Written evidence from Democracy Volunteers (RGE 09)

Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee 

Review of the 2024 general election inquiry

Overview

On July 4th 2024, Democracy Volunteers observed the electoral process in 204 Westminster parliamentary constituencies across the UK. The organisation deployed two or more observers to each constituency[1]. In total, the number of observers, experts, and support staff was over 200 at this election.

These observers generally formed teams of two, sometimes three, and attended 1,173 polling stations, across these constituencies.

Democracy Volunteers’ observers spent between 30 and 45 minutes at each polling venue observing the voting process and then completed an online survey, regarding the integrity of the electoral process, for each polling station.

The team of observers observed a total of 20,289 voters in the process of those observations.

As well as our normal observations in polling stations we also assessed other aspects of the electoral process, including the process of voter registration, the challenges of postal voting, and the media and social media landscape in the UK, as well as assessing some of the impacts of personal and political social media regarding verbal and physical attacks on candidates during the election campaign.

This submission constitutes a precis of the information we collected, and select recommendations we made, as part of our own submission to the Electoral Commission’s report on the 2024 General Election.

About Democracy Volunteers

Democracy Volunteers is a non-partisan, domestic election observation organisation committed to improving the security and accessibility of elections in the UK and abroad. Our mission is to improve the quality of democratic elections by advising those who legislate for, administer, and oversee elections to enhance them for the benefit of voters.

We aim to do this by attending elections, empirically reporting our findings in an accessible way through statistical analysis and the undertaking of interlocutor meetings to support this objective. We do this through a strong methodology, based on the international standards for election observation as set out by OSCE/ODIHR[2] and others. We are a member of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM) and abide by GNDEM’s Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organisations and the accompanying Code of Conduct[3]. Our observers sign this code of conduct and Democracy Volunteers also signs the Code of Conduct required by the UK’s Electoral Commission to observe elections.

We maintain strict impartiality and require our observers to abide by UK and international standards, as well as the relevant local legal framework, when acting as our observers. All our observers, who observe in the UK, are officially accredited with the UK’s Electoral Commission and undergo a thorough interview and training process to ensure they are able to accurately and impartially record and report data from polling stations and counting venues. None of our observers are members of political parties and they are not politically active.

We aim to report on our observations in a constructive and encouraging way to benefit the delivery of democracy and the electorate. Since we were formed in 2016, we have observed dozens of elections across the UK and internationally, including general elections, referenda, by-elections, council elections, and devolved parliamentary/assembly elections.

Our reports have been used as the basis for trials of various methodologies and equipment at numerous elections. Our data is regularly cited in the Houses of Parliament and used in debates nationally, as well as informing local council training for election officials and the public on the conduct of electoral events. Lord Robert Hayward recently said that the data that Democracy Volunteers collects ‘has been painstakingly researched over a number of years [and] has proved the case to parliament that it needed to legislate,’ in reference to his Ballot Secrecy Act 2023, intended to deal with so-called ‘family voting’.

Voter Registration

Aside from any administrative concerns about the weight of extra work during an election itself, the process also leads to disenfranchisement of a significant portion of the potential electorate. At these elections our observers identified 131 potential voters being turned away for not being registered, 0.6% of the voters we observed in total. This is, naturally, a smaller figure than one imagines did not vote due to not being registered, as many voters will have elected not to travel to the polling station if they were aware that they had missed the registration deadline.

Whilst academics[4] and the Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee[5] have explored the challenges and potential solutions in some depth, the data, both quantitative and qualitative that our observers collected on the day, and our meetings with interlocutors are indicative that the current system could, and should, be improved through either automatic, or at least some form of, assisted registration in the future. This will engage the wider public with elections, prevent disenfranchisement of polling day, and aid elections staff in providing even higher quality elections with their limited resources.

