International Development Committee

Humanitarian access and adherence to international humanitarian law

Written evidence by Andra-Lucia Martinescu 

Submitted with support from the Foreign Policy Centre, February 2025

Introduction

1. This submission was prepared by Andra-Lucia Martinescu who is a Research Fellow with the

Foreign Policy Centre and Co-founder of The Diaspora Initiative, a non-profit based in

Luxembourg, specialising in migration and diaspora research. Since 2014, Andra-Lucia conducted extensive fieldwork in the region, including the Republic of Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, and Russia. As of February 2022, she helps coordinate humanitarian efforts in Ukraine and from abroad, whilst researching the impact of decentralised/distributed networks in crisis response.

She has written about humanitarian aid in Ukraine in previous articles for FPC.[1]

Summary 

2. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is in crisis, with numerous sovereign states and international actors demonstrating both ignorance and/or complete contempt for the rule of law during war. Since the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, there have been repeated instances of deliberate infringements of key legislative frameworks - such as the Geneva Conventions - and customary IHL. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, access to humanitarian aid has often been hindered - or in some cases entirely stopped - by Russian state actors. Norms of war and the protection of civilians have been cast aside in a continuous assault on IHL. There is a place for the UK Government to advocate against this attack on principles that govern international custom, support those affected - such as intergovernmental agencies as well as grassroots organisations - and promote the deep necessity of the rule of IHL.

What are the current trends in adherence to international humanitarian law in conflicts, particularly regarding the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance?

Current trends in the lack of adherence to international humanitarian law in conflicts

3.       The ongoing war in Ukraine continues to test the limits of IHL, with systematic violations of civilian protections and significant challenges in the safe delivery of aid and humanitarian assistance. The deliberate targeting and destruction of civilian infrastructure, including residential areas, hospitals, schools, and energy facilities, not only violates the IHL principle of distinction, which mandates that military operations must distinguish between combatants and civilians (as per Protocol 1, Article 48 of the Geneva Convention), but also severely impedes the provision of relief. While not exhaustive, key incidents include:

3.1.   Mariupol Maternity Hospital Attack (March 2022): a Russian airstrike hit a maternity hospital in Mariupol, causing multiple civilian casualties, including pregnant women and newborns. The attack was widely condemned as a possible war crime (Article 14 and 18 of the Geneva Convention IV as well as under customary IHL).[2] 

3.2.   Strike on Kyiv’s Paediatric Hospital Okhmatdyt (July 2024): a Russian missile strike hit Kyiv’s largest children’s hospital in one of the deadliest attacks since the illegal invasion (see ICRC’s advisory service on the Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflict).[3]

3.3.   Kramatorsk Train Station Strike (April 2022): A missile attack on a train station used for evacuating civilians killed at least 59, including children, violating the Geneva Conventions.[4]

3.4.   Attacks on Ukraine’s Power Grid (Winter 2023-2024): Russian forces have repeatedly targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, leaving millions without heating, electricity, and running water during the harsh winter season. The deliberate destruction of services essential for civilian survival may constitute a war crime under Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.[5]

3.5.   Infrastructure obstruction: targeted attacks on roads, bridges, and supply hubs continue to pose significant operational challenges to the last-mile delivery of aid, causing delays and/or impeding access, particularly in the proximity of frontlines. For example, to adapt to infrastructure disruptions, local aid groups based in Odesa, servicing hard-to-reach areas in Kherson Oblast, increasingly relied on smaller vehicles (i.e.: vans, even cars) for distribution instead of trucks/lorries or convoys. Lighter, faster transportation enabled a modicum of flexibility in terms of navigation and geographical reach, especially in rural areas with poor connectivity predating the war. However, more trips ferrying vital cargo had to be logistically planned and undertaken, compounding the aid workers’ exposure to risks (i.e.: landmines, unexploded ordnance, targeted attacks, shelling), in many instances, across uncharted routes.

What impact does lack of adherence have on both the physical access to humanitarian supplies and the safe operation of aid workers?

The lack of adherence to IHL’s resultant impact on humanitarian assistance

4.       Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine since 2022, civilian volunteers and aid workers have reported that power outages severely disrupt logistical and administrative operations associated with the time-sensitive distribution of aid, particularly in hard-to-reach areas. For instance, without a stable power supply, electronic inventory systems and cold storage for perishable medical supplies (i.e. insulin) are prone to failure, forcing aid groups to prioritise the delivery of short-shelf-life medications. Deliveries such as this are often undertaken in extreme conditions, whilst coordination and communication with field teams become fractured, directly impacting localisation and the safety of aid workers further afield. In effect, power outages disrupting humanitarian logistics in Ukraine are a direct result of Russian-targeted attacks on critical infrastructure, constituting a violation of IHL, specifically Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of civilians.

