Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Ellis KBE, KC

Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Ellis KBE, KC served as Attorney General for England and Wales. Sir Michael previously served as Solicitor General and Paymaster General, among other ministerial positions. Sir Michael was the Member of Parliament for Northampton North between 2010 and 2024, during which time he took an active interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, speaking regularly in Parliament on this issue, writing articles and reports, and visiting Israel and the Palestinian Authority several times.

Executive Summary

The Israel-Hamas war and the associated humanitarian efforts in Gaza have presented humanitarian agencies and the international community with one of the most challenging conflict environments and aid operations in recent history. The war has taken a particularly heavy toll on humanitarian workers.

Israel has made concerted and significant efforts to adhere to its international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations and alleviate the dire humanitarian situation faced by Gaza’s 2.3 million civilian population. This has been undertaken within a complex high-intensity urban theatre of war amidst wider multi-front attacks, faced with a terror group cynically hiding behind its civilian population, and while contending with widespread misinformation.

Despite these unenviable challenges, Israel has facilitated large quantities of aid to enter Gaza and supported humanitarian aid workers in their invaluable efforts. By several key metrics, Israel has been successful with the aid reaching Gaza recognised as being above internationally adopted guidelines for humanitarian needs in conflict zones. While Israel's aid efforts during the last 16 months have at times fallen short of the stated expectations of democratic allies, there is extensive evidence of Israel’s ability and desire to meet its IHL obligations.

Hamas’ presence within Gaza has proven an intractable obstacle to humanitarian efforts. Hamas has implemented a deplorable strategy of worsening the humanitarian situation in Gaza as a means to increase international pressure on Israel and end the war to ensure Hamas’ survival, while engendering the civilian population’s dependency on the group. Accordingly, Hamas has been documented stealing large quantities of aid, attacking and threatening civilians accessing aid, killing aid workers, and attacking Israel’s aid crossings to force closures as well as its water and electricity infrastructure into Gaza.

Hamas’ abrogation of its IHL obligation to provide for Gaza’s civilian population has been compounded by the failure of the international community to pressure it to end this and instead focusing their scrutiny upon Israel. This sends a dangerous message to other terror groups and sets a precedent which risks exposing aid workers to greater threats in the future.

Hamas’ infiltration of major aid agencies (most notably UNRWA), fighting from within civilian areas and humanitarian zones, and flagrant misuse of protected humanitarian facilities has exposed humanitarian workers to intolerable levels of risk. The situation has been further complicated by the significant number of UNRWA’s workers found to be directly linked to Hamas  and involved in the unprecedented 7th October terror attacks and detention of hostages. A number of aid workers from other aid agencies killed within Gaza were active members of terror groups.

The challenges posed by the conflict and Hamas’ war strategy have been exacerbated by the procedural and logistical failings of key humanitarian aid actors operating in the territory. This has stymied the delivery of aid across Gaza and exposed humanitarian workers to additional risks. Post-conflict analysis must focus upon developing future best practice in deconfliction and coordination mechanisms between warring parties and humanitarian organisations to better protect aid workers and maximise efficiency in delivery.

Introduction

1. The upholding of IHL is fundamental to preserving a rules based order in an increasingly volatile world. Malign international actors - most notably, rogue and autocratic states and non-state terror groups - have made concerted efforts over recent decades to circumvent and undermine IHL to challenge and threaten international peace and security and the legal underpinnings of the post-Second World War paradigm.

2. While egregious breaches of IHL by autocratic states such as China, Iran and Russia have become commonplace, no state has been subjected to more opprobrium than the UK’s democratic ally Israel.

3. The devastating conflict in the Middle East which erupted with Hamas’ appalling terror attack against Israel on 7th October 2023 and followed by a major war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has been the subject of intense international scrutiny.

4. Israel’s military and humanitarian efforts in Gaza have been vigorously debated and the Jewish State has faced erroneous accusations of disregard for IHL and collective punishment against Gaza’s civilian population.

5. It is a matter of great concern that such misinformation and false narratives have largely gone unchallenged. This counterfactual narrative, and the subsequent focus of diplomatic pressure on Israel, has had the effect of absolving Hamas of its responsibility for, and ongoing role in, the terrible events of the last 16 months.

