UKCES0002

Written Evidence submitted by the Human Security Centre.

Prepared for the UK House of Commons Defence Committee Inquiry into the UK contribution to European Security

Background

The Human Security Centre (HSC) is an international, independent, not-for-profit foreign policy think-tank based in London. The HSC adopts and promotes the concept of human security as a central pillar of foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

The author of this evidence, Dr Rowan Allport, is an HSC Deputy Director who leads the organisation’s security and defence policy activities. In addition to written submissions to relevant parliamentary committees, he has in the past provided oral evidence to inquiries by the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee and the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee.

Questions Addressed

This submission principally addresses the following inquiry areas of interest:

1. What role does the UK play in European and NATO deterrence?
2. What should a NATO-first approach look like?
3. What are the UK's current military commitments to NATO and in what time frame can these be met?
4. Where are the current capability gaps amongst the European Allies of NATO?
5. Where do NATO Allies rely on the UK to provide a unique capability?
6. What areas could the UK rely on NATO European Allies to provide specialist capabilities?
7. What role do the UK's non-NATO commitments play in European security?
8. What is the contribution to European security of the UK's bilateral and multilateral relationships in Europe which exist outside of NATO?

Summary

• The UK plays an important role in the deterrence posture of Europe and NATO, including in the nuclear, conventional, intelligence gathering, diplomatic, economic, industrial, geographic and infrastructural realms.
• The UK has had a ‘NATO-first’ approach since at least the latter half of the 1960s, and adjustments since that point have largely been around the degree of absolutism of focus on NATO. Further orientating UK defence policy around the Alliance would have to centre on an increase in the overall resources for defence to represent meaningful change.
• NATO is revising its posture and planning for defending Europe. The details of the UK's current commitments to the continent's defence are classified, although certain elements of it, most notably ground forces, can be deduced from current deployments, exercises, force structure, and policy statements.
• Capability gaps exhibited by European NATO members are rooted in a mix of post-Cold War policy decisions and defence spending reductions. While they vary from nation to nation, they include shortfalls in air and missile defence, land, maritime and air and space capabilities, force enablers, recruitment and retention, and defence-industrial capacity.
• Capabilities that the UK is relatively well-positioned to provide in comparison to most of its European NATO Allies include strategic nuclear forces, intelligence, airlift, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), conventional precision strike, arctic operations, special forces, and leadership/rapid response.
• The UK could to an extent rely on European NATO Allies to provide land force mass, non-strategic nuclear forces, and logistics and basing support.
• Outside of NATO, the UK supports the security of Europe through bilateral efforts such as the Lancaster House treaties with France and multilateral arrangements such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). Defence-industrial cooperation also supports collective defence.
• UK efforts to support global security and stability play both a direct and indirect role in supporting European security, with the anti-ISIS campaign being an example of the former and the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) Treaty the latter.

What role does the UK play in European and NATO deterrence?

1. The MoD’s 2019 Joint Doctrine Note 1/19 Deterrence: the Defence Contribution puts forward the NATO definition of deterrence as: “The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act.”[1] NATO states that “The Alliance deters aggression by maintaining a credible deterrence and defence posture based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities.”[2]
2. The Integrated Review Refresh of 2023 states that the UK will take an “integrated approach to deterrence and defence” as part of an effort to “deter, defend and compete across all domains”. Deterrence is a cross-government endeavour, and can also include measures that are fully or in part outside of defence, such as the threat of economic and political sanctions, or information operations.[3]
3. The UK’s primary contributions to NATO deterrence can be identified as:

1. The UK nuclear deterrent. NATO is a nuclear alliance, with three member states possessing nuclear weapons and others participating in ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements. The UK’s only nuclear weapons system, built around the Trident D5 missile, is “assigned to the defence of NATO” while remaining under UK national control.[4]
2. Conventional, special forces, missile defence, space and cyber. The UK's traditional conventional forces consisting of the Royal Navy (inclusive of the Royal Marines), Royal Air Force, and British Army, as well as joint components such as the Directorate of Special Forces, act as the UK’s major non-nuclear military contribution to deterring attacks on Europe and NATO.
3. Intelligence gathering. The UK’s primary intelligence agencies, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), the Security Service (MI5), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Defence Intelligence (DI) provide the UK Government with one of the most capable intelligence gathering capabilities in the world.
4. Diplomatic. In addition to being a leading member of NATO, UK diplomatic influence can be exerted to further deterrence goals through channels including its position as one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, leadership of the Commonwealth, and close bilateral relationship with the United States.
5. Economic and industry. As the world's sixth largest economy, the UK possesses an ability to generate substantial military power that can in part be facilitated using its sovereign defence industry. Britain's role in the global economy also provides pathways for an outsized role in sanctions enforcement.
6. Geographic and infrastructural. The UK’s physical position relative to NATO’s potential areas of operations (including the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap, Baltic Sea and Eastern Europe) provides a balance between proximity, security and available infrastructure. Bases in Gibraltar and Cyprus under UK sovereign control can also support Alliance activity.

