Dr Yusra Suedi (Manchester International Law Centre)

Submission to the International Development Committee’s Inquiry into Humanitarian access and adherence to international humanitarian law.

Dr Yusra Suedi is a Lecturer in International Law at the University of Manchester. She holds a doctorate from the University of Geneva. She has worked for the UN, international courts, and assisted counsel before the International Court of Justice.

Submission supported by Policy@Manchester.

1. What are the current trends in adherence to international humanitarian law in conflicts, particularly regarding the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance?

Relevant provisions of international humanitarian law regarding the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has clarified that parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need in both international and non-international conflicts.[1] A humanitarian response must adhere to the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality.[2]

The ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) have issued a Code of Conduct that provides guidance on behavioral standards that humanitarian agencies can sign up to.[3] The Sphere Handbook “Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response” has expounded on the laconic core principles of the ICRC and the IFRC.[4] The Sphere Handbook provides an internationally recognized set of common principles and universal minimum standards for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The last edition was released in 2018. The Professional Standards for Protection Work that was updated in 2020 sets minimum but essential standards aimed at ensuring that protection work carried out by human rights and humanitarian actors in armed conflict and other situations of violence is safe and effective.[5]

The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) focuses on ensuring support for people and communities in ways that respect their rights and dignity and promoting peoples’ agency in finding solutions to the crises they face. It sets out nine commitments that humanitarian organizations can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide and to facilitate greater accountability to communities and people affected by crises.[6] It also corresponds to the “growing recognition that affected people should have more say over the type of help they get and how they get it".[7]

An important aspect of the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance relates to coordination and collaboration with the relevant authorities, humanitarian agencies, and civil society organisations. Collaboration promotes maximum efficiency, coverage, and effectiveness.[8] As states can take a number of measures to control the content and delivery of humanitarian aid,[9] humanitarian relief personnel must be sufficiently informed about domestic law on access to territory and the security requirements in force.[10] For example, humanitarian aid in Gaza has been inhibited by obstacles related to access and bureaucratic hurdles.[11] Bureaucratic impediments have been noted in other contexts as well.[12]

Current trends in adherence to the above provisions regarding the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance

A promising trend in the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance is the growing emphasis on negotiating and maintaining humanitarian corridors or ‘safe passages’ to ensure the delivery of aid. This was seen in Syria,[13] Yemen[14] and Ukraine,[15] to name a few. It is often done in compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), especially the Geneva Conventions, which require parties to a conflict to allow and facilitate the passage of humanitarian relief.[16]

Another positive trend is the use technology to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.[17] Indeed, the use of drones, satellite imagery, and digital tools for monitoring conflict zones has allowed humanitarian organizations to better assess needs, track movements of people, and advocate for access in real time.[18] While technological advancements may bring potential risks and harm to the humanitarian objectives pursued,[19] technology is increasingly helping to identify violations of IHL related to humanitarian assistance and to mobilize international support for protection. In some cases, the use of digital platforms and cash transfers has become a method of delivering aid remotely, especially when physical access is too dangerous or restricted. This approach helps mitigate some of the challenges posed by conflict, though it still requires careful adherence to legal frameworks to ensure that it does not exacerbate inequalities or further the goals of warring parties. For example, more research is needed on how air-dropping humanitarian packages can become more effective and mitigate potential dangers.[20]

On the other hand, the safe delivery of humanitarian aid in recent conflicts has faced noteworthy challenges. Parties to conflicts often violate IHL by preventing or impeding aid.[21] Furthermore, according to the UN Security Council, recent conflicts have seen an increase in attacks against humanitarian workers.[22] Reports have detailed how local/national aid workers are in fact primarily the targets of attacks.[23] Humanitarian workers are often targeted due to the perception that they are linked to one side of the conflict, or due to deliberate strategies to hinder the provision of aid to enemy groups.[24] 

2. What impact does lack of adherence have to both the physical access to humanitarian supplies and the safe operation of aid workers?

Access to humanitarian aid is essential to protecting the rights and dignity of civilians affected by conflict. Bureaucratic impediments, in general, can inhibit physical access to humanitarian supplies as limited organizational resources have to be allocated to overcoming bureaucratic hurdles. Arbitrary bureaucratic impediments are illegal under international law and can have a debilitating effect on the logistics of the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, humanitarian workers often operate in insecure environments with potential threats that are not specifically targeted at humanitarian workers (i.e., mines, rockets, or improvised explosive devices). In response to security threats, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has promoted a policy of risk management, rather than risk aversion.[25] However, deliberate attacks on aid workers exacerbate the existing threats. They seriously challenge and impede the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. Both bureaucratic impediments and attacks against humanitarian workers are being increasingly used as “a weapon of war [] for political or military gain” and constitute forms of denial of humanitarian access.[26]

3. What is the FCDO’s record of using its diplomatic levers to promote access to aid, protection of aid workers? How might its approach be improved?