6. An objective analysis shows that in reality, Israel has made concerted and significant efforts to adhere to IHL and alleviate the dire humanitarian situation faced by Gaza’s 2.3 million civilian population, amidst a complex war and despite unenviable security challenges.

7. Conversely, Hamas has systematically and cynically breached IHL and committed war crimes through its abuse of Gaza’s civilian population and infrastructure for military activities, and its well-documented misappropriation of humanitarian aid. These actions have dramatically complicated the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

8. The failure of the international community to apply significant pressure on the internationally proscribed terror group to end these illegal practices sets a dangerous precedent that other terror groups and non-state actors will internalise. It has dramatically exposed humanitarian workers to increased risk. More broadly, it presents a dramatic threat to the future of international peace and security, the application of IHL, and international aid efforts.

9. Israel has been held to an impossibly high standard and diverted diplomatic focus from some of the world’s most egregious human rights busters. In 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions condemning Israel 17 times, compared to six for the rest of the world combined (including, one against Iran and one against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine).[1]

10. The disproportionate focus on Israel-Gaza has also diverted resources away from humanitarian crises of a significantly greater scale elsewhere in the world. A 2024 report detailed that more than 23 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan and over six million displaced, yet the country has received only a small percentage of the requested humanitarian funds.[2] Sudan continues to experience the world’s largest internal displacement crisis with more than 10 million impacted, while almost half of the country’s 50 million citizens are in need of life-saving humanitarian aid. Despite this, the global funding appeal reportedly remains only 60% met.[3]

Israel’s Adherence to International Humanitarian Law

11. International law requires warring parties to ensure the basic needs of non-combatants during war.

12. Israel has repeatedly emphasised that it is committed to upholding and acting in accordance with IHL in Gaza. The country unilaterally withdrew settlers from Gaza in 2005 and so can no longer be considered an occupying power, but it has continued to meet the basic needs of Gazans for the last two decades and been the principal facilitator of aid in the wake of the 7th October attack.

13. Under the law of armed conflict, Israel is obligated to facilitate humanitarian relief via third parties as the goods cannot be reasonably delivered without diversion to military combatants. Israel has worked with a diverse range of aid agencies and international bodies to ensure that aid has continued to reach Gaza’s civilian population throughout the conflict, including the World Food Programme (WFP), World Central Kitchen (WCK), UNRWA, UNICEF, UNFPA, and WHO.

14. Israel’s humanitarian efforts within Gaza - and the West Bank - are overseen and coordinated by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a unit of Israel’s Ministry of Defense. COGAT has been the central stakeholder in ensuring aid reaches Gaza and the principal interlocutor with the IDF and international community in implementing the humanitarian effort. COGAT routinely provides authoritative updates on the quantities of aid entering Gaza.[4] COGAT has repeatedly disputed figures provided by UN agencies as they only document aid entering via a single Israeli crossing (Kerem Shalom) and do not record the large quantities of aid distributed by non-UN agencies.[5] [6]

15. While Israel is fulfilling this fundamental IHL obligation, Hamas does not. Hamas, and other Gaza-based terror groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are bound by the same laws of war despite their categorisation as non-state actors. Hamas is therefore responsible for ensuring the provision of basic needs for the local population, including food and medical care. The terror group has, however, abrogated this responsibility with senior leader Moussa Abu Marzouk stating in October 2023 that it is the UN and Israel’s responsibility to care for Gaza’s civilian population.[7] Hamas Political Bureau official Khalil al-Hayya said in November 2023: “Hamas’ goal is not to run Gaza and to bring it water and electricity and such”.[8] 

16. In the immediate aftermath of the 7th October attack, Israeli leaders stated their intention to impose a blockade on all goods and services into Gaza.[9] This controversial policy was strongly criticised and reversed within two weeks, with Israel initially facilitating humanitarian trucks through Egypt’s Rafah crossing and then fuel for hospitals and water sanitation facilities, bakeries and telecommunication services in November.[10] [11] It has since dramatically enhanced and scaled up its humanitarian efforts. It is worth noting that the UK Ministry of Defence’s Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict states that “siege is a legitimate method of warfare”.[12]

17. It is reasonable and legitimate to question whether sufficient aid has at times reached Gaza’s civilian population - it has proven to be inadequate to meet needs on a number of occasions - but it is legally indisputable that Israel has upheld its fundamental IHL obligations and gone further than most other parties involved in conflict.

