[SCS0006]

Written evidence submitted by the Antisemitism Policy Trust

Summary

The Antisemitism Policy Trust, a charity supporting policymakers in addressing antisemitism, has long focused on electoral conduct and candidate security. The recent UK General Election saw alarming levels of intimidation and abuse towards candidates, particularly those perceived as Jewish or supportive of Israel. Many incidents were linked to discourse surrounding the Israel-Hamas conflict, with some candidates facing threats, harassment, and vandalism. The Trust highlights the role of social media in amplifying antisemitic rhetoric and disinformation, exacerbating real-world hostility. We call for stronger regulations on AI-generated content, disinformation, online hate speech, and improved protections for MPs and candidates, including better law enforcement responses and enhanced election security measures.

In our submission, we emphasise the need for systemic changes, including more precise legislation regarding harassment, and better candidate support. We set out the history of work in this area, and recommend that the Conference revisits the All-Party Inquiry into Electoral Conduct, and Intimidation in public life: A Review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life report. We recommend improving data collection on political threats, and ensuring online platforms are held accountable for spreading harmful content. Ultimately, safeguarding MPs and candidates is essential to protect democratic integrity and prevent the normalisation of hate-driven intimidation in political discourse.

Introduction
The Antisemitism Policy Trust is a charity that works to educate and empower parliamentarians and policy makers to address antisemitism. For more than two decades, the Trust has provided the secretariat to the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) Against Antisemitism. We supported the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct, and have advised Government, parliamentarians and regulators on issues connected with abuse and intimidation of parliamentary candidates, in particular those relating to antisemitism.

We welcome this consultation on the security of candidates, MPs and elections. The recent General Election was host to some of the most appalling intimidation of candidates, including threats and abuse. These are not solely attacks on individuals but rather represent an attack on our democratic system and values, with negative implications for our democratic processes and governance.

As outlined above, the Antisemitism Policy Trust has long taken an interest in matters relating to electoral conduct. In 2013, we supported the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct.[1] That inquiry investigated the nature and extend of racist and other forms of abuse and harassment encountered by electoral candidates. The inquiry panel uncovered cases of racial discrimination, including antisemitic abuse, directed at candidates. It also found instances of antisemitism expressed by candidates themselves in both national and local elections.

Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct (October 2013):
The inquiry was commissioned by Lord John Mann, former MP for Bassetlaw and Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism and was chaired by former Deputy Speaker, Natascha Engel (now a board member of the Trust). Its aims were to investigate the scope and nature of the problem [of electoral abuse], identify the frameworks for addressing it and make recommendations rooted in good practice. The Inquiry gathered evidence from a range of bodies including political parties, domestic and international election agencies, the police, academics, trade unions, councils, elected officials, community groups, and NGOs.
 

The report was deliberately published outside of the General Election cycle. It was considered that the report would be most useful if its recommendations were allowed time to be absorbed and acted on.

The key recommendations are summarised below.

Policing, law and justice:

         The Equality and Human Rights Commission [EHRC] should produce a plan for engaging in work on electoral conduct. Specifically, it should update the election toolkit. It should continue to publish and promote guidance annually.

         The Electoral Commission should extend and enhance the group of stakeholders they consult, to include the EHRC and other experts in tackling racist discrimination.

         The Electoral Commission should run a central, online briefing for all candidates. This would ensure all candidates have been briefed on the relevant legal guidelines.

         SPOCs [Police Special Points of Contact] should be appointed in each regional police force. They should undergo mandatory training and should report details of poor community relations where evident.

         There should be an enhanced level of co-operation and data sharing between the Police National Community Tensions Team (NCTT), the SPOC network and the Electoral Commission, in advance of elections.

Political parties:

         A major gap exists in appropriate training procedures around racism and discrimination in political parties. Parties should draw on expert knowledge and enhance the level of existing training.

         More should be done by political parties to prepare candidates for the ruthless nature of campaigning (eg. Personal safety sessions and briefings from experienced campaigners).

         Parties should compile a register of contacts with associated referral procedures to appropriate support schemes for candidates (eg. Help lines, counselling and other professional or voluntary services).

