UKCES0025

Written evidence submitted by the Council on Geostrategy

1. The Council on Geostrategy is an independent non-profit organisation situated in Westminster. It focuses on shaping British strategic ambition in an international environment increasingly defined by geopolitical competition and the environmental crisis, so that the United Kingdom (UK) is best able to succeed and prosper in the twenty-first century.
2. This submission is from William Freer, Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy. He is part of the Council on Geostrategy’s Strategic Advantage Cell, which focuses on UK force posture, allies and partners, space, and hypersonic weapons.

What role does the UK play in European and NATO deterrence?

3. It is important to first understand what deterrence is, and what kind of deterrence NATO is trying to achieve. Deterrence is the ability to stop a rival from undertaking a course of action one finds undesirable. This makes deterrence as an alliance more difficult as individual members may have different views on what constitutes undesirable behaviour. In relation to NATO, deterrence means deterring any potential state from initiating an armed attack against any member of the alliance. By far the most serious potential aggressor is Russia.
4. Deterrence can take one of two principal forms: 1. Deterrence by punishment, which involves maintaining the military capability, and demonstrating the political will to use it, to punish undesirable actions; and 2. Deterrence by denial, which involves maintaining the military capabilities to deny an opponent the ability to pursue their goals at an acceptable cost.
5. Further to this, deterrence can be either direct or extended: 1. Direct Deterrence is where a country takes measures and signals its willingness to respond if it comes under direct attack; 2. Extended deterrence is where a country takes measures and signals its commitment to defend others should they come under attack.
6. Extended deterrence, both by denial and by punishment, is most relevant to the role the UK plays in European and NATO deterrence. Extended deterrence is more complicated than direct deterrence. It is harder to convince an adversary that a country is willing to use a direct and forceful response for an act directed at an ally, especially in the case of actions by a nuclear-armed adversary towards a non-nuclear ally.
7. Both UK nuclear and conventional forces make significant contributions to deterring attack against any member of the alliance. The UK is one of three nuclear armed members in NATO, the other two being the United States (US) and France, but one of only two nuclear custodians of the alliance. Both the US and the UK officially declare their nuclear forces to the defence of NATO, while France does not.[1] These declarations are heavily reliant on credible signalling. The deployment of British forces to NATO members, especially those which share a border with Russia, alongside regular statements from military and political figures, are some of the methods HM Government uses to signal its determination.
8. The UK’s nuclear arsenal comes in the form of Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carried on nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The UK possesses four Vanguard class SSBNs to ensure that one is out on patrol at any given time (this is necessary because of the way maintenance cycles work). This is known as the Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD). The Vanguard class will be replaced by the Dreadnought class from the 2030s:
1. CASD ensures that NATO has a second nuclear decision making centre, which significantly bolsters deterrence. Any adversaries must be certain neither the US nor the UK would be willing to use their nuclear weapons in defence of the alliance. In addition to this, the use of extremely difficult to locate SSBNs helps provide a credible second strike capability.
2. However, CASD has come under increasing pressure in recent years. The process for replacing the Vanguard class should have begun in the early 2010s with an in-service date for the mid-2020s, but the 2010 Defence Review delayed the process by five years to save money.[2] This has meant that the Vanguard class submarines are now serving well beyond their intended lifetime, which has resulted in additional maintenance problems and longer patrols for the crew. The time spent on CASD patrol over the last few years has almost doubled from a usual patrol of around three months to now around six months.[3]
9. The nuclear deterrent is by far the most significant contribution the UK makes to NATO collective deterrence. Given uncertainty over American strategic priorities, ensuring unbroken CASD patrols, providing adequate protection for CASD patrols, and accelerating the construction of the Dreadnought class, should be the absolute priorities of UK defence policy.
10. In addition to the nuclear deterrent, the UK’s conventional forces make several meaningful contributions:
1. The British armed forces add to the overall mass of NATO’s military strength, though they have been dangerously hollowed out over the last 20 years.
2. British naval power is vital to protecting the high north from the modernised Russian Northern Fleet, which has had a suite of new submarines and surface vessels entering service in recent years including the new Yasen class nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) and the new Borei class SSBN. Russia plans to build ‌up to 25 of these submarines.[4] The Royal Navy is still the most powerful European NATO fleet, but it has suffered from several issues of maintenance difficulties, reduced ship numbers, and problems with recruitment and retention – all in part due to underfunding by successive governments.
3. Forward deployed British Army elements help contribute towards making the UK’s extended nuclear deterrence more credible and Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft help police NATO’s skies. The British Army’s formations – in theory, two divisions – help provide a mix of forces able to reinforce NATO in a full-scale conflict or respond quickly to contingencies in or beyond Europe. However, underinvestment in those formations, as well as enablers such as strategic airlift and strategic sealift, would make this difficult in practice. Just under 20 years ago, the Royal Air Force had at its disposal four C-17 Globemasters and 50 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft as well as 16 VC-10 and nine Tristar tankers.[5] Today, these have been reduced to eight C-17 Globemasters and 22 A400M transport aircraft and just nine A330 tankers.[6] Similarly, between 2009 and 2023, the number of militarily useful British flagged-vessels declined from 841 to 495.[7] If the British Army is unable to get to Europe, it is not particularly useful to NATO.

