Call for Evidence: Humanitarian access and adherence to international humanitarian law

Save the Children Submission: International Development Committee Inquiry on Humanitarian Access and Adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

21 January 2024

1. Introduction

1.1.   This submission explores global trends in the adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and humanitarian access, with a particular focus on Save the Children’s unique insight into the impacts on children’s rights gathered through our humanitarian programming. It then explores the UK Government's approach to addressing non-adherence to IHL and supporting humanitarian action, with recommendations for action.

1.2.   Last year, Save the Children’s humanitarian portfolio set out to assist approximately 27.4 million people, including 15.9 million children, across 46 countries. Alongside our local and national partners, we responded to emergencies in five regions with a funding target of $1.3 billion. Our humanitarian programs work across all sectors, ensuring children and families have access to healthcare, education, protection and livelihoods.

1.3.   Through our advocacy, Save the Children champions the centrality of protection in humanitarian action by demanding adherence to IHL and international human rights law (IHRL), ensuring the protection of children is a central component of all humanitarian response plans, and promoting accountability to children.

2. What are the current trends in adherence to international humanitarian law in conflicts, particularly regarding the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance?

2.1.   The nature of conflict has changed; wars are lasting longer and are more likely to be fought in urban areas amongst civilian populations leading to deaths and life-changing injuries. The denial of humanitarian aid is used as another weapon of war. The international rules and basic standards of conduct that exist to protect civilians in conflict are being flouted with impunity.

2.2.   The denial of humanitarian access has reached a historic high – with 5,158 incidents in 2023 compared to 3,931 the previous year. This is over 11 times more than a decade ago. The occupied Palestinian territory alone recorded 3,250 incidents of denial of humanitarian access in 2023, the highest number ever recorded in any conflict setting. These incidents include violence and threats directed at humanitarian aid workers, the theft of humanitarian facilities and supplies, and various physical and administrative barriers.

2.3.   A single incident of denied humanitarian access can have a far-reaching impact on thousands of children’s survival, hampering their access to basic services and protection. That makes this an extremely serious violation. The global humanitarian community suffered its deadliest year ever in 2024. The war in Gaza has driven the surge in casualties, with at least 333 humanitarian personnel killed since 7 October 2023.

2.4.   The dramatic increase in 2019 shown by figure 1 is mostly due to frequent access denial in the occupied Palestinian territory and Yemen. In 2019, 2022 and 2023, the occupied Palestinian territory topped the list. In 2020 and 2021, it was Yemen. Humanitarian access was frequently denied in Afghanistan in 2022 and 2023. There was also a sharp increase in the denial of humanitarian access in Sudan, Ukraine and Myanmar in 2023 compared to the year before.

3. What impact does lack of adherence have to both the physical access to humanitarian supplies and the safe operation of aid workers?

3.1.   We will approach this question by examining the impact of lack of adherence in two case studies – Sudan and Gaza.

3.2.   Sudan

3.2.1. There continues to be a multitude of access challenges facing the safe delivery of aid within Sudan. These include fighting and insecurity; extreme weather conditions; bureaucratic impediments and obstruction of access; violence against humanitarian staff and assets and obstruction of aid convoys.

3.2.2. Active hostilities in many areas have forced humanitarian organizations to rely on alternative routes and modalities to deliver assistance, but these routes are often subject to security risks and logistical constraints, and can also entail movement through conflict lines and/or travelling long distances. In November 2024, Save the Children was able to deploy the  first cargo flight carrying critical drugs and medical supplies to Blue Nile state – but this was the first humanitarian flight to the region since the conflict began in April 2023.

3.2.3. The ongoing hostilities have also caused huge barriers to delivering humanitarian aid. Communities are being cut off by the fighting from accessing essential services, while humanitarian personnel and resources are being targeted in attacks. Local frontline humanitarian volunteer teams, known as Emergency Response Rooms (ERR), have been targeted, with over 50 volunteers killed and 50 detained since April 2023. This has significantly limited their ability to provide essential supplies to vulnerable communities.