         Cross-party agreement should be sought on a standardised framework for reporting discrimination during election campaigns (contact address, named official with responsibility for assessing case, stipulated timeframe, publication of any adjudication or sanctions applied). This should work in tandem with existing party disciplinary and police procedures.

         Each political party should establish a library of campaign materials featuring their imprint for a rolling period of five years, allowing for a proper and more timely police investigation should complaints be lodged.

         Cross-party mechanisms should be established to rebut myths perpetrated by extremist parties during the course of an election.

         Non-party campaigners should be required to maintain a database of election campaign literature to assist the police when allegations of misconduct arise. This should be extended to online and other election communications.

         Parties should judge carefully the relationships they cultivate with groups that are likely to use divisive and discriminatory tactics in election campaigns. Political parties should also have guidance for candidates on engaging with third party groups.

The full report can be found online on the APPG web page: https://antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/3767_APPG_Electoral_-Parliamentary_Report_emailable.pdf.

Intimidation in public life: A Review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (December 2017):

This report was commissioned by former Prime Minister, Theresa May, after a significant proportion of candidates in the 2017 general election experienced ‘harassment, abuse and intimidation’.
 

The Committee on Standards in Public Life undertook a review of the intimidation of Parliamentary candidates and the wider implications of this for public-office holders. It produced a series of recommendations for both short- and long-term action.
 

The Trust gave evidence to the committee on the nature and extent of intimidatory behaviour, what can be done to combat intimidation in public life, and the impact of such behaviour on public life. Particular areas of concern raised included:
 

         The use of social media. The report notes that use of social media had been ‘the most significant factor accelerating and enabling intimidatory behaviour in recent years’.

         Training of candidates, including the use of social media, but also around what they will encounter, how to report intimidatory or abusive behaviour, and how they can access support.

         Political parties and leaders. The report stated there should be cross-party condemnation of intimidatory behaviour. Specifically, leaders and candidates should set an example in calling out this behaviour when it occurs.

The full report including recommendations can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/intimidation-in-public-life-a-review-by-the-committee-on-standards-in-public-life.

Results of the APPG Inquiry into Electoral Conduct

There have been several areas of progress since the APPG published its report in October 2013. These have been covered in two further reports produced by the APPG. The first was commissioned by Natascha Engel following the 2015 General Election, to determine the impact of the report and identify any unresolved issues requiring further action.
 

Key findings are as follows:

         The EHRC was criticised in the original report for not issuing relevant guidance. For the 2015 election, it published new guidance to help local authorities, parties and candidates understand the role of equality and human rights law in elections (http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/commission-publishes-election-guidance)

         The Electoral Commission made a number of key commitments, including:

• Extending stakeholder relations
• Signposting relevant guidance from the EHRC and distributing this through Returning Officers
• Trailing online webinars
• Updating guidance on equalities legislation and complaint processes

         Nick Clegg, former Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal Democrats, wrote a detailed response to the inquiry in which he committed to implement a number of the recommendations and stated he was open to cross-party talks on a framework for minimum standards. Whilst some progress was made with the other major parties, there was a general reticence to enter into cross-party talks.

         John Mann wrote to the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties requesting details about how they planned to deal with cases of electoral misconduct. All three parties responded and provided a named contact for complaints to be referred to.

The report also includes a ‘State of the Parties Report’, providing a summary of relevant issues arising from the 2015 general election.

The full report can be found here: https://antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/4454_PCAA_Electoral-Conduct-follow-up_V6_flattened-cover.pdf.
 

The second report was commissioned in 2017. This was previously planned for the 2020 general election, but the unexpected announcement of a 2017 general election altered the focus and release plans for the report.
 

The document reflects on each recommendation from the original enquiry and whether these have been addressed. Key findings are as follows:

         The EHRC updated its guidance further to include case studies and contact details for relevant organisations.

         The report notes that a framework for reporting incidents of intimidation and misconduct had not been established, despite being recommended as part of the original inquiry.

         A reticence to commit to cross-party initiatives such as a joint code of conduct was still evident.

The report also includes a ‘State of the Parties Report’, providing a summary of relevant issues arising from the 2017 general election. The full report can be found here: https://antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Electoral-ConductFinalReportUpdate.pdf.