Israel’s Humanitarian Aid Effort in Gaza

18. Israel has facilitated significant humanitarian aid supplies to Gaza’s civilian population over the last 16 months, including food, medicine, water, fuel and electricity. Israel has repeatedly emphasised that while it is the responsibility of humanitarian agencies to distribute the aid within Gaza, there are no limits on the quantities which can be facilitated and it seeks to “flood” the territory with aid.[13] [14]

19. At the time of writing, Israel has facilitated delivery of 1,303,452 tonnes of aid on 65,312 trucks. This includes: 45,890 trucks carrying 986,522 tonnes of food; 2,646 trucks carrying 53,000 tonnes of water; 7,562 trucks carrying 103,218 tonnes of shelter equipment; 2,685 trucks carrying 29,805 tonnes of medical equipment. Additional aid provided to Gaza: 776 fuel tankers; 1,428 cooking gas tankers; 10,272 humanitarian packages airdropped; and 9,710 tonnes on 725 trucks via a temporary pier constructed by the international community. 5,000+ trucks entered in December 2024 carrying 100,000 tonnes of aid.[15]

20. Israel has gradually increased the number of crossings into Gaza to enable the scaling up of deliveries. The Erez crossing - severely damaged by Hamas on 7th October - was repaired and resumed operation on 1st May 2024, Ashdod Port was opened for aid operations in April 2024 (which saw the delivery of large quantities of flour capable of feeding 1.5 million Gazans for five months), an additional crossing into northern Gaza opened in May 2024, the new Kissufim crossing recently opened, a corridor between Gaza and Jordan opened and customs requirements waived, and Israel’s fence road in Gaza expanded to be used for aid delivery.[16][17] [18] Israel’s major Kerem Shalom goods crossing - repeatedly attacked by Hamas rockets - has been adapted to enable the safe transfer of injured Gazans for care in third countries.[19] Israel has also facilitated the entry of equipment into Gaza and implemented humanitarian pauses to support aid delivery and provide aid workers with a safer environment in which to operate.[20]

21. Claims that Israel is seeking to starve Gaza’s population are false. A scientific study published on 2nd June 2024 showed how food shipments into Gaza between January and April that year had been sufficient to feed Gaza’s entire population.[21] [22] The study, based upon COGAT’s data and undertaken by Israeli academics and public health officials, concluded that the mean “per capita per day energy supplied was 3,163 [calories]”. The nutritional content of shipments being facilitated by Israel were found to be 40% in excess of the internationally accepted Sphere guidelines (2,100 calories) for conflict-impacted populations.[23] Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also said that Israel was facilitating food aid equating to “more than 3,000 calories a day for every man, woman and child in Gaza”.[24]

22. Protecting the health and right to life of Gazans is a fundamental IHL requirement which Israel has demonstrably sought to uphold. Israel played an integral role in responding to an outbreak of polio in Gaza in the autumn of 2024, helping to deliver a successful vaccination programme for nearly 500,000 children under ten years-old. The WHO praised the success of the complex initiative which required a major logistical operation featuring circa 150 fixed sites and several thousand workers across Gaza, and humanitarian pauses.[25] Israel has also facilitated the transfer of injured Gazans and their caregivers for treatment outside the territory.[26]

23. Israel has facilitated medicine, blood units and plasma, as well as tonnes of sanitary products and medical equipment, including equipment for hospitals, wheelchairs, dialysis machines and medication. 13 field hospitals have been established since the start of the war with the assistance of international partners to help meet the health needs of a displaced population and compensate for the loss of hospitals which have been damaged as a result of Hamas illegally militarising them.[27] [28]

24. Israel has also provided large quantities of fuel to Gaza to ensure that critical infrastructure (hospitals, water treatment facilities, bakeries) can continue functioning. Fuel has been delivered by Israel to sustain critical operations of hospitals throughout the war, including 6,570 litres of fuel transferred on 8th January 2025 for the Nasser, Al-Aqsa and the European Hospitals.[29] Israel’s long standing humanitarian commitment is evidenced by the fact that around 50% of Gaza’s electricity supply came from Israel prior to 7th October (according to COGAT).[30]

