International Rescue Committee UK – Response to International Development Committee call for evidence on Humanitarian access and adherence to international humanitarian law

About the International Rescue Committee

The International Rescue Committee responds to the world's worst humanitarian crises, including the conflict in Ukraine and the crises in Gaza and Sudan. We help to restore health, safety, education, economic wellbeing and power to people devastated by conflict and disaster. And we are proud to fight for a world where women and girls have an equal chance to succeed.

Overview

The IRC monitors humanitarian trends across the world and report on the 20 countries of most concern in its Emergency Watchlists. In the 2025 Emergency Watchlist, violations of international humanitarian law, attacks on aid workers, and denial of humanitarian access were identified as key trends in the conduct of war.

The 2022 Humanitarian Framework set out the UK’s commitment to international humanitarian law (IHL), and to use UK diplomatic influence to “lead efforts on humanitarian access”. The new Government should continue to adhere to these objectives and use its position in the international system to support adherence to IHL, and associated obligations to humanitarian access. Using its privileged roles within the United Nations and wider diplomatic environment, the UK should continue to lead on efforts to promote and protect access within international fora, UN accountability mechanisms, and through bilateral engagement.

The problem is not with international humanitarian law itself – rather, with states’ lack of adherence, and inadequate efforts to hold those who violate IHL to account. The IRC’s operational and policy experience in a multitude of conflicts provides daily experience of the impacts of access barriers and denial in humanitarian emergencies. Despite the impact of these actions on the world’s most vulnerable populations, the denial of humanitarian access has received far lower international attention than other violations. The combination of these trends demonstrates the need for a global prioritisation of efforts to ensure those in need of assistance can access, and be accessed by, humanitarian and development aid.

Recommendations

The FCDO should:

 

Response to specific terms of reference

What are the current trends in adherence to international humanitarian law in conflicts, particularly regarding the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance?

  1. International humanitarian law (IHL) was designed to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not, or are no longer, directly or actively participating in hostilities, and imposes limits on the means and methods of warfare. However, conflicts are lasting longer and becoming more complex.

 

  1. The number of attacks on civilians by state and nonstate armed groups around the globe rose by 66% between 2013 and 2023 to reach almost 2,600 attacks, and 74% (around 1,900 attacks) were in countries featured in the IRC’s 2025 Emergency Watchlist. Barriers to humanitarian access in Watchlist countries have also deteriorated. In 2024, Watchlist countries averaged 4.2 out of five on the ACAPS humanitarian access measure (in which higher scores indicate more barriers to humanitarian access), up from 3.75 in 2020, while scores in non-Watchlist nations remained stable. Such worsening restrictions harm civilians by blocking humanitarian actors from delivering vital services, food and medical care. The lack of accountability for these trends undermines international humanitarian law, making the rules of war appear toothless.[1]

 

  1. IRC teams around the world experience the impacts of access restrictions on a daily basis. While higher profile attacks on aid workers receive relatively more attention, for many teams, it is the complex bureaucratic processes required to secure basic agreements to implement programming or move staff into and within a country that slow and undermine the delivery of life saving assistance. Efforts to control the delivery of aid, including efforts by authorities to impose fees on the delivery of aid, to insert themselves into recruitment processes, or to influence decisions on programming locations and models, all serve to undermine access and principled programme delivery.

 

  1. In contexts including Afghanistan, efforts to limit and control aid provision have seen the outright ban of programming to support women and girls, but these high-profile cases hide an increasingly common reality of restrictions on similar programming elsewhere. Restrictions on aid access are not an accident or an inevitable side effect of armed conflict. The crises in Tigray and Gaza also highlight the challenges, where access has been used as a bargaining chip, with restrictions only eased when political objectives of a ceasefire or hostage deal were agreed. In other contexts, restrictions on aid delivery are deliberate attempts to secure income and/or demonstrate control/governance over a territory.

 

  1. This trend in part reflects the increasing prominence of internationalised conflicts. Increasingly, regional powers are intervening in civil wars by providing troops and other material support to conflict actors. For example, between 3,000 and 4,000 Rwandan soldiers are reportedly fighting alongside the M23 armed group in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have militarily supported Yemen’s internationally recognised government since 2015 against Ansar Allah, which receives weapons from Iran. In 2023, internationalised civil wars accounted for 34% of all conflicts, up from 26% in 2013 and from just 9% in 2003. With a greater diversity of conflict actors and more complex lines of command and control, more international actors are willing to ignore conflict actor behaviour in support fo their own political interests in the conflict, leading to greater impunity in violations of international humanitarian law.

 

What impact does lack of adherence have to both the physical access to humanitarian supplies and the safe operation of aid workers?

  1. IHL aims to protect aid workers, but attacks on aid workers have surged alarmingly. Since 2010, such attacks have risen by 136%, with almost 600 incidents in 2023; in IRC Watchlist countries, the increase was almost 200%, with around 560 attacks in 2023.