What should a NATO-first approach look like?

4. The phrase 'NATO-first' should be seen as a political signal of the UK's commitment to the Alliance that seeks to differentiate the NATO-centric but at least rhetorically more global vision of the last government. UK defence policy has been 'NATO-first' since at least the defence white paper of 1966 and the supplementary policy documents of 1967 and 1968, with the withdrawal from 'East of Suez' being announced in the 1967 paper and accelerated in its 1968 counterpart, with the latter noting that "Britain’s defence forces, apart from those needed to meet certain residual obligations to dependent territories...should...be concentrated in Europe”.[5] This remained the case for the rest of the Cold War. The 1981 defence review noted that NATO “is at the top of the Government’s priorities.”[6]
5. At the end of the Cold War, NATO remained central to UK defence policy, although a broader range of potential contingencies were increasingly envisaged. The 1998 SDR pivoted towards expeditionary warfare, and stated that with regards to a strategic attack on NATO, “No threat on this scale is in prospect.”.[7] Nevertheless, this was caveated with a warning that “We need, however, to retain a basis on which we could reconstitute larger capabilities should a strategic threat to NATO ever begin to re-emerge.”[8]
6. The 2015 NSS & SDSR marked the beginning of a pivot back to NATO in its traditional territorial defence role following Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine. This process was further advanced in the 2021 Integrated Review and the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh. Despite this, the former document in particular sought to emphasise global engagement – particularly in the Indo-Pacific – at least in part as a component of the post-Brexit 'Global Britain' concept. Nevertheless, the operational resources allocated to such tasking were minimal. The two most notable initiatives to emerge were the AUKUS security partnership and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), with the latter seeing the UK work in partnership with Italy and Japan to develop a new combat aircraft system.
7. Mirroring the limited nature of the Integrated Review's pivot to the Indo-Pacific, it can be anticipated that policy changes resulting from a 'NATO-first' approach will be limited. AUKUS is excluded from the current defence review, and GCAP is highly unlikely to be cancelled. The UK's Indo-Pacific commitments are generally limited to the point that no meaningful benefit to NATO taskings could be obtained from ending them. Similarly, ongoing tensions in the Middle East with regard to terrorism and the activities of Iran and its proxies make substantial disengagement hard to envisage.
8. It is important that the committee note that the UK’s commitment to NATO necessitates engagement beyond Europe but within NATO jurisdiction. Notably, under the Atlantic Treaty, the UK is committed to the defence of the continental United States (including Alaska and the Aleutian Islands under that state’s jurisdiction) and Canada.[9] This means that were – for example – China to attack these territories as part of a plan to prevent US intervention in an invasion of Taiwan, Article 5 would likely be invoked and it would be expected that NATO members would contribute to supporting US security.
9. In terms of what a 'NATO-first' approach should look like, the most succinct answer is "the same but more". This means that the broad balance of NATO and other taskings is currently correct, but the pool of forces is too small. Specific areas in which these additional resources could be used include increasing armed forces readiness and improving UK homeland defence – including air and missile defence – in the context of its NATO role.

What are the UK's current military commitments to NATO and in what time frame can these be met?

10. NATO is implementing a revision of its contingency plans and a restructuring of how it generates forces to respond to contingencies.