3.2.4. Bureaucratic and administrative impediments continue to hinder humanitarian access and assistance to vulnerable people. According to the UN, for INGOs, out of 139 visa applications submitted during November 2024 only 25 were approved with 55 per cent pending for more than four weeks.

3.2.5. Save the Children has continued to call on the warring parties to protect humanitarian workers and assets and remove all obstacles to the sustained, timely, effective and principled delivery of humanitarian assistance to all that urgently need it, including through both cross-border and crossline entry points. This includes the opening of safe passage for food, medical aid, and medical, humanitarian and commercial supplies.

3.3.   Gaza

3.3.1. The conflict in Gaza has inflicted indescribable harm on Palestinian children, compounding existing vulnerabilities created by the Government of Israel’s 17-year blockade. Since the start of the current war, the Government of Israel has systematically denied humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of Gaza, depriving children of access to the basic means of survival.

3.3.2. Throughout more than a year of unrelenting siege, Israeli authorities have consistently blocked, rejected and impeded aid delivery. North Gaza has been almost entirely cut off from the world by the Israeli military, with scarcely a drop of aid entering in the last 3 months, according to OCHA.

3.3.3. The UN attempted to reach the besieged area 165 times between 6 October and 31 December 2024, of which 149 attempts were denied by the Israeli authorities and 16 faced impediments. None of the land crossings into Gaza have been fully functional since October 2023, and lifesaving items are being denied entry even where border crossings are open. Safe conditions for humanitarian operations, including the distribution of supplies, have simply not been present, with aid convoys, offices, and warehouses coming under attack again and again, despite Israeli authorities being aware of their locations and movement.

3.3.4. Save the Children’s response team in Gaza is made up almost entirely of local Palestinian staff. They are carrying out life-saving work at great personal risk, all while struggling to keep their families safe, with many having themselves been displaced multiple times.  Two of our staff members were among the – at least - 333 humanitarian workers killed by Israeli forces in Gaza since October 2023. It is now the deadliest place on earth to be an aid worker.

3.3.5. UN experts have declared that Israel has conducted an ‘intentional and targeted starvation campaign against the Palestinian people’ and on 21 November the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli leaders for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare.

3.3.6. The impact on children of not being able to access the food they need has been profound and potentially irreversible. The entire population has been pushed to the brink of famine and children face acute risks from starvation and acute malnutrition. Children are uniquely and disproportionately vulnerable to malnutrition and can begin experiencing critical effects after just three weeks.

3.3.7. In Rafah, Save the Children spoke to Mostafa*, 48, a father of eight. He noted the visible impact of malnutrition on his children, explaining: “The children… lost a lot of weight, did not have energy to play. Even their skin started to get yellowish due to lack of iron and sugar. My 10-year-old son started to develop cracks in his skin, especially around the eyes.” Prolonged malnutrition in children leads to stunting, wasting, weakened immune systems, and profoundly impacts their cognitive development.

3.3.8. Children are being systematically denied access to healthcare through the destruction of hospitals and healthcare facilities, detention of medical workers, and blocking of vital medicines and medical equipment by Israeli authorities. Out of 36 hospitals in Gaza, 35 have been out of service at least once, 31 have been directly targeted, and 11 have been under siege – some multiple times. The Health Cluster has reported over 1,120 attacks on healthcare facilities since October 2023. Israeli authorities have blocked the transport of many paediatric medications, such as antibiotics, asthma inhalers, and epilepsy drugs, leaving them in critically short supply. Even adequate pain relief for children who have experienced devastating injuries is difficult to come by.

3.3.9. According to Becky Platt, a British paediatric nurse working with Save the Children in Gaza, “One of the things that we really, really needed was stronger pain relief for children. We had paracetamol and ibuprofen that you might take for a headache, but we were using that to treat the pain of children who'd had their limbs blown off. I've worked in several other humanitarian contexts, and I've also deployed to Ukraine, which was another conflict zone. But Gaza was like nothing I've ever seen before, both in terms of healthcare needs and in terms of the whole humanitarian context.”

