Written evidence submitted by ODI Global

 

Contents
 

What assessment has been made of Government efforts to tackle the drivers of displacement?

Where could the Government better focus its attention and ODA to prevent the drivers of displacement, including conflict and destabilisation?

What is the role of local and civil society organisations in supporting displaced people? How could the FCDO better support these organisations?

To what extent are the international laws regarding the treatment of refugees fit for purpose?

To what extent does ODA spent on housing displaced people within the UK represent value for money?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

What assessment has been made of Government efforts to tackle the drivers of displacement?

-          FCDO policy has focused on a limited number of drivers, often employing the “root cause” approach that has been used for decades. However, managing migration by ‘tackling the root causes’ is unlikely to work because ‘root cause’ of displacement are highly context specific: they affect migration in different ways in different areas – and make up only part of the drivers of displacement.[1]
 

-          Displacement is caused by an interplay of factors, including: insecurity, climate breakdown, conflict and violence as well as environmental impacts, lack of basic services and limited livelihood opportunities. There are also individual factors such as: access to sufficient resources, protection and family reunification, the availability of information and social networks.[2]  There is rarely one single or standard set of drivers that can be “tackled”.  
 

-          There has been a growing emphasis on the prevention of refugee arrivals at the border through deterrence strategies. This throws into question whether the UK Government is fulfilling is role in keeping displaced people safe. Furthermore, deterrence strategies usually have limited effectiveness because they don’t take into account the complex, underlying determinants of displacement.[3] The usual targets of deterrence policies – most prominently, the tens of thousands of refugees arriving by small boats – will continue to arrive, often in search of protection from conflict, persecution or violence.
 

Where could the Government better focus its attention and ODA to prevent the drivers of displacement, including conflict and destabilisation?

The UK should place renewed emphasis on the prevention of the drivers of displacement by increasing investments in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reducing violence. Our evidence and analysis found that this would:

-          reduce violence and mitigate its worst consequences,

-          reduce humanitarian need in the longer term.[4]

-          In turn, this could reduce displacement and humanitarian need, which the government currently spends a significant amount of its ODA assistance on.

Our recommendations for other priority areas of focus are:

Internal displacement

Internal displacement is accelerating at an alarming rate yet it has long been a neglected issue on the international stage[5]. Limited policy appetite, funding shortfalls, capacity issues and rising displacement cast a long shadow on the prospect for solutions – durable or otherwise.

But there is a hope. Recent years have seen an uptick in policy momentum – spearheaded by the creation of a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement in 2019 and the resultant Action Agenda on Internal Displacement in 2022. Their generation of practical and workable evidence-based recommendations present an opportunity that humanitarian and development actors should grasp with both hands.

Livelihoods and protection in protracted crisis

Global funding shortages in aid budgets are arguably driving a ‘back to basics’ narrative that focuses on immediate needs and life-saving assistance. This is to the detriment of longer-term objectives of livelihoods and resilience. While livelihoods are not a panacea, they are a key part of any durable solution. By delaying livelihoods programming, aid actors are sacrificing important opportunities for building affected people’s resilience now and in the future.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

What is the role of local and civil society organisations in supporting displaced people? How could the FCDO better support these organisations?

Refugee-led organisations (RLOs) are a crucial cog in the refugee-response machine; providing essential services to their communities, as well as being more likely to lead responses that are accountable, legitimate, transparent, effective and impactful. Yet they are chronically underfunded.[7]

-          Adopting a pragmatic approach to intermediaries
Intermediaries that empower and support RLOs to access international funding and amplify their advocacy have a long-term role in increasing funding to RLOs.
 

-          Committing to better tracking and reporting of funding to RLOs
Publicly available data would allow independent and efficient tracking of funding that reaches RLO. This would contribute to improved transparency and accountability of the funding system as a whole, and the improved data would allow RLOs and others to plan and coordinate more effectively.
 

-          Streamlining and simplifying funding processes
A lighter touch – whereby funders only ask RLOs for what is needed – would alleviate the administrative burden that funding processes currently place on RLOs.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To what extent are the international laws regarding the treatment of refugees fit for purpose?

While there is always space to develop legal protections for refugees, the primary issue is not shortcomings in international frameworks. The main issue is that governments, the UK included, are not honouring their commitments under the refugee convention and other relevant international legal frameworks.

For years there has been hypocrisy and double standards in the application of international laws relevant to refugee protection, which has undermined international legal frameworks and, importantly, the protection of refugees and people affected by conflict.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


To what extent does ODA spent on housing displaced people within the UK represent value for money?

The current allocation of ODA for housing displaced people in the UK raises significant value for money concerns, and a significant value for money concern resides in the nature of the contracts and contract management with private providers.

-          Escalating costs are not solely driven by increasing numbers of asylum seekers: between 2019/20 and 2023/24, accommodation and support costs rose around six times, while the number of asylum seekers roughly doubled.[8]

-          It is well established that this cost escalation is largely driven by accommodation costs. More than two thirds of all aid spending on asylum seekers and refugees is spent on asylum accommodation.[9]

-          A key factor is the increasing use of contingency accommodation before dispersal, including the use of expensive hotel options.

-          Criticism has been directed at the Home Office’s oversight of accommodation contracts with private providers, lack of proper contract management and infrequent inspections.

-          The near-monopoly position of these firms has further undermined value for money; with both the BBC and Financial Times reporting on the rapid growth in the pre-tax profits of asylum accommodation contractors.
 


[1] Hagen-Zanker, J. and Carling, J. (2023) What are the ‘root causes’ of migration? MIGNEX Policy Brief. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo.

[2] Crawley, H., Hagen-Zanker, J., 2019. Deciding Where to go: Policies, People and Perceptions Shaping Destination Preferences. International Migration 57, 20–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12537

[3] Mazzilli, C. (2024) Migration deterrence strategies are popular amongst politicians, but what do we know about their effectiveness? ODI Global insight. London: ODI Global (https://odi.org/en/insights/migration-deterrence-strategies-are-popular-amongst-politicians-but-what-do-we-know-about-their-effectiveness/)

[4] Davies, G., Barbelet, V. and Mayhew, L. (2024) Reducing violence and strengthening

the protection of civilians through community dialogue with armed actors. London: ODI (www.

odi.org/en/publications/reducing-violence-and-strengthening-the-protection-of-civilians-throughcommunity-dialogue-with-armed-actors).

[5] Sida, L., Mooney, E., Lough, O. and Fouad, L. et al. (2024) Independent review of the humanitarian response to internal displacement. HPG report (compendium). London: ODI (www.odi.org/en/publications/compendium-report-independent-review-of-the-humanitarianresponse-to-internal-displacement).

[6] Crawford, N. and Holloway, K. (2024) The livelihoods of forcibly displaced persons (FDPs): a global evidence review. HPG working paper. London: ODI (www.odi.org/en/publications/ the-livelihoods-of-forcibly-displaced-persons-fdps-a-global-evidence-review)

[7] Sturridge, C., Girling-Morris, F., Spencer, A., Kara, A., and Chicet, C. (2023) The failure to fund refugee led organisations: Why the current system is not working, and the potential for change. HPG report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/en/publications/the-failure-to-fund-refugee-ledorganisations-why-the-current-system-is-not-working-and-the-potential-for-change).

 

[8] Mort L and Morris M (2024) Transforming asylum accommodation, IPPR: 2024 (http://www.ippr.org/articles/transforming-asylum-accommodation)

[9] ICAI follow-up review of 2022-23 reports. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact: 2024. (https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/icai-follow-up-2022-23/review/)