Written evidence submitted by Asylum Matters (AAC0034)
Asylum Matters is a charity working locally and nationally to address systemic issues in the asylum system. Our campaigns managers are based in the East Midlands, North East England, North West England, Wales, the West Midlands and Yorkshire and Humber. More information on our previous work on asylum accommodation is at the end of this submission.
The current Asylum and Accommodation and Support Contracts (AASC) have been characterised by a lack of transparency, substandard performance, fragility, an inability to withstand change and a tendency to lurch from crisis to crisis. They have been unresponsive to local circumstance or to meaningful performance improvement and are not providing value for money for the taxpayer.
Identifying and delivering appropriate accommodation: containment sites / camps
The most egregious examples of harmful ‘accommodation’ under the current contractual regime has been the institution under the former Government of containment sites or camps in barges, on Crown Land or in ex military barracks – including ex RAF Wethersfield in Essex; and the former military barracks at Napier in Kent. Wethersfield and Napier are both managed by AASC provider Clearsprings Ready Homes.
The site at Wethersfield is manifestly unsuitable to accommodate people seeking asylum. The camp is in rural Essex, 9 miles from the nearest town by road and 1.7 miles from the nearest village of Wethersfield.
It came into use in July 2023, and its severe impact on those sent there since then has been meticulously documented by organisations operational around it.[1] A substantial body of evidence over the last year and a half documents worsening mental health amongst people following transfer to the site, including low mood, loneliness, flashbacks, reduced appetite, weight loss, feelings of despair, difficulty sleeping, and worsening symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, with the isolated and detention like conditions being a contributory factor.[2] Increasing incidents of suicide and self-harm have been reported as the site has continued to be used: according to Home Office data, in the first three months of 2024 alone there were 30 recorded occurrences of men self-harming, attempting suicide, or at serious risk of doing so. In that period, there were a further 91 recorded occurrences of men in Wethersfield expressing that they were considering suicide or self-harm, and over 160 safeguarding referrals made regarding suicide and self-harm.[3] Whilst the pace of asylum interviews at the site has since increased, organisations report that problems with access to justice for those placed there remain.[4]
The acquisition of the Wethersfield site, and other ‘pathfinder sites’ under the last Government[5] was characterised by the circumventing of established planning processes, a lack of consultation which in the case of Wethersfield is alleged to have been deliberate[6], and an eye watering cost to the taxpayer. The National Audit Office revealed that budgeted set up costs for Wethersfield were £5m but the actual costs were £49m. The Home Office pursued its large sites programme despite repeated assessments from both the Infrastructure and Projects Authority and within the Home Office that the delivery of the programme to time, cost and quality was unachievable and that competitive tendering processes were not used.[7]
We are deeply concerned at reports that the present Government plan to increase the capacity at the base[8], and house up to 800 people seeking asylum there, especially in the context of recent changes to its ‘Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Policy’[9] which make it harder for people placed inappropriately at the site, for example survivors of torture, to challenge their placement there.
The previous Home Affairs Select Committee requested to visit the site in February 2024[10] – as far as we are aware such a site visit never took place.
Whilst conditions at Napier were ameliorated by a time limit of 90 days being placed on the placement of people at the site, it shares many of the characteristics of the Wethersfield site and is manifestly unfit for purpose.[11]
Recommendation: The camps at Wethersfield and Napier are manifestly unsuitable to accommodate people seeking asylum and must be closed immediately.
Identifying and delivering appropriate accommodation: Hotels
Likewise, an extensive body of evidence from the last five years details chronic issues in hotel accommodation, including : lack of culturally appropriate food provision, lack of access to healthcare, restricted access to communications, instances of inappropriate staff behaviour, restricted access to education for children, lack of advice provision, and lack of communication from the Home Office, which adversely impact on people seeking asylum. We detailed many of these issues four years ago in our 2021 joint report: In a Place Like Prison[12], and unfortunately have not seen raised standards or the end of hotel use since that time.