3.3.10.    Following the temporary pause of hostilities beginning on 19th January, Save the Children’s response team will be doing everything we can to scale up our response – but only a permanent ceasefire will enable agencies like ours to meet children’s long-term needs.

4. What is the FCDO’s record of using its diplomatic levers to promote access to aid, protection of aid workers? How might its approach be improved?

Again, we will address this question by taking the two case studies of Gaza and Sudan to explore the UK’s recent track record of deploying its diplomatic levers to promote aid access and the protection of aid workers.

4.1.   Sudan

4.1.1. The UK, as a major global player and the lead country for Sudan on the UN Security Council (UNSC), has a role to support the broadening of humanitarian access, including applying pressure to parties to the conflict to allow organisations to conduct a principled humanitarian response.

4.1.2. We have seen efforts in recent months, including the UK doubling humanitarian aid to Sudan and the UNSC Resolution brought to the Council by the UK and Sierra Leone, which highlighted the need for the safe passage of civilians and aid. While this resolution was not passed, the initiative to bring Council members together is welcome and efforts should continue to bring consensus.

4.1.3. The UK should take a leading role in ensuring urgent humanitarian access throughout Sudan by intensifying diplomatic efforts to engage conflict parties and their backers, advocating for the removal of bureaucratic barriers like travel permits and unpredictable visa procedures, and supporting efforts to secure the indefinite opening of critical routes such as the Adre border crossing. Recognising the importance of local mutual aid networks as vital lifelines in hard-to-reach areas is also essential to a more effective humanitarian response, this includes ensuring local and national actors have the resources they need to deliver.

4.1.4. The UK also has a role in raising the cost for warring parties and their international backers, including condemning violations of international law, including grave violations of children’s rights. We have seen the UK doing this, including at the 57th session of the Human Rights Council, the UK led a core group of states in negotiating the renewal of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for Sudan. It is essential the UK continues to ensure the FFM has all the necessary resources and support to conduct its investigation and documentation work, in particular sustained and long-term capacity to capture the full range of children's violations and crimes in this context.

4.2.   Gaza

4.2.1. While the UK Government has consistently advocated for full humanitarian access into Gaza and provided much-needed support for UNRWA, its failure to acknowledge that the denial of humanitarian assistance by Israeli authorities is systematic and is depriving children of the basic means of survival means the UK is not pursuing the right solution. The Government must replace pleas for access with the application of robust consequences for IHL violations. Current UK policies risk perpetuating impunity and undermining faith in international law.

4.2.2. We recognise that the Government of Israel’s failure to comply with its obligations to facilitate aid access was one of the grounds for the UK’s partial ban on arms sales. However, the decision to exempt some licenses related to components for the F-35 fighter jets undermines efforts to implement robust consequences, and means the UK is still failing to fulfil its legal, and moral, obligations to uphold IHL.  The Government must suspend all arms exports and licenses to the Government of Israel given the clear risk they might be used to commit or facilitate violations of international humanitarian law.  

4.2.3. The UK has been reactive rather than proactive at the UN, lagging behind other states in pressing for ceasefires and accountability. Its humanitarian diplomacy remains primarily focused on piecemeal operational and logistical access issues. It has still not publicly recognised the reality that access constraints go far beyond the issues it has advocated on – such as the opening of crossings, the removal of bureaucratic impediments, and the need for effective deconfliction.

4.2.4. The temporary pause in hostilities between the Government of Israel and Hamas now offers children some desperately needed respite. However, this crisis is far from over for children: a pause and increased aid access only offers them the prospect of short-term survival, not long-term protection. Reflecting the recommendations made in this submission, the UK Government must do everything in its power to ensure the pause turns into a permanent ceasefire and an end to atrocities, and that all perpetrators of crimes and violations against children are held to account. The horrors children have endured over the past 15 months must never happen again – to any child anywhere.

