Written evidence submitted to the Foreign Committee’s Inquiry on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, December 2024 by Dr Merav Amir, Dr Moshe Behar, Dr Diana Dolev, Professor Hagar Kotef, Dr Maya Mukamel, Dr Idit Nathan, Mr Yair Perry, Ms Maya Reggev, Dr Lior Suchoy, Dr Yair Wallach (IPC0087)

Executive Summary

We write to you as a group of Jewish Israelis, citizens or residents of the UK, who came together to respond to the inquiry’s Call for Evidence.

We assume that the committee has already received evidence of Israel’s horrific and unprecedented violence in Gaza following Hamas’s heinous 7th of October attack. We accordingly hope that you have all the evidence required to establish the facts of Israel’s ongoing violations of international law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and potentially genocide. 

Our evidence focuses on the premise that the unprecedented military campaign in which Israel is engaged within Gaza and beyond is a symptom of its rapid transition to a non-democratic regime. We endeavour to demonstrate how the current Israeli government is increasingly employing non-democratic means whilst promoting authoritarian practices, displaying values that no longer align with fundamental British values.

We submit that: (1) Recognising this withdrawal from democracy should be a critical factor in bringing international pressure to bear on ending the war and the conflict, which in turn is necessary to save lives and prevent further violations of human rights; (2) Putting international  (British) pressure on the Israeli government to end its ongoing war is legitimate, since, as we evidence here, this government is becoming less and less democratic and legitimate. Such pressure is therefore necessary for the benefit and well-being of not only Palestinians but of Israeli Jews as well.

The cumulative impact of the bills, laws, policies and practices evidenced in this submission are transforming the Israeli regime into one that is non-democratic. They include the explicit and formal promotion of an apartheid regime both in the West Bank and in pre-1967 Israeli borders (vis-a-vis Palestinian citizens of the state); changing the constitutional structure of the state; eroding the system of checks and balances and dismantling the judiciary’s independence; a removal of accountability, including an active refusal to investigate war crimes; eroding freedoms such as speech, protest and academic freedom, and undermining individual rights; violating the status quo on holy sites, instigating regional instability; and causing intentional economic and other harm to its own citizens. All will be detailed and evidenced in the Annexes to this submission.

Therefore, the British government can no longer view the Israeli government as an ally. Rather, we call on the British government to employ all necessary sanctions against the Israeli government that would promote the end of the war, including:

●       Reassess relations with the current Israeli government, given it is dismantling the democratic rights of its citizens and others under its control, and its destabilising role in the region.

●       Impose political sanctions on extreme-right parties whose members have explicitly called for ethnic cleansing and genocide.

●       Expand the weapons embargo.

●       Avoid official contact with PM Netanyahu as long as the ICC warrants against him are in force.

These steps are critical to prevent the continued loss of Palestinian lives and the continuing devastation of Gaza. We see the Israeli violence unleashed in Gaza as part of the unprecedented and worrying internal attacks on democracy in Israel. As the Israeli government is busy dismantling internal checks and balances, it requires external ones to be imposed on it. We implore the British government to recognise this grave situation and to respond accordingly, leveraging its international power to stop the war.

Introduction

(1) We write to you as a group of Jewish Israelis, citizens or residents of the UK, who came together to respond to the inquiry’s Call for Evidence. None of us have ever submitted evidence to Parliament. We decided to do so now because we believe this is a moment of utmost urgency;  an unprecedented catastrophe for both Palestinians and Israelis.

(2) We believe that our perspective, as Jewish Israelis in Britain, Academics and Civil Society activists who are attuned to internal dynamics in Israel, is lacking from the discussion, and provides important insight. We are part of wider initiatives of Israelis abroad and in Israel, such as the letter calling for international sanctions on Israel to stop the war on Gaza, signed by 3,700 Israelis in Israel and worldwide[1]; and the recent letter to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, signed by more than 500 Israelis in the UK, calling for sanctions on extremist Israelis.[2] These interventions, like our own, brought together many Israelis who had not taken part previously in political mobilisation, and are moved to do so because of the urgency of the current moment.

(3) We assume that the inquiry has already received evidence on Israel’s horrific and unprecedented violence in Gaza following Hamas’s heinous 7th of October attack. And we hope that you have all the evidence required to establish Israel’s ongoing violations of international law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and potentially genocide. 

(4) Our view, based on our expertise, experience, our native knowledge of Hebrew, and the evidence presented here, is that the unprecedented military campaign that Israel is engaged with in Gaza and beyond is a dimension of its rapid transformation into a non-democratic regime. The evidence we submit here shows how the current Israeli government is increasingly employing non-democratic strategies. It promotes authoritarian practices and manifestly holds values which no longer align with fundamental British values. This withdrawal from democracy is a key enabling factor of Israel’s military attacks throughout the region.

(5) We are calling on the British government to recognise this and in response reassess relations with the current Israeli government. His Majesty’s Government must maintain its commitment towards all those living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, to ensure it is doing everything it can to defend and expand democratic freedoms in Israel/Palestine, and not to cooperate with Israel to facilitate their elimination.

(6) We submit that:

• These two processes are interlinked: the war and the anti-democratic overhaul launched by the government that came to power in December 2022. Therefore, the current government therefore has a vested interest in the continuation of the war, which allows it to destroy Gaza, extend its grip on the West Bank, occupy territory in Syria, carry out missile strikes on regional neighbours, and promote illiberal processes that undermine democracy within pre-1967 Israel.

• The regime the current Israeli government is establishing must accordingly be understood as a rogue regime, dangerous to the stability of the region, to international interests, and the wellbeing of Israel’s own citizens.

• Acting on this retreat from democracy is a critical dimension of bringing international pressure to bear on ending the war and the conflict, which is necessary to save lives and prevent further violations of human rights. As we evidence here, such pressure is necessary for the benefit and wellbeing of not only Palestinians but of Israeli Jews as well. 