Though there was no report issued for the 2019 election, the Antisemitism Policy Trust CEO maintained an online thread reporting on allegations of antisemitism levelled against candidates: https://twitter.com/DannyStone1/status/1194747104859701249?t=sWW2CXhoJgS4I2_XSqKm7Q&s=19

Threats to MPs and candidates to Parliament in the 2024 election

The scale of online and offline harassment, abusive behaviour and threats outlined in the Candidates Survey 2024[2], demonstrates that existing measures have failed to protect those standing for election to parliament. The survey does not look at the specific motivations for harassment and abuse. However, there is evidence to suggest that some of the abuse relates to tensions emanating from the war between Hamas and Israel, which correlates with a major increase in antisemitic hate crimes against the Jewish community. The same toxic discourse about the conflict that has inspired antisemitic attacks, has also motivated people to behave in an abusive way, to intimidate and harass electoral candidates, politicians and their constituency offices.

The backdrop to some of this is captured in Lord Walney’s report ‘Protecting Our Democracy from Coercion.’ In his paper, he identified activism surrounding the war between Hamas and Israel as a source of incitement and intimidation[3] including threatening and abusive behaviour towards MPs. Some of this abuse has been blatantly antisemitic. Lord Walney concluded in his review, that some pro-Palestinian activists have created a hostile atmosphere that promotes abusive behaviour towards MPs. In the aftermath of the October 7 attacks and subsequent parliamentary activity, the media also highlighted similar concerns. The Guardian reported that: ‘many Labour parliamentarians have expressed concern for their personal safety, after their offices were targeted by pro-Palestinian protesters angered by the party’s refusal to back a ceasefire in Gaza.’[4][5]

There are anecdotal examples of abusive and threatening behaviour just before and during the general election. This includes threats made against former MP Mike Freer, who represented Finchley and Golders Green – a constituency with a large Jewish community – from 2010. Following long-term abuse, death threats and an arson attack on his constituency office, Mr. Freer decided to step down and not contest the election, citing safety concerns. He said at the time: "I don't think we can divorce" antisemitism from the intimidation that influenced his decision.[6] The office of Jo Stevens, Labour MP for Cardiff Central, was vandalised with the word ‘murderer’, and covered with posters saying she had ‘blood on her hands’.[7] We are also aware of targeting of other candidates/MPs in Wales and their offices.

Other MPs were targeted before the election was called. The office of Feryal Clark, Labour MP for Enfield North, was vandalised and daubed with the words ‘free Palestine.’[8] Protesters also targeted the family home of Tobias Ellwood MP. Between 60 and 80 people protested outside his home for several hours, with flags and megaphones, calling Ellwood a ‘war criminal’ while his children were in the house.[9] Although these protests are not antisemitic, they are an example of how the boundaries between activism and intimidation or abuse have been broken.

Some of these behaviours continued and were exacerbated by the election. For example, Labour candidate for Dewsbury and Batley, Heather Iqbal, cited incidents of abuse and intimidation at the hands of activists throughout her campaign. She was reportedly called a ‘child killer’ and ‘genocide agent.’ She told the BBC “It was relentless. There were a lot of horrible things circulating about my background, family and name.”[10] She also detailed efforts to stalk her on social media. She told the Guardian: “As well as the van with a megaphone shouting that I was a Zionist and genocide agent, we had activists being chased down the street, malicious online content about my white husband and my first name.”[11]

Jess Philips MPs also suffered relentless abuse and harassment throughout her election campaign, dubbing it one of the 'worst elections ever.'[12][13] Much of this was linked to discourse about the Middle East conflict, including falsely claiming that Philips is a ‘Zionist agent.’ The accusation that candidates are ‘agents of Zionism’ feeds from a longstanding antisemitic mode of thinking about Jewish power and influence. The attacks on Iqbal though unique to that context echo past abuse of former MP and Baroness, Oona King which she detailed in her evidence to the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct.

There were other incidents that occurred during the election that received less coverage. For example, an independent candidate was leading a rally at which people among the crowd were heard shouting, “Kill the Jews, kill Israel, kill the Jews.” 

