Written evidence submitted by Dr kate Gooch, University of Bath (TDP0022)
Executive Summary
1. Introduction
1.1 This submission has been prepared by Dr Kate Gooch, Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Bath. It draws on research conducted over an 11-year period on prison safety and security, including violence, drugs and organised crime. This research includes immersive research within 11 prisons in England and Wales, interviews with prisoners and prison officers, and collaborative work with criminal justice agencies. A full list of references to relevant publications is provided at the end of the submission.
2. Scale and Impact
2.1 Drug use within male closed and open prisons in England and Wales is widespread. It is also prevalent in women’s prison, albeit not to the same extent. Assessing the true level of drug use is difficult given that only proxy measure are available, such as the number of times drugs and/or drug paraphernalia are found or the number of times prisoners fail mandatory drug tests. These measures are at the mercy of local practices, e.g. whether searches are being conducted and how thoroughly. That said, the available statistics suggest that there has been an increase in the quantity of drugs found within prison.[1] Moreover, HM Chief Inspector of Prison notes that one third of men and one fifth of women in prison thought it was easy to get drugs.[2]
2.2 The primary factors driving demand are: -
2.3 Much drug use is driven by the desire for escapism (e.g. ‘to have your day out of prison’), to relieve boredom, to manage mental and physical health needs, to resolve frustration, and to ‘block’ traumatic events and memories. Too many prisoners have too little to do. Consequently, prisoners are developing drug habits within prison, and this can come at great cost to their health and their progression. It can also create substantial financial burdens for families and partners who are often asked to foot the bill for drugs and any debts generated, sometimes at a cost of several thousands of pounds.
2.4 New psychoactive substances and synthetic cannabinoids (PS) became the primary drug in the 2010’s and into the early 2020’s. They remain the most widely used drug, but the prison drug economy has always included a range of other substances, including: cannabis, cocaine, crack, heroin, anabolic steroids, prescription medication, and amphetamines.[3] Initially, PS presented a particular challenge because it was a ‘legal high,’ the relevant legislation did not include PS in mandatory drug tests, and sniffer and search dogs were not trained to identify it. Legislation was rapidly introduced with the effect that possession and conveyance of PS into prison became a criminal offence and prisons were authorised to test for PS as part of mandatory drug tests.[4] However, these were only partial solutions.
2.5 Since PS is a synthetic substance, the chemical composition can be altered with the effect that certain strains ae not amenable to detection and/or ‘bad batches’ are produced with particularly nasty side effects. PS is both easily conveyed and easily taken. For example, PS can be sprayed onto paper and only a small amount is needed (which can be easily concealed in a vape). The effect of this is that one A4 sheet can generate as much as £1000 for dealers, making PS an attractive drug to sell. PS can have a wide range of effects of varying severity, ranging from lethargy to cardiac arrest. The interaction of PS with prescription medication can also prove fatal. Initially, as PS use became more widespread, so did the demand for on-site and paramedic treatment, diverting staff from other duties.[5]
2.6 Although PS has dominated the prison drug economy over the last decade, cannabis use has increased, and other drugs such as ketamine are beginning to emerge. Most notably, though, is the possibility of synthetic opioids (or Nitazenes) becoming more widespread within the prison system. In 2024, four drug-related deaths at HMP Parc were linked to the use of Nitazenes, prompting Adrian Usher, Prison and Probation Ombudsman, to advise prisoners to immediately dispose of any drugs.[6] Synthetic opioids offer a new marketable drug for criminal entrepreneurs, and may be particularly attractive for those seeking something other than PS or those who rely on prescription medication for pain management (especially if the supply of prescription medication has been disrupted or delayed within prison, or they have been using prescribed medication provided by other prisoners).
2.7 Prison drug use can have an impact on those who are not involved in the illicit economy. Those who have previously been drug users can find it incredibly difficult to maintain sobriety (despite their determination), especially when they receive bad news or ‘knock backs’ (e.g. from the Parole Board or Secretary of State for Justice). Equally, staff time and attention can be diverted to caring for prisoners who have, for example, had a cardiac arrest, fit, or overdosed. This can disrupt the regime or mean that staff are diverted from dealing with other practical or administrative tasks.