• Putting pressure on the Israeli government to end its ongoing war is legitimate since, as we evidence here, it is becoming less and less democratic.

(7) In this document we demonstrate how democratic ideals, structures, and procedures have been undermined by the current Israeli government, moving the country away from fundamental values of Democracy, Rule of Law, Respect & Tolerance, and Individual Liberty. Our account is based on the extensive work of human rights organisations, investigative reporting, and our own research as scholars studying the topics.

(8) In summary, the current Israeli government:

1. Is further entrenching and explicitly endorsing and promoting an apartheid regime. The downgrading of civic rights for Palestinian citizens of Israel, the de-jure annexation of the West Bank, the extensive expansion of settlement activities, and the operations to ethnically cleanse and clear large parts of the Gaza Strip, are all one of a single agenda: the consolidation of a non-democratic regime of Jewish Israeli supremacy between the River and the Sea, and the exclusion and marginalisation of Palestinians within that new apartheid configuration.     
2. Is carrying out a judicial overhaul in an effort to dismantle the judiciary’s independence, the system of checks and balances and the separation of powers. These structural changes have led to an active refusal to investigate violations of human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity, some publicly evidenced.
3. Violated the status quo in all holy sites, thus leading to further regional and international instability. Such violations rest on deeply anti-democratic notions of Jewish supremacy that set the basis of the anti-democratic creep.
4. Has substantially reduced freedom of speech, freedom of protest, and academic freedom. The curtailment of these freedoms lead to a lack of clarity on the scale and consequences of the war by Israeli-Jews, as well as fear to call for the war to stop.
5. Is systematically engaging in torture, cruel and inhumane practices in its treatment of Palestinians, including Palestinian citizens of Israel. 
6. Has escalated practices of forced displacement, house demolitions and land confiscation of Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem in Israel, under pretence of security reasons, deepening tensions.
7. Intentionally led to economic harm to its own citizens through a patronage system, using political leverage to weaken the opposition and utilising the war budget to push more of its citizens into poverty.
8. Has been marginalising women from decision-making roles, and promoting discriminatory gender-related policies. Furthermore, the war itself, and the violence it entails, has been burdening and harming for women specifically exposing them to increased risk of domestic violence.
9. Ultimately, is waging this war not to protect the security of its citizens, but in ways that target and harm also its own citizens, above all the hostages and their families, as well as displaced citizens in both the northern and southern parts of Israel. It is failing its fundamental responsibility to ensure the safety, welfare, and rights of its people.  

(9) We cover each of these domains in the annexes below, and include references to more comprehensive reports for each section.

(10) The cumulative impact of the bills, laws, policies and practices evidenced here are transforming the Israeli regime to one that is non-democratic. Therefore, the British government can no longer view the Israeli government as an ally, as it does not share the same values. Rather, we call on the British government to employ all necessary sanctions on the Israeli government that would promote the end of the war, including:

●     Reassess relations with the current Israeli government, given it is dismantling the democratic rights of its citizens and others under its control, and its destabilising role in the region

●     Impose political sanctions on extreme-right parties whose members have explicitly called for ethnic cleansing and genocide

●     Expand the weapon embargo

●     Avoid official contact with PM Netanyahu as long as ICC warrants against him are in force

(11) These steps are critical to prevent the continued loss of Palestinian lives and devastation of Gaza. We see the Israeli violence unleashed in Gaza as part of the worrying internal attacks on democracy in Israel. As the Israeli government is busy dismantling internal checks and balances, it requires external ones to be pushed on it. We are imploring the British government to recognise this grave situation and to respond accordingly, leveraging its international power to stop the war.

Annex: Evidence demonstrating the spread of non-democratic policies and practices

1.     The consolidation of a regime of exclusive Jewish Israeli Domination and Supremacy in Israel and the Palestinian Territories

1.1. Since the current government came to power in 2022, it has pursued a set of reforms widely seen as leading to a regime change between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The new regime is built on the principles of Israeli sovereignty between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, over the entire territory of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories; formal and explicit Jewish supremacy and domination over Palestinians; and an invigorated settlement expansion, designed to extend Jewish control of land and space and marginalise Palestinians.

1.2 Current Government rapidly accelerates transition to a regime of Jewish Supremacy between the River and the Sea

(1) These steps accelerate trends that were already in place. Israel had long been understood internationally as an imperfect democracy within the 1967 “Green Line” borders, maintaining a “temporary” military occupation over the West Bank (and, indirectly, over Gaza) that was to end through peace talks. However, since 2015 the Israeli government increasingly described its rule over the West Bank as permanent. The 2018 “Nation-State Basic Law” defined Israel as an exclusively Jewish nation-state, and offered no commitment to equality or democracy. The Palestinian minority within Israel (a fifth of the citizenry) were not even mentioned in the Basic Law. In 2021-22, Israeli, Palestinian and international human rights organisations concluded that this configuration of Israeli rule over Israel/Palestine amounted to Apartheid.[3]    

(2) The current government has dramatically escalated the consolidation of this regime, by accelerating the annexation of the West Bank, preparing the ground for settlement and annexation of the Gaza Strip, and dismantling the democratic rights of Palestinian citizens within the Green Line. The Government’s Guiding Principles (December 2022) stated that “[t]he Jewish people have an exclusive and indisputable right to all parts of the Land of Israel”. Key human rights organisations in Israel warned that the government aimed to establish “Jewish supremacy as the central consideration in all government actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and within Israel.”[4]         
 

1.3 West Bank: Annexation and Settlement

(1) The new government soon embarked on the de-jure annexation of the West Bank.[5] The two extreme right-wing parties in the current government, the “Religious Zionism” party and “Otzma Yehudit” (Jewish Power) include in their platform explicit plans to formally annex the West Bank. For this purpose, they explicitly propagate a plan to ethnically cleanse most Palestinians from the entire region of Mandatory Palestine (referred to as “encouraging voluntary migration”)[6]. Since they came into power, both parties, with the support of many Parliament members from the Likud Party, have been working to carry out these plans. 