25. In addition to the delivery of large quantities of bottled water, Israel operates three major water lines into Gaza which provide 10% of the territory’s water supply - Birkat Sa’id, Bani Sheila and the northern water line.[31] According to COGAT, the northern water line provides 21,000 cubic litres of water per day. The WHO’s minimum requirement for water per capita in emergency circumstances is 20 litres.[32] The northern line alone is providing the minimum water needs for more than one million Gazans. Israel has also repaired infrastructure damaged during the war, including water treatment facilities.[33]

26. Despite widespread allegations of Israel preventing aid entering Gaza, the Israeli Government confirmed in April 2024 that just 1.5% of distribution requests for Gaza had been rejected.[34] Israel maintains that 99% of inspected trucks are approved and that the 1% which are rejected are due to issues such as drivers refusing inspection and trucks found to contain military equipment; the majority of these were able to proceed once issues were resolved.[35] [36]

27. The above examples do not seek to be an exhaustive record of Israel’s humanitarian efforts but it compellingly displays Israel’s concerted efforts to honour and uphold its IHL obligations.

Challenges Hampering Humanitarian Efforts in Gaza

28. The quantity of aid reaching Gaza has progressively increased during the war but the distribution operations of NGOs and international agencies have been hampered by Hamas and beset by considerable logistical challenges. There have also been periods where aid supply acutely dropped owing to a deteriorating security situation on the ground, most notably in northern Gaza throughout October 2024.

29. Gaza is one of the most complicated arenas in the world for humanitarian operations. The significant challenges that humanitarian actors have faced require careful consideration to best prepare for future aid efforts around the world.

30. Humanitarian efforts within war zones are complicated and evolve over time to adapt to changing circumstances, for example, the risk of exposure to live fire and the breakdown of civil order. The aid operations within Gaza have been no different in this regard. However, it is the presence of a major terror group that has created an almost unique set of challenges.

a) Hamas

31. In Gaza, humanitarian organisations have at all times contended with the difficult reality that they are operating in a territory ruthlessly controlled by a terror group which cynically and systematically attempts to worsen the humanitarian situation and maximise civilian casualties as its modus operandi.

32. Hamas’ systemic misuse of humanitarian facilities and infrastructure protected under IHL - including hospitals - for terror purposes has presented a constant problem for aid efforts and exposed humanitarian workers to great risk.[37]

33. Israel has long-warned of the threat posed by Hamas’ misuse of aid, which has included excavating EU-funded water pipework for the construction of rockets, smuggling items with military uses within aid shipments, and using vast quantities of building materials intended for civilian projects to construct its huge underground tunnel network.[38] [39] [40] [41] Accordingly, it is legitimate that Israel has security concerns over the potential misuse of aid; not only for the sustenance of Hamas fighters and its ability to sell aid at inflated prices on the Gazan black market, but also its repurposing of dual-use items for terror purposes (for example, component parts for the manufacture of rockets).

34. Hamas - and Hamas linked criminal gangs - has repeatedly misappropriated large quantities of humanitarian aid via violent hijackings during the war. Aid organisations have confirmed that aid convoys have been looted. UNRWA suspended deliveries through Kerem Shalom in December 2024 owing to security concerns after two convoys were looted by armed men.[42] On 16th November 2024, 97 lorries carrying food were stolen by hundreds of armed men, with their drivers beaten and then forced to take the aid to pre-prepared locations where forklifts were awaiting.[43] Georgios Petropolous, head of the UN’s humanitarian OCHA organisation in Gaza, said that there is “tactical, systematic, criminal looting”.[44] He added: “The damage we’re seeing done through looted equipment and supplies being sold back to people already in desperate poverty is just immense”.[45]

35. Veteran Arab affairs analyst Ehud Yaari of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy claimed in May 2024 that Hamas had generated at least $500 million from hijacked aid trucks since the start of the war.[46] Israel’s Shin Bet security service had stated that Hamas was diverting at least 60% of the aid entering Gaza.[47] Gazan civilians speaking to Palestinian and Israeli journalists have bravely condemned Hamas’ theft of critically needed aid.[48]

