The International Development Committee Inquiry on humanitarian access and adherence to international humanitarian law

Written evidence submitted by the UN World Food Programme

Introduction

1. Global humanitarian needs have increased significantly in the last five years, whilst responding to those needs has become more dangerous. Between 2019 and 2024, the number of people facing hunger rose to 343 million, a more than 125 percent increase, and acute food security has risen by more than 50 percent.[1] Driving many of these needs is a dramatic increase in conflicts. There were more conflicts in 2024 than at any point since World War II,[2] with 120 armed conflicts recorded worldwide. 2024 also saw more children than ever living in conflict zones or displaced by violence – 473 million, or 1 in 6 children worldwide.[3]              
    
2. The UN World Food Programme (WFP) is the world’s largest humanitarian organisation. It operates in 120 countries, often in hard-to-reach areas affected by conflicts, natural disasters and climatic shocks. WFP is mandated to deliver humanitarian aid, whilst building the resilience of communities and governments to withstand shocks. WFP supported 150 million people in 2023. WFP also manages the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS).

3. WFP continually works to strengthen its ability to negotiate humanitarian access and to better analyse access constraints. Despite these investments, access constraints are one of the main challenges in reaching food-insecure people. In 2024, violence and insecurity, bureaucratic and administrative impediments (BAI), political inaction, and climactic shocks significantly hampered WFP’s timely, efficient and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.             
    
4. This submission addresses the following questions outlined in the inquiry's terms of reference:
• The current trends in adherence to international humanitarian law (IHL) in conflicts, with a particular focus on the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance; and
• The consequences of non-compliance on both the physical accessibility of humanitarian supplies and the safety of aid workers' operations.

5. The submission also provides recommendations based on the above responses to encourage compliance with IHL and ensure the safety of humanitarian workers.

Trends and consequences

Trend 1: Instrumentalisation of aid

6. In recent years, WFP has witnessed the increasing ‘instrumentalisation’ of humanitarian aid, where actors use assistance to further their political or military objectives. This can be accomplished by: deciding which populations can access assistance; which organisations can provide which types of assistance; and by directly impeding or attacking humanitarians. The trend challenges the ability of humanitarian organisations to adhere to the humanitarian principles, particularly independence and neutrality. Parties to conflicts target humanitarian workers, attack journalists and medical professionals, obstruct access to aid, and use starvation as a weapon of war. Particularly alarming are the attacks on UN staff and facilities, as well as the online targeting of UN agencies. This significantly undermines the respect for the institutions underpinning the humanitarian system and violates IHL.

Trend 1.1 Attacks on humanitarian workers

7. Attacks on humanitarian workers are prohibited under the Geneva Conventions (directly, in Additional Protocol I, Article 71(2), and as a corollary in Additional Protocol II, Article 18(2)) and under customary international law.[4] UN staff involved in humanitarian operations are also protected by the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.[5] The UN Security Council has also passed a number of resolutions calling for the protection of humanitarian workers, most recently 2024’s Resolution 2730.[6]

8. Disregard for IHL has a marked effect on civilians and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. There was a 72% increase in civilian deaths in conflict zones between 2022 and 2023[7] and a 260% rise in aid worker fatalities from 2019 to 2023.[8] 2024 was the deadliest year on record for humanitarian personnel, with at least 325 aid workers killed. 96% were national staff (312) - primarily Palestinians in Gaza - and 4% were international staff (13), highlighting the exceptional vulnerability faced by national UN staff, co-operating partners, and national and local NGOs. On 19 December 2024, a WFP field office in the Blue Nile State, Sudan, came under aerial bombardment, killing 3 WFP staff members.              
    
9. WFP staff have been attacked in conflict zones,[9] which can lead to the suspension of operations. For example, in Myanmar, WFP has had to relocate staff from field offices in conflict-affected areas, as the increased security risks endanger the lives of aid workers.[10] Delays and relocations significantly hamper the delivery of humanitarian assistance, often preventing aid from reaching the people who need it most. In 2024, WFP was forced to temporarily suspend operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gaza and elsewhere due to State and NSAG attacks against humanitarian workers.[11]

Figure 1: 5-Year Trend in Aid Worker Attacks (2019-24) [12]

10. In addition to fatalities, WFP saw a 65% rise in safety and security incidents that affected our operations between 2018 and 2023.