(2) Most directly, the execution of these plans is overseen by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, head of the “Religious Zionism” party, who is also a minister in the Defence Ministry. In his “Defence Ministry” portfolio, Smotrich has transferred the Civil Administration, the body responsible for administering the civilian population (Jewish Israeli settlers and Palestinians) in the Occupied West Bank from the hands of the IDF to those of the Ministry of Defence. The West Bank has been under military occupation since 1967; the IDF  is the de facto sovereign of this territory. Until 2023, the Civil Administration had operated under the authority of the IDF. By transferring the Civil Administration to the Ministry of Defence, Smotrich has made it answerable to the Israeli government. This move all but obliterates the distinction between Israel “proper” (the sovereign State of Israel inside the internationally recognised 1967 borders) and the Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank. While Israel has not formally announced its annexation of the West Bank, the Israeli government is now, operationally, directly in control of this territory. The transition facilitated the allocation of budgets to Jewish settlers and the expansion of settlement construction.[7]

(3) At the same time, a series of orders and regulations have been introduced to enforce the legal separation between Palestinians and Jews in the West Bank. These include explicit and implicit orders not to evacuate Jewish Israeli illegal outposts in the West Bank[8] while engaging in mass-scale house demolition of unregulated Palestinian construction[9]; launching extensive illegal settlement construction in the West Bank[10], and establishing formal discrimination in applying administrative arrest and detention only against Palestinians and not against Israeli Jews.[11]

1.4 Gaza War in the service of annexation and settlement

(1)  Such policies also guide the war effort in Gaza. The clearing of the northern part of the Gaza Strip - through forced removal of population, and the destruction of the built environment - is in concord with the right-wing plan to establish settlements in Gaza. While not adopted by the cabinet, this plan has been endorsed by numerous ministers and Knesset members, including from the ruling Likud party.[12] Government legislation also prepares the ground for such settlements.[13]

1.5  Jewish Supremacy in “Israel Proper”

(1) Within Israel ‘proper’, the government seeks to downgrade the legal rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel (a fifth of the citizenry) and potentially to exclude them from democratic participation and representation. A new amendment to the “Knesset Basic Law”, which has passed the first reading in the Knesset, expands dramatically the ability of the Central Election Committee to bar individuals and parties from running for election, under the pretext of “support for terrorism” (very broadly defined). “Terror supporters” is a right-wing euphemism for Palestinian citizens, and the bill is widely understood as an attempt to facilitate the disqualification of Arab political lists and their candidates while cementing right-wing control of the government.[14] At the same time, extremist Jewish parties face no such risk. Racist incitement, or opposition to Israel’s democratic character, would no longer be a reason to disqualify a party from running for elections. The minister for National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, was convicted several times for supporting terrorism and inciting violence. Yet, it is clear that he would not be barred under the new legislation. If the bill is approved and is implemented in a manner that severely hampers Palestinian participation in elections, it would render hollow the claim for democratic legitimacy and would tilt the Knesset heavily towards the populist hard-right. 

(2) The government has introduced numerous bills and policies designed to limit Palestinian participation in public life. These bills allow and facilitate: the exclusion of Palestinians from some residential areas; the deportation of family members of “terror activists” from Israel; the dismissal of teachers accused of being “terrorist sympathisers,” and the closure of their schools.[15] Numerous other bills are under consideration.        

1.6 Gaza, West Bank, Israel: A single logic
(1) The downgrading of civic rights for Palestinians within Israel, the de-jure annexation of the West Bank, the extensive expansion of settlement activities, and the operations to ethnically cleanse and clear large parts of the Gaza Strip, are all one of a single agenda: the consolidation of a non-democratic regime of Jewish Israeli supremacy between the River and the Sea, and the exclusion and marginalisation of Palestinians within that new Apartheid configuration.       

2.     Dismantling the judiciary’s independence, including an active refusal to investigate war crimes.

2.1 Immediately upon its election, the current Israeli government has been working to change Israel’s constitutional structure with an explicit aim to undermine the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers Israel has in place. As has been established by several organisations, these changes, also known as the judicial overhaul, amount to significantly eroding, if not cancelling, the democratic structure of the state,[16] eroding civil rights, human rights, and the rule of law.[17]

2.2 Undermining the independence of the judiciary

(1) The government has been successfully working to undermine the independence of the judiciary, through a series of measures including: (i) interfering with the process for judicial appointments across levels, effectively giving the government the power to appoint judges and prosecutors;[18] (ii) undermining the independence of the Attorney General and legal advisers for government ministries, effectively removing internal government legal oversight[19]; and (iii) eroding judicial review and removing constitutional review of legislation.[20]

(2) Ministers have openly threatened officials in the judiciary and other public servants, in an effort to intimidate them[21]. 

(3) The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has warned that if all proposed legislation passes, it “would seriously undermine the independence of courts in Israel, including the Supreme Court.”[22]

2.3 Undermining the independence of the Police

(1) Within two weeks of the far-right politician and Kahane supporter Itamar Ben-Gvir stepping into the Ministry of National Security office, a rushed amendment to the Police Ordinance was enacted. This amendment allowed Ben-Gvir to expand his control over the police and other law enforcement agencies.[23]

(2) Israel’s High Court of Justice has determined these changes to be an illegal step by the government.[24] Nevertheless, ministerial interference in police governance has been recorded at unprecedented levels, as Ben-Gvir had issued direct orders to police officers, intervened in investigations, and meddled with appointments in the police and prison services. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the head of Shin Bet was quoted saying to the Prime Minister “There is no police in Israel.”[25]