36. Hamas has contributed to the humanitarian challenges in a number of other ways. The group retains a military presence along some convoy routes and distribution points, which have necessitated aid agencies to coordinate with Hamas.[49] The terror group was found by the New York Times to have stockpiled food, medicine and water in underground caches to enable fighters to continue for months without resupply.[50] Hamas stole 24,000 litres of fuel and medical supplies from UNRWA in October 2023, and was accused by Israel of stockpiling 500,000 litres of fuel.[51] [52] Hamas has rationed supplies of fuel needed to power portable generators to create dependency among the population, and in order to generate power to circulate air within its tunnel network, launch rockets and operate its communication systems.[53] [54]

37. Hamas has also attacked Gazan civilians attempting to acquire aid and in March 2024 announced that any Palestinian found cooperating with Israel to distribute aid within Gaza would be regarded as a collaborator; a crime punishable by death.[55]

38. Hamas attacked the temporary sea port constructed by the international community after threatening to resist any foreign military presence involved in the port project which would be regarded as “an occupying force and aggression”.[56] [57] Hamas has also repeatedly and deliberately fired rockets at Israeli aid crossings, killing four Israeli soldiers at the Kerem Shalom crossing in one incident in May 2024.[58] It also destroyed nine of the 10 power lines through which Israel provided electricity to Gaza  - since repaired by Israel - and fired rockets at the city of Ashkelon; home to a major Israeli power station which is an important source of electricity for Gaza.[59] [60]

39. Criminal gangs - some with Hamas links - have also sought to exploit the plight of ordinary Gazans by stealing aid to sell on the black market at increased prices. A major Gazan criminal family blocked the main road near Kerem Shalom for two days and fired on lorries attempting to access the aid depot, in an apparent attempt to cause shortages of goods to further drive up costs.[61] Basic commodities within Gaza have increased in price at different times partly because of these criminal activities, with an UNRWA official confirming that “a bag of flour costs more than $200, a single egg $15”.[62]

b) Hamas’ abuse of humanitarian actors

40. A number of key humanitarian bodies have been severely impacted by the successful efforts over the last two decades of Hamas - and other terror groups - to embed their fighters and supporters as locally employed workers within aid organisations.[63] This has had the regrettable effect of stymying humanitarian efforts throughout the war and caused doubts about the organisations’ reliability as humanitarian partners. It has hampered the swift delivery of aid as it necessitated time consuming deconfliction mechanisms and Israel’s screening of all aid entering Gaza.

41. Hamas’ abuse of UNRWA has been known for decades and the failure of the UN and international community to take the requisite action is lamentable. The terror group regards UNRWA as a means to control Gaza and assist its military activities. Several senior staff within the organisation have over the last ten years had to leave due to threats to their personal safety after identifying Hamas links.[64] UNRWA facilities have previously been found to be housing Hamas military assets, including tunnel entrances and rockets.[65] [66] COGAT officials informed British parliamentarians at a briefing last year that Hamas-linked individuals even allegedly takes part in UNRWA’s hiring commission which gives it a role in the hiring of senior staff - this must be urgently investigated.

42. Hamas has exploited its links and knowledge of the internal workings of UNRWA throughout this war. A Hamas and Islamic Jihad war room, drones and weapons were discovered at UNRWA’s HQ in Gaza City and a large data centre was separately unearthed beneath the HQ.[67] [68] Dozens of Hamas terrorists have been killed while operating from within UNRWA schools during the war.[69] A number of UNRWA workers have been identified as participants in the 7th October attack and in the detention of Israeli hostages.[70] The Wall Street Journal has reported that Israel identified hundreds of workers who are Hamas operatives and thousands more who have a family member involved with Hamas.[71] [72] An UNRWA worker told Israeli officials that Hamas had stolen official agency vehicles, in an apparent attempt to protect themselves from the IDF.[73] COGAT officials informed British parliamentarians at a briefing last year that 14% of UNRWA drivers - who are responsible for delivering aid - were known members of terror groups.

43. The susceptibility of humanitarian bodies, including those of the United Nations, to infiltration and exploitation by terror groups poses a major policy challenge and must act as a warning for all future aid operations.

c) Humanitarian workers killed and exposed to extreme risk

44. A worryingly high number of humanitarian workers have been killed and injured while undertaking their invaluable work within Gaza. The nature of conflict zones means that these brave workers are always exposed to dangerous situations, but this has been manifestly worsened during the Israel-Hamas war  due to Hamas’ illegal abuse of civilian and humanitarian facilities. There have also been a number of tragic cases of mistaken identity by Israel which necessitate efforts to improve procedures to best protect aid workers.