Figure 2: Trend in safety and security incidents, 2018–2023

[13]

11. In some contexts, such as Burkina Faso and Gaza, insecurity and attacks on humanitarians have forced organisations to use air drops to provide food to vulnerable populations. Air operations are significantly more expensive – approximately seven times more expensive, but context dependent – than ground operations, so the decision to use them is always the last resort.[14] In general, the delivery of humanitarian assistance is becoming more costly, driven largely by increased insecurity (but also a more proactive approach to risk management), just at a time when WFP, and the humanitarian community more broadly, is facing an historic gap between funds and needs.

12. In Mali, since the withdrawal of MINUSMA, the Malian Armed Forces are required to secure airfields for each UNHAS operation due to security risks and barriers to negotiating with other actors. Only five of 36 scheduled flights were authorised from February–April 2024.[16]

13. The Israeli air strike on Yemen’s Sana’a airport on 26 December 2024, which injured a UNHAS crew member and where UN staff were waiting to board, also highlights the ongoing erosion of humanitarian protection.[17]

Trend 1.2: Humanitarian access

14. The primary responsibility to care for civilians lies with States.[19] When States are unable or unwilling to do so, humanitarian organisations may provide assistance. Consequently, parties to conflicts must allow and facilitate humanitarian access according to the Geneva Conventions (Geneva Convention IV, Article 23; Additional Protocol I, Article 70(2); and as a necessary precondition under Additional Protocol II) and under customary international law.[20] The UN Security Council has also passed a number of resolutions calling for rapid and unhindered humanitarian access in various contexts.[21]

15. However, WFP has faced access constraints in operations across the world (e.g. Mali, Ukraine, Yemen), including the closure of major supply routes (e.g. Gaza, Sudan), resulting in the denial of aid to civilians. Verified incidents of the denial of humanitarian access to children alone has risen by over 32% in 2023, from 3’931 in 2022[22] to 5’205.[23] [24]             
     
16. WFP and its co-operating partners have faced outright and arbitrary denials of access in multiple operations. For example, an NSAG in Ethiopia’s Oromia region banned truck movements from the 3 October 2024. This ban was imposed in Adama, one of the largest hubs for WFP, and significantly affected the transportation of WFP food. 

17. In many contexts, multiple NSAGs are present which can complicate access negotiations (e.g. in eastern DRC). The command structure of NSAGs also varies, meaning that access or security decisions taken at the leadership level are not always fully disseminated or followed amongst rank-and-file combatants. Armed actors also attempt to control the delivery of assistance itself, including via the required use of armed escorts in certain contexts.[25]

18. Bureaucratic and administrative impediments (BAI) also obstruct assistance and increase costs for WFP and its partners. Although IHL allow parties to conflicts to prescribe some technical arrangements around humanitarian assistance, some host governments use these to frustrate timely, efficient humanitarian operations. BAI may take the form of restricted visa authorisations, high visa fees, stringent internal travel authorisations and registration procedures, and requirements for the approval of individual shipments and cooperating partners, as well as security clearances.

19. In Afghanistan, Sudan and Myanmar, the adoption of restrictive laws, decrees and regulations to increase control over humanitarian organisations and personnel is also expected to lead to increasing impediments to humanitarian access.[26]

Trend 1.3: Misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech             
 

20. Certain types of misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech (MDH) may violate IHL. For example, IHL prohibits the encouragement of IHL violations, inciting violence against humanitarian operations or personnel, and likely spreading disinformation aimed at obstructing humanitarian operations.[28]

21. In accordance with the humanitarian principles, WFP engages with all parties to the conflict, which can be exploited by social media disinformation campaigns. States and NSAGs may also instrumentalise aid through the use of misinformation and disinformation, both inadvertent and deliberate. This contributes to the creation of mistrust in humanitarian action, in turn affecting perceptions of aid workers and endangering their safety.

22. In the DRC and Ethiopia, social media influencers have spread misinformation about WFP and UN operations, heightening the risks of attacks and looting.[29] Misinformation about aid allocations in the Syrian Arab Republic led to violent protests against WFP in 2023,[30] a further challenge to aid worker safety.[31]

Trend 2: Reinterpretation of IHL

23. The substance of IHL, Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, and customary law, remains the same, regardless of changes in the conduct of hostilities. However, parties to conflicts regularly reinterpret the law and how they apply it. This is particularly evident with regards to the use of new technologies and the areas in which operations are conducted. These reinterpretations jeopardise the protection of civilians and the safety and security of humanitarian workers.