(3) According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, political interference in policing and law enforcement by Ben-Gvir is diminishing the rule of law, and is diminishing the personal safety of Israeli citizens. [26] The Minister’s control had been used to intensify non-democratic practices through further legislation, including: (i) limiting the freedoms of citizens without a trial or any legal processes[27]; (ii) privatisation of policing by expanding Civilian Defence Squads and unprecedented civilian armament. [28] Both measures are discriminatively implemented to arm primarily people with affiliation to right-wing parties[29]. In addition, Ben-Gvir is promoting a ‘National Guard’ that will be under his direct control, without the legal safeguards which exist for the police.[30]  

(4) This has led to selective and biased law enforcement, which explicitly targets the Palestinian citizens of Israel.[31]

2.4 A refusal to investigate war crimes

(1)  In the context of the current submission, undermining Israel’s judiciary means not only that its democratic structure is eroding within pre-1967 Israel. It also means that the war crimes committed in Gaza are not being investigated. As of November 2024, the military police has launched 80 investigations for war-related offences, and only 15 indictments against IDF soldiers have been filed,[32] even though many hundreds of soldiers have documented themselves committing acts which may amount to war crimes and even crimes against humanity on social media.[33] There is also substantial evidence that some official orders of the IDF during the war may constitute such crimes.[34] Yet despite the ample evidence, investigations are slow and limited.

(2) The lack of serious and independent investigation has already led the ICC to issue international arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Minister of Defence Gallant. It has also led the ICJ to reject Israel’s request to dismiss South Africa’s genocide case against it, and issue provisional measures.[35] Given the evident lack of serious internal investigation external intervention in Israel’s unlawful violence in Gaza is warranted.

(3)  In an ESRC funded research, Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir, signatories of this submission, have found evidence that the Attorney General has no intention of investigating many of these crimes. Officials have stated to us in interviews they do not see their roles as entailing investigating war crimes, even though they are the ones tasked with such investigations. Furthermore, official correspondence we reviewed entail hints for institutional coverup of such crimes.[36]

3.     Violations of status quo in all holy sites which generate regional and international instability.

3.1 A key part of the establishment of a rule based on Jewish supremacy in the land  between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is a new policy concerning the holy sites, mainly in Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus. The systematic violation of the status quo is a risk to the stability of the entire region, if not beyond.

3.2 Jerusalem

(1) The current government is systematically violating the status quo in the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the compound Haram al-Sharif/the Temple Mount, a holy site in Islam, and the holiest site for Jews. An Israel/Palestine scholar expert on the holy sites has recently noted that the status quo has essentially collapsed.[37] The result is heightened tension that threatens to disrupt the delicate balance at one of the world's most contested religious sites.[38] Several recent examples of violations include:

(i)  a visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound by Itamar Ben-Gvir, that took place In August 2024. Ben-Gvir was accompanied by Jewish Israelis who engaged in prayers, despite a longstanding ban on Jewish prayer at the site. This act was widely condemned as a provocation and a breach of the status quo.[39]

(ii) Also in August 2024, Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu expressed intentions to build a synagogue within the Al-Aqsa compound. This proposal was seen as a direct challenge to the existing status quo.[40]

(iii) A group of Jewish extremist Temple Mount activists aims to rebuild the Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount. Their activities include rehearsals of ancient religious rituals, and advocating for increased Jewish presence and prayer rights on the site. Scholars warn that these actions pose significant risks, including escalation of religious tensions, provocation of violent confrontations both in Israel and the Middle East, and undermining of political stability.[41]

(2) The violations have elicited strong responses from the global community. The UN deputy spokesman Farhan Haq described them as “counterproductive” and “excessively provocative,” emphasising that such conduct risks escalating tensions in an already fragile and sensitive region.[42] The French Foreign Ministry condemned Ben-Gvir's actions, calling them “unacceptable” and a "new provocation.”[43]

3.3 West Bank

(1) Similar violations take place in The Cave of the Patriarchs (Me'arat HaMachpelah in Hebrew and Al-Haram Al-Ibrahim in Arabic) in Hebron, a site which holds immense religious significance for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Violations include public and explicit statements by right-wing Israeli ministers and members of the Knesset in favour of altering the longstanding status quo between Jewish and Muslim worshippers[44]

(i) Since October 2023, Hebron's holy sites, particularly the Ibrahimi Mosque have undergone significant developments amid escalating regional tensions. In December 2024 Israeli forces installed a ceiling over the yard of the site. Palestinian officials have criticised this action, viewing it as an attempt to alter the mosque's historical and religious features. Ghassan al-Rajabi of the Hebron Endowments Authority described the move as a "grave assault" on the Muslim place of worship.[45]

(2) On several occasions, hundreds of Israeli settlers, accompanied by Israeli forces, entered Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, a site of religious significance traditionally associated with the biblical patriarch Joseph. On September 18 2024, Palestinians responded by throwing stones, and Israeli forces fired live ammunition. During these clashes, an ambulance transporting an infant to the hospital was obstructed, and paramedics were assaulted.[46]

4.     Limitations set on freedom of protest, academic freedom, and freedom of speech.

4.1 Since October 2023, there have been severe restrictions both in regulation and in practice on the freedoms of protest, speech, movement, press, and expression, creating a climate of fear and self-censorship.