5. What are the gaps in international humanitarian law when it comes to humanitarian access and what could be the UK Government’s role in addressing this?  What more could the Government do, with or without partners, to hold perpetrators of attacks and abuse against aid workers to account and encouraging adherence to international humanitarian law on these issues?

5.1.   The UK Government must utilise all diplomatic levers to increase compliance with international standards, laws and norms. A clear and consistent application of the law and public condemnation of violations of laws, norms and standards is the only way the UK can remain a credible voice on upholding IHL and other frameworks to protect civilians, and particularly children, in conflict. To ensure all relevant departments align their efforts, the UK Government should publish its first-ever cross-department Children and Armed Conflict Strategy to provide a comprehensive framework to address the unique vulnerabilities of children in conflict zones.

5.2.   The UK Government can utilise its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and Penholder on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict; Peacekeeping; Women, Peace and Security and key conflict contexts, including Myanmar, Yemen and Sudan, to be influential on humanitarian access.[1] As the main body with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the UNSC is one of the key avenues the UK can exercise its diplomatic influence.

5.3.   There are a number of UNSC resolutions relating to IHL, access and attacks on aid workers.[2] For example, the unanimously adopted Resolution 2417, which strongly condemns both the denial of humanitarian access and “the starving of civilians as a method[s] of warfare”. Since the adoption of 2417, the UK has helped establish the UN Group of Friends of Conflict and Hunger and made conflict and hunger a theme of the 2023 International Development Strategy White Paper. To support implementation, the UK should publish its own legal handbook on Conflict, Hunger and International Humanitarian Law and, further to this, should consult, promote and encourage the incorporation of tangible measures outlined in documents such as the Practical Measures to Prevent and Mitigate Conflict-Induced Food Insecurity into the training and best practice guidance of armed actors.

5.4.   Last year (2024) was the deadliest year ever for aid workers. The alarming rise in attacks against humanitarian workers necessitates urgent action from the UK to enhance their protection. The UK has co-sponsored a UN Security Council Resolution (2730) that condemns rising attacks on humanitarian workers and UN personnel, urging all conflict parties to ensure their safety and access. The Government must intensify efforts to implement this Resolution, including advocating for adherence to international humanitarian law, supporting accountability measures for perpetrators, and increasing resources dedicated to the safety and security of those delivering life-saving assistance worldwide.

5.5.   There are also resolutions aimed at easing restrictions on humanitarian access such as Resolution 2664 (2022) on humanitarian exemptions to UN sanctions. This resolution sought to combat the unintended impacts of sanctions and counter-terrorism regulations on humanitarian access. In line with the spirit of this resolution, the UK Government should deliver on its White Paper (2023) commitment to introduce a tailored humanitarian exception across UK financial sanctions.

5.6.   Beyond condemnation of non-compliance to international frameworks, the UK Government must ensure that violations of the laws of war are met with concrete consequences – words without actions lead to cycles of impunity and cede space for malign actors to flout international standards. A key part of this is through supporting accountability mechanisms and bodies mandated to uphold international law and norms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice. In December 2019, the Rome Statute of the ICC was amended to include the intentional starvation of civilians as a war crime.  The UK Government should ratify this amendment on the starvation of civilians in non-international armed conflicts, legally recognising starvation as a weapon of war as a crime. 

5.7.   To uphold standards of conduct in conflict the government should work with parties to armed conflict to ensure their full compliance with IHL, IHRL and International Refugee Law, and their respect for norms and standards on civilian protection. This includes ensuring the UK’s own actions are both directly and indirectly upholding international standards in a clear and consistent manner.

5.8.   The UK should continue to engage, directly or indirectly, with all parties to conflict to ensure that children and other civilians can safely access life-saving assistance, protection and basic needs support to promote the protection of humanitarian action and access. The UK Government should prioritise and advocate for principled humanitarian action, avoiding undue interference or politicisation of aid by host state authorities, non-state actors and donor governments, with a particular focus on areas where the FCDO has active programming.

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