2.8 The expansion of the illicit and debt economy has had a particularly deleterious effect on prison safety. It is not necessarily drug use itself that leads to aggression or violence, but the fallout from the drug trade. It is common for prisoners to finance their drug use through credit arrangements, but non-repayment of debt typically leads to threats, assaults, behaviour designed to engineer a move to segregation or another wing/prison (e.g. assaulting an officer or climbing to a position of height), self-harm and suicide attempts.[7]
3. Tacking the Supply of Drugs in Prison
3.1 The most common routes for bringing drugs into prison are:
3.2 Drones developed as a supply route in the early 2010’s, and their use has increased since then. For example, reported drone sightings have increased 770% between 2019 and 2023.[8] Drones offer the advantage of being able to carry large ‘loads’ and fly straight to a particular location (e.g. a specific cell window). They can carry various items of contraband, including drugs, alcohol, mobile phones, and weapons. Whilst some prisoners are willing accomplices in the drug trade (and may be paid for their involvement), others are coerced to collect and receive drone loads. If those drones are intercepted by security, the person due to collect the load is responsible for the full cost (which may be worth several thousand pounds).
3.3 Mobile phones are highly desired and expensive commodities within prison. For example, an old iPhone may cost £1500-£300. The disproportionate costs associated with use of prison pin phones incentivises some prisoners to purchase mobile phones as a financial investment and to facilitate more regular family contact (e.g. if cells do not have telephones fitted). Mobile phones serve a range of functions within prison beyond contact with loved ones, including: accessing film and TV content, accessing social media, accessing encrypted chats and crypto-currencies/the dark web. Crucially, mobile phones are an important commodity for arranging the importation and distribution of drugs into prison and the associated financial transactions. Typically, payments for contraband such as drugs can be made via items available within the prison (e.g. vapes), but also involve bank transfers or cash exchanges in the community. Equally, mobile phones may be used to contact, threaten and demand that partners and family members transfer money or bring drugs into a prison to pay a loved one’s debt.
3.4 The empathies in the Government’s ‘From Harm to Hope’ plan is on improving gate security. However, this enhanced gate security can be impeded by crumbling buildings and broken windows, and the ability to fly or throw packages straight into the prison. Supply routes are supple, buoyant and can adapt to changes in security tactics. Even if it was possible to close all supply routes, prison staff will always remain a possible option, particularly since prison officer pay is low (and prisoners know this). Not many corrupt staff are needed in any one prison, and as long as demand remains, there will always be a way to overcome the various security measures. Supply reduction strategies can require significant financial investment but investment in prison conditions and the quality of prison life will have longer term benefits.
3.5 HMPPS invests significant resource in corruption prevention. Prison officers tend to be vehemently opposed to corrupt staff and perceive such behaviour as a betrayal and a risk to their own personal safety. Some corrupt staff will deliberately apply for prison officer work with the intent of facilitating criminal activities. Vetting and recruitment processes are not always sufficiently robust to identify such individuals. Prisoners are aware that officer pay is low and rely on the possible financial temptations to ‘hook’ them in. They are also highly attuned to possible weakness and vulnerability. Their strategies for approaching staff can be subtle, be forged in the context of a sexual relationship, or involve direct threats whilst also revealing their knowledge of, for example, their home address or their children’s school. Staff corruption never exists in a vacuum though, and corruption prevention relies on high quality training, ongoing supporting and coaching, strong relationships with managements, appropriate pay and reward, and the consistent practice of high standards of professional and moral behaviour.
4. Organised Crime
4.1 There has always been some degree of serious and organised criminality occurring within prison or organised by prisoners from their cell. However, organised crime has become more embedded and more prevalent over the decade due to a range of situational changes within prisons. Prisoners not only organise criminal activities within the community from their cell (e.g. jury intimidation, murder, kidnap, drug dealing etc), but engage in entrepreneurial crime within the prison (typically, the sale of drugs and mobile phones). Prisoners do not lose their connections to wider criminal networks when they are imprisoned; rather than import them into the prison and may expand them or forge new collaborations.
