the fastest and largest displacement of people in Europe since the Second World War. Half of the world’s refugees are children, and less than 1% of all refugees are ever able to resettle and find a new life of safety and security.

 

  1. Where could the Government better focus its attention and ODA to prevent the drivers of displacement, including conflict and destabilisation?

 

2.1.   In our work, we experience and address drivers of displacement including conflict and violence (primary driver of internal displacement), natural disasters and climate change, as well as economic factors. As a child rights organisation, we also focus on the impact of a lack of education which can act as a key driver of conflict and instability.

 

2.2.   Conflict prevention and stabilisation:

2.2.1. The global cost of conflict and violence is $14.4 trillion–while every dollar invested in conflict prevention saves $16 in the cost of conflict, if adequately funded. The UK should prioritise ODA spending on addressing the root causes of conflict and violence by investing in long-term programming that enhances communities' resilience and stability, including addressing critical issues such as impacts of climate change, land rights, and ethnic tension.

2.2.2. With the new UK Integrated Security Fund (ISF) set to receive only £233 million of ODA in 2025-26 (down from £350 million in 2024-25), and other conflict prevention and stabilisation efforts also significantly reduced, this will impact the UK’s ability to prevent conflict escalations and support conflict resolutions. Additionally, the broadening and change of scope of the ISF in comparison to the previous Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) raises concerns that there will be a reduced emphasis on traditional conflict prevention and stabilisation efforts. A study found that 60% of conflicts that ended in the 2000s had relapsed into violence within five years. The FCDO must therefore focus its ODA on reinvesting in peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts.

2.2.3. The UK should ensure its ODA supports efforts to promote meaningful participation and leadership by local actors and civil society in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, addressing root causes and creating sustainable, long-lasting solutions. Emphasis should be placed on including marginalised groups and voices, including children.

2.2.4. The UK also holds significant leverage through diplomatic channels in countries experiencing some of the highest levels of displacement, such as Sudan, DRC, and Gaza. Additionally, the UK’s role in supporting accountability mechanisms can have a significant impact on peace processes, conduct of armed groups in conflict, and the reintegration of displaced people into an area. As a permanent member of the UNSC and a major global player, the UK should pursue diplomatic solutions as the first course of action to de-escalate any global conflict or crisis.

2.2.5. Both conflict and displacement increase child protection risks such as early marriage, recruitment into armed forces, and sexual gender-based violence. In a representative study conducted by the Women’s Refugee Commission, IDPs showed the highest rate of early marriage among the three groups, with 13% of those currently aged 20–24 having married as minors. This study also showed a potential increase in the rates of early marriage for refugees after displacement. The UK should use its influence to ensure stronger laws and protection mechanisms are in place to stop sexual exploitation of minors.

 

2.3.   Climate change:

2.3.1. Extreme weather and slow-onset events are increasingly contributing to children’s displacement and exposing them to significant protection risks. Save the Children’s research found that migration prompted by slow-onset events such as extreme temperatures, rising sea levels and salinization of agricultural land is far more likely to be permanent compared to displacement from extreme weather events such as sudden storms.  

2.3.2. Children’s rights must be protected in shelters for people displaced by climate disasters, with proactive steps taken to ensure that living in a shelter does not adversely impact children’s developmental and wellbeing outcomes. The FCDO should also invest in better data and analysis as a pivotal step in developing more effective, durable and child-responsive responses to the impacts of climate-induced displacement and migration. This would include encouraging the use of predictive analytics and forecasting expertise to carry out long-term scenario planning for child migration and displacement in high-risk climate settings alongside responses for improved early or anticipatory action.

2.3.3. The FCDO should also support the development of proactive and child-responsive movement plans within responses to climate-related displacement and migration which go beyond reactive support for unplanned displacement.

 

2.4.   Education:

2.4.1. Bilateral FCDO ODA to education has fallen significantly in recent years from 10% to 3.5% of total ODA. The FCDO should prioritise education within the ODA budget leading to a commitment to a progressive increase over the next 5 years ahead of the finalisation of the SDGs in 2030.