1. In 2020, NATO agreed on a new Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), which identified Russia and terrorist groups as the primary threat to the Alliance.[10] In 2022, the Alliance published a new NATO Strategic Concept which identified Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”[11]  This replaced its 2010 concept which took a more benign view of Moscow. New Political Guidance for Defence Planning was approved in February 2023.
2. At the July 2023 Vilnius Summit, a new set of military operational plans was approved. Building on the already approved Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) Area of Responsibility (AOR)-Wide Strategic Plan (SASP), these reportedly include three regional plans (divided into North, Central and Southern Europe), and five domain-specific plans (air, land, sea, cyber and space), with additional plans for logistics and sustainment.[12] These plans inform the Force Structure Requirement (FSR), which outlines the resources necessary for NATO to execute said plans. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a NATO pivot to ‘forward defence’, with an intention to defend “every inch” of NATO territory – a policy of deterrence by denial – rather than accept that in some scenarios areas may be lost temporally and have to be liberated later.[13] The Baltic States were a particular area of focus. While Germany and Canada, the framework nations for the Lithuania and Latvia enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) units, respectively, opted to increase the forces they fielded by deploying additional equipment and personnel to these states, the UK opted to keep most of the additional assets earmarked for Estonia in the UK.[14]
3. It has been reported that in spring 2024, the Allies were presented with a list of the ‘Minimum Capability Requirements' required by NATO to achieve its goals. Amongst the requirements are reportedly an increase in the number of combat brigades from 82 to 131, and anti-aircraft units from 293 to 1,467. Final decisions on implementation – including on which member state delivers what – are due to be taken by the October 2025 NATO ministerial meeting.[15] The committee may wish to inquire as to any changes regarding the UK’s contribution to these new requirements. It has been reported in the media that NATO’s ‘Capability Target 2025’ has amongst other UK shortcomings identified a limited ability to defend the British Isles against missiles.[16]
4. Under the new NATO Force Model, around 100,000 (Tier One) personnel are held at up to 10 days readiness; around 200,000 at approximately 10-30 days readiness (Tier Two); and around 500,000 at 30-180 days readiness (Tier Three). The force is now led by the Allied Reaction Force (ARF).[17]

11. The UK's commitments to NATO include:

1. The UK’s nuclear deterrent. This is declared to the defence of NATO, although its use would ultimately be a national decision. Importantly, the UK is an Alliance member that provides an additional centre of decision-making that would in extremis allow for a nuclear response in defence of the UK or its Allies without US participation or consent.
2. Participation in the NATO command structure. The UK has a substantial footprint within NATO’s institutions. Notably, the current Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe has been held by a series of British senior officers continuously for over twenty years. Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), the central command of NATO maritime forces, is based in Northwood and headed by a British Vice Admiral.
3. Participation in and facilitation of exercises featuring NATO member states. The training and interoperability requirements of NATO see the UK both participate in and host relevant exercises. The latter include the RAF-led Cobra Warrior and Royal Navy-led Joint Warrior.
4. Forces deployed forward routinely on NATO tasking. These include the UK-led enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup in Estonia (with the balance of the component unit’s brigade held at readiness to reinforce it in the UK) and a Light Cavalry Squadron in Poland under Operation Cabrit. Periodic air policing missions in the Baltic states and Iceland are also undertaken as NATO tasking.
5. Force elements earmarked for NATO tasking in a crisis. Full details of the UK’s commitment to NATO are classified.[18] For land forces, it is the stated intent for the UK to provide one of two Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO, built around the UK-led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).[19] However, the British Army alone is not currently able to supply the formations (which would require a minimum of two divisions and corps-level units) necessary for such a force. Given the commitment of a brigade to Estonia, current estimates being that only a further one understrength combat brigade and a Deep Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team are available to the corps, with the force also suffering from an overall shortfall of enablers.[20] Real-world activities in pursuit of the corps target have included the recent resubordinating of 1 Combat Aviation Brigade Combat Team, 8 Engineer Brigade and 7 Air Defence Group to the ARRC. The subordination of 16 Air Assault Brigade Combat Team to the 1st (UK) Division and the statement in the MoD's 2021 Future Soldier plan that it is intended that the division is to "lead for delivery of land operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and offers NATO the agility to command operations on its flanks" potentially indicates an ambition to deploy at least elements of two divisions (the other being the UK’s notional “warfighting division”, 3rd (UK) Division.[21]) during a crisis in the NATO region.[22] Between July 2024 and January 2025, the 1st (UK) Division led the land component of the ARF under the command of NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps based in Milan, Italy, with 7 Light Mechanised Brigade Combat Team as the division’s major land formation.[23] For the Royal Navy, efforts supporting the defence of Europe would concentrate on tasks including securing NATO’s sea lines of communication, ensuring the continued operation of the UK nuclear deterrent, long-range conventional precision strike and support of forces ashore. The RAF would be tasked with missions including homeland defence, maritime patrol, intelligence gathering, surveillance & reconnaissance, long-range precision conventional strike and air support of deployed forces.
6. Forces based in the UK that participate in peacetime national tasking 'dual-hatted' as a NATO mission. This includes the UK incorporation into NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence System, which utilises UK-based assets, including radar systems and combat aircraft kept on quick reaction alert.
7. Basing facilities. Non-UK NATO forces based in the UK are chiefly from the US. They include offensive air power and special forces and force enablers including in-flight refuelling, reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering, logistic support and missile defence elements.