4.2 Police violence and freedom of protest

(1) Police violence, which had long been widespread when policing protests by minority groups in Israel, has been increasingly employed as a tool to suppress dissent among the general public. Since 2020, violent practices have been increasing and becoming prevalent, reducing the right to protest.[47]

(2) Police have employed violent tactics during largely peaceful protests, including the use of stun grenades, water cannons, harassment, and physical force such as grabbing and forcibly detaining demonstrators.[48] These actions have raised serious concerns about the suppression of dissent and the erosion of democratic freedoms. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has been instrumental in directing these measures.[49]

(3) Police officers, both uniformed and plain-clothed, regularly photograph protesters, often using personal mobile phones and sharing images on WhatsApp to identify and detain protestors, bypassing due process.[50] 

(4) A proposed bill to curtail the independence of the Department of Internal Police Investigations (DIPI) is now being prepared.[51]

(5) Police have repeatedly prevented journalists from covering various events, sometimes using force, extreme violence, false arrests or lack of protection,[52] undermining freedom of press and the public's right to know.[53]

4.3 Freedom of movement and freedom of expression

(1) In December 2024, the Knesset passed a law allowing the courts to issue orders restricting citizens’ freedom of movement and expression without evidence or judicial process, and based solely only on ‘confidential police intelligence’. Experts warn that this new law would impose anti-terrorism measures within the criminal law realm, infringing on basic rights such as the right to due process.[54]

(2) Since October 7, 2023, freedom of speech in Israel has faced significant restrictions, particularly targeting Palestinian citizens and dissenting voices. Social media content critical of Israeli policies has been censored, with thousands of posts removed and numerous individuals investigated for "incitement."[55] Protests and expressions of solidarity with Gaza have been met with harsh crackdowns, creating a climate of fear and self-censorship that undermines democratic principles.

(3) Freedom of expression has been limited also at and by universities, disproportionately targeting Palestinian students and staff, often with limited evidence to substantiate accusations. Israeli universities and colleges initiated disciplinary actions against approximately 160 Palestinian students for social media posts, primarily those expressing solidarity with Gaza or quotations from the Quran—both actions protected under the right to freedom of expression. Notably, 79% of these cases were directed against female students.[56]

4.5 Academic Freedom  

(1)  Academic institutions in Israel have become a battleground for the suppression of free speech and academic freedom, particularly, but not exclusively, targeting Palestinian students and faculty.

(2) The Minister of Education, Yoav Kisch, directed academic institutions to report and penalise students accused of supporting terrorism. While some institutions resisted these directives, others complied, referring cases to the police and exacerbating the suppression of academic freedoms.[57]

(3) Surveys conducted among Palestinian students reveal a growing trend of self-censorship, with many fearing disciplinary or legal repercussions for expressing their opinions, with 97% of surveyed students reported feeling unsafe in their institutions, and 87% believed their activities were under surveillance.[58]

4.4 Freedom of press

(1) Since October 2023, there have been drastically increasing measures taken by the government to control the press, both public broadcasting and Arab media, as well as social media platforms.

(2) The Israeli government is targeting public broadcasting, including a plan set in December 2024 by Israeli Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi, to shut down the news division of the public broadcasting corporation. The plan also includes decreasing the corporation's funding. Critics argue that this move could undermine press freedom and limit the public's access to independent news sources.[59]

(3) Meanwhile, Channel 14, a privately owned, right-wing-leaning broadcaster, has gained favour among government officials for its alignment with state narratives. Critics argue that the government's actions, including efforts to sideline critical media and bolster supportive outlets, risk undermining press freedom and public access to balanced information.[60]

(4) Since October 7 2023, Israel has implemented a series of measures that have significantly restricted Palestinian and Arab media operations within its borders. This included arresting 76 Palestinian journalists and media workers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. As of May 2024, 50 of them remain in prison, including 20 under administrative detention.[61] In addition, in April, the Israeli parliament approved a law that enables the government to ban broadcasts of TV channels.[62] In September, the IDF raided and shut down Al Jazeera's office in the occupied West Bank, effectively silencing one of the most influential Middle Eastern news channels in the region.[63]

(5) The suppression of media outlets and the arrest of journalists undermine the public's right to information and violate international standards of press freedom. The International Federation of Journalists has expressed alarm over the record number of journalists arbitrarily arrested, viewing it as part of a broader campaign to intimidate and deter them from reporting on the military occupation.[64]

5.     Systematic use of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment of Palestinians in the Israeli carceral system

5.1 More than 10,000 Palestinians are currently held in Israeli custody in Israeli Prison Service (IPS) and IDF facilities. Over 60% of those are held without charge, either on administrative detention (internment) or as “Unlawful Combatants.” The number of Palestinian detainees in Israeli custody more than doubled over the last 14 months.[65]

5.2 Holding Conditions

(1) Current holding conditions of Palestinian prisoners and detainees in the IPS facilities amount to a systematic use of torture and inhumane treatment.[66] Facilities are overcrowded: prison capacity is 60% over the authorised standard.[67] Access to showers and running water is heavily limited, forcing inmates to live in deteriorated hygienic conditions. These conditions have led to the outbreak of diseases such as scabies which are left untreated, thus using deprivation of healthcare as a method to cause unnecessary pain and suffering[68]. Access to medical care has been generally restricted and fails to meet the needs of the prison population, leading to several unnecessary deaths that could have easily been prevented.[69]

(2) Palestinian detainees held in  IDF facilities of Sde Teiman, Ofer and Anatot are subjected to even worse holding conditions.[70]  Detainees are held in open-air cages, blindfolded and handcuffed 24/7. Many are forced to kneel all day. Hygiene is substandard and food is scarce. Medical treatment is strictly limited as a policy[71]

(3) Food and water provided to Palestinians prisoners and detainees have been drastically reduced. Prison canteens, wherein prisoners could previously buy their own food, have been closed. This has brought Palestinian detainees to the verge of starvation.[72]

(4) The worsening of the incarceration conditions of Palestinian prisoners and detainees has been implemented as a deliberate policy dictated by Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir since he stepped into office,[73] even though there has been a sharp escalation in this regard following the Hamas attacks on Oct 7th.