2.4.2. To prevent cyclical waves of conflict and displacement, it is essential to ensure the continuity of education, and access to education for all children within 1 month of displacement and throughout their displacement. The FCDO should direct funding towards the most impactful parts of educational inclusion, in particular recognising that teachers are the biggest influence on children’s learning and therefore investments in teachers’ training and salaries are critical to ensure all children are learning.

2.4.3. The breadth of hazards that drive displacement necessitate an all-hazards approach in the FCDO’s response. To better address these drivers through education, the FCDO should implement and scale up its work towards comprehensive school safety, including endorsing the Comprehensive School Safety Framework (CSSF).

2.4.4. The FCDO should recognise education in emergencies as a lifesaving, child-centred humanitarian response that must be prioritised and funded from the start of a crisis. This supports displaced children and families while preventing further displacement in search of education. Our research, conducted in eight humanitarian emergencies with 1,689 children (aged 5–18) between 2013 and 2018, found that, on average, 37% ranked education among their top three needs - far surpassing food, healthcare, water, and shelter.

2.4.5. The FCDO should ensure that it uses its influence at global and country levels to ensure prioritisation of education in emergencies within humanitarian and refugee response plans – and provide the necessary funding for education from its humanitarian budget. 

2.4.6. The FCDO provides substantial funding to the multilateral funds to education (e.g. Education Cannot Wait) which plays a vital role in both supporting education system strengthening to ensure greater resilience when a crisis occurs, and in responding in the immediate escalation of large-scale displacement to reduce disruption to children’s learning. ECW reached more internally displaced children (17%), and refugee children (22%) in 2023 than in previous years. The FCDO should continue to invest in these funds (including at upcoming replenishment events in 2026) and use its influence to ensure value for money, lesson learning and that affected children, teachers and local representatives have their voices heard in the planning, implementation and evaluation of funds.

2.4.7. The FCDO took on a welcome shared leadership role in forming a Multi-Stakeholder Pledge: Towards a Shared Responsibility to Uphold the Right to Education and Include Refugee Children in National Education Systems at the Global Refugee Forum in 2023. 151 pledges by governments, international institutions, and NGOs were made in support. Ahead of the mid-way point between Global Refugee Forums, in December 2025 at the High-Level Officials Meeting, the FCDO should convene all pledge-makers to ensure pledges are reported upon and analysed, and to ensure lessons are learned and disseminated. The FCDO hosted a Wilton Park conference in November 2024 to make progress on this a multi-stakeholder pledge and we look forward to seeing the outcome report.

2.4.8. At the Global Refugee Forum 2023, the UK announced a pledge of £4 million in partnership with the World Bank through the INSPIRE programme to provide lower income refugee hosting countries the technical support they need to integrate refugee children in their national education systems. It is hoped that this funding will help position these Ministries of Education to apply for and receive significant multi-year funding for refugee education from the World Bank’s IDA. This approach seems to have been successful to date and we urge the FCDO to communicate these successes so that other donors can learn from this approach and make similar investments.   

 

  1. At the outset of conflict, does the FCDO pay sufficient interest to the needs of civilians, including how to prevent displacement and how to support those who are displaced?

 

3.1.   The FCDO’s response to conflicts globally and provision of humanitarian aid needs to be centred around addressing civilian needs. We will address this question by looking at the case of Sudan to explore the UK’s recent track record of supporting those who are displaced and centring the needs of civilians:

 

3.2.   Sudan:

3.2.1. Sudan constitutes the biggest displacement crisis in the world, which so far has affected over 3 million people. Children in Sudan have been suffering from the consequences of displacement from the onset of the conflict. Famine was first confirmed in August 2024 in the Zamzam displacement camp in North Darfur housing about 500,000 displaced people and this has now expanded to Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps and to the Western Nuba Mountains, according to the independent IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC). Most of the IDP populations living in these camps live in makeshift shelters, are unable to access social safety nets, and have little opportunity to achieve durable solutions and often continue to rely on assistance without being able to secure durable solutions. Staff told us that bombing regularly hits camps such as Zamzam, injuring and killing civilians including children.