Nationality Loophole in the Voter Registration Process

There is one specific issue with voter registration that we would wish to highlight to the committee. When an elector wishes to register to vote, they are required to provide the following information:

• First Name
• Middle Name (if applicable)
• Surname
• Date of Birth
• National Insurance Number
• Nationality
• Open Register Preference
• Previous Address (if applicable)
• Absent Voting Preferences (if applicable)

The National Insurance Number and Date of Birth of the elector are checked against the records held by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). If accepted by the DWP, the elector is added to the register. If there is a discrepancy, the application is effectively placed on hold, pending further information from the elector in the form of a scan/photo of an identity document such as a driving licence/passport to prove their identity.

However, there is no mechanism to check of the nationality of the elector. Although the potential elector would break the law by providing false information in their registration, there is no mechanism to prevent incorrect information populating the nationality section of the registration system.

The nationality of the potential elector is taken at face value by the electoral administrators in local government, and the national government’s online registration triage process.

At the end of the triage process on the national government’s registration website, there is only the following warning message to potential electors:

‘By sending your application you confirm that the information you have provided is true. Your information may be shared with other government departments to check your identity and that you’re entitled to register to vote. You can also find out more about how we handle your data. If you knowingly give false information in your application, you could go to prison for up to 6 months or be fined[6].’

If an elector would like to change their nationality on the electoral register, they can submit a fresh application to register to vote. The duplicate application is then merged with the existing application, so the nationality of the elector is updated in the Electoral Management System.

The Requirement to Show Official ID to Vote

Democracy Volunteers identified 262 voters who were turned away because they lacked ID. This constituted 1.29% of all the voters observed.

However, the requirement to show photographic ID has been in place in Northern Ireland for several years, ahead of the rest of the UK. In Northern Ireland, observers saw only 7 voters turned away out of 2085 observed. As such, within Great Britain, 255 voters were turned away out of 18,622, this meant 1.37% of voters were turned away in England, Scotland and Wales. 28,805,931 people voted on July 4th and whilst it is not scientific, and with this appropriate caveat, if 1.37% of voters were those excluded across the UK, this would mean that over 370,000 people might have been turned away due to lacking useable ID.

However, we also asked our observers to assess different aspects of those voters being excluded. As we evaluated, even with a large-scale observation, the capacity to see large-scale exclusions was relatively low.

As in both the local elections in 2023 and 2024, as well as the parliamentary by-elections in the same period, we again asked our observers to report broad ethnicity descriptions for those turned away. To classify, we used the phrases ‘white passing’ and ‘non-white passing’ to see if there was evidence of this policy being more impactful on voters from ethnic minorities[7]. Our observers saw voters turned away in 17% of all polling stations.

Our observers discovered those excluded because they lacked the appropriate ID in the polling station were:

• 20.2% ‘white passing’ males
• 21.0% ‘non-white passing’ males
• 32.5% ‘white passing’ females
• 26.2% ‘non-white passing’ females

Once again, as in previous election observations by Democracy Volunteers, this has disproportionately affected those from non-white passing backgrounds, as well as those being excluded being disproportionately women.

We also observed 37 voters not being asked for ID before being allowed to vote during our observation. One team noted that voters ‘’were checked upon arrival at the door by a meeter and greeter, but not at the desk to tick off their name or receive a ballot.’

This is clearly not an acceptable methodology for the assessment of ID as the voter could easily say a different name to the presiding officer at the desk from that checked by the meeter and greeter at the door.

Our observers also saw voters who were allowed to vote as it appeared that the presiding officer knew the relevant person. This is equally unacceptable as a practice required to formally assess the identity of every voter, however reasonable it might seem to both parties.