5.3 Forced Disappearance

(1) Visitation by legal representatives has been heavily restricted in IPS facilities and is close to impossible in most IDF facilities. ICRC representatives have not been allowed access to prisoners and detainees and all visitation rights by family members have been revoked.[74]

(2) The IDF does not provide information concerning whether Palestinians have been detained, are dead or alive. The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel thus claims this is an unlawful practice of forced disappearance.[75]

5.4 Physical Violence

(1) Human rights organisations have documented many incidents in which Palestinian detainees and prisoners have been subjected to severe abuse by wardens both in IPS and in IDF facilities. These include multiple instances of violence and physical assaults, including sexual violence, sexual harassment, humiliation and threats. This abuse has been directed at both male and female detainees. All these indicate systemic breaches of the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and other egregious human rights violations. These actions also constitute collective punishment and blatant violations of both domestic and international law.

(2) Over a dozen detainees have reportedly died in these facilities since October 7, 2023, with forensic evidence suggesting that at least some of these deaths were connected to instances of severe violence by IPS officers.[76] At least 44 detainees died in Israeli holding facilities, as a result of both violence and lack of medical care (the numbers are likely higher; see 5.4(1)).

5.6 Lack of Accountability 

(1) Israel refuses to investigate torture taking place in these facilities. None of more than 1450 complaints filed on behalf of prisoners and detainees have led to the launching of criminal investigations, and none of the wardens or their commanding officers have been charged.[77]

(2)  The Israeli High Court of Justice had also refused to intervene in these violations. Recognising the complete lack of oversight and accountability, several human rights organisations in Israel appealed to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, calling for urgent action to protect Palestinians detained by Israel from torture in order to stop the widespread abuse inflicted by IPS officers on Palestinian prisoners.[78]

5.7 The Palestinian prison population includes many hundreds of Palestinian citizens of Israel. These prisoners have similarly been stripped of their rights and subjected to these substandard conditions. Accordingly, the above not only amounts to a breach of the absolute prohibition of torture by Israel in relation to occupied Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank. It is also part of the blatantly discriminatory policies Israel has been implementing across all domains, in this case, discriminatory policies implemented by the IPS based on the ethno-national identity of the persons in custody.[79] 

6. Escalation in Practices of Forced displacements, house demolitions, and land confiscation

6.1 Since October 2023, forced displacements, house demolitions, and land confiscation affecting Palestinian communities have escalated significantly across all regions under Israeli control, including the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Negev, and the Jordan Valley. These measures, often implemented under the pretence of security or urban development, have deepened the humanitarian crisis and exacerbated tensions across these areas.

6.2 Land Confiscation and Ethnic Cleansing in The West Bank

(1) In the West Bank, land confiscation has reached alarming levels. In November 2024 alone, over 12,800 acres were confiscated, primarily to expand settlements and military zones. These actions are part of a broader strategy following October 2023 to solidify Israeli control over strategic areas.[80]

(2) Settler violence has doubled compared to the previous year, with attacks targeting Palestinian farmers and herders. In the Jordan Valley, shepherding communities face increasing threats, harassment, physical assaults, and property destruction, leading to the forced displacement of numerous families.[81] Settler outposts encroach on grazing lands, forcing many families to abandon their traditional livelihoods. These communities, reliant on livestock grazing on natural pastures (pastoralism), now face the dual threats of violent displacement and economic collapse.[82] According to the human rights organisation B’Tselem, in the year following October 7th 2023, more than 1,170 people have been forcibly transferred in the West Bank.[83] The majority of these displacements have occurred in areas such as the northern Jordan Valley, east of Ramallah, southeast of Bethlehem, and the South Hebron Hills.[84]

(3) Israeli military checkpoints in the Jordan Valley have experienced increased closures, severely limiting the movement of Palestinian residents. Non-residents are often denied entry, and residents face significant hindrances in their daily activities. More than ten Palestinian communities in the Jordan Valley have been deprived of access to water due to these closures and policies aimed at resource deprivation. This exacerbates the already challenging living conditions for these communities.[85]

(4) As noted in section 1, this is part of a declared part to render as much of the land in the West Bank clean of Palestinians, in preparation for annexing at least significant parts of it.

6.3 House demolitions in East Jerusalem

(1) In East Jerusalem, this year has seen an unprecedented rise in demolitions of Palestinian structures, according to data from the NGO Ir Amim. 243 structures were demolished, the highest number recorded in any single year since 1967. 171 of the demolished structures were residential homes. In 103 cases, residents themselves demolished their own homes to avoid the heavy financial penalties imposed if the municipality carried out the demolitions.[86]

(2) In the months following the 7th October attack, the Jerusalem District Planning Committee advanced several plans to expand settlements and to build thousands more housing units, resulting in the confiscation of land and displacement of dozens of families in Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem.[87] 85 additional homes currently face demolition orders and some Palestinian neighbourhoods (e.g. Al-Bustan, located in the Silwan neighbourhood) are slated for eventual removal.[88]

(3) On December 4, 2023, the Jerusalem District Planning Committee granted final approval to the Lower Aqueduct settlement plan. This plan includes the construction of approximately 1,800 housing units on both sides of the Green Line, between the Israeli settlements of Har Homa and the planned Givat HaMatos settlement. The strategic location of this development further isolates East Jerusalem from Bethlehem and the southern West Bank, complicating prospects for a contiguous Palestinian state.[89]

(4) In Sheikh Jarrah, Palestinian families face imminent eviction following court rulings favouring settler organisations. In April 2024, the Israeli Supreme Court dismissed the Shehadeh family's appeal, paving the way for their forcible displacement.[90] Israeli authorities have approved settlement projects in Sheikh Jarrah, further threatening Palestinian homes and exacerbating fears of displacement among residents.[91]

6.4 Forced Evictions in the Negev/Naqab

(1) In the Negev, Bedouin communities of Palestinian citizens of Israel are particularly vulnerable to displacement due to the Israeli government’s policy of non-recognition for many villages[92]. Since October 2023, the pace of demolitions in Bedouin areas has increased, with several villages being razed to make way for urban and agricultural projects. These communities lack legal recognition, depriving them of basic infrastructure, including water and electricity, while exposing them to forced evictions. For example, in Al-Araqib, a village demolished more than 200 times over the years, the pattern of destruction persists, leaving families homeless and without recourse. New policies aimed at centralising Bedouin populations into planned towns have been criticised for erasing Bedouin cultural and economic ties to the land.[93]

7. Economic War

7.1 The Israeli government employs a sectorial war economy that does not benefit, and even harms, the major public. Israel has the second worst level of poverty of OECD countries, and the government’s decision to prolong and expand the war has pushed more people into poverty and dependency on social welfare.[94] Moreover, financial discrimination is becoming prevalent, with funds deliberately withheld from opposition organisations and channelled to groups that support the government[95].