3.2.2. The UK, as a major global player and the lead country for Sudan on the UN Security Council (UNSC), can mobilise diplomatic pressure and work with different global actors to support the broadening of humanitarian access, especially to displacement camps, as well as applying pressure to parties to the conflict to ensure a ceasefire and the protection of civilians.

3.2.3. The UK displayed a lack of urgency at the onset of the conflict. Despite the conflict starting in April 2023, the UK Government did not work on a draft resolution to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities until November 18th, 2024. A UK envoy to Sudan was only appointed in Q3 of 2024, which meant 1.5 years without UK representation to Sudan. While the UK has increased its support to the crisis in Sudan significantly, more diplomatic pressure is needed to ensure a robust resolution is set out to focus on long-term stability and recovery, which is needed to prevent further violence and subsequent displacement.

3.2.4. Save the Children colleagues shared that while humanitarian organisations are supporting as much as possible, the lack of funding and humanitarian access is affecting their reach. Children [in these camps] are suffering, and some children are telling us horrible things they have seen which have affected their ability to sleep.”

3.2.5. The UK should take a leading role in ensuring urgent humanitarian access throughout Sudan by intensifying diplomatic efforts to engage conflict parties and their backers, advocating for the removal of bureaucratic barriers like travel permits and unpredictable visa procedures, and supporting efforts to secure the indefinite opening of critical routes such as the Adre border crossing. Recognising the importance of local mutual aid networks as vital lifelines in hard-to-reach areas is also essential for a more effective humanitarian response. This includes ensuring local and national actors have the resources they need to deliver. This is especially important when addressing the needs of IDPs who are often stuck in conflict zones without access to humanitarian aid.

3.2.6. The UK has a role in raising the cost for warring parties and their international backers to ensure that violations of international law, including grave violations, are condemned and actors are held accountable. We have seen the UK doing this, including at the 57th session of the Human Rights Council, where the UK led a core group of states in negotiating the renewal of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for Sudan. This would mean that civilians are better protected, and people are less likely to be displaced.

3.2.7. While accountability must be driven by affected populations themselves, the UK can highlight the importance of the respectful partnerships and up the pace of change by building it into every level of ODA funding and FCDO engagement. This would not only represent genuine partnership with affected populations in the Global South but would also result in more cost-effective programming more tightly focussed on the needs on the ground. The FCDO needs to make partnership with local actors a key requirement for all business cases and funding applications, to ensure the affected population has input in decision-making on programmes and other structures potentially impacting their everyday life. 

3.2.8. To ensure that displaced people continue to have viable livelihoods for when they return home or can access other forms of durable solutions, it is crucial that they have livelihoods options during displacement. Refugee teachers are essential in ensuring refugee learners have quality education, but they face limitations on their right to work, a lack of effective procedures to have their teaching credentials recognised and few opportunities for professional development and training in host countries. FCDO should use its convening power to push forward the conversation on quality teaching in displacement contexts, including what is needed to speed up national, regional and global initiatives to recognise and accredit refugee teachers and build common competences.

 

  1. How effective is FCDO work to keep displaced people safe?

 

4.1.   We will answer this question by focusing on the FCDO’s work on Ukraine and Gaza. This allows us to compare a particularly extreme example of the international community’s failure to keep displaced people safe and uphold their rights and dignity with an example where the UK has shown strong leadership and achieved meaningful impact.

4.2.   The UK’s role in keeping displaced people safe is about ensuring their fundamental rights are upheld - including protection and access to humanitarian assistance - and addressing the root causes of displacement to enable their safe and voluntary return home. Given children’s unique and disproportionate vulnerabilities, special attention should be paid to the rights and protections of displaced children.