In fact, things have got worse. Following a programme of ‘hotel maximisation’ by the Home Office people are now routinely across the country placed in accommodation where they are forced to share rooms with unrelated adults, with associated consequences for safeguarding and wellbeing (the NAO has reported that between June 2023 and January 2024 the Home Office had recorded 857 safeguarding incidents where room sharing was a potential factor, with 283 involving suicide or self-harm)[13]: there are in some instances no communal areas, and routinely no access to self-catering facilities. There are an unacceptable number of age-disputed children who are wrongly placed in hotel accommodation,[14] with associated serious safeguarding risks, and an unacceptable number of adults with particular specific needs (such as disabilities, health conditions etc) who are allocated accommodation which does not meet these needs.
Current mechanisms to monitor for standards are inadequate and lack transparency, with the barest information on compliance with key performance indicators being published.[15] There is little evidence of centralised complaints driving long term change, or providers being held to account. Hotels are often staffed by a mixture of hotel staff, provider staff and others with no clear mechanisms for accountability.
There are no key performance indicators specific to safeguarding in the contractual regime[16], and no centrally published data on incidences of self-harm or suicide in Home Office supported sites or accommodation. Some partial data in this regard has been put in the public domain due to the efforts of concerned journalists and stakeholders to obtain information through the Freedom of Information Act[17], but there is a general gap in accountability.
Recommendations
● Hotel use should be ended at the earliest opportunity. Whilst these facilities remain in use, Government must take immediate action to mitigate the harms caused.
● Safeguarding KPIs should be included in the contractual regime. The Home Office should publish transparency data about the number of incidents of self-harm and suicide in the asylum accommodation estate.
● As part of the contractual arrangements for hotel use, every facility should have a mechanism whereby residents can bring up issues in house (anonymously if required) and have them monitored, acted on, and fed back. Residents should be regularly surveyed onsite on long standing chronic issues such as food quality / access to healthcare / staff attitudes / behaviour / access to education for children etc. Each site should have a plan for continuous improvement with clear lines of managerial responsibility and accountability. These plans and the feedback of people on specific sites should be available to residents and inform Home Office monitoring of contractual standards.
● No new facilities should be brought online without communal areas
● Accommodation should be appropriate to the particular needs of individuals. No age disputed children should be placed in hotel accommodation.
● Room sharing must not be allowed to become a standing feature of the asylum support system and must be phased out.
Engaging and working with stakeholders
We continue to see community cohesion harmed by poor communication between the Home Office and local government and a lack of transparency and accountability in relation to the institution of new hotel sites. Despite requests, and the fact that this is a high profile issue subject to widespread public debate, we are aware of no easily accessible public communications (for example on gov.uk) which seek to explain the current situation in relation to hotel accommodation, the reasons for the continued use of such sites, and what communities can expect (the last communication we can find being from 2020)[18]. In a post-riots context, we find this inexplicable.
One recent example of repeated poor communication was the decision in bringing into use of a hotel in October 2024 in Trafford, Greater Manchester, where communication that a decision to use the site had been made was given to the local authority just before a weekend, and the site was operationalised at the beginning of the following week. It is our assessment that the lack of communication made effective communication with or preparation of the local community impossible and has given rise to serious consequences for community cohesion in the locality, as both racist agitators and some local politicians have sought to exploit the situation.
Whilst disquiet in communities about the use of hotel accommodation in the UK is not confined to racist agitators, racist activists have sought to exploit their use. As well as stoking and participating in disorder, their activities have included hate crime, harassment and filming of people outside, and sometimes inside their accommodation. In this context, coordination to inform and keep safe people in accommodation is crucial.
Unfortunately, such coordination has also been lacking. During and in the immediate aftermath of the riots, despite repeated requests in various regional fora for clarity on and sight of the kind of information and briefing, if any, which was being given to people seeking safety themselves in their accommodation, in order that they could take appropriate actions to keep themselves safe, and report hate crime etc: no such information has been forthcoming to our staff. To fill this gap we ourselves, in conjunction with some of our partner organisations, therefore produced two resources: one on considerations for people seeking safety themselves, and the other for the organisations which work with them[19] – this is yet another example of work which in our view should fall to the contractors being undertaken instead by a hard pressed voluntary and community sector to fill an obvious need.
Likewise, requests by voluntary sector stakeholders in some regions working in and around hotels to see trigger and evacuation plans, with undertakings of confidentiality given, have still to our knowledge not resulted in sharing of that information. Information on security threats and planned events in the main has not been communicated satisfactorily, if at all.