 

  1. 2023 was the deadliest year for aid workers, with fatalities more than double the yearly average. The 2023 trends were driven by the war in Gaza, but Sudan and South Sudan have seen record numbers of deaths too. Data on aid worker arrests and detention is harder to track, but anecdotal evidence suggests numbers are on the rise as reflected by experience in conflicts such as Yemen and Gaza where aid and health workers are detained while carrying out their duties. The safety of humanitarian staff and health workers has a direct impact on the delivery of aid. If staff safety cannot be guaranteed, services cannot be maintained, leaving civilians unable to access critical support.

 

  1. Access barriers also have a direct impact on the ability of humanitarians to move supplies and staff into and within countries, further undermining the sustainability of services. For example, during the recent Gaza war, Israel has blocked the entry of goods into Gaza that could be considered ‘dual use’ (i.e., anything that could have both civil and military applications). This includes almost all electronic items and tools, meaning that access has been denied for electrical surgical tools used for lifesaving procedures such as amputations. The result has been that medical practitioners in Gaza have been forced to perform amputations without modern tools, causing immense and wholly avoidable pain and suffering for patients. Restrictions on medical supplies have meant that procedures have had to be carried out without pain relief. In Sudan, barriers to cross border aid delivery have undermined the contribution the UN can make to addressing needs in Darfur, where the IPC now reports that famine is present in multiple locations.

 

  1. Maintaining access when aid is under attack requires a multipronged approach. Typically, aid actors negotiate their access with conflict parties locally and privately, often drawing on humanitarian principles to demonstrate humanitarian neutrality and impartiality. These local negotiations are vital to secure agreements on aid delivery and to protect humanitarian workers. UN-led efforts where the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) leads on access engagement also provide an important case study, contributing to improvements in aid access, for example, but securing extensions to agreements by the Sudanese Armed Forces to allow cross border aid into Darfur via Chad.

 

  1. But, as conflicts intensify and aid actors face new and complex barriers to reaching those in need, there is growing motivation to find new ways to secure access. In recent years, access negotiations have increasingly involved non-humanitarians such as regional political bodies and third-party states at the highest level. Designed correctly, high level access negotiations can play a positive role in support and sustaining access.

How has the level of risk for aid workers changed in recent years and where does responsibility for their protection lie? What protections are available and are they adequate?

  1. As outlined above, the environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid is becoming more complex and more dangerous. Longer, more complex and internationalised conflicts, combined with waning respect for IHL and humanitarian principles all combined to undermine aid worker safety and security.

 

  1. Respect for IHL and understanding of humanitarian principles (which allow humanitarian actors to demonstrate their neutrality and impartiality) are key to negotiating access and securing acceptance of humanitarian action from warring parties. Reinforcing understanding of and adherence to these frameworks is vital. The UN Security Council has taken steps in recent years, issuing several resolutions that condemn attacks on aid workers and reinforce the need for accountability, safe access, and protection measures in conflict zones.[2] It is incumbent upon states to recognise the growing risks that aid workers face and the implications of the politicisation of humanitarian response in conflict. It should also be highlighted that the risk is primarily for national staff, rather than international.

 

  1. Aid agencies themselves, with the right support from donors, can also make investments to support aid worker safety and protection. Ensuring appropriate investments in security staff and analysis is critical to allow humanitarian agencies to maintain presence and expand programming into new areas of conflict affected states. Analysis of attacks on health care in South Sudan by the IRC demonstrates the need for investments in security measures for all facilities and efforts to ensure adequate and standardised monitoring and reporting of attacks on healthcare to strengthen accountability efforts.

 

What are the gaps in international humanitarian law when it comes to humanitarian access and what could be the UK Government’s role in addressing this?

  1. The issue is not that there are ‘gaps’ in international humanitarian law, but in states’ implementation of it. IHL clearly obligates conflict parties to allow and facilitate humanitarian access, not deny access under arbitrary grounds. There is little accountability when states violate this law. Moreover, access barriers receive a lower level of attention and reporting in international mechanisms compared to other violations of IHL.

 

  1. While agendas like Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Protection of Civilians, and Women, Peace and Security acknowledge the importance of humanitarian access, they lack comprehensive analysis. The annual Protection of Civilians reports occasionally touch on access, and initiatives like the CAAC monitoring and reporting mechanism publicly lists actors for perpetuating grave violations against children in conflict situations (one of which includes denial of humanitarian assistance) but provide limited analysis of access trends. Further, while Relief and Recovery is one of the 4 pillars of the women, peace and security agenda, it remains ambiguous and under researched. 

What more could the Government do, with or without partners, to hold perpetrators of attacks and abuse against aid workers to account and encouraging adherence to international humanitarian law on these issues?