Trend 2.1: Technological advancements

24. Under IHL, parties to conflicts are bound to conduct hostilities in accordance with the fundamental principles of proportionality, distinction, and necessity.[32] These principles are key to achieving IHL’s humanitarian objective of limiting the suffering of civilians affected by conflict.

25. There are questions about whether new technologies, such as artificial intelligence and drones, are being used in accordance with the fundamental principles of IHL. As the use of AI and drone warfare becomes increasingly commonplace, the lack of regulation leaves the humanitarian community vulnerable, and some actors reinterpret IHL to their own needs. Ensuring that such interpretations do not create a precedent or standard view within the broader international community is crucial to adapting to these technological advancements.

Trend 2:2 Urban warfare and harm to objects indispensable to civilian survival

26. IHL prohibits the destruction of objects indispensable to civilian life.[33] This prohibition is included in the same articles that prohibit starvation as a weapon of warfare, meaning that the destruction of civilian objects is a form of starvation. UN Security Council Resolution 2417 reaffirms IHL, explicitly connecting hunger and conflict and condemning starvation as a weapon of war and the unlawful denial of humanitarian aid of civilians.[34] Attacks on food production, processing, and procurement facilities in Sudan and Gaza, and ports in Ukraine and Yemen, highlight how the damage to or destruction of objects indispensable to civilian life is regularly used as a tactic during war.[35]

Conclusion and recommendations

27. The UK Government has made statements advocating for the protection of humanitarian aid workers and respect for IHL.[39] WFP also notes the UK’s role in the Ministerial Group and pursuit of Declaration on the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel in September 2024.[40] WFP would welcome the UK’s leadership in the following areas:

• Diplomatic engagement;
• Civilian-harm mitigation & humanitarian assistance policies;
• Advocate for principled humanitarian operations;
• Increase accountability for IHL violations; and  
• Training & capacity building for local actors.

28. Diplomatic engagement. The UK should work with humanitarian organisations to understand what challenges they face and whether or how the UK can help alleviate those. The UK should also leverage diplomatic, political and judicial tools to ensure that parties to conflicts comply with IHL and use good offices/mediation to ensure the protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel.

29. Civilian-harm mitigation & humanitarian assistance policies. The UK should encourage all armed actors, whether States or NSAGs, to have in place policies, guidance, and procedures that reflect applicable law and emphasise the importance of preventing, minimising, and responding to civilian harm. This should include a clear statement that civilians and civilian objects, and humanitarian personnel and objects, must be respected and protected and cannot be targeted.

30. The UK should also encourage all armed actors, whether States or NSAGs, to put in place policies that prohibit: 
• Arbitrarily withholding consent for impartial humanitarian organisations to access conflict-affected civilians in need of assistance; 
• Threatening or attacking humanitarian personnel, facilities, supplies, or operations; and
• Confiscating, diverting, looting, or stealing humanitarian commodities.

31. Advocate for principled humanitarian operations. Humanitarian operations are guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and operational independence.[41] While some States might actively seek to instrumentalise humanitarian assistance, others might want to adopt restrictive measures to protect humanitarian personnel. Regardless, humanitarian organisations must be able to make their own decisions and provide principled humanitarian assistance that is coordinated with and accountable to affected populations. The UK should advocate for a robust humanitarian space that allows all organisations, in all contexts, to operate according to the principles.

31. Increase accountability for IHL violations. Utilising pre-existing frameworks, such as UNSC Resolutions 2730 and 2417, the UK should advocate that actors who violate IHL are held accountable. WFP has noted a growing lack of accountability for IHL violations by governments and NSAGs.

32. Training & capacity building for local actors.[42] National humanitarian personnel are essential but also most at risk of being killed or injured. 96% of all deaths in 2024 were nationals. National and local NGOs must have the knowledge and skills to identify and mitigate risks, increase safety and security and understand the protections afforded by IHL. WFP’s Security Strengthening Programme (SSP) is currently developing a package of support for local and national partners (guidance, training) for use by the humanitarian system across the world. We would welcome UK support for this initiative.

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