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Written evidence submitted by Lieutenant Colonel James Cartwright.

1.             Reason for submitting evidence. I write in a personal capacity to describe my experiences of local and national government departments’ awareness of and willingness to uphold the AF Covenant. As a result of my service, my family have been disadvantaged: my wife has not been able to work and my children have not been able to apply for schools. These situations could have, and arguably should have, been supported and protected by the AF Covenant, particularly as all the bodies involved were government departments. I would prefer to appear before a committee and provide evidence in person if possible. I hope this submission will help the AF community and strengthen the AF Covenant.

2.             Aim. This document principally addresses the following questions:

Where is the Armed Forces Covenant failing the Armed Forces Community?

What are the main causes for these failings?

3.             Structure. The narratives and impact statement are at paras 5 to 12. They provide evidence for the observations & conclusions (paras 23 to 31) and recommendations (paras 32-36). Whilst others will have their own unique experiences and events, my observations and conclusions are generalised and based on my own experiences. I can of course provide further supporting evidence if required.

Context.

4.             I have served since 5 May 2001. I have been married for 14 years and have three children (aged 13, 10, 10). My family have accompanied me in four countries (Germany, Brunei, Kenya and France), and we have moved house 11 times so far, including one evacuation (Kenya 2020). My youngest children have attended four schools. When overseas, my wife has either found employment or been shown the policy or treaty which states that she cannot work. We have felt well supported by the Army. Since 2021, I weekly commuted and my family lived in our own home in Kent. I took a NATO post in France to continue my career on its current track and allow my family to be together. I wrongly assumed that my wife could work – noting that my predecessor’s wife is a civil servant who worked remotely while accompanying the family in Lille.

Narrative - International Remote Working (IRW) as a Crown Servant (Jan 24 to present)

5.             My wife became a full-time Home Office (HO) civil servant in 2024 to fulfil her ambition of working in the civil service and allow her to work remotely while she accompanied me and our children to a NATO posting in Lille, France. There are HO and pan-government policies on IRW, which makes specific allowances for spouses of military personnel and provides check lists for departmental and employee responsibilities. My wife, after reading these policies and ensuring she complied with the guidance within, applied for IRW, with the support of her line manager. After consulting the FCDO, the HO refused the application, citing visas/working permissions and tax liabilities to both her and the Home Office as the reasons for doing so.

6.             We made every effort to address these concerns. The Lille Préfecture – the French government authority for processing titres de séjour (similar to visas) – stated in writing that my wife was allowed to work remotely. An independent tax advisor, after examining our affairs in detail, stated that neither my spouse nor the HO would be liable to French taxes or social security. Neither the HO nor the FCDO IRW Team could not point to a single rule which prohibited my spouse working, nor did three subject access requests show evidence of any meaningful attempt at researching this matter, beyond asking other desks in government, who were equally perplexed by the laws in France. The FCDO in Paris did not offer advice on the matter of French tax and employment laws, even though they employ people at the embassy under French law.

7.             One HMG is a platform for civil servants to continue to work overseas under the umbrella of the FCDO office in country, which in effect assumed duty of care for the Crown Servant and enables and protects them. The HO did ask the FCDO if this could be used for my wife. The FCDO (I do not know if this was the Paris or London office) decided that my spouse was not eligible to use this platform and would not take the responsibility of ‘ensuring duty of care’ – an understandable position if she were accompanying me to a war-torn or remote country, or one with a severe risk of espionage, but less so in France.

8.             The Armed Forces Network Sponsor at the HO engaged with the HO and other departments on our behalf. It appears that he was successful in receiving responses but not in persuading the HO to change the decision. I would like to thank him for his efforts.

9.             My MP intervened on our behalf. After my wife left employment at the HO, he received a response from the Security Minister explaining why my wife’s application to IRW had been declined. It contained factually untrue information, cited other reasons which had never been raised before, and claimed that it would not be a good use of taxpayers’ money to ensure that they complied with French employment law. A free source of advice would have been the FCDO in France. I would like to thank my MP for the extensive time and attention he spent in helping my family.

10.        Throughout this experience, neither the HO nor the FCDO IRW Team have been willing to communicate with us in a meaningful, constructive way. My wife has had to submit three subject access requests to receive information.