 

4.3.   Ukraine

4.3.1. The UK Government has had meaningful impact in protecting displaced Ukrainians, particularly through legal protection, access to work and education, and humanitarian assistance. However, critical gaps remain in reaching those in occupied territories and ensuring the safety of unaccompanied children.

4.3.2. Positive Impact

4.3.2.1.              The UK’s temporary protection schemes have provided over 250,000 Ukrainians with refuge, allowing them to work, study, and integrate into their host communities. These schemes, alongside EU-wide initiatives, have proven effective in ensuring immediate safety and stability for displaced individuals.

4.3.2.2.              The right to work and study has been particularly beneficial. Evidence from the Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) shows that economic self-reliance significantly reduces vulnerabilities among displaced families. Many Ukrainian refugees in the UK and EU have accessed education and employment, helping them rebuild their lives rather than depending solely on humanitarian aid.

4.3.2.3.              In terms of immediate assistance, the UK has committed £5 billion to humanitarian and economic non-military support for Ukraine. This includes funding for child protection programs, education support, and emergency shelter, which has helped millions of displaced Ukrainians access essential services. This response should be considered a blueprint for any displacement crisis in the future.

4.3.3. Key Challenges

4.3.3.1.              Decrease in humanitarian funding - As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year since the full-scale invasion, increasingly dynamic frontlines and renewed attacks on civilian infrastructure are destroying lives and forcing people to flee their homes. The use of landmines, cluster munitions, and explosive weapons in populated areas further endangers civilians, with lasting consequences. Many internally displaced persons (IDPs) are now in long-term displacement as humanitarian funding decreases, raising urgent questions about sustained support for affected communities.

4.3.3.2.              Lack of access to displaced Ukrainians in Russia and Belarus - An estimated 1.1 million Ukrainians remain in Russian-occupied territories without adequate humanitarian support. No inter-agency aid convoys have been able to reach Russian-controlled areas since February 2022, leaving displaced populations without critical assistance.

4.3.3.3.              Protection of unaccompanied and separated children - Thousands of Ukrainian children have been forcibly transferred to Russia. The lack of sustained diplomatic pressure and mechanisms for safe repatriation leaves them vulnerable to exploitation. Ukraine’s humanitarian agencies continue to push for coordinated efforts to reunite these children with their families, yet progress remains slow.

4.4.   Gaza

4.4.1. The international community, including the UK Government, has unequivocally failed to keep displaced Palestinians safe. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza is dire, with over 1.7 million Palestinians forcibly displaced by Israeli forces, often multiple times. For more than a year, families have been squeezed into smaller and smaller areas with no guarantee of safety or protection. The siege and systematic denial of aid access has deprived children of the basics they need to survive, including food, water, and medical supplies. The entire population has been pushed to the brink of famine. While the current pause in hostilities has offered children increased hope of short-term survival, 15 months of conflict and displacement have inflicted on them lasting physical and mental harm, including through malnutrition, inadequate healthcare, and constant exposure to violence.

4.4.2. Save the Children’s response team in Gaza is made up almost entirely of local Palestinian staff. Two of our staff members were among the – at least - 333 humanitarian workers killed by Israeli forces in Gaza since October 2023. It is now the deadliest place on earth to be an aid worker, with aid convoys, offices, and warehouses coming under attack again and again, despite Israeli authorities being aware of their locations and movement.

4.4.3. The UK Government has consistently advocated for full humanitarian access into Gaza, and committed funding, including much-needed support for UNRWA. However, the Government’s failure to acknowledge the denial of humanitarian assistance by Israeli authorities (including through the de facto banning of UNRWA) as systematic, and as depriving children of the basic means of survival, means the UK has not been pursuing the right solutions. Its humanitarian diplomacy has been primarily focused on piecemeal operational and logistical access issues and pleas for access, rather than the application of robust consequences for IHL violations.  The effective banning of UNRWA, a UNGA-mandated agency - is an example of how the Government of Israel continues to be emboldened by impunity granted by allies including the UK.