12. On 2 November 2022, during an oral evidence session, former Defence Secretary Sir Ben Wallace KCB offered to privately brief the Defence Committee in private regarding the details of the UK forces committed to NATO.[24] Presumably, this offer is still valid under the current administration.

Where are the current capability gaps amongst the European Allies of NATO?

13. It should be noted that not all capability shortfalls amongst European NATO members apply uniformly. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, current capability gaps among European NATO members include:

1. Spending shortfalls. While significant defence spending levels will not automatically result in military capabilities, they are a prerequisite. Although a majority of NATO members now meet or exceed the long-standing 2% of GDP target, this is increasingly seen as inadequate, and spending levels are increasingly divergent. For example, Germany met the 2% target in 2024, while Poland is scheduled to spend 4.7% in 2025 and Finland 3.3% in 2032.[25]
2. Air and Missile Defence. Ground-based air defence capabilities were rapidly drawn down following the end of the Cold War as land forces pivoted to peacekeeping and expeditionary operations against lesser powers. The return of an environment in which control of the air is no longer guaranteed either against conventional aircraft or the various types of uncrewed aerial vehicles has led to a significant shortfall in capabilities. Effective ballistic missile defence systems are largely a post-Cold War development, but as of yet, only a limited capability is fielded by European NATO members on land and at sea. For both air and missile defence, munitions stockpiles fall short of requirements for prolonged high-intensity fighting.
3. Land capabilities. A pivot away from the prospect of fighting massed armoured battles against the Soviet Union naturally resulted in both a contraction of land force size and a move away from sustaining expensive heavy ground forces. This trend continued as NATO moved towards peacekeeping and expeditionary operations, in which heavy platforms such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and heavy artillery were often judged inappropriate and impractical for use on a large scale. Stockpiles of munitions and other consumables required to keep available forces operational are also limited, and readiness shortfalls are an issue.
4. Maritime Capabilities. While bringing a broad array of capabilities to NATO, chief amongst the Cold War taskings of European NATO navies were anti-submarine warfare and mine-countermeasures operations. The drawdown of Moscow’s maritime capabilities and the limited threat from other sources led to European NATO navies making major cutbacks. While Russia’s maritime capabilities remain limited compared to NATOs as a whole, they retain a core of capable submarines, older but upgraded large and newer light surface vessels, as well as maritime attack aircraft. The new trend towards sabotaging undersea infrastructure has introduced a new area where European NATO’s defensive capabilities are weak.
5. Air Capabilities. As with land forces, the end of the conventional Soviet threat led to a steady drawdown in European NATO air capabilities. This is chiefly manifest as a force that is sized and equipped to support the type of limited missions the Alliance has undertaken over the last thirty years. Specific shortfalls include standoff munitions stockpiles, as well as suppression/destruction of enemy air defences (S/DEAD) capabilities.
6. Space Capabilities. European space-based capabilities are limited, with a majority of requirements supplied to the US. At present, several European member states sustain their own satellite networks for military communication, and France leads Europe in ground surveillance and intelligence-gathering space efforts. The pan-European Galileo project also provides an alternative to the US GPS navigation system.
7. Force Enablers. Across all fields, the shortfalls of those capabilities required to support the front are keenly felt across European NATO members. These include airlift, sealift, in-flight refuelling, electronic warfare, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
8. Defence Industrial Capacity. As has been demonstrated by efforts to support Ukraine, European NATO members cannot produce platforms and simple and complex munitions at scale at anything like short notice.
9. Recruitment and retention shortfalls. The combination of Europe being an 'ageing continent' combined with public spending pressures making military service less attractive has resulted in many member states experiencing personnel shortages.

Where do NATO Allies rely on the UK to provide a unique capability?