45. Hamas is deliberately exposing humanitarian workers to heightened risk through their actions. Hamas fighters positioned near aid convoys and within aid facilities have tragically led to the deaths of humanitarian workers and civilians. In March 2024, for example, an Israeli airstrike killed four aid workers alongside Hamas military operative Mohammed Abu Hasna within an UNRWA food distribution facility in Rafah.[74] The IDF stated that Hasna was “involved in taking control of humanitarian aid and distributing it to Hamas terrorists” and ran an “intelligence operations room”.[75] In May 2024, the IDF released drone footage of armed Hamas fighters next to UN vehicles within a UNRWA logistics centre in Rafah.[76] Mohammad Abu Itiwi, an UNWRA employee and Hamas commander involved in the 7th October attack, was killed in October 2024.[77]

46. Hamas and unidentified Palestinian gunmen have killed aid workers. In one incident, gunmen in three cars killed Islam Hejazy who worked for U.S. charity HEAL Palestine in September 2024, with reports from Gaza that she had been deliberately targeted.[78] The Fatah-run Adwah TV reported that Hamas had “persecuted well-known figures and teams of volunteers”. It continued “it attacked them and killed some for two reasons: Firstly, preventing any activity by any [other] party in the Gaza Strip; and secondly, ensuring Hamas control over the aid and its storage”.[79]

47. Other humanitarian workers that have been killed within Gaza have turned out to be moonlighting terrorists, including WCK worker Ahed Qadir who had participated in the 7th October atrocities at kibbutz Nir Oz.[80] Hamas platoon commander Husam Mansour, who worked for British organisation Al-Khair Foundation, was killed in an airstrike on an aid facility in the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in July 2024.[81]

48. Deconfliction mechanisms play an integral role in ensuring aid can be distributed within conflict zones and to protect aid workers. Israel has had to adapt and improve these throughout the conflict with a diverse range of humanitarian interlocutors that are submitting thousands of requests for permits to undertake operations. The complex nature of fighting against a group embedded within the civilian population, often appearing without warning, operating from humanitarian infrastructure in blatant disregard of IHL, and wearing civilian clothing (a war crime), has led to a number of tragic incidents in which humanitarian workers were killed by Israel.

49. Israel has asserted that it acts in accordance with a strict series of targeting procedures to adhere to the laws of war but said it made a “grave mistake” in killing seven WCK humanitarian workers on 1st April 2024.[82] The convoy was attacked in a deconflicted area after an IDF drone spotted what appeared to be a gunman atop an lorry who was mistakenly thought to have latterly been travelling within the escorting cars. The IDF team operating a drone had not been notified of the convoy’s movements and were not able to directly communicate with the convoy.[83] Footage shows that the WCK insignia atop the vehicles was not visible in the dark and the IDF said aid was being moved at night due to risk of dangerous stampedes in day-time hours by civilians.[84] As a result, Israel implemented a series of improved communication mechanisms to ensure open channels for coordination with humanitarian organisations, introduced a non-governmental liaison into its Southern Command HQ to strengthen deconfliction and communication with aid workers on the ground, and new technology to identify aid vehicles at night.[85]

d) Failings of humanitarian actors

50. The humanitarian aid operation has been beset by logistical, procedural and structural failings by aid organisations. These include: inefficient prioritisation of aid, limited working hours of UN staff, lack of manpower, slow packing processes, lack of storage capacity within Gaza, and a lack of trucks and drivers.[86] This has caused logistics gaps and bottlenecks. COGAT has repeatedly claimed that hundreds of lorries carrying aid remain undelivered in Gaza despite clearing Israeli security checks. For example, on 16th January 2025, COGAT stated that “800 trucks worth of aid are waiting for collection and distribution”, while 1,500 were stranded at Kerem Shalom and the temporary pier on June 25th 2024.[87] [88]

51. In an effort to alleviate this situation, Israel began working with private traders and by October 2024, and at one point were reportedly responsible for 60% of aid within Gaza.[89] It is important to note that private aid supplies are not accounted for in the UN’s reporting of aid entering Gaza.

