Written evidence submitted on behalf of the University of Staffordshire (TDP0017)

 

Inquiry:                             Response to the United Kingdom Parliament Justice Committee’s call for evidence on tackling drugs in prisons

Respondents:               Dr Mia Abbott, Dr Alison Davidson and Dr Jodie Dunnett

School of Health, Education, Policing and Science

University of Staffordshire

Leek Road

Stoke on Trent

ST4 2DF

 

mia.abbott@staffs.ac.uk

 

Qualifications:               Dr Mia Abbott has undertaken research regarding synthetic cannabinoids and prisons for seven years and is currently working as a Lecturer at University of Staffordshire.

Dr Alison Davidson is a Technical Specialist in Analytical Chemistry at University of Staffordshire.

Dr Jodie Dunnett is a Senior Lecturer at University of Staffordshire, specialising in forensic chemistry, particularly forensic drug analysis.

 

 

Introduction to authors and reason for submission

Dr Mia Abbott, University of Staffordshire, produced her PhD entitled “An investigation into the application of a continuous screening, confirmation and feedback cycle for the identification of synthetic cannabinoids in prisons” in 2023, and was supervised by Dr Alison Davidson and Dr Jodie Dunnett. Both the PhD and a previous integrated Masters placement involved working closely with staff at a West Midlands prison and with Rapiscan Systems Limited to analyse and identify synthetic cannabinoid-soaked paper being sent into the prison, as at the beginning of the research in 2018, there was limited research in the area. Samples were submitted from English prisons to the University within this timeframe to confirm the presence of synthetic cannabinoids soaked in paper after they had been screened by prison staff using the Rapiscan Systems Limited Itemiser 3E™. The research showed that implementing the use of ion mobility spectrometry-based trace detection equipment as a screening technique had a significant impact on reducing drugs entering the prison and trace detection instruments are an important tool in combatting the constantly evolving threat of novel synthetic cannabinoids. A publication specifically focused on the paper samples which had synthetic cannabinoids present was published in the journal ‘Forensic Science International’ in 2023 (Abbott, Dunnett, Wheeler and Davidson, 2023). The thesis produced is available through the University’s online repository (Abbott, 2023).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Executive Summary

  1. The detection of synthetic cannabinoids is difficult due to their evolving nature and varying chemical compositions, making it hard for drug detection dogs and trace detection screening equipment to keep pace.

 

  1. Current ion mobility spectrometry-based trace detection equipment (e.g., Smiths Detection IonScan600) needs regular library updates to effectively detect emerging substances. Outdated libraries and underutilisation of the trace detection equipment leads to false negatives, allowing synthetic cannabinoids to enter prisons undetected. Support from confirmatory analysis and horizon scanning for emerging drugs would improve detection accuracy.

 

  1. Research collaboration between universities, prisons, and trace detection equipment manufacturers has led to improvements in drug detection, utilising a screening, confirmation and feedback cycle. However, ongoing research is needed to maintain and expand these efforts.

 

  1. Effective drug detection relies on properly trained staff who understand the limitations and potential of trace detection equipment. Enhanced training on forensic procedures, contamination control, and data interpretation is crucial for improving detection outcomes.

 

  1. To effectively tackle the growing challenge of synthetic cannabinoids and drug smuggling in prisons, a combination of improved drug detection procedures, ongoing training, and data sharing is essential. Collaborative research led approaches provide a promising model for enhancing detection capabilities and disrupting the supply of drugs in prisons.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Full Response

Scale and impact

1. What is the current scale of drug use in prisons in England and Wales?

  1. New synthetic cannabinoids are constantly being produced to evade legislation, either to circumvent the national legislation of the countries they are being synthesised in or exported to. The United Kingdom (UK)’s Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 does not encourage the diversification of these drugs, however, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 is a list based legislation with higher penalties associated than the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, giving the opportunity to diversify and import new drugs into the UK before they are controlled and classified. This diversification opportunity is not reflected in traditional drugs, and therefore we are consistently seeing new psychoactive substances (NPS), including synthetic cannabinoids, in the UK prison drug market.