Negotiations and diplomacy are a vital part of access to humanitarian assistance. We welcome the FCDO’s commitment to harness diplomacy to promote humanitarian objectives.[27] The FCDO’s commitment to the protection of humanitarian aid workers has been notable.[28]

Scholars have claimed that international humanitarian law relating to the security of humanitarian personnel in situations of armed conflict produces a hierarchy of legal protections that privileges certain categories of aid workers above others, while leaving the majority of aid workers with largely civilian protection”.[29] The clarification of the legal framework surrounding this issue through the initiative for the “Declaration on the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel” will be welcomed in this respect.[30]

However, as this declaration can only be soft law, it would recommended that the UK harnesses its diplomatic levers toward the negotiation and creation of a binding legal framework that protects all humanitarian aid workers. In addition, FCDO’s humanitarian diplomacy must include issues related to bureaucratic obstacles, as the latter can also significantly impede access to aid. Bilateral negotiations with countries that arbitrarily impose bureaucratic obstacles could help their reversal.

4. How has the level of risk for aid workers changed in recent years and where does responsibility for their protection lie? What protections are available and are they adequate?

The level is risk for aid workers has grown significantly in the last two decades due to the challenging trends noted above (see Question 1): parties to conflicts often violate IHL by preventing or impeding aid, and humanitarian workers are more frequently attacked.

Under international humanitarian law, the responsibility for their protection lies with all parties to the conflict. According to IHL, particularly the Geneva Conventions, states are required to take measures to protect humanitarian personnel operating in conflict zones.[31]

Third states like the UK, while not directly involved in an armed conflict, have the responsibility to ensure the compliance with these provisions by recalling other states to respect them.[32] Armed groups, both state and non-state actors, are also responsible for respecting IHL and ensuring the safety of aid workers.[33]

The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) is specifically tasked with ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel, including humanitarian workers.[34] It provides security analysis, threat assessments, and operational support to ensure that aid workers can operate safely in conflict zones.[35]

Finally, NGOs and humanitarian agencies have the responsibility to implement adequate risk management practices, including security protocols, contingency plans, and the training of staff. They must also advocate for the safety of their personnel, coordinate with local actors, and work closely with governments to ensure a protective environment for their operations.

The protections are adequate, however compliance with them must be improved. The UK government has an important role to play in encouraging adherence to international humanitarian law – see Question 8 for more information.

5. How could UK ODA funding be made more relevant and accessible to support protection of workers, both local and international?

UK ODA could pursue funding of organizations that provide security training in the humanitarian sector as this can help improve humanitarian workers’ capacity to deal with violent incidents.[36]

Funding for security purposes as well as capacity-strengthening and preparedness, particularly for national NGO partners, is also crucial.[37]

Finally, while the UK has arranged for a third-party monitoring system in the effective provision of humanitarian aid in Ukraine,[38] it has not done so with respect to the conflict in Gaza. The UK should not only include due diligence assessments in funding agreements with partners in Gaza but should also strive to fund and establish a third-party monitoring system for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid in Gaza, where most deaths of humanitarian workers have been reported.[39]

6. What are the gaps in international humanitarian law when it comes to humanitarian access and what could be the UK Government’s role in addressing this?

There are no significant legal gaps in international humanitarian law, but rather deficiencies in the enforcement of its provisions.

First, violations of humanitarian access are common, but perpetrators are rarely held accountable. This lack of accountability encourages violations and undermines the protection of humanitarian workers and the delivery of aid. It encourages violations and undermines the protection of humanitarian workers and the delivery of aid. In the context of the 2023-2024 Gaza war, however, the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued warrants of arrest for Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant due to their “in impeding humanitarian aid in violation of international humanitarian law and their failure to facilitate relief by all means at its disposal”.[40] The Chamber reasoned that “their conduct led to the disruption of the ability of humanitarian organisations to provide food and other essential goods to the population in need in Gaza”.[41] Such accountability, however, was not free from political obstacles severely slowing down the process at the cost of many lives. Such accountability has also not been achieved in other past or ongoing wars.

Second, deficiencies in the enforcement of IHL provisions are also attributed to the fact that the Geneva Conventions primarily regulate the conduct of states and do not have the same level of binding authority over non-state armed groups (NSAGs). In many conflicts today, NSAGs control significant territories, yet they are not always willing to allow humanitarian access or may see aid as being aligned with one side of the conflict.

The UK Government’s role in addressing these issues is addressed below.

7. What more could the Government do, with or without partners, to hold perpetrators of attacks and abuse against aid workers to account and encouraging adherence to international humanitarian law on these issues?

First, the UK Government can increase international pressure on states and armed groups to uphold the protections for humanitarian workers, working within multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, European Union, and NATO to push for collective action on humanitarian access, including sanctions or diplomatic measures against parties that violate IHL.

Second, it can form coalitions with other states (e.g., G7 states), to collectively increase pressure on the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open investigations where it is suspected that attacks and abuse against aid workers will have taken place.[42]

Third, it can leverage its unique position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to have the Council refer a situation to the International Criminal Court.[43]

Fourth, it can fund organisations such as Geneva Call who professionally negotiate with NSAGs to encourage their compliance with IHL provisions.[44]

Fifth, UK ODA may fund organizations that pursue justice and accountability for incidents of violence against humanitarian workers.[45]

Sixth, the UK can extradite or prosecute, under its own domestic jurisdiction, any prospective perpetrators of attacks and abuse against aid workers who enter the UK, upon the grounds that they will have committed potential war crimes thereby triggering the UK’s universal jurisdiction.[46]

Finally, the UK government can increase its funding to humanitarian organizations, particularly those working in high-risk areas or where access is limited. Financial support for local and international NGOs operating in conflict zones is crucial for ensuring that aid can be delivered, even when access is restricted.