14. Rather than truly ‘unique’ capabilities the UK can provide to NATO, it is more helpful to refer those areas in which the UK has a disproportionate strength compared to its European Allies (excluding the US, which has greater relative strength in most fields). In this context, examples include:

1. Strategic nuclear forces. The UK’s strategic deterrent provides a survivable nuclear force outside of the control of the US which is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on an opponent. In Europe, only France possesses a similar capability.
2. Intelligence. The UK's extensive intelligence—gathering capabilities are bolstered by being the only European member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement.
3. Airlift. Despite cuts including the sales of its C-130J Hercules transport fleet, the UK still possesses C-17 and A-400M transport aircraft, plus a relatively large fleet of Chinook helicopters.
4. Anti-submarine warfare. Despite a much-reduced fleet, the UK remains a world leader in ASW, chiefly through its Astute-class submarines, P-8 Poseidon aircraft and Type-23 frigates, with the latter being replaced in the ASW role by Type 26 frigates.
5. Conventional precision strike. The UK can currently deliver conventional precision strikes using Tomahawk missiles launched from Astute-class submarines and air-launched Storm Shadow cruise missiles.
6. Arctic operations. The UK possesses extensive experience in operating in the High North in the maritime and land environment. While this will suffer due to the retirement of the Albion-class landing ships, all indications are that operations in the region will become increasingly important, particularly with Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership.
7. Special Forces. The UK retains some of the most capable special forces in existence and the ability and willingness to deploy them. It is noteworthy that according to a leaked document from the US Department of Defense in 2023, the British special forces contingent made up more than half (50 of 97, although the MoD stated that the leak in its entirety “demonstrated a serious level of inaccuracy”) of such Allied personnel in Ukraine.[26]
8. Leadership and rapid reaction. The UK retains a leadership and convening role, as well as an ability and will to take unilateral action that serves to support NATO interests. An example of the latter was the decision to deliver anti-tank missiles to Ukraine immediately before Russia's 2022 invasion.

What areas could the UK rely on NATO European Allies to provide specialist capabilities?

15. The UK cannot and should not seek to provide the full spectrum of capabilities in-depth to NATO. Examples of where European Allies could provide support include:

1. Land force mass. Even under the most optimistic plans, the UK will not be in a position to provide the decisive land force element in a conflict in Eastern Europe. With regards to European NATO members, most of the mass will be provided by European powers such as Poland.
2. Sub-strategic nuclear forces. While the UK’s Trident D5 likely retains a sub-strategic role through the use of warheads set to a lower yield, Britain lacks an airborne component to its nuclear force that might be better suited to such missions. France possesses such a force independently, and several European NATO powers participate in a 'nuclear sharing' agreement with the US in which they can deploy US-owned and controlled nuclear weapons.
3. Logistics and basing. While adjacent to NATO’s primary maritime operating area, the UK is relatively distant from Eastern Europe. This necessitates a significant degree of dependency on countries that would host UK forces in wartime, including for logistics and basing.

What role do the UK's non-NATO commitments play in European security?

16. The UK’s non-NATO commitments – which I am interpreting to mean commitments outside the territorial defence of Europe (and, as noted, the US and Canada) – play both direct and indirect roles in European security. In a direct sense, such commitments serve to reduce the immediate security threat to Europe. The most prominent recent example of this was the UK's participation in the territorial defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, which reduced the threat of terrorist attacks in Europe by depriving the organisation of a secure base.
17. Supporting global stability in general facilitates prosperity and cohesion within Europe, reducing the potential for the rise of extremism and the opportunities for hostile powers including Russia to exploit such tensions. Potential future scenarios where the UK's non-NATO commitments could influence (although unlikely decisively) European security include the following:

1. The UK’s commitment to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean under Operation Kipion includes the facilitation of the flow of oil, gas and wider trade. The disruption of such activity – likely by Iran and/or through its proxies – could result in increasing fuel prices, placing both economic strains on Europe and increasing the leverage of Russia as an alternative gas and oil supplier.
2. A major conflict in the Indo-Pacific region – potentially initiated by China or North Korea – would trigger catastrophic disruption to the European and global economy. While the UK's role in the region is relatively minor, it can help enhance stability through initiatives such as the AUKUS security partnership and the GCAP. The Five Power Defence Arrangements between the UK, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore also provides a forum for regional military engagement.

What is the contribution to European security of the UK's bilateral and multilateral relationships in Europe which exist outside of NATO?

18. The Defence arrangements such as the bilateral Lancaster House treaties between the UK and France and the multinational Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) can serve to augment Europe’s deterrence capabilities by providing alternative conduits through which European security issues can be addressed. This is important when speed is required – a particularly challenging issue given NATO's thirty-two member states. Going forward, they are also likely to prove important should the US wish to take an increasingly hands-off approach to European security.
19. Industrial collaboration is also a major area of importance. European countries like France, Germany, and Italy contribute to joint procurement and development initiatives (e.g., Typhoon, Boxer and A400M), enhancing shared capabilities and reducing duplication.

6th January 2025