 

  1. Detection of synthetic cannabinoids is therefore difficult to keep up to date, especially as prevalence and popularity of a particular synthetic cannabinoid can change depending on global availability and associated legislation.

 

  1. The use of drug detection dogs can be limited as there is not one set chemical structure or compound that is present throughout all synthetic cannabinoids, and therefore training can lead to choices being made surrounding particular synthetic cannabinoids that may be popular for a few months and then never encountered again in prisons. This issue is not encountered with traditional drugs, as they are known compounds which have been successfully detected for decades.

 

  1. There are opportunities to utilise ion mobility spectrometry-based trace detection equipment, currently being used within the prison estates to screen post (for example, the Smiths Detection IonScan600), however, time and effort needs to be dedicated to updating the libraries so they can detect the latest substances. This is not an issue with traditional drugs as manufacturers can access certified reference material to produce library definitions for their instrumentation, and therefore effective detection can take place. However, if a new synthetic cannabinoid is screened using this equipment and there is no definition for the synthetic cannabinoid in the library, the trace detection equipment cannot effectively identify the synthetic cannabinoid. Depending on the set-up of the instrument being used, there is opportunity for trained staff to identify that a substance has been detected but not identified, however without that support in place, the synthetic cannabinoid will go undetected and enter the prison.

 

  1. Previous unencountered synthetic cannabinoids and new psychoactive substances may have unknown potencies or may be much more potent than their traditional counterparts (for example, many synthetic cannabinoids are more potent that delta-9-THC). Therefore, there can be more physical and mental health threats to the user, even if they have previously used a synthetic cannabinoid. Synthetic cannabinoids may also be in different concentrations, with varied use of preparations being administered across the prison estate. For example, smoking a synthetic cannabinoid that has been soaked into paper may be more ‘dilute’ compared to vaping powder or crystalline synthetic cannabinoid samples directly. The inconsistency of preparation is not often encountered in the same manner for the majority of traditional drugs. 

 

2. What impact does the presence of drugs have on the mental and physical wellbeing of prisoners, particularly vulnerable prisoners or those not previously involved in illicit activity?

3. What is the impact of drugs on the safety of the prison environment for prisoners and staff?

Tackling the supply of drugs in prisons

4. What are the common routes for bringing drugs into prisons, and what recent trends have been observed in these methods?

  1. Smuggling of synthetic cannabinoids can occur through them being soaked into paper and sent into prisons as post. We have encountered samples of plain pieces of paper, children’s drawings, pieces of paper obviously soaked with a substance, greetings cards and legal correspondence. There is significantly less of an impact from this route in prisons where photocopies of post are undertaken as standard procedure. This procedure occurs in Scottish prisons as well as some in England and Wales.

 

  1. Powder or putty drugs (including synthetic cannabinoids) can enter prisons by getting in “over the wall”, either through catapults, being thrown over, or the use of drones. We have had intelligence from prisons in the last year stating synthetic cannabinoids are being sent into prisons as a powder or putty, and subsequently mixed with substitute solvent (for example cleaning products) and spread onto paper in-house. We have also previously analysed powder synthetic cannabinoid samples that have been found within the prison.
  1. During our research, information was always shared with the prison where the samples originated from regarding the specific synthetic cannabinoids identified from prison post and the sample sizes to allow security staff and drug team leads to be able to identify trends. The information was also relayed to Rapiscan Systems Limited to inform library changes to aid future detection of the synthetic cannabinoids.

 

  1. With the Rapiscan Systems Itemiser 3E™, although it was possible to export the data from the instrument to highlight the amount of use, number of identifications made and changes over time, it was not routine protocol. Following discussions with Smiths, we believe there is scope to investigate the capability of the current trace detection equipment within the prisons to provide this important intelligence.