4.2 On one hand, it is difficult to quantity the true prevalence of prison-based organised crime or the value of the prison illicit economy because prices vary as do the length of time for which debts are repaid. That said, prisoners report that they can earn more money in prison, and that it is the criminal entrepreneurs who have social and economic power. The prison hierarchy has been re-shaped so that it is the ‘Businessmen’ who sit at the apex of the prisoner hierarchy. Equally, the prison normative code has evolved so it is those who do not pay their debts (for contraband use) that are stigmatised, not those who engage in exploitative and predatory behaviour. The prison culture and normative code honours, even valorises, those who can ‘graft,’ manage their financial affairs, and those who possess and display consumer goods (e.g. designer clothes and trainers).
4.3 To function effectively, organised crime requires: motivated individuals, the demand for goods and services and a lack of guardianship, and – when in prison – a means of communication. Organised crime within prison has become particularly pronounced because: 1) there has been a reconfiguration of the prison workforce such that guardianship by prison officers is less consistent or effective; 2) demand has increased; 3) opportunities for employment are limited and this incentivises ‘hustling’ and ‘grafting’ on the wing to generate income; and 4) PS created a new marketable and profitable commodity. Moreover, criminal enterprise within prison has been eased by technological solutions (such as drones, mobile phones, banking online or via apps, the dark web and cryptocurrencies, social media) and the diversification of supply routes.[9] Essentially, some prisoners have exploited the opportunity for financial gain.
4.4 ‘Disruptive’ tactics can be relatively unproductive within prison, partly because transfers across the prison estate do not necessarily disrupt networks or collaborations. Prisoners can still communicate, can issues ‘contracts on people’s heads,’ or expand their network and activities within the new prison.
5. Tackling Demand
5.1 For most prisoners, mandatory drug testing (MDT) does not deter drug use. Prisoners are typically driven by more immediate concerns (e.g. distress, crisis, boredom) than the possibility of a urine test (that occur infrequently). Prisoners may be more concerned if they are in an open prison, or want to evidence change, or do not want to jeopardise the possibility of parole/release. However, MDTs are of doubtful utility in discouraging use or tacking demand.
5.2 The current widespread drug use is a symptom of impoverished regimes, stalled progression, and poor conditions, and demand will not reduce unless this is attended to. Those sentenced to ‘Imprisonment for Public Protection’ can feel particularly hopeless and understandably frustrated with the perceived illegitimacy of their sentence (and associated recall decisions. Punitive or authoritarian responses won’t deter drug use if the quality of prison life remains poor. Rather, punitive responses may exacerbate drug use, particularly if such authoritarian measures involve even less freedom, time out of cell, or further impacts progression.
5.3 Prisoners can access opiate treatment within prison, but support with drug recovery and treatment more generally is relatively limited. If a prisoner is found in possession of drugs, or if a prisoner fails an MDT, they will typically have a ‘nicking’ (adjudication) and be punished with ‘losses’ (e.g. restrictions on their spends, canteen, gym etc), but the underlying reasons for drug use are not always addressed (e.g. prescription medication, distress, unemployment, bereavement etc).
6. Further Reading
6.1 The written submission is underpinned by the following publications: -
Full copies are available on request.
January 2025
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[1] Ministry of Justice (2024) HMPPS Annual Digest, April 2023 to March 2024. London: Ministry of Justice.
[2] HM Inspectorate of Prisons (2024) HM Chief Inspector of Prisons For England and Wales Annual Report 2023-2024. HC 218. London:
[3] Ibid, n2.
[4] The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 and the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016.
[5] Gooch, K. and Treadwell, J. (2020) ‘Prisoner Society in an Era of Psychoactive Substances, Organised Crime, New Drug Markets and Austerity,’ British Journal of Criminology 60(5): 1260-1281.
[6] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-68630464
[7] Ibid, n5.
[8] Hansard (2025) Drones: High Security Prisons. House of Commons Debate. Volume 960, Tuesday 14 January 2025.
[9] Also see Gooch, K. and Treadwell, J. (2024) ‘The Prison Firm: The ‘Transportation’ of Organised Crime, New Criminal Markets and Contemporary Prisoner Society,’ Criminology and Criminal Justice.