4.4.4. The UK has also been reactive rather than proactive at the UN, lagging behind other states in pressing for a definitive ceasefire and accountability.

4.4.5. The UK’s policy approach has risked perpetuating impunity and undermining faith in international law, and thereby further putting displaced people at risk of violations. The UK can only keep displaced people in Gaza, and other conflict areas, safe if it takes a consistent approach to upholding IHL including the right to humanitarian assistance.

 

4.5.   Recommendations for the protection of displaced people:

4.5.1. Sustainable support for internally displaced families in all contexts.
Multi-year funding is essential to prevent reliance on short-term emergency aid. Many IDPs face rising living costs, and continued financial support is needed, through institutions equipped to support, to ensure they can remain safe and self-sufficient.

4.5.2. Increased diplomatic pressure to protect unaccompanied and separated children. The UK should intensify diplomatic efforts to secure the return of forcibly transferred children in Ukraine, and uphold the protection of children in Gaza, using international platforms such as the UN Security Council and Human Rights Council. Displaced children’s protection should be a key element in peacebuilding negotiations and ceasefire discussions to ensure long-term safety.

 

  1. To what extent does ODA spent on housing displaced people within the UK represent value for money?

 

5.1.   The UK’s approach to spending ODA on housing displaced people within the UK does not represent value for money for several reasons, including the fact that allocating this money for refugees in the UK is misaligned with the purpose of ODA. Traditionally, ODA is designed to target global poverty reduction and support developing countries. Allocating ODA money to work in the UK means cuts for other relevant programmes such as conflict prevention and resolution, education, or climate adaptation programmes – programmes needed to support displaced people in vulnerable situations abroad.

5.2.   Additionally, asylum accommodation costs and inadequate conditions have increasingly been criticised by charities. The cost of asylum accommodation and support rose disproportionately around six times (from £17,000 in 2019/20 to £41,000 per person in 2023/24 (both calculated in 2023/24 prices)), while the number of asylum seekers receiving support only roughly doubled in the same period. Despite the enormous costs, the quality of accommodation and support for people seeking asylum is substandard. Substandard accommodation harms both adults and children, with reports of serious mental health crises commonplace, especially in hotels and large-scale accommodation sites. The UK’s approach to contract out asylum accommodation to private landlords and providers rather than housing providers and NGOs with experience has led to a glaring lack of effective oversight, and in turn increased cost and misuse of ODA.

5.3.   From 2022 to 2023, it is estimated that the Home Office spent around £8 million per day to accommodate asylum seekers in hotels and councils are spending £2.3bn per year on temporary accommodation.

5.4.   Soha Housing Association and Impact Works Associates, as well as other NGOs and actors in the housing sector, have put forward models highlighting how restructuring the Home Office’s approach to housing could not only significantly reduce spending overall, but also ensure that less ODA would be needed to cover the gap in funding. Considering the restricted funding available to the humanitarian and development sector, which affects displaced people as outlined above, reforming the housing sector in the UK could free up additional ODA funding.

5.5.   It would take only seven months to pay back the cost of providing councils with capital to buy up to 16,000 homes for asylum seekers. Rather than money going from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), the Home Office and councils to landlords/ hotel owners, the Government should seek to increase national wealth through increasing the housing stock. The Government should restore housing stock to pre-right to buy levels, which would mean building / buying 100,000 social homes per year, over a period of 20 years.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Save the Children UK

 

Children are on the frontline of the most brutal wars on the planet, as well as feeling the devastating impact of the climate crisis, and the pernicious cycles of poverty across many parts of the world.

 

Save the Children’s teams of local staff work in over 120 countries worldwide; standing shoulder to shoulder with children in communities, listening to them and their families, to ensure that all children can survive, learn and be protected. This means we have a unique insight into the challenges children face, and the local, national, and international action that can help to create lasting change.