 

 

5. How can the supply of drugs into prisons be better tackled to eliminate the availability of substances?

  1. One of the primary methods for identifying drugs carried by visitors is the use of drug detection dogs, however as mentioned in paragraph 8, they may not be able to identify many synthetic cannabinoids, especially those that are emerging.
  1. There is an opportunity to extract the data from the trace detection equipment to gather timely intelligence on the drugs that have been identified and any increasing trends, and to have an early warning of drugs which have been detected by the instrument but not produced an alarm. Current barriers include access to and involvement from each prison, logistical issues (as the trace detection equipment is not connected to a network for remote data extraction or receiving library updates) and limited understanding of how to interpret the data and the caveats involved (easy opportunities to overload the instruments, false positives do occur from contamination and the equipment may be used more than once per sample). We believe this could be overcome by having regional initiatives that focus on maximising the opportunities available from the trace detection equipment. This would aid with the logistics and travel, and trained personnel could work in conjunction with the National Intelligence Assessments Centre.

 

  1. We have found that some prison staff are highly engaged and motivated to use the available countermeasures, including dedicating efforts to trace detection equipment maintenance, following training guidelines, and creating their own best practice

 

materials to maximise the capability of the process. However, we have also encountered a lack of confidence amongst prison staff in the capabilities of the trace detection equipment. To some extent, this was due to changing from equipment that would still indicate the presence of a substance, even if it did not alarm, to equipment that either alarms or does not. But this lack of confidence also stems from untrained personnel using the equipment and as a result, obtaining false positives (because of contamination), and misunderstanding the sensitivity of the equipment. If more trained personnel were to use the equipment, understand the capabilities and limits, plus how to mitigate the shortcomings, then there would be more confidence in the outputs generated by the equipment. Due to the high turnover of staff, training would need to happen on a regular basis or be incorporated into new staff inductions. 

 

  1. Further to paragraph 9, trace detection countermeasures will quickly lose effectiveness if libraries are not kept up to date. The current protocol as per the Drug Trace Detection Flow Diagram included within the Use of Drug Trace Detection Equipment in Prisons Policy Framework (Ministry of Justice, 2023) states that that if the trace detection equipment results in a negative result for drug presence after being swabbed and the paper sample does not look suspicious, it will be returned to the intended recipient. This is the same for legal correspondence (Rule 39 post). Therefore, there is potential that new synthetic cannabinoids are going undetected and entering prisons. Ongoing horizon scanning is needed to determine the drugs currently being used within the prisons, or attempting to be sent in, to then inform updates to the trace detection equipment libraries.

6. What examples are there of effective interventions to prevent and disrupt drug supply within prisons?

  1. The process undertaken during our research (as described in paragraphs 9 and 13) was an effective tool to identify the synthetic cannabinoids being sent into the prisons through confirmatory analysis and inform the relevant prison and associated trace detection equipment manufacturer (Rapiscan Systems Limited at the time). Our research significantly improved the detection of drugs in prisons, specifically through the library additions and updates produced by Rapiscan Systems Limited to help disrupt the drug supply. However, it was only effective due to collaborative practice between the University, the prisons and the trace detection equipment manufacturer. The research project finished in 2023, and although sporadic testing has occurred since, there has not been a formalised continuation to date.

 

  1. The initiative taken by the Scottish Prison Service is a great example of effective intervention to prevent and disrupt drug supply within prisons. They aim to confirm the identification of synthetic cannabinoids in prison samples for intelligence purposes through collaboration between the Scottish Prison Service and the University of Dundee’s Leverhulme Research Centre for Forensic Science (LRCFS). While regular prison mail is photocopied to prevent drug smuggling, legal correspondence (Rule 39 post) can still be used by organised crime groups to send imitation letters. LRCFS researchers analyse seized prison post and other items to

 

support trace detection equipment manufacturers to update their libraries in a timely fashion. Since 2018, LRCFS has expanded its support to all Scottish public prisons, developed and updated trace detection libraries with new synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines, and improved screening and feedback processes. Regular user group meetings facilitate information sharing between prison representatives, while the research team also maintains a closed email list for updates and publishes regular reports on trends, methods, and substance prevalence.