The Trust CEO kept an online thread[14], as he did at the last election, detailing allegations about candidate behaviours, there are multiple stories about candidates from across a number of parties. This behaviour cannot be divorced from the threat faced by candidates. The tenor and discourse in any given constituency election can and will impact the safety of other individuals seeking election. Candidates in Bethnal Green and Bow[15], Rochdale[16], and Batley and Spen[17] have spoken about concerns they have had in the past during what were heated election campaigns. In Batley and Spen, Labour activists were pelted with eggs and kicked in the head while campaigning.[18] Former PM Rishi Sunak described the campaign for the Rochdale by-election as ‘one of the most divisive in recent time.’[19] There were also allegations of harassment, abuse and possibly illegal activity in Leicester, against the previous incumbent and Labour candidate, Jonathan Ashworth allegedly by supporters of his successor.[20]

Home Secretary Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP, issued a warning during the last election about the harassment of Labour candidates and canvassers in particular, that was taking place at the hands of pro-Palestinian activists, after several such incidents, including in Bethnal Green and Birmingham.[21] Regrettably, incidents nonetheless continued.

The Antisemitism Policy Trust is always eager to make clear that we are not seeking to make comment on the Israel-Palestinian conflict, nor are we seeking to censor or admonish those seeking to support or promote Palestinian rights and welfare, nor to impede proper scrutiny of electoral candidates but there is, of course, a line between democratic engagement and harassment and abuse.

Disinformation, online antisemitism, and violence against MPs

The conference has asked about the role of disinformation. Online harm, primarily content found on social media platforms, undermines democracy. Social media amplifies the psychological impact of discrimination by exposing individuals to large amounts of online hate speech and abuse, and channeling it through personal devices. Online platforms create echo chambers where discrimination, including antisemitic rhetoric is normalised, increasing the visibility of abuse and its mental health impact. This is all the more acute during election periods. Online behaviours include abuse, harassment, the amplification of content that discriminates on the basis of a protected characteristic, and extremist materials that can cause distress or radicalise individuals. 

It is well documented that social media profits are driven by clicks and attention. Grabbing attention is often through reinforcement of personal narratives, which can lead to siloing and then a wider impact offline. The House of Commons debated this as recently as last year.[22]  We have published documents in the past that draw the line between online hate and offline actions[23] As Meta and X further reduce their moderation and enforcement activities, we can expect the situation offline to further deteriorate.

Together with a dramatic rise in online antisemitism since 7 October, AI-generated images and deep fake videos have become more commonplace.[24] Some of these are sophisticated enough to deceive social media users, who share them believing they depict true events. Others share these images knowingly, aiming to intensify a particular narrative, including anti-Jewish sentiments or lies about electoral candidates. Many of these images contain emotive content designed to manipulate viewers and shape their perspectives. The influx of AI-generated disinformation has been so significant that fact-checkers and analysts have struggled to moderate the content.39

The Trust has recently released a study on AI-generated antisemitic content that has aided the  spread of disinformation and tropes.[25] These include antisemitic blood-libels, especially about Jews targeting children, accusations of Jewish power, influence, and greed, Holocaust denial and revisionism, and support for Nazi ideology. Due to lack of effective safety mechanism, regulation and ethical standards, such content is easy to produce and to disseminate. It helps to spread conspiracy theories about Jews and about the Israel-Hamas war in a way that can radicalise people into believing extremist and racist narratives that result not only in the targeting of the Jewish community, but also of MPs and candidates – especially if they are Jewish or are conceived to be Zionist (whatever the interpretation of that word), supporters of the Jewish community or Israel (irrespective of whether the latter is true or not).

Better regulation of AI-generated content, especially with regard to transparency, accountability and improved safety by design practices, is crucial. More detailed recommendations can be found in the AI study.[26] There is a question as to whether the use of local authority powers to correct false information could be applied in respect of AI-generative or other misinformation being spread online during an election, and careful consideration of the means, method and use of such powers is required.