Recommendations
● Government must set out protocols on clear communication with Local Authorities and other relevant stakeholders in advance of a decision to use any hotel. There should be a process of assessment involving local stakeholders before the decision to use a site is made final, and at a minimum clear communication with the relevant local authority and MP within 24 hours of a final decision being made to use a site.
● Government must commit to a minimum timeframe (of at least 5 working days but ideally substantially longer) from decision in central Government to the operationalisation of new hotels, which would allow local authorities and MPs to form a proactive communications plan to combat disinformation and mitigate stresses placed on communities.
● Government must commit to ongoing public communication (for example on gov.uk) to factually explain the reasons for the use of hotels to accommodate people seeking asylum in the UK and what communities can expect.
● Multi agency coordination should prioritise ensuring that people seeking asylum themselves are equipped with appropriate translated information to mitigate the risks they face. This should incorporate advice on strategies to deal with racist behaviour or unwelcome approaches, for example from self - styled ‘migrant hunters’, as well as specific and locally appropriate information on how to report hate crime and sources of help.
● Every hotel site should have a specific, bespoke plan for what to do in the event of a security threat which should be communicated clearly to residents and to agencies working with them. Risk registers should be maintained for individual sites and shared with local stakeholders.
● The Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government and the Home Office should together urgently prioritise a wider strategy to build community cohesion. This should include monitoring of tensions and funding and partnering with those in communities affected by or vulnerable to far right agitation.
Managing and sharing data
Systemic issues persist in relation to data sharing in the interests of those seeking asylum, particularly with services who are charged with facilitating access to education for children in the hotel estate, local health services or contractors working to provide healthcare, and local organisations working to provide donations and services to those in hotels. Frustratingly, people frequently continue to be moved around the hotel estate with very little or no notice, in contravention to contractual requirements.[20] This can make it almost impossible for those providing services to people in hotels to be able to plan properly for their work or the provision of their services or act in the best interests of their patients or service users.
Recommendations
● The Home Office should urgently review its information sharing protocols to ensure that local authorities and statutory health and education services, as well as voluntary sector organisations where appropriate, receive enough information to allow them to properly exercise their functions in discharging care and support for residents.
● As long as no-choice dispersal persists, the Home Office and its providers should commit to ongoing continuous communication (at least weekly) with people seeking asylum, stakeholders, local authorities and health providers over movements of people between hotels and between hotel and dispersal accommodation. People should not be subject to repeated moves, should never be moved with less than 5 days’ notice except in an emergency evacuation, should always be briefed in advance and given the opportunity to raise concerns and the move should only ever be in the person’s best interests.
The Home Office’s approach to working with local partners to support people who have been granted refugee status and are leaving asylum accommodation
Efforts by this Government to address the asylum backlog, the recent lengthening of the time which people have to leave asylum accommodation to 56 days (on a ‘pilot’ basis) and the institution of Asylum Move On Liaison Officers tasked with facilitating the move on process for newly recognised refugees are welcome steps.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Local Authorities in areas of high dispersal or in areas where people granted refugee status may understandably travel to try and find work and housing, are not resourced to be able to cope with the pace of Government decision making, especially in the context of a lack of information sharing or when notification processes from central Government to local Government have not worked.
Our partners NACCOM along with Homeless Link produced a comprehensive briefing[21] in August 2024 on solutions to Migrant Homelessness, which we commend to the Committee.
Recommendations:
● Processes should be instituted to monitor demand on local authority homelessness teams across the piece as a result of Home Office decision making. Decision making planning should properly take into account where people seeking asylum have been placed in local authority areas and mechanisms such as staggered decision making should be instituted alongside other measures to ensure that homelessness is prevented and designed out of the system.
● Communities must be adequately resourced to welcome new refugees. As part of this, current expenditure must be reviewed and a wholesale review of the cost effectiveness of the current asylum accommodation model should be carried out, and not for profit models considered.[22]
● Government should implement the recommendations of the NACCOM / Homeless Link briefing of August 2024 on solutions to Migrant Homelessness.