5.       These outages have forced organisations to adapt operations and rely on backup sources to maintain critical functions. However, for small volunteer networks, grassroots aid groups or community-led humanitarian initiatives lacking considerable resources or adequate organisational capacity, the burden is much greater. A number of local organisations also reported that ‘power cuts often prevented them from meeting the strict reporting requirements set by major international donors,’ such as detailed tracking of aid deliveries, updated beneficiary lists, and financial transparency, in addition to other administrative processes that require stable connectivity. [6]  Without donor flexibility for administrative processes, these smaller, community-led initiatives remain highly vulnerable to operational collapse despite their vital contribution to enabling access and the last-mile delivery of aid, otherwise a constant challenge due to the disregard of international humanitarian law by the Russian state during the ongoing Ukraine war. 

6.       There is documented evidence of Russian forces deliberately targeting and destroying humanitarian hubs across Ukraine, which directly impacts the delivery of essential relief to civilian populations. Incidents include:

6.1.   Attack on Humanitarian Aid Distribution Centre in Solonchaky (25th November 2024): Russian forces attacked a humanitarian aid distribution hub in the village of Solonchaky in Mykolaiv Oblast, deploying a first-person view (FPV) drone. The drone specifically targeted individuals during the distribution of aid, injuring five.[7]

6.2.   Shelling of Humanitarian Aid Distribution Centre in Kherson (5th December 2024): the Russian rocket attack destroyed a humanitarian hub operated by a Ukrainian organisation (I am Kherson), forcing the suspension of critical humanitarian activities amid harsh winter conditions.[8]

6.3.   Russian Attack on Humanitarian Aid Point in Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia Oblast (9th July 2023): a Russian-guided bomb struck a school in Orikhiv, which was used as a humanitarian distribution centre, resulting in the deaths of seven people and injuries to eleven others.[9]

Obstruction and delay of humanitarian assistance

7.       Another major violation of IHL has been the obstruction and delay of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, all parties in a conflict must allow unimpeded humanitarian access.[10] However, there have been numerous reports from aid workers and organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of restricted access to civilians trapped in besieged cities and occupied areas. Some key examples include:

7.1.   Russian-occupied areas in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson have experienced restricted humanitarian access with aid convoys actively blocked by Russian forces.

7.2.   Although the use of starvation as an instrument of warfare is prohibited under IHL Article 54 of Additional Protocol I, the blockade of humanitarian supplies in Mariupol led to extreme food and water shortages, with civilians forced to consume contaminated water. A similar tactic has been observed in occupied Kherson.[11] 

7.3.   According to local testimonials, aid and foodstuffs were not allowed into Kherson city, hospitals ran out of vital medicines and basic consumables, most businesses closed, staple prices skyrocketed, and queues extended for hours. Until limited communication with the left bank (of the Dnieper River) resumed, the agricultural abundance of the region was essentially cut off from the city’s food supply chains, trapping the local population in a race for subsistence.[12]  

7.4.   In occupied regions, delivering aid has become a matter of survival and personal sacrifice. A testimonial from an individual in occupied-Kherson recounts the vital role of volunteers in averting a humanitarian disaster in the immediate aftermath of Russian occupation (beginning of March 2022): ‘Volunteers risked their lives to bring medicine and other necessities from territories under Ukrainian control, across the frontline. Unfortunately, a good friend of mine disappeared with his companions after crossing the Russian checkpoint’[13], thus also infringing upon the illegality of forced disappearances.14

7.5.   In a constantly shifting and volatile battlefield, humanitarian centres and staging hubs are forced to move operations to safer areas, turning the distribution of humanitarian supplies into a complex logistical process and compounding the extreme vulnerability of populations in need. Most local volunteers and aid workers interviewed reported extreme exhaustion and persistent psychological effects akin to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Mobilisation efforts within Ukraine also impact access to aid due to understaffing and organisational capacity constraints. In this context, mobilisation refers to the large-scale conscription and enlistment of civilians (predominantly male) in Ukraine’s armed forces, which has significantly reduced the workforce available for humanitarian operations. 