11.        Various senior members of the MOD offered to help, expressing sympathy and directing their staff to look into the matter further. My British and French chains of command in Lille wrote to the HO to offer to explain our position and to offer reassurance that my wife could work. They received cursory responses from the HO. I would like to thank them for their efforts, in particular my French chain of command.

12.        The Minister for Veterans and People did not reply to my letter dated 15th July 2024, which requested help.

13.        The Cabinet Office Chief of People replied to my letter dated 15th July 2024 requesting help, saying that they would ask the HO to explain their decision. This stimulated action from the HO, who gave my wife unpaid leave to research her case. It did not lead to the HO explaining the reasons for refusing her application. I wrote to the CPO again when my wife was at the end of her unpaid leave. I received no response.

14.        One SCS-level civil servant in the MOD became aware of my case and chose to help. Adopting a principles-based approach, they judged that the HO and FCDO level of risk appetite was wrong, and that the approach that the HO and FCDO had taken was to start by saying no rather than by looking to support their member of staff by finding possible solutions. This individual and their team took up our cause. I am extremely grateful to this individual and their team for their help.

15.        It appears that nobody in authority held the HO or FCDO to account.

16.        In no part of any correspondence I have accessed, can I find an HO, FCDO or CO official who referred to the AF Covenant or the government’s obligation to protect the AF community from disadvantages as a result of service.[1]

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Education – narrative

17.        Noting that employment as a Civil Servant was going to be impossible for my wife, we planned to move the family from France to our own home in Kent and send two of our children to a local school, while I remained in France. Kent County Council (KCC) would not allow us to apply for school places as I did not have an assignment order to a post in Kent.

18.        KCC cited para 2.21 of the Dept of Ed School Admissions Code, which provides for applications for children of serving persons being posted into an area or returning from overseas service; therefore, I did not qualify as I was not returning from overseas service and I was not posted to Kent. This paragraph does not cover the many circumstances which might make AF children ineligible under normal rules to apply for school places but nonetheless should be allowed to do so, and which should be protected by the AF Covenant.

19.        After haggling with the KCC, they agreed that our children could apply for school places as long as I applied to leave my NATO post in France as soon as practical and get a post in SE England, which I am in the process of doing. The KCC would not countenance an application for my children predicated on the idea of my family moving back to Kent while I remained in my NATO post in France.

Spousal employment and education – impact on my family

20.        My family and I are exhausted. We are financially poorer, owing to my wife’s loss of income, and pension; we believe that we are now effectively paying to be posted abroad. It appears also that my wife cannot claim job seekers’ allowance, as she is not in the UK. Her career prospects are also damaged, affecting her future earnings. Our trust in the covenant, the chain of command and wider government has been affected by these experiences. After 24 years’ service, I did not expect my family to be the subject of my biggest challenge, and I did not expect my adversaries to be other government departments.

21.        The things my family asked for were legal, policy compliant and did not disadvantage others. They were also reasonable. Our circumstances came about because of my military service and were therefore a little outside the norm. We believe that if the AF Covenant were observed (or even known about), if government policies were more explicit about the commitment to the AF Covenant, and if suitably empowered leaders made principles-based decisions, this chain of events would have been avoided, and my energy and attention could have been spent on playing my part in defending the nation’s interests. I expected Partners Across Government to be on our side and leaders to act decisively, not only in support of my family but in support of government policy and national strategy.

Observations and conclusions

22.        The Covenant itself provides adequate protection if it is known about and implemented. However, it is clearly not implemented in some cases, for reasons given below.

23.        Members of the AF community which require AF Covenant protection may often have circumstances which fall outside the detail in government policy. This requires an approach to supporting them which is flexible, cognisant of the AF Covenant, and exercises principles-based judgement.

24.        AF community members requiring AF Covenant protection may well be individual cases, which means that they are not significant enough for a government department to deal with in detail – each issue raised is likely to require a dedicated caseworker. This means that AF Covenant cases must be protected by authority, namely well-written policies and a body or individual empowered to make informed decisions.