We note that our figures seem to express a larger impact on voting than the figures collected by polling station presiding officers for the Electoral Commission. We believe that this is because of several factors that understate the real figures, as publicised by the Commission. Other factors which lead to this understatement are:

• 43% of polling stations, of those observed, had signage outside them informing voters of the requirement to show ID, so those leaving before entering would not be recorded in the figures collected by the presiding officer at the desk.
• Another 5% had signage both inside and outside.
• In some polling stations our observers identified ‘meeters and greeters’ who helped voters find their relevant polling station, in the case of those where there were multiple polling stations in one venue, as well as more generally in busier polling stations. These greeters often asked voters if they had their ID, and if not, they often left before presenting themselves at the desk, these individuals would not be recorded in the official figures collected for the Electoral Commission. We saw ‘meeters and greeters’ in 47% of polling stations we observed.
• Party tellers were also seen at 27% of polling stations. Whilst their primary function is to collect voters’ polling number for ‘Get Out the Vote’ operations, they also regularly ask if people have their ID with them. Whilst not intentionally trying to prevent voters entering the polling station, any elector without their ID might be reasonably expected to leave. These would not be included in the official figures collected by the presiding officer.

Postal Voting

As well as the challenges of so-called ‘family voting’, which we have reported on, at length, in the past, which was legislated for in the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023, postal voting remains one of the UK’s most vulnerable activities regarding electoral integrity.

As an unsupervised route for voting, postal voters are potentially subject to intimidation and coercion, family voting, in a similar fashion to what we can observe at polling booths. Due to the nature of this practice, we are unable to collect data on this issue, though the cross-party support for the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023, which attempts to prevent this in polling stations, indicates potential support for controls to prevent means of duress during postal voting.

Some of the changes to the postal voting process brought into place by the Elections Act 2022 were in place at these elections. A new limit of 6 postal votes per elector (their own plus five others), a restriction in campaigners handling/handing in postal votes of those who are not close family members or those they care for, and a new ‘Postal vote return form’ to be filled in by all handing in postal votes at polling stations or directly to Returning Officers at council buildings. These were filled in by voters when handing in their postal vote(s) at all but seven instances we observed. These votes should therefore not be counted.

Thus, it is vital that if postal voting is to operate more successfully at future elections, better education for voters to ensure personal identifiers are correct, the risks of returns not reaching the council in time, and their rights to a secret ballot in the home is prioritised when considering necessary changes.

Threats and Violence towards Political Representatives: Data Collection on Threats to Candidates

Our team sent an email to 3,569 candidates from Lesley Abdela, one of Democracy Volunteers’ core team members, who was leading the research on the threats and challenges faced by candidates.[8] Except for Reform UK, candidates from all the major parties in Great Britain responded[9]. 40% said they had been ‘subject to concerning behaviour during the election campaign from voters, electors, campaigners, or other members of the public[10].’ As this was a self-selecting survey this could potentially exaggerate the scale of the problem but is potentially indicative. Whilst the number of respondents is not excessive, we do feel the data should be published. 153 respondents completed the survey using their name, as well as others who did anonymously. We identified specific groups that could be subject to these behaviours. We also identified ‘Major Parties’ as a group, assessing whether they might be subject to more challenges as they were arguably more public. For this group we identified ‘Conservative, Green, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Reform UK, Plaid Cymru and SNP’ as being main parties.

Our team then asked those who had been subjected to intimidation or threats Which of the following categories best describes the challenges they had faced during the election campaign. 67% of LGBTQ+ candidates said they had been subject to intimidation and 75% of those from ethnic minorities did so too. This is significantly higher than the average, 49% of women said they had.

As can be seen above, women are more likely to receive any form of abuse than men. Those candidates who self-defined themselves as being part of the LGBTQ+ community were twice as likely to have received negative behaviour than heterosexual candidates. Candidates from ethnic minorities were more than twice as likely than white candidates to have been in receipt of negative behaviour.

Our full report on the general election details the full findings of this research and can be found on our website.

Recommendations

Following this election, we have a series of recommendations as set out below, these are those relevant to the inquiry being conducted by the committee.

Recommendation - Voter ID Requirements

The requirement to show ID at a polling station before being issued with a vote continues to have challenges.

There continues to be a need for greater clarity and potentially diversity in the forms of ID that are acceptable. As in 2023 and 2024’s local elections, on some occasions our observers identified perhaps perverse circumstances where police officers were unable to show their Police official warrant cards as identification to vote, as it is not listed, but could, at least in theory, have been allowed to clear a polling station for legal reasons. Even the accreditation badge, which afford election observers open access to the polling station, the opening of postal voters and the counting of votes, is not acceptable ID in a polling station to vote.