Destruction of the Kakhovka Dam

8.       The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 caused devastating flooding in Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts (southern Ukraine), exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and exposing severe violations of International Humanitarian Law. The environmental damage has been described as a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which specifically prohibits deliberate attacks on infrastructure necessary for civilian survival. On the ground, the floodwaters engulfed approximately 620 km2 of territory, including agricultural land, households, settlements, industrial facilities, and infrastructure, while displacing landmines and releasing volumes of harmful contaminants.[14] As the flooding receded, the landscape of devastation and displacement could hardly be conveyed. Under IHL Article 70 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief.[15] However, following the dam’s destruction, Russian forces were accused of deliberately obstructing aid and evacuation operations, restricting access to flooded areas, and targeting emergency response. 

8.1.   Targeting of evacuation efforts: reports from first responders, volunteers on the ground and humanitarian organisations indicated that Russian forces shelled Ukrainian rescue boats attempting to evacuate civilians from submerged settlements.[16] The flooding placed humanitarian workers at extreme risk, thus violating IHL protections for aid personnel (Article 18 of Geneva Convention IV).

8.2.   Threats to safety: the flooding dislodged thousands of landmines, creating an unpredictable and deadly hazard for civilians, aid workers and volunteers. As decontamination and rehabilitation operations were underway throughout the summer months of 2023 - a process most likely to take years, if not decades - interviews with volunteers and aid groups revealed the extremely hazardous conditions of their work: ‘There were communities that decided to remain, hundreds of families and elderly people who refused to leave their homes or simply couldn’t. We couldn’t leave them behind, so in remote villages and towns, we helped with rehabilitation, moving from house to house, pumping water and debris out, emptying the households for inventories of what could be salvaged while other teams decontaminated every corner. We tried to persuade people to leave, fearing waterborne illnesses, even cholera and dysentery. Children and adults alike were showing signs of skin rashes, difficulty breathing. We [the aid workers and volunteers] experienced the same [symptoms] from long exposure (...).’[17] At the time, there was no mandatory civilian evacuation imposed by the Ukrainian government, which some perceived as a decision-making error due to the heightened risk of infectious outbreaks and transmission to densely populated urban centres – for instance, in Odesa which also hosts tens of thousands of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons).[18] 

8.3.   Physical obstruction of humanitarian access: swathes of territory have been rendered inaccessible, straining access and timely humanitarian response. Furthermore, Russian forces denied the UN’s access to the flooded areas under its control, leaving thousands without sustenance, clean water, and crucial medical assistance (Art 55 and Art 59 of Geneva Convention IV).[19]

‘Double-tap’ strikes and the targeting of humanitarian aid assistance

9.       There is substantial evidence that Russian forces have employed ‘double-tap’ strikes, a tactic previously observed in Syria, and condemned as violating Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.[20] The discernible pattern involves an initial strike followed by a second one targeting the wounded as well as first responders, emergency services, and civilian volunteers arriving at the scene, with the scope of exacerbating casualties. Some documented incidents include:

9.1.   Pokrovsk Missile Strikes (7th August 2023): Russian forces launched two consecutive missile attacks in the city of Pokrvosk in Donetsk Oblast. The first strike hit a residential area, and approximately 40 minutes later, a second missile deliberately targeted the same location, resulting in the deaths of emergency personnel and first responders.[21]

9.2.   Budy Shelling near Kharkiv (13th July 2024): in the town of Budy, near Kharkiv, Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile attack on a railway station, resulting in two deaths and at least twenty-five injured.[22]

9.3.   Odesa Missile Attack (15th March 2024): Russian forces launched a missile attack on the Black Sea port city of Odesa, killing at least twenty and wounding more than seventy. Consistent with the double-tap tactics, the attack involved multiple strikes targeting rescue and relief operations.[23]

10.   In addition to ‘double-tap’ strikes targeting first responders, emergency services and civilian volunteers, there have been a number of direct attacks on aid workers, thus violating customary

IHL.[24] 

10.1.1.    Red Cross Personnel Casualties (12th September 2024): three ICRC workers were killed and two others injured during Russian shelling in the village of Viroliubivka in eastern Ukraine. The attack ensued as aid workers were unloading humanitarian supplies.[25]

10.1.2.    Foreign Aid Workers Killed (10th September 2023): two foreign aid workers were killed in Eastern Ukraine when Russian shelling hit a van carrying a multi-national team of four affiliated with the Road to Relief group, an NGO assisting evacuations from frontline areas.[26]

How has the level of risk for aid workers changed in recent years and where does responsibility for their protection lie? What protections are available and are they adequate?