What should a NATO-first approach look like?

11. A NATO-first approach should not be seen as a NATO-only approach. The UK, as well as many other NATO allies, has important interests beyond the NATO area of operations. 2025 will see a British Carrier Strike Group (CSG) deploy to the Indo-Pacific, but this does not mean the UK is ignoring its NATO duties. For one, as in 2021, the CSG will also operate in the Euro-Atlantic as it moves towards the Indo-Pacific; in 2021, for example, HMS Defender broke away from the CSG in the Eastern Mediterranean to challenge Russian claims in the Black Sea. For another, this approach is fully in line with the thinking of other European NATO allies: in 2024, a French CSG deployed to the Indo-Pacific, following an Italian CSG in 2023.
12. The ultimate litmus test for a NATO-first approach is to continue to deter a Russian attack against any member of the alliance and, if necessary, defeat any attack if one materialises. The level of force required by the alliance to do this will evolve depending on the size and capability of Russia’s armed forces and the political intent of its leaders:
1. Hypothetically, were Russia to disarm, then the UK could still pursue a NATO-first approach with almost no forces earmarked for Europe. On the other extreme, if Russia were to move from a partial mobilisation footing to a war footing, e.g., by devoting over 40% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence, as opposed to the current level of 8-10% and the US were to turn isolationist, then the UK would likely have to earmark all of its forces to Europe to follow a NATO-first approach.
13. A NATO-first approach should see the UK focus on where it can best add value by aiming to compliment the existing capabilities of allies, rather than duplicate them. This would see the UK develop a more focused force which places a greater priority on naval and air power. It makes more sense for the UK’s allies along NATO’s eastern flank and in central Europe to focus on generating land power and for the UK to focus on other NATO needs. Given the fact Russia failed to conquer Ukraine and has suffered enormous losses (including the irreplaceable erosion of its vast stockpile of legacy Soviet equipment) and the build-up of brigades available to NATO (see paragraph 16b below), the balance of power on land between the alliance and Russia is the most in favour of NATO it has been since the early 1990s.

Where are the current capability gaps amongst the European Allies of NATO?

14. If the US military presence in Europe were to disappear overnight, European NATO allies would face serious capability gaps. However, this question is less pertinent as the US is unlikely to fully withdraw from Europe. Instead, the key question European members of NATO should be asking themselves is twofold:
1. Which US capabilities are likely to be re-prioritised towards the Indo-Pacific as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military build-up continues, especially if a conflict were to break out in the Indo-Pacific?
2. Which of those gaps are most urgent for the European allies of NATO to fill?
15. Current US military presence in Europe sits at around 100,000 personnel (up from a post-Second World War low of 66,000 in 2013).[8] There is a mix of permanent and temporary deployments. Current permanent deployments include six Arleigh Burke class destroyers, multiple fighter-jet squadrons alongside a number of support aircraft (such as in-flight refuelling), and five Brigade Combat Teams.[9] In addition there are often visiting forces present such as an aircraft carrier (sometimes more than one), amphibious ready group, a number of logistics ships, and additional air assets:
1. For reference, the six Arleigh Burke class destroyers bring with them 576 missile cells known as vertical launch systems (VLS). The VLS firepower which these ships bring (including high-end Ballistic Missile Defence and strike capabilities) is greater than the French and Italian navies combined.[10]
2. It is also worth noting that the US possesses 52 operational SSNs, whereas European NATO possesses 10 (five British and five French), and roughly 60 Patriot missile batteries, whereas European NATO possesses around 30.[11] Although most of these US assets are not deployed in Europe, the withdrawal of those that are would leave a significant gap. There has been evidence over the last couple of years that the UK has had to rely on US SSNs to provide escort to CASD patrols owing to lack of available British SSNs.[12]
16. The US is likely over the coming years to redeploy ships, submarines, airborne assets, and missile defences away from Europe. Its land forces are of less use in the Indo-Pacific, so are more likely to stay:
1. The gaps that would be most sorely felt are at sea; the defensive and offensive firepower of the US surface fleet presence in Europe would require billions to fill, and crucially, it would take some years for European countries to build the necessary ships. The reduced presence of US SSNs would also be sorely felt, especially as Russia modernises its own SSN fleet.
2. NATO strength on land is in need of expansion, but many allies are already on top of this issue: Poland is generating six to eight new brigades (two new divisions), Finland joining NATO adds eight brigades, Sweden joining adds another four brigades, Norway is generating two new brigades and several others are either generating new brigades or turning existing ones into modern and deployable formations. Yet, at sea, much of Europe’s naval power has been allowed to atrophy over the last three decades.
17. The withdrawal of US naval power from Europe would place an even heavier burden on the UK as Europe’s premier naval power, a burden it would struggle to fill if it is attempting to generate a balanced force which duplicates the armies of Europe. As of last year, 25% of NATO’s standing maritime forces were provided by the Royal Navy, with much of the rest coming from the US.[13]

What could the UK learn from its NATO European allies on improving military and industrial capability?