 

  1. These two examples of localised research-based approaches show the benefit of screening, confirmation and feedback cycles. Whilst there has been a shift in policy since 2023 for private forensic providers to deliver confirmatory analysis for non-judicial samples, there is a missed opportunity for the identifications to directly feed into the update and innovation of the trace detection equipment’s potential. This could be overseen more directly by the trace detection equipment manufacturer, but they would need to develop an infrastructure to liaise with the private forensic providers, or work with research groups to facilitate the confirmatory analysis as previously undertaken and currently occurring in Scotland.

 

7. How effective is collaboration between the police, National Crime Agency and HMPPS in tackling the role of organised crime gangs in bringing drugs into prisons?

Tackling demand

8. How effective are existing measures, such as substance-free wings, in tackling the demand for drugs in prisons?

9. What impact does drug testing have on reducing demand in prisons, and to what extent is HMPPS’s current approach to drug testing effective?

  1. Drug testing has previously acted as more of a threat, as during our research we have seen some prisons issue warnings and statements to prisoners to explain that their post has been seized with the aim to discourage future attempts and show the effective use of the trace detection equipment. However, when synthetic cannabinoids are not detected through this process, it causes doubt and opportunity for exploitation.

 

  1. Following the statements made in paragraphs 9, 13 and 19, confirmatory testing of seized samples needs to occur to better support the use of trace detection equipment by enabling regular and timely updates to the equipment libraries. 

 

  1. Further to the statements made in paragraph 18, the current protocol as per the Drug Trace Detection Flow Diagram included within the Use of Drug Trace Detection Equipment in Prisons Policy Framework (Ministry of Justice, 2023) is open to interpretation regarding how suspicious the post looks, and we have encountered samples previously that have had no obvious staining, ink disruption or strong smell to indicate the paper has been tampered with, yet synthetic cannabinoids have been

 

found to be soaked into the paper. The current method for trace detection also relies on the trace detection equipment having up to date libraries, which cannot happen without effective communication.

 

  1. Urine analysis from Mandatory Drug Tests is often a targeted sampling approach and therefore currently limits the option to investigate the detection and identification of synthetic cannabinoid that have not been detected previously. A joined-up approach that utilises data collected from the detection equipment and intelligence from global early warning systems to inform the target compounds for urine analysis would more effectively identify the drugs which are getting through.

10. What role should prison governors and staff play in identifying and addressing drug misuse?

  1.  In terms of identification, we believe priority needs to be on trace detection equipment being coupled with simple, yet effective, training so operational staff are confident in the trace detection equipment capabilities. This includes understanding how to limit overloading the equipment, how to reduce contamination within the testing process (by applying fundamental forensic procedures) and when to take advantage of opportunities to have confirmatory testing done, especially where there is reason to believe a synthetic cannabinoid is present, but the trace detection equipment has not alarmed.

 

 

 

 

 

Reference List:

Abbott, M.J. (2023) An investigation into the application of a continuous screening, confirmation and feedback cycle for the identification of synthetic cannabinoids in prisons. PhD. University of Staffordshire. Available at: https://eprints.staffs.ac.uk/8329/ (Accessed: 29/01/2025)

Abbott, M.J., Dunnett, J., Wheeler, J. and Davidson, A. (2023) The identification of synthetic cannabinoids in English prisons. Forensic Science International. Volume 348, July 2023, 111613. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2023.111613

Ministry of Justice (2023) Use of Drug Trace Detection Equipment in Prisons Policy Framework. London: Ministry of Justice.

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