7.2 The war’s impact on workers and low-income Israelis

(1) The lack of clear government regulation regarding workers’ entitlements during the war has left many Israelis to face sudden job losses, school and nursery closures, evictions, significant income reductions, and uncertainty about compensation eligibility[96]. A report published in 2024 found that a typical Israeli household will face an increase of over 10,000ILS (approximately £2,160) in basic living expenses in 2025. 680,500 households - 21.1% of Israel’s population, experienced food insecurity, with 34.1% of children affected. Israel’s largest NGO combating poverty and food insecurity, La’tet, links the deterioration of all poverty indicators among these families directly to the war[97].

(2) As part of the effort to exclude and marginalise Palestinians, there has been a sharp increase in the dismissal of non-Jewish workers for overtly racist and illegal reasons, often linked to allegations about their social media activity[98].

(3) Cuts to social services affect primarily women, as they constitute the majority of public sector employees (e.g., teachers, nurses, and social workers) whose real-term pay declined. Women, who depend more on welfare services, suffered disproportionately from the closure of these services. Specific needs, such as safe houses for victims of domestic abuse, saw budget cuts at a time when demand for such services increased due to the war. As primary caregivers, women were also most affected by the closure of public education programmes for children[99]. These trends are expected to worsen in 2025, with further cuts to all government departments deepening gender and income inequalities[100].

7.3 Government policies to defund any source of opposition and destabilize the Palestinian Authority

(1) The government has directed public investment to its core constituencies, while withholding funds from other groups. The most blatant example is the Ministry of Transport, which oversees tens of billions of Shekels, and allocated them according to Likud priorities.[101]

(2) Financial support has been withheld from some communities devastated by the Hamas attack on 7th October because they are seen as hostile to the government. The Israeli government (and, according to news outlets, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself) is withholding 5 billion Shekels, about 25% of this budget, explicitly because it does not include funds for towns that voted for the Likud party, such as Ofaqim and Sderot[102].

(3) The war has provided Knesset Members (MK) and Ministers with an opportunity to target opposition groups broadly, with a particular focus on Palestinian citizens of Israel. Coalition MKs have introduced bills aimed at limiting funding for universities[103] and schools[104] whose staff are accused of “supporting terrorism”. The government has also increasingly withheld funding from cultural events that offer alternative perspectives on the conflict, particularly those perceived as critical of the war.[105]

(4) The Treasury Minister Bezalel Smotrich has taken advantage of the war to undermine the finances of the Palestinian Authority by repeatedly withholding budgetary transfers Israel is required to make, by and by threatening to disconnect the Palestinian Authority from the global banking system by threatening Israeli banks dealing with it (as they are obliged to by law)[106]. This is widely seen as Smotrich’s attempt to bring down the Palestinian Authority.

(5) Since the 7th of October 2023, the government has banned the employment of Palestinian workers from the West Bank in Israel. At least 20% of the West Bank’s Labour force, or 156,000 workers, had been working in Israel before that point. They provided no less than 22% of the West Bank GDP.[107] Most of the workers have work permits and security clearance. Israel’s security services support their employment in Israel and consider it a stabilising factor, given the importance of their wages to the West Bank’s economy. Since 7th of October, the security services and intelligence community repeatedly argued against the ban, to no avail.[108] Hard right ministers – Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, have vetoed the lifting of the ban, despite the enormous damage it causes to various economic sectors in Israel, particularly the construction sector.

(6) Ben-Gvir and Smotrich’s ban on Palestinian employment in Israel is part of their attempts to destabilise the Palestinian Authority and to provoke unrest in the West Bank, that would allow Israel to extend the Gaza war – and the draconic military means it currently employs in Gaza and the West Bank. 

8. The Impact of the War on Women in Israel

8.1 The current government marginalises women in influential decision-making roles during the war and exacerbates their economic and social vulnerabilities, particularly those in precarious employment and caregiving roles. It neglects to implement gender-sensitive policies aligned with UN Resolution 1325, adopted by Israel in 2000, which emphasises the protection and inclusion of women in conflict and post-conflict settings, thereby compromising their safety.[109] The war is deepening pre-existing inequalities, affecting women across diverse communities in Israel, including Jewish women, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and migrant women. These impacts are multi-dimensional, encompassing political, economic, and social aspects.[110]

8.2 Representation

(1) Women have been significantly underrepresented in decision-making during the current crisis. A study by Hadass Ben Eliyahu et al. underscores a marked absence of women in influential political and administrative roles. For instance, women occupy only a fraction of positions in the Security Policy Cabinet and the Social Economic Cabinet, critical bodies managing war-related strategies.[111]

8.3 Employment

(1) The war has severely disrupted employment, particularly for women in precarious jobs. According to Workers’ Hotline, many women faced job losses, unpaid leave, or reduced hours due to wartime disruptions. For example, migrant workers, heavily represented in care and domestic sectors, faced increased exploitation and risk, while Arab women, already underrepresented in the workforce, experienced heightened economic insecurity[112].