18. There are a number of lessons which could be learnt from European allies, in particular those along NATO’s northern and eastern flanks. These include the necessity of investing more in defence to generate credible deterrence, how to build resilience, and how to communicate with the public.
1. Investing more in defence: Multiple NATO European allies have greatly increased their investment in defence in light of the worsening security environment. On average, European NATO spend on defence (excluding the UK) from 2021 (before Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine) to 2024 increased from 1.62% of GDP to 2.18% of GDP.[14] Whereas UK defence spending increased from 2.29% of GDP to 2.33% of GDP, a far smaller relative increase. This poor record is mitigated partly by the fact the UK was already spending more than most allies, but some of the increases have been very impressive. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Poland have all increased their defence spending by over one percentage point of GDP, with several others, such as Sweden, Czechia, and Lithuania not far behind. Western European NATO countries, including the UK, risk being left behind by their ‘frontline’ allies. It is worth noting that, in 2014, the UK was the third highest defence spender in NATO in terms of GDP per capita, but as of last year, it had dropped to the ninth highest. Given announcements on plans to further increase spending from several countries just behind the UK on defence spending, this trend only looks set to continue.
2. Building up resilience: Many allies along NATO’s northern and southern flanks are better at building resilience into their defence posture and are increasingly embedding security needs in other policy areas. There is a wealth of examples to choose from.
1. Sweden denied permits for a number of wind farms in its waters due to concerns these could reduce the effectiveness of radar designed to warn of Russian missile attack.[15] Sweden also has a ‘Civil Contingencies Agency’ with over 1,200 employees, one of the primary responsibilities of which is to help society prepare for crises and the consequences of war.
2. Finland has developed what it calls a ‘comprehensive security’ designed to last across governments and which a ‘Security Strategy for Society’ is a centrepiece of.[16]
3. Poland has spent its increased defence expenditure wisely through a mix of off the shelf purchases to build up capability quickly, such as over 800 JASSM-ER cruise missiles from the US, with orders which require production to be established in Poland (or orders with Polish defence firms). This is part of a large-scale ‘Polonisation’ move in defence procurement which aims for 50% of production and purchases to take place in Poland.[17]
3. However, it is important to recognise that building resilience alone is not sufficient. The UK, and its allies, should develop strategies which put NATO on the front foot and unbalance adversaries.
4. Communicating with the public: Countries closest to Russia are far better at communicating the threat of conflict and the need to invest in deterrence. In Sweden, for example, a brochure entitled ‘In case of crisis or war’ is sent out to every household by the Civil Contingencies Agency.[18] This is not scaremongering, it is an honest conversation with the public about the seriousness of the situation. In the UK, according to polling, the general public still views international terrorism as the most severe threat to the UK’s national security.[19]

What role do the UK’s non-NATO commitments play in European security?

19. Other than the US, the UK is one of the few NATO members capable of conducting meaningful military operations outside of the European theatre. However, as the size of the British Armed Forces have been reduced, especially in their enablers such as the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (and as outlined in paragraph 10c), this capacity has declined in recent years. The UK has several non-NATO commitments which make a meaningful contribution towards European Security, primarily those in the Middle East and in the Indo-Pacific:
1. Middle East: Instability in the Middle East can have a direct impact on the security picture in Europe. Migration flows as a result of conflict and interruptions to the flow of maritime trade are the two most severe consequences, both of which have been seen over the last decade in Syria and the Red Sea, respectively. Britain has an array of military bases in the region, including RAF Akrotiri, the Joint Logistics Support Base at Duqm, and the United Kingdom Naval Support Facility in Bahrain. In addition to these bases and the forces deployed to them, there is a regular presence of visiting or transiting UK forces, although this presence has been much reduced in recent years. Before the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, approximately 12% of global trade flowed through the Suez Canal, most of it between Europe and Asia.
2. Indo-Pacific: Events in the Indo-Pacific are of great importance to the security of Europe. Estimates vary, but the economic fallout from a potential attempted Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be enormous, and make the fallout from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine pale in comparison: some project it would cost 10% of global GDP.[20] The UK military presence in the region includes regular visits by naval and air forces in addition to the permanent presence of two Offshore Patrol Vessels, and growing defence industrial collaboration such as AUKUS with Australia and GCAP with Japan. In comparison to the balance of naval power between the US and the PRC, the British contribution is modest, but it helps significantly complicate decision making in Beijing by adding another powerful supporter of the free and open order to contend with.

18th January 2025