25.        Government departments act quickly when challenged by authority figures. Some people, principally but not exclusively the Cabinet Office Chief People Officer, could have held the decision makers (HO) and advisors (FCDO) to account and, using their authority, insisted that they explain their advice and decision. This would have most-likely led to quicker and more efficient action, as was the case in another virtually identical case. This may suggest that decisiveness and active championing is required from leaders and authority figures in individual cases, with the starting question being ‘show me exactly why this this member of the AF community should not be employed/admitted to school or hospital?’

26.        Government policies do not adequately take the AF Covenant into account, and they are overly prescriptive, which excludes several circumstances which may require protection of the AF Covenant. There may be several policies involved in each case, which make it even harder to navigate. It may be a good idea to rewrite several government policies to reflect the AF Covenant. However, rewriting government policy on this scale, even with the assistance of Artificial Intelligence, would be time-consuming and potentially not worth the significant resource. There may therefore be a case to say that the AF Covenant should sit above all policies to guide decision making.

27.        Government departments (outside of the MOD):

1.           are seemingly unaware of the AF Covenant;
2.           prioritise existing policy ahead of their commitment to the AF Covenant;
3.           are unwilling to exercise judgement on the basis of the AF Covenant’s central principles. They may do this because they:[2]

(1)          fear getting a decision wrong;

(2)          make decisions according to tick box criteria and dogmatic application of policy;[3]

(3)          may not have capacity to look into individual cases;

(4)          are averse to taking risks or dealing with things which appear novel or complex;

(5)          are unwilling to spend money on upholding the AF Covenant;

(6)          are unwilling to listen or engage with the chain of command in a meaningful way. This may be because they do not recognise the significance of the chain of command in military life.

28.        These lead to departments not upholding the AF Covenant. If government departments had known about the AF Covenant, paid it more attention and exercised a more pragmatic approach to decision making, it is possible that my wife would still be employed by the Civil Service or I would not have had to request to shorten my time at my NATO posting to France.

29.        These observations therefore suggest a requirement for a principles-based approach to making decisions,[4] and the establishment of a higher authority to take such an approach to decision making. These observations suggest that there needs to be a wider awareness of the AF Covenant in government, and the duties that they have to fulfil it.

30.        There may be a role for the chain of command to support the AF community and government departments, as they are impartial, accountable and authoritative.

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Recommendations.

31.        Recommendation 1 - Establish an Armed Forces Covenant Head at the centre of government, who is the custodian, arbiter, ombudsman and final authority on Armed Forces Covenant cases which only involve national and local government departments. This should probably sit in the Cabinet Office. Its roles could include:

1.           educating and informing government on the AF Covenant and the duties contained therein;
2.          ensuring that government policies are compliant with the AF Covenant. Noting that this is a very large task, it could review policies as and when they are queried.
3.           Deciding cases which come to its attention.

32.        Recommendation 2 - Change government policies to be more compliant with the AF Covenant, allowing more opportunity to exercise principles based decision making. To support this, government policies should:

1.           highlight the government’s commitment to the AF Covenant and its duty to remove disadvantage from the AF community.
2.          include reference to the new authority proposed in Recommendation 1 and the process for referring to it.
3.           increase the role of the chain of command in liaising between government departments and AF community. This should include acting as the approving authority which allows governments departments to make appropriate allowances/adjustments for the AF community.
4.          direct departments to refer cases to the chain of command for approval/agreement that the case is subject to the protections of the AF Covenant.
5.           include a template letter for the chain of command which explains that the individual/family in question are protected by the AF Covenant.

33.        Recommendation 3 – give commanders a new role – to “approve/authorise” and advise on the AF Covenant. Commanders could be used as the first port of call to validate if a member of the AF community could be eligible for dispensation under the AF Covenant. This will require that the MOD trains commanders and other relevant personnel on their new role and responsibilities regarding the AF Covenant. This could also be delegated to a specialist within units, such as Unit Welfare Officers. This training could be done on the Commanding Officers’ Designate Course and other courses.

34.        Recommendation 4 – recruit, train and foster a culture of leaders and authority figures who are willing to take policy compliant but principles based decisions.

35.        Recommendation 5 - pass the AF Covenant into law.

I hope this helps the inquiry and leads to positive and quick outcomes. I am willing to contribute further if requested to do so.

20th February 2025