For our previous work on asylum accommodation: please see our report Wake Up Call (2019) on the mismanaged transition to the current contractual framework[23]; resources to explain the asylum accommodation and support contracts (2019[24] and 2020[25]); our report In a Place Like Prison (2021) on the experience of people living in institutionalised accommodation[26]; joint briefing on Principles for Asylum Dispersal’ (2023)[27] and work under the banner ‘Communities Not Camps’ (2022 – present) on camps, barracks and barges.[28]
Feb 2025
[1] Ghettoised and Traumatised, the experiences of men being held in quasi-detention at Wethersfield: Helen Bamber Foundation and Humans for Rights, December 2023; Like a Prison, No Control, No Sleep: Medecins Sans Frontiers and Doctors of the World May 2024; At what cost? The Ongoing Harm Caused to men seeking asylum held in Wethersfield, Helen Bamber Foundation and Humans for Rights, June 2024; Racial Segregation and the asylum system: the case of RAF Wethersfield, Care 4 Calais and Runnymede Trust, June 2024;
[2] See above
[3] See Helen Bamber Foundation and Humans for Rights Network, June 2024 as above.
[4]Briefing on RAF Wethersfield, Helen Bamber Foundation and Humans for Rights Network, December 2024 https://helenbamber.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/Briefing%20on%20Wethersfield_December%202024.pdf
[5] See in particular investigation into the acquisition of the Northeye site for asylum accommodation, November 2024 https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/investigation-into-the-acquisition-of-the-northeye-site-for-asylum-accommodation.pdf; also NAO investigation into asylum accommodation, March 2024 https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/investigation-into-asylum-accommodation/
[6] Written evidence of the Fields Association to the Public Accounts Committee re Home Office acquisition of former HMP Northeye, December 2024 available at https://committees.parliament.uk/work/8584/asylum-accommodation-home-office-acquisition-of-former-hmp-northeye/publications/ and evidence of six organisations to the Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee available at https://www.rainbowmigration.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Evidence-to-the-Secondary-Legislation-Scrutiny-Committee-Final-version.pdf
[7] https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/investigation-into-asylum-accommodation/, March 2024
[8] https://inews.co.uk/news/raf-base-hundreds-migrants-starmer-close-3376719?srsltid=AfmBOoqcvF9L0AXVCjsTeiwNbOlkF7Z2Gy3n7tkayEFZ5e3k0UPivLmI
[9]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asylum-accommodation-requests-policy/allocation-of-asylum-accommodation-policy-accessible
[10] https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/83/home-affairs-committee/news/200152/
[11] Napier barracks, the inhumane reality, Jesuit Refugee Service March 2023 https://www.jrsuk.net/napier-report/
[12] https://asylummatters.org/2021/12/15/new-joint-report-in-a-place-like-prison-voices-from-institutional-asylum-accommodation/
[13] https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/investigation-into-asylum-accommodation.pdf
[14]https://refugeechildrensconsortium.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/RMCC-Briefing-Age-Disputes-September-2024.pdf
[15]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/key-performance-indicators-kpis-for-governments-most-important-contracts
[16] KPIs are contained in Schedule 13 AASC contracts
[17] see for example https://www.asylumseekermemorial.co.uk/about-asylum-seeker-deaths; https://libertyinvestigates.org.uk/articles/suicides-of-asylum-seekers-in-home-office-accommodation-double-in-last-four-years/ December 2023
[18]https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2020/08/08/the-use-of-temporary-hotels-to-house-asylum-seekers-during-covid-19/
[19] https://hopenothate.org.uk/communities/community-resources/
[20] See Para 4.2.2 AASC Statement of Requirements: https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2018-1112/AASC_-_Schedule_2_-_Statement_of_Requirements.pdf
[21] https://homelesslink-1b54.kxcdn.com/media/documents/Policy_briefing_-_Vital_solutions_to_ending_migrant_homelessness.pdf
[22] See IPPR: Transforming Asylum Accommodation https://www.ippr.org/articles/transforming-asylum-accommodation for proposals in this regard.
[23] https://asylummatters.org/app/uploads/2020/07/Wake-Up-Call-Report_July-2020_final.pdf
[24] https://asylummatters.org/2019/11/19/launch-of-new-aasc-and-aire-resources/
[25] https://asylummatters.org/2020/12/04/new-resources-on-full-board-asylum-accommodation/
[26] https://asylummatters.org/app/uploads/2021/12/In-a-place-like-prison.pdf
[27] https://asylummatters.org/app/uploads/2023/02/Principles-for-Asylum-Dispersal.docx-1.pdf
[28] https://asylummatters.org/2022/05/25/stop-asylum-accommodation-centres/