Online disinformation has real-life consequences. It has the ability to mobilise people to act in a violent or threatening way, as was evident for example in the riots that broke after disinformation spread on social media about the Southport killer. Terrorists and other attackers who targeted Jewish communities have been partially or fully motivated, or radicalised, by conspiracy theories and disinformation consumed online. These conspiracies encourage people to scapegoat Jews for their grievances and play into pre-existing attitudes and fears. One example is the gunman who killed 11 congregants at a Pittsburgh Synagogue – he held antisemitic attitudes, including believing that Jews were the masters of the so-called ‘Great Replacement’.[27]

Violent extremism influenced by disinformation, conspiracy theories and other racist and extremist content, is a real and present danger. It has been evident in deadly attacks against political figures based on their real or perceived religion, views, or party affiliation. The man who murdered Jo Cox MP, was influenced by far right, neo-Nazi, white nationalist ideologies.[28] He reportedly consumed many of those offline and online prior to the attack on Cox and had visited extremist websites. The man who murdered David Amess MP, was also influenced by radical Islamist ideologies consumed online.[29] He also expressed admiration for ISIS and figures like the Norwegian mass murderer, who himself had been radicalised by far-right ideologies online.

This speaks to the importance of improved online action against radicalising content, and a broader duty of care for social media platforms. The Trust has been manifestly clear about the role of small. high-harm platforms. Some small platforms host the worst kind of extremist content, including racism, and misogyny. We supported changes to the Online Safety Act that would have ensured they were more closely regulated. These platforms, some of which have demonstrably radicalised individuals, and interact with more mainstream platforms, should have been given special status. They create harmful online mini-communities that radicalise one another and as we have outlined above and in our research (on antisemitism, the manosphere and more), there are offline realities to such self-reinforcing filter bubbles. The Government made a mistake in not instructing Ofcom to categorise these small platforms appropriately.

We believe that there should be stronger regulation of disinformation, and of AI-generate content including deepfakes. The recent decision by Meta to scrap fact checkers[30] could have a widespread, negative effect on the spread on harmful disinformation. Although this decision presently only applies to Meta’s activity in the US, the UK should be prepared to deal with the expansion of this policy in due course and make sure that Facebook is not allowed to become a larger hotbed for harmful, hateful and divisive disinformation – particularly at election time.

The All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct recommended that where appropriate, local authorities continue to use their powers under the Code on Publicity as pertains to the Local Government Act 1986 and publish “objective, accurate and factual information” to correct false information circulated by candidates, as well as non-party campaigners parties, during an election period. It would be helpful to better understand what local authorities did do in this regard, if anything, and what conclusions can be drawn from their actions (and whether they can be better positioned to act in future elections).

 
There should be a new approach to online legislation, given the Online Safety Act is overly cumbersome and complex. A simple, high-level duty of care, a power (with appropriate checks and balances) to remove misinformation in relation to national security, stronger emergency powers for the regulator, a statutory access pathway for independent researchers to access platform data, and other duties should be introduced at speed. We need to consider what special measures should be imposed for periods of election, and – taking account of platform size and scale – what resources such sites should be putting into monitoring and feedback from periods of election.

As evident by the examples presented here, and with regard to the committee’s questions about the drivers of threat levels, it is evident that rising online and offline antisemitism and a discourse that demonises and dehumanises Jews and Israel, has been a catalyst for the rise in threat levels to MPs and candidates – some of whom have been dehumanised and vilified. Narratives surrounding the Israel-Hamas conflict have played a role in causing people to adopt increasingly extreme views which for some, seems to justify the use of intimidation and verbal and physical violence.

How to increase support for MPs and candidates to Parliament, reducing threat levels and safeguarding our democracy

It is vital for our democracy that actions are taken against those who abuse, threaten, or intimidate candidates and campaigners. The law needs to be applied consistently and swiftly in order to provide MPs and candidates with a feeling of safety that will allow them to pursue their political activities. In addition, we would like to see better support given to candidates and campaigners, and a system that is better prepared and equipped to deal with instances of harmful behaviours during general elections. A number of the recommendations of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct sought to establish such systems.

We have made recommendations to other committees of the House of Commons that there should be an assessment of whether support for candidates is sufficient, especially considering the high number of those that replied to the Electoral Commission survey saying that they felt unsafe to campaign on their own out of safety fears (40% of female candidates, 11% of male candidates). 46% of female candidates have also reported that they have avoided talking about or voicing their opinion on controversial issues. This means that nearly half of female candidates felt compelled to censor themselves out of concerns for their safety. We have produced detailed evidence on antisemitic misogyny before and so the potential deterrents arising from this election for Jewish women in particular are likely to be significant.