52. Further difficulties have been caused by diplomatic disputes among countries donating aid seeking to be prioritised over others. UN officials revealed to Reuters that “because aid comes not only from international agencies but also directly from individual donor countries, the process of deciding which trucks go to the front of the queue can be thorny”.[90] The Egyptian Red Crescent noted that some donor countries “drop off aid in Al Arish or at Al Arish airport and walk away and say, ‘we gave out aid to Gaza’”.[91]

e) Distrust between key actors

53. Trust is an essential ingredient to roll out a successful humanitarian programme, create robust operational systems, and respond at speed to changing circumstances. Regrettably, some of the central parties to this conflict and its humanitarian operations have poor relationships. The prevailing geopolitical circumstances in the region led to public disagreements between Israel and Egypt, which shares a land border with Gaza. This created friction over Egypt’s operations at the Rafah crossing during the earlier stages of the war. The situation worsened when Israel took control of the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egypt-Gaza border after Israel discovered an extensive network of smuggling tunnels used by Hamas, and which Egyptian authorities appear to have done little to prevent.[92]  

54. Israel has particularly cold relations with the United Nations due to what it perceives - not unreasonably - as its anti-Israel bias. UNRWA’s well-documented infiltration by Hamas has acted as a brake on a more collaborative relationship and actively impeded aid delivery due to the additional security measures Israel feels are needed. Repairing Israel’s relationship with - and trust in - the UN and its constituent bodies must be a priority moving forward.

f) Israel

55. Israel has faced its own challenges and at times its humanitarian efforts have fallen short. This does not, however, mean that it failed to uphold IHL.

56. Israel has had to contend with a large-scale humanitarian operation amidst a complex urban war in Gaza and sustained multi-front attacks from Iran-backed terror groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank, Yemen and Iran itself.

57. The deterioration and breakdown of civil order in Gaza has been particularly problematic. The IDF has attempted to secure routes for aid convoys and find alternate routes, but COGAT has stated that it isn’t possible to accompany each aid truck or convoy. The situation has been compounded by the inability to utilise Gaza’s police force to provide escorts due to their deep connection to Hamas.[93] Israel has been unable to find a workable solution to this, which will have enabled malign actors to hijack some lorries.

58. Israel’s attempts to prevent Hamas acquiring dual-use items is an ongoing logistical and ethical predicament. COGAT’s refusal to permit certain items has at times appeared unreasonable, such as sleeping bags with zips.[94] Israel has been criticised over its previous reluctance to permit entry for water purification tablets, but this is an item which can readily be used by Hamas terrorists hiding in tunnels for extended periods.[95] Each of these will be a complex decision but the fact that Israel is otherwise readily facilitating vast quantities of aid evidences that it is complying with its IHL obligations.

59. The provision of aid to Gaza has been a source of intense internal political debate in Israel. Far-right members of the current coalition threatened to bring down the Government over the supply of aid. Hardline Israel activists and the families of some hostages have at times attempted to block aid deliveries.[96] Israeli authorities made a number of arrests and blocked the protestors.[97]

Conclusion

60. The conflict and humanitarian situation in Gaza has been one of the greatest challenges in recent history and led to an intolerably high number of humanitarian workers being killed.

61. Israel has itself faced many challenges and at times its humanitarian efforts have fallen short of humanitarian need and the stated expectations of fellow democracies. It has though, crucially, shown a broad and consistent intention and ability to comply with IHL even under the uniquely complicated circumstances. Throughout the war, Israel and COGAT have demonstrably facilitated large quantities, and a broad range, of humanitarian aid and repeatedly asserted that there is no ceiling on the volume it can facilitate. It has worked closely with partners to reduce the risk of famine, malnutrition and disease, and with great success at periods of acute risk.

62. Logistical failings by a number of Israel’s aid partners have unfortunately impacted operational efficiency, as evidenced by the routine build up of large volumes of undelivered aid following Israeli security checks. The successful Polio vaccine programme for half a million children - the overwhelming number who are displaced - showed, however, that extraordinarily large and complex humanitarian missions are possible within Gaza when all parties are complementing each other in a disciplined manner.