  1. The FCDO should use UK engagement and influence to hold all warring parties to account for their obligations around access under international humanitarian law and elevate diplomatic focus on access barriers and denial. It can do this by:

 

  1. The current mechanisms relied on to highlight and address violations of IHL within the UN and UNSC are constrained by member state politics and the overall low diplomatic focus on access. Humanitarian actors themselves are often unable to call out access denial for fear of impacting their ability to operate. These trends require steps to elevate access denial and to strengthen existing accountability mechanisms. For the CAAC MRM, member states should push for greater profile on the impact of humanitarian access denial on children. As a first step, the CAAC mechanism should publish a guidance note on what is considered humanitarian access denial for children so that it is accurately represented in reporting mechanisms.

 

  1. When local access negotiations have failed, the FCDO should use UK diplomatic engagement and political levers to hold warring parties to account for their obligations for access under IHL, in coordination with humanitarian actors.

 

  1. When humanitarian access is weaponized and national-level humanitarian-led negotiations are insufficient to maintain the delivery of aid, as witnessed in numerous contexts including Gaza, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, high-level diplomatic engagement can serve as a complementary effort alongside local engagement to improve humanitarian access. With the right incentives and political commitments, such efforts can play a positive role in supporting access. However, to do so, diplomatic processes must be carefully designed. Participating states, diplomats, regional bodies and the U.N. should coordinate their approaches and leverage to deliver access agreements that are meaningful for the affected populations. To ensure alignment with the needs of people in humanitarian crises, diplomatic actors should coordinate closely with NGOs, adopt transparent metrics for aid delivery that are not limited to “trucks on the road,” and allow for monitoring of the impact of access agreements on the needs of affected populations.

 

  1. The FCDO should ensure UK military efforts to train partner forces on IHL includes specific focus on the obligations of conflict partiers to support humanitarian access.

 

  1. Often conflict parties, particularly non-state armed groups, are often unaware of their obligations under International Humanitarian Law, including the responsibility to not arbitrarily deny humanitarian access. Institutions like Geneva Call already exist to bring about behavioural change among non-state armed groups to improve compliance to IHL.

 

  1. The FCDO should invest in supporting national and international partners to improve security procedures, conflict and security mapping and reporting on attacks on aid workers to improve aid worker protection and support advocacy with warring parties, national authorities and where appropriate and safe, international accountability efforts.

 

  1. This would further ensure rigorous reporting of violations of international humanitarian law, complementary to existing and future mechanisms that provide reporting and security measures.

 

  1. The FCDO should channel financial support to frontline national and international NGOs to support them to institutionalise capacity on access strategy development and negotiation skills.

 

  1. Ensuring capacity amongst national and international partners will allow them to augment and complement UN aid delivery and reach populations that the UN cannot due to security or acceptance challenges.              

 

  1. Ensure high level diplomatic efforts on access are informed by regular and formalised consultation with humanitarian partners.

 

  1. High level humanitarian access diplomacy involving third party states is most successful when diplomatic actors are coordinated, well-informed by local experiences, and delineated from the political interests of third-party states. The UK should use its diplomatic leverage to join high level diplomatic efforts and to ensure effective consultation processes between NGOs and local actors and diplomatic leads. Existing mechanisms for UN and NGO dialogue and decision making on access, such as Humanitarian Country Teams and Access Working groups, offer opportunities to share insights on access barriers and solutions. However, these groups are not systematically consulted or engaged in support of high-level diplomatic efforts.

 

  1. Provide vocal and practical support to the establishment of a new independent access organisation (IAO) that will develop evidence around humanitarian access, raise awareness of the importance of access, and support the expansion of deliberate and informed humanitarian diplomacy.

 

  1. UN systems to support accountability are constrained by member state politics. The establishment of an alternative and complementary mechanism to support international diplomatic understanding of, and response to, access barriers and denial is therefore an important step in galvanising action on humanitarian access and fidelity to IHL. A new Independent Access Organization would improve reporting, raise awareness of access barriers and denial, and—when local negotiation efforts fail—catalyse action by global, regional and national policymakers, including non-traditional actors and middle powers. Such an organisation would be invaluable in providing evidence to support and encourage advocacy on specific situations where access is constrained; delivering education and regulation of global efforts to monitor and address humanitarian access constraints; and establishing access as a ‘common good’ which is the responsibility of all parties to conflict. Crucially, the IAO would not serve as a replacement to existing UN or other multilateral agencies engaged on humanitarian work – rather, it would ‘fill the gaps’ that cannot be addressed by existing agencies.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] According to ACAPS, "access constraints" refer to the barriers and challenges that limit or obstruct humanitarian actors' ability to deliver assistance to populations in need. ACAPS categorizes them into three main areas: physical constraints, security constraints, and administrative and political constraints.

[2] Resolution 1502 (August 2003), Resolution 2175 (August 2014), Resolution 2286 (May 2016), Resolution 2730 (May 2024)