The increased risk for aid workers 

11.   Interviews with humanitarian workers in Ukraine highlighted the challenges posed by strict donor-imposed bans on communication with military officials, particularly under OCHAcoordinated frameworks. In the volatile battlefield environment, only military administrations (i.e. regional command centres) possess real-time intelligence on active combat zones, landmine locations, and safe routes. However, the IHL principles of neutrality and independence strictly prohibit coordination with military authorities.[27] Strict adherence to these principles may pose challenges to the safety of humanitarian personnel, leaving aid groups without access to crucial security data, thereby compromising informed risk assessments and increasing operational risks. 

12.   As the current measures appear to be inadequate relating to the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia, it is the responsibility of outside states to promote respect for the rule of IHL and its related principles. For example, the UK Government should advocate for a structured, nonoperational approach to security coordination during humanitarian interventions, ensuring that aid workers in Ukraine can access vital information without compromising core humanitarian principles. Such controlled measures would balance the imperative of safeguarding humanitarian personnel and volunteers with the commitment to neutrality and independence, all the while setting a much-needed example of respect due to the rule of law in the current climate of global conflict. 

13.   Upon the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, hundreds of (foreign) self-mandated volunteers poured into Ukraine to assist with relief efforts, including British nationals. Often lacking formal affiliation or humanitarian training, these grassroots volunteer networks spanned the whole country, assisting (local) charities as well as troops with the last-mile delivery of aid, civilian evacuations, and, at times, even reconstruction. Despite addressing some critical gaps through flexibility and rapid response, such decentralised initiatives do not necessarily fit within conventional humanitarian frameworks. Furthermore, in the absence of institutional support and formal recognition, these volunteer networks operate in an increasingly perilous and unregulated space, vulnerable to the multifaceted threats of an active warzone. However, the lack of oversight and adequate training also compounds inefficiencies and accountability issues.29 

14.   Although IHL does extend protections to volunteers, enforcement remains weak and dependent on uptake by warring parties. Despite being a widespread, difficult-to-contain phenomenon, specific programmes tailored to support grassroots volunteer networks - also involving, but not limited to, British nationals - are not prominently featured in the available information/training packages. Lack of situational awareness, language, and cultural barriers can significantly impact the effectiveness and safety of humanitarian volunteers, particularly those operating outside formal structures. Therefore, it remains pertinent to recommend that the British Government consider implementing targeted measures that would enhance the safety of these unconventional contributors to humanitarian efforts.

14.1.1. This could begin with more accessible pre-deployment training courses aimed at educating volunteers on how to assess security conditions before engaging in aid work, on local/regional customs and etiquette to facilitate adequate engagement with communities and authorities, and IHL principles and the operational frameworks of major aid organisations. 

What are the gaps in international humanitarian law when it comes to humanitarian access and what could be the UK Government’s role in addressing this?

How the UK Government can address the gaps in IHL regarding humanitarian access

15. This set of recommendations builds extensively on insights gathered from local charities and NGOs based in Ukraine. The UK Government has committed substantial resources to support Ukraine, including £357 million in humanitarian assistance, which has primarily flowed through established entities such as UN agencies, humanitarian NGOs, and the Red Cross.[28] To improve last-mile delivery – one of the most pervasive challenges on the ground - and foster access to aid, context-sensitive and adaptable responses could bolster the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions:

15.1.1. Revise potential administrative/bureaucratic constraints in donor frameworks to improve local responsiveness: streamlining funding processes for local humanitarian actors by reducing top-down bureaucratic requirements to enable greater flexibility in assessing and responding to evolving community needs. Currently, ‘the bureaucracy of big donor organisations wouldn’t allow local aid groups to assess wisely and act fast. The project frameworks were very strict (i.e.: OCHA) – once signed, donor-driven reporting takes precedence, which shouldn’t be a problem; however, [this happens] at the expense of more informed, community-level assessments of actual needs, which can be conducted by engaging with realities on the ground, at hromada level

[municipality] (....). Ukraine is decentralised, so nation-wide, even region-wide [oblast] assessments may not reflect the evolving needs of the most vulnerable and/or displaced populations, groups at heightened risk that require certain protections, children, people with disability etc.’

15.1.2. Improve donor reporting to balance compliance with community engagement by encouraging participatory grant models whereby local aid groups and grassroots (community-led) humanitarian initiatives co-develop project reporting frameworks, ensuring that accountability does not come at the expense of adaptability.

15.1.3. Increase funding for localised needs assessments by allowing flexible allocations within grant agreements. This would help ensure that community-level research and direct engagement are not sidelined.

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