Given the increasing number of independent candidates for election, we think it appropriate that the Electoral Commission provide additional training or other support for such candidates and determine whether additional guidelines or regulations are required. Certainly, the relationship between candidates for election and third parties requires further scrutiny. It remains possible for candidates to encourage and benefit from spending on materials deployed by third parties to create an electoral advantage but for those materials not feature in any election expenses. As Lord Mann has previously pointed out, “someone could even calculatedly set up an organisation to do damage to certain candidates and other than criminal law there is nothing that can be done”.

We would also encourage the Conference to urge the relevant authorities to review the All-Party Inquiry into Electoral conduct and its other recommendations.

The Home Secretary announced in September a review of extremism and responses to ‘poisonous ideologies that corrode community cohesion and fray the fabric of our democracy.’[31] Although this was in response to the Southport riots, conclusions from the review should be used to inspire new ways to combat violent and non-violent extremist and racist ideologies that increase threat to political figures. Recommendations from Lord Walney’s report on political violence and disruption also deserve more careful consideration.

Lord Walney has found that lack of accurate and consistent data means that the true scale and nature of the problem, and relevant trends cannot be identified – both crucial in helping to formulate solutions and allocating resources to better protect MPs and candidates. We support recommendation 24 of his report: ‘The Metropolitan Police Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team (PLaIT) should develop a plan to improve the recording and reporting of harassment and intimidation directed against MPs. The police should be able to record and retrieve accurate and consistent information showing the scale of crimes against MPs to identify trends and allocate resources accordingly.’[32] This information should feed into local forces so that relevant security arrangements can be made for elections. The data capture should work the other way too, and be extended so that intimidation and harassment of candidates who are successfully returned is passed without delay to the PLaIT team in order that it can better assess the situation with MPs offices as and when required.

Similarly there is merit in recommendation 26: ‘The Government should extend the scope of Expedited Public Spaces Protection Orders to include places vital to the functioning of democratic governance, such as MPs’ constituency offices and surgeries and council chambers. This would serve a dual function of being an additional practical measure to stop lawmakers being targeted and underline the Government’s commitment to promoting democracy’[33]

This is particularly important for safeguarding the democratic process from disruption, and should also include venues where hustings are being conducted by candidates and MPs. Increasing police presence at campaign events would ensure a rapid response to threats and intimidation. The government should also examine whether the threshold to meet the criteria for police protection for MPs under Operation Bridger is too high and should be lowered.

Additionally, strengthening laws against harassment and intimidation of MPs and candidates may be needed. This could include harsher penalties for those found guilty of such offences and the introduction of new laws specifically targeting election-related harassment.

Once elected, one additional layer of transparency for voting might assist in preventing abuse of MPs. Where votes are recorded, should an MP or peer be granted a slip and have a reason to be away from the Commons, perhaps this could be specifically noted in some way so that they are not automatically considered to have missed a vote for no good reason or ‘abstained’. 

In order to secure free and fair elections, it is vital to provide a safe environment to MPs and candidates to Parliament, so they are free to campaign and express themselves without concerns for their security. Failure to address the root causes and factors that inspire antisemitism, including calls for violence against Jews and support for terrorism that have been visible on the streets of London, at universities, workplaces, the NHS and other places, has left not only the Jewish community but our elected representatives and as such – our democratic system – at threat.

4 February 2025

Appendix I:

Incidents of antisemitism during the 2024 General Election

Incidents recorded by the Community Security Trust

The Community Security Trust is the charity that protects British Jews and documents incidents of antisemitism. They received the below reports of antisemitism relating to or directed towards candidates in the 2024 general election.

Appendix II:

Incidents on social media

The Trust’s CEO maintained a thread on X[34] for the most recent election. There were at least 25 allegations of antisemitic behaviours, Holocaust inversion, implicit support for the proscribed terrorist organisation Hamas, or other conduct. These incidents related to candidates from the Labour, Conservative, Plaid, Workers and Reform parties, and to independent candidates: