Written evidence from Institute for Public Policy Research [CCI0060]
Submitted to the Women and Equalities Commission – Inquiry on Community Cohesion
1.1 The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) is an independent charity working towards a fairer, greener, and more prosperous society. For over two decades, IPPR has conducted extensive research on migration, integration and social cohesion, publishing key reports that examine the factors influencing community relations in the UK. This submission draws on that body of work to provide evidence-based recommendations on strengthening social cohesion at both national and local levels.
1.2 The urgency of addressing community cohesion has grown in recent months. The rioting and violent disorder that spread across towns and cities in England and Northern Ireland in August 2024 demonstrated the fragility of community resilience in many areas. The violence was triggered by the murder of three young girls in Southport, which was exploited by far-right actors to incite hostility against racialised and asylum-seeking communities. This event demonstrated the dangers of misinformation, far-right extremism and the absence of meaningful social cohesion policies.
1.3 This submission responds to a number of the Committee’s questions, offering insights into the current state of community cohesion, identifying key threats and barriers, and recommending policy interventions to build stronger, more inclusive communities. It argues that a purely law-and-order approach is insufficient - while security measures may address immediate threats, they do not resolve the underlying economic, social and political drivers of division. Instead, proactive policies that empower local leadership, support integration initiatives and promote inclusion are needed to create cohesive communities.
2.1 IPPR has conducted multiple research projects examining community cohesion at both local and national levels. Recent work has particularly focused on the Yorkshire and Humber region, including Communities Up Close (Mort and Morris 2020), which, while place-based, offers broader lessons for the UK.
2.2 This study aimed to understand how different neighbourhoods experience and respond to recent migration through focus groups with around 250 people from both receiving and migrant communities. The findings highlighted that responses to migration varied significantly depending on several factors, including:
2.3 Additionally, the research found that wider economic and social grievances - such as declining high streets, poor housing and strained public services - were often misattributed to migration, even where there was little or no evidence of a direct link.
2.4 There have been particular challenges for cohesion in recent years, first in the aftermath of the EU referendum and later during and after the pandemic, with participants across multiple studies reporting increased xenophobia, racism, and, in some cases, violent hate crime (Mort and Morris 2020; Mort et al 2021). Racialised communities – including British citizens - experience heightened discrimination following key events. For instance, the Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group found that Islamophobic language intensified on social media during the pandemic, with some portrayed as ‘super spreaders’ (Awan and Khan-Williams 2020). This demonstrates that cohesion challenges extend beyond newly arrived migrants and are often shaped by wider societal narratives and political discourse.
3.1 Community cohesion in the UK is shaped by structural and social challenges, including economic inequalities, misinformation and divisive political rhetoric. When these intersect with perceptions of migrants – whether real or imagined - they can fuel resentment and division. This was evident in the 2024 riots, where hotels accommodating people seeking asylum became targets in Rotherham and Tamworth. Yet these challenges are not inevitable; they are the result of policy choices, longstanding underinvestment and the absence of a long-term approach to building cohesive communities.
3.2.1 The UK has lacked a clear and proactive national cohesion strategy, leaving local areas without the leadership or resources needed to foster meaningful social connections. Instead, government efforts have too often been reactive, crisis-driven and overly focused on security risks. The Prevent strategy, for example, has been criticised for eroding trust rather than promoting inclusion, with many arguing that it has alienated entire communities, making them feel surveilled rather than supported (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011). At the same time, the government’s approach to preventing far-right extremism has faced scrutiny, with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) warning that far-right violence is often not treated as seriously as Islamist extremism. This imbalance has led to concerns that Prevent disproportionately targets racialised communities while failing to address the full spectrum of extremist threats (Patel and Morris 2024; RUSI 2024).
3.2.2 Patel and Morris (2024) argue that while policing and sentencing have been effective in stopping the riots, this approach alone is insufficient in addressing the root causes of far-right mobilisation and racial violence. They highlight that economic scarcity, the erosion of social infrastructure, and inflammatory political rhetoric create conditions where such violence can thrive. Without a long-term strategy that promotes resilience, inclusion, and economic security, government policy risks reinforcing cycles of division rather than fostering a sense of shared belonging.
3.3.1 Cuts to local government finances have significantly weakened the local institutions and social spaces that help build community cohesion. Many youth clubs, community centres and support organisations have closed due to funding cuts, leaving fewer opportunities for people to meet, socialise and engage in cross-community activities.
3.3.2 The removal of targeted funding streams, such as the Controlling Migration Fund (CMF) - which supported local authorities in addressing pressures linked to migration - has further exacerbated these challenges. An independent evaluation of the CMF (DLUHC 2022) found that it had helped address service pressures and improved interactions between people of different backgrounds by funding initiatives such as English language classes, housing support and community engagement programmes. Its withdrawal in 2020 left a gap in resources, particularly for councils already struggling with reduced budgets.
3.3.3 Local economic challenges have also played a role. Mort and Morris (2020) found that in areas hit hardest by industrial decline and high street closures, residents expressed a stronger sense of loss and social fragmentation. which in turn made them more vulnerable to divisive narratives about migration and change. As one local community worker interviewed for the study put it:
“[If] we're really talking about community development work - with the intent of getting people to get to know one another and to socialise and to take part in joint activities - I think that takes investment, and it takes investment over many years. The sad thing is that actually when that investment stops, things can regress very quickly… I think it's very unsurprising that with a lack of investment cohesion suffers, integration suffers. Definitely, I'd say that’s the case here too.”
3.3.4 At the same time, cuts to language support and local services have created barriers to participation, particularly for new arrivals. Without adequate language support, for instance, many struggle to fully engage in community life, deepening social divides (Mort and Morris 2020).
3.4.1 Misinformation, particularly on social media and in sections of the press, has played a key role in amplifying divisions and fuelling distrust between communities. Local newspapers in some areas have been accused of publishing sensationalist headlines that reinforce negative perceptions of migration, while social media platforms spread unverified claims that inflame tensions. One stakeholder in the Communities up Close study (ibid) described how community pages often mirror hostile public narratives:
“[If] something happens [in the community], it always gets put on Facebook. If you ever read it you will always get the white English saying Romanians, Ba-di-blah-di-blah. Send them all back."
3.4.2 Instead of relying solely on fact-checking or myth-busting approaches - which research suggests can often be ineffective or even counterproductive - proactive, community-led strategies to counter misinformation should be adopted. For instance, the ‘anti-rumour’ approach, first developed in Barcelona and implemented in several European cities, offers a more effective model. Rather than simply refuting misinformation with data, which can risk entrenching false beliefs, this strategy focuses on promoting alternative, positive narratives about community relations, engaging directly with those who hold ambivalent views rather than dismissing or alienating them (de Torres Barderi 2018). Applying this approach in a UK context, local authorities and community organisations should develop tailored responses to misinformation that reflect local dynamics and engage trusted community voices in shaping and delivering these narratives (Mort and Morris 2020)
3.4.3 An effective example of this approach in practice is Who is Your Neighbour? (WIYN), a grassroots initiative established in response to far-right activity in South Yorkshire. WIYN promotes understanding and reduces community tensions through intra-group conversations, particularly among White British communities. It creates spaces for open discussions on issues such as immigration, allowing people to voice concerns, reflect on different perspectives and engage in mutual learning. By fostering dialogue and creating opportunities to challenge stereotypes, WIYN helps to build empathy, deepen understanding and strengthen social cohesion (Mort et al 2022).
3.5.1 Barriers to citizenship and stable legal status further weaken community cohesion. Many long-term UK residents - for instance, those on the 10-year route to settlement - face prolonged insecurity, making it harder to engage in community life (Mort et al 2023).
3.5.2 IPPR research (ibid) has highlighted how restrictive immigration policies trap people in uncertainty, preventing them from pursuing education, stable employment or civic engagement. One participant described how, despite working in social care, she was unable to train as an occupational therapist because she was blocked from accessing student finance. Others spoke about how visa costs meant they had to prioritise Home Office fees over basic needs for their children, leading to feelings of exclusion and frustration (ibid).
4.1 Building resilient and cohesive communities requires more than short-term interventions or security measures; it should involve a long-term, strategic commitment to fostering inclusion, building trust and enabling shared opportunities. Importantly, the government’s response to the August 2024 riots must go beyond a law-and-order approach – social cohesion cannot be policed into existence, and must instead be built through investing in relationships, building trust and inclusive policymaking. Based on our research, we recommend three key actions at both national and local levels to strengthen community cohesion.
4.2 First, we strongly encourage the development of a national cohesion strategy with cross-government coordination. As Patel and Morris (2024) note, while successive governments have commissioned social cohesion reviews, little has been done to effectively act on their recommendations and as such the UK lacks a clear and proactive strategy for fostering cohesion. Efforts to address cohesion have been reactive and intermittent, as well as entailing a counter-extremism focus that has targeted and alienated certain groups, particularly Muslim communities.
4.3 A national cohesion strategy should be led by the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government and embedded across government departments, including the Home Office, Department for Education, and Department for Culture, Media and Sports, with buy-in from the Treasury and Number 10. The strategy should be clearly defined while empowering local organisations to deliver cohesion initiatives that:
4.4 This approach would ensure cohesion is not an afterthought but a core government priority, backed by resources and long-term planning.
4.5 Second, restoring local funding for cohesion and integration initiatives is essential. Local authorities and community organisations play a vital role in fostering cohesion, yet sustained funding cuts have weakened their ability to do so. The removal of dedicated funding streams, such as the Migration Impacts Fund (later the Controlling Migration Fund), has left many councils without the resources to invest in initiatives that promote integration, support social mixing and reduce tensions.
4.6 A dedicated, long-term fund, allocated directly to local authorities through a fair and transparent methodology, rather than through competitive bidding,[1] is necessary to ensure councils and their partners can plan and deliver effective, sustained initiatives.
4.7 At the same time, asylum accommodation policy plays a crucial role in shaping community relations. The use of hotels and large, segregated sites for asylum seekers has exacerbated tensions, making them a target for attacks and furthering social divisions. IPPR has argued that decentralising asylum accommodation management from private providers to local and regional bodies would improve cohesion, as local authorities are incentivised to house people in a way that better supports community integration and avoids the visibility of large, isolated sites (Mort and Morris 2024).
4.8 Third, ensuring that all long-term residents have a clear and fair route to settlement and citizenship is critical for fostering social participation. Under the current system, many migrants face prolonged and costly pathways to securing permanent status in the UK. The 10-year route to settlement, for instance, imposes significant financial and administrative barriers, often leaving individuals in a state of precariousness for an extended period (Mort et al 2023). Reforming this route by reducing its duration and simplifying the application process would not only improve integration outcomes but also enhance community participation.
4.9 By committing to a national cohesion strategy, restoring local funding and reforming routes to settlement and citizenship, policymakers can take meaningful steps towards fostering a more inclusive, resilient and democratic society - one where social cohesion is actively built rather than left to chance.
References
Awan I and Khan-Williams R (2020) Coronavirus, fear and how Islamophobia spreads on social media, Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group. https://antimuslimhatredworkinggrouphome.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/research-briefing-report-7-1.pdf
Choudhury T and Fenwick H (2011) The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities, Equality and Human Right Commission. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf
De Torres Barderi, D. (2018) ‘Antirumours handbook’, Council of Europe. https://edoc.coe.int/en/living-together-diversity-and-freedom-in-europe/7615-antirumours-handbook-2018.html
Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [DLUHC] (2022) An evaluation of the Controlling Migration Fund Programme, report. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/an-evaluation-of-the-controlling-migration-fund-programme
Johns M and Hutt H (2023) Looking out to level up: How the North and the UK measure up – State of the North 2023, IPPR. http://www.ippr.org/publications/looking-out-to-level-up
Mort L and Morris M (2020) Communities up Close: Neighbourhood change and migration in Yorkshire and Humber, Migration Yorkshire. https://www.migrationyorkshire.org.uk/research-entry/communities-close-neighbourhood-change-and-migration-yorkshire-and-humber
Mort L and Morris M (2024) Transforming asylum accommodation, IPPR. https://www.ippr.org/articles/transforming-asylum-accommodation
Mort L, Morris M and Griniute E (2021) Jump starting integration: Supporting communities to reconnect and thrive, IPPR. http://www.ippr.org/research/publications/jump-starting-integration
Mort L, Qureshi A, Liuta J, Mahmood S and Yemane T (2022) Building the foundations for social connections in Yorkshire and the Humber, IPPR. https://www.ippr.org/articles/social-connections-in-yorkshire-and-humber
Mort L, Whitaker-Yilmaz J, Morris M and Shah A (2023) ‘A punishing process’: Experiences of people on the 10-year route to settlement, IPPR, GMIAU and Praxis. http://www.ippr.org/research/publications/a-punishing-process
Patel P and Morris M (2024) ‘Full force of politics? Government strategies to defeat the far right’, blogpost, IPPR. https://www.ippr.org/articles/full-force-of-politics-government-strategies-to-defeat-the-far-right
Royal United Services Institute [RUSI] (2024) ‘’Two-tier’: UK treats far-right attacks less harshly than Islamist violence, says think tank’, press release. https://www.rusi.org/news-and-comment/in-the-news/two-tier-uk-treats-far-right-attacks-less-harshly-islamist-violence-says-thinktank
January 2025
[1] See Johns and Hutt (2023) for a critique of competitive bidding.