(2)  Migrant women, especially those employed in care work, face dire conditions as their employers often disregard their safety. Reports indicate cases of migrant workers being compelled to work under dangerous conditions, such as exposure to rocket attacks, due to the absence of alternative livelihood options.[113]

8.4 Gender based Violence

(1) Social workers have reported a rise in gender-based violence (GBV) during the war, with Na’amat hotline services documenting a 45% increase in GBV-related calls. Palestinian women citizens of Israel, particularly in marginalised Bedouin communities, face compounded risks due to limited access to shelters, poor infrastructure, and systemic neglect.[114] These communities often lack essential protections such as bomb shelters or even early warning systems for incoming rockets that exist at all Jewish areas.[115]

(2) The easing of firearm licensing regulations during the war posed an additional risk, as studies have linked the presence of firearms in households to increased instances of domestic violence. Social workers highlighted the urgent need for systemic reforms to address these risks and provide adequate support for survivors.[116]

8.5 Political persecution

(1) Palestinian women citizens of Israel have faced dual hardships due to their identity and systemic discrimination. Many Palestinian citizens of Israel, including women, have been labelled as internal threats, facing arrests, job losses, and heightened surveillance. Such political persecution has led to a climate of fear and alienation, further silencing these communities.[117]

8.6 Mental Health

(1) The war intensified stress, anxiety, and trauma among women, who frequently serve as primary caregivers in their households. Many women expressed difficulty managing their own fears while comforting children and other family members. Social workers observed a rise in anxiety-related behaviors, such as bed-wetting among children and increased fear of abduction, which placed additional emotional burden on mothers.[118]

(2) Palestinian women citizens of Israel, particularly those with reatives in Gaza, reported feeling isolated and unable to openly express their grief due to the prevailing political and social climate. This silencing added to their emotional distress.[119]

(3) Social workers face emotional burnout as they navigate shared traumatic realities with their clients. Women in these professions have reported blurred boundaries between their professional and personal experiences of trauma, further straining their resilience. Women social workers from Arab and Bedouin communities were particularly affected.[120] 

9. Breach of faith towards the hostages and displaced citizens

9.1 The Israeli government changed the war objectives several times. The military admitted that the objectives, as specified by the government, are unattainable, and that as long as they are so defined, the war cannot be won.[121] At times, the war has been framed as a means of creating military pressure on Hamas in an effort to bring the hostages back and bring back a sense of security and stability to Israelis. This, however, is far from being the case, and in its war efforts the current government is knowingly and deliberately sacrificing the hostages, and other citizens of the state[122].

9.2 The Israeli government is therefore in breach of faith towards its own citizens, particularly concerning the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, and the displaced residents in two fronts: those who live along the border with Gaza, who have been most affected by the attack on7th of October and the ongoing war, and those along the northern Lebanon border, who had endured relentless bombardment from Hezbollah. This situation underscores a failure in the government’s fundamental responsibility to ensure the safety, welfare, and rights of its people.

9.3 Hostages

(1) 251 Israeli citizens, including children, women, and elderly people, were abducted during the brutal October 7, 2023 attack[123]. 109 hostages were released in the first, and so far only hostage deals (some due to their dual nationality); 8 more released in military operations; 100 hostages are still in captivity.

(2) The government is not only not doing enough to release the hostages. Recent publications have demonstrated that it has been knowingly and deliberately thwarting any possibility of a deal[124]. Netanyahu, who is controlling the negotiations, has been refusing deals proposed in December 2023, September and December 2024, and was criticised even by US President Biden[125]. War cabinet ministers have repeatedly refused and delayed deals[126] and instead promoted resettlement of the Gaza strip by Israel[127] and “voluntary emigration” of Gazans[128].

(3) The military operations have proved to be fatal to hostages, putting them at risk from air raids and combat troops[129].

(4) The families of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas and their supporters have engaged in non-violent campaigns to secure the release of their loved ones. Despite their peaceful efforts, they have faced harassment and delegitimisation from government and coalition members, as well as affiliated media channels. Some families have been subjected to online abuse, including from war cabinet members[130]. Additionally, there have been instances where relatives of hostages were violently arrested during protests, further exacerbating tensions between the families and authorities[131].

9.4 Displaced Communities

(1) Over 200,000 Israeli citizens have been displaced from their homes that were under attack by Hamas and Hezbollah. Forced to evacuate their homes, they created a wave of internal displacement. These individuals and families have lived for months in temporary accommodations, often far from their communities and sources of livelihood, enduring significant emotional and financial strain. 15 months later, many have still not been able to return to their homes. The government’s response to their plight has been criticised as slow and inadequate, with insufficient support systems in place to assist their safe return to their homes and rehabilitation[132].

(2) A recent report shows 70% of evacuees from northern Israel are considering not returning home, with 3% having already left permanently. Employment struggles are significant, with 70% earning less than before displacement and nearly 33% unemployed. Additionally, over 70% reported receiving no employment assistance, and 58% rated government support as "poor."[133]

9.5 The entire citizen body

(1) The 7th October attack was an earthquake whose aftershocks are still reverberating in Israeli society. The unprecedented scope and nature of the attacks, the large-scale loss of life and the lack of protection from the state and army were shocking, leaving Israelis frightened and scarred. Regaining a sense of security remains difficult for many with the war and instability raging on[134]. The entire country is in a continuous state of trauma, experiencing existential threat as hostages and soldiers continue to die, and the population is suffering systemic and economic hardship as part of the anti-democratic measures detailed throughout this document.

(2) With the military’s admission that the war objectives are unattainable[135], it is clear that the war cannot be won and therefore the instability and loss of life have no end in sight. For the far right, Jewish supremacy members of the government, the war is an opportunity to execute long standing annexation and settlement plans, as we detailed above (section 1).[136] Some of them even referred to October 7th as “a miracle”[137]. For Netanyahu, keeping himself in power is the ultimate goal. In its aid he is willing to put everyone at risk - the civilians of Gaza, the Palestinians in the West Bank, his own citizens of Israel, civilians in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and the world at large.