Some other countries allow a system of ‘attestation’ where a family member is allowed to swear the identity of another close family member, this maybe something that could be considered ahead of the forthcoming election.

1. Valid forms of ID should be extended to include those issued by trusted organisations as well as more formal IDs that are presently acceptable.

2. ID checks should only be conducted when the elector is greeted by the presiding officer at their desk, as their name is taken compared to the electoral register.

3. A system of attestation as to the identity of another voter could be a possible solution to some of the ID challenges that are faced. This would have to be formalised, potentially under some form of oath-swearing process.

Recommendation – Voter Registration

The process of registering voters can create large scale administrative challenges to council election departments in the immediate tun up to an election, especially a general election, in which voters seek to be registered in a short period of time and in many cases, these are already registered. Council elections departments are not large teams, and this can create a large workload in the election period.

We believe this would benefit from significant change in the process of voter registration, making easier for electors to be registered, widening participation and simplifying the process for council officials. Whilst government will need to assess the practicalities of this process, we believe that a form of automatic voter registration, based on data that His Majesty’s Government already holds, such as National Insurance Numbers, can and should be adopted to make it simpler, even automatic that voters are registered from the age of 16 on receipt of their National Insurance Number.

1. The introduction of Automatic Voter Registration, to make the process simpler for voters and less time-consuming for council officials, preventing administrative challenges in the election period.

2. Close the loophole that allows those applying to be on the register to self-identify as a UK citizen without this being formally checked.

Recommendation - Postal Voting

Postal voting is not an as equally secure method of voting as it now is polling stations. It is open to threats, intimidation, family voting and collusion in a way that should not be possible in a polling station context. Supervised voting in a formal space is preferable to this unmanaged methodology of voting. Those who wish to subvert the electoral process can simply apply for a postal vote and thus avoid the same level of oversight.

Furthermore, this election has seen several administrative challenges concerning postal voting, whether this is an issue with the postal service, printing or the different timing of school holidays in Scotland, as well as the challenges of newly enfranchised voters overseas, which need to be addressed.

There are also issues concerning mismatched personal identifiers on the postal vote return forms which can, and arguably, should lead to votes being invalid due to them not being correct. Whilst this data was yet to be published by the Electoral Commission when we issued our original report, there were large numbers of invalid votes as well as votes received late due to challenges with domestic and international post.

1. We believe that the standard of postal voting at this election does not meet the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice for postal voting. Efforts should be made to encourage other forms of voting, which are not subject to the vagaries of the postal service or interference in a domestic setting. These could include advance voting in some centralised locations combined with supervised home voting, such as in sheltered accommodation, to maintain higher levels of voter engagement and retain ease of access to the voting process. In other jurisdictions, such as Finland, we have also seen the use of overseas embassies and consulates to facilitate international voting.

Recommendation - Security for Candidates

One of the increasing challenges at elections, and in politics in general, is the negative behaviour of some towards candidates which takes the form of abuse, anger and potentially violence. Whilst this behaviour is completely unacceptable, it would seem to be an increasingly common aspect of our elections. We noted that many candidates now regularly do not use their home address on the ballot papers, whilst some, especially smaller parties are still required, through legislation on the production of published election materials to display an address on their election communications. In the case of smaller parties and independent candidates, this is regularly their home address, meaning they are unable to have the same degree of anonymity as other candidates. As such, we recommend the following.

1. Candidates to receive, as part of their candidate’s pack, when applying to stand for election, a guide on maintaining their personal security. They could also receive a briefing from local law enforcement to the same end.
2. We recommend that those candidates who are unable to publish any address other than their home address should be afforded the same potential personal safety as other candidates. We suggest this could be in the form of an anonymised post box code which is registered with the Returning Officer, to ensure that a barrier is created between the public and the residences of candidates.

January 2025

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