63. The collective failure of the international community and international bodies, foremost the UN, as well as humanitarian aid organisations, to challenge Hamas’s dominance and exploitation of humanitarian services within Gaza over several decades underpins the current crisis facing Gazans. In many ways, this enabled Hamas to prioritise its efforts to militarise Gaza while other actors assumed humanitarian responsibilities and effectively normalised Hamas’ misuse of civilian infrastructure. This failure is epitomised by Hamas’ entrenchment and exploitation of UNRWA. It was further evident in the relatively muted public response of humanitarian actors to the genocidal 7th October attacks.

64. Hamas is likely to retain its presence and a degree of influence within post-war Gaza. The long-term collective failure to hold Hamas to account provides a blueprint and incentive for other malign actors to exploit the generosity of donor nations and NGOs, and will inevitably lead to future rounds of conflict. Other malign actors can be expected to learn from his situation and seek to exploit and weaponise IHL for their own military and political ends.

65. The UK has a proud record of providing aid around the world and it has again contributed significantly during this crisis. The complexities of humanitarian operations within Gaza does, however, necessitate a need for clear eyed foreign policy to best prevent territory being controlled and exploited by terror groups, and the need to carefully scrutinise humanitarian actors and programmes to ensure they do not advance the interests of malign actors. Successive UK Governments have focused their diplomatic efforts on Israel’s perceived failures within Gaza, but this has effectively alleviated the pressure on Hamas and enabled its infiltration of vital aid organisations over an extended period. We owe it to humanitarian workers to ensure that they are not being dispatched to such challenging arenas like Gaza.

66. Recommendations:

-          Foreign policy makers must be willing to challenge the status quo to better avoid malign actors establishing themselves and exploiting aid agencies operating on the ground. The world can ill afford another scenario where a terror group is unconstrained to establish itself within a large territory. If this goes unchecked then humanitarian efforts will inevitably be dramatically complicated and expose aid workers to higher levels of risk.

-          A collective international effort is needed to ensure that information on aid distribution is accurate and agreed by all parties, and that misinformation is not weaponised as this inevitably distorts the reality on the ground and can lead to wrong headed policy and diplomatic responses.

-          The Palestinian Authority must replace Hamas in Gaza and establish systems and institutions independent of Hamas to best avoid Hamas’ long-term influence within Gaza.

-          Existing aid programmes must be closely scrutinised and alternative humanitarian actors considered as a means to better prevent vested interest and infiltration. UNRWA’s long-term failings are self-evident, but alternative actors such as WFP and WCK have shown their ability to make outsized contributions to the humanitarian efforts in Gaza despite their relative size. WFP has been the largest provider of food aid in Gaza, delivering 308,714 tonnes of aid by 9th January 2025.[98] The susceptibility of existing agencies - most notably UNRWA - to infiltration and misuse shows the need for donor nations and international bodies to continuously review these organisations’ mandates, operations, processes and employees.

-          Humanitarian organisations should be required to provide lists of locally employed workers to better prevent infiltration and afford greater protection within the field.

-          Aid organisations need to adopt more rigorous procedures, such as vetting mechanisms, to ensure that local hires are not linked to terror organisations and that aid is not being misappropriated. The apparent wholesale misappropriation of cement and other construction materials supplied by the international community following previous rounds of conflict in Gaza must act as a cautionary tale that existing mechanisms have proven inadequate.

-          Efficient and effective deconfliction and safe movement for humanitarian workers and aid convoys must remain a collective priority for all parties to a conflict. It could be future best practice to follow Israel’s decision to embed a non-governmental representative within its operational HQ for any future army engaged in warfare against non-state actors. Aid organisations could also be required to provide workers with effective communication systems at all times, with recordings and reviews mandated.

-          Given the importance of trust to building strong and responsive working relationships and practices it is imperative that efforts are made to repair Israel’s relationship with the UN and international aid community. This is the best route to ensuring open lines of communication essential to enable improvement of procedures and mechanisms for delivery of aid.

67. The nascent ceasefire agreed in January 2025 now offers an invaluable opportunity to achieve a dramatic surge in aid entering Gaza and establish a benchmark of 600 trucks entering Gaza daily. The unavoidable reality, however, is that unless the Palestinian Authority can reestablish control over Gaza and remove Hamas as part of a process towards a negotiated two-state solution then this tragedy is liable to be repeated.

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