Friends of the Earth England Wales and Northern Ireland              ESH0066

Written evidence submitted by Friends of the Earth England Wales and Northern Ireland

Call for Evidence (EAC) - Environmental Sustainability and Housing Growth

       20th December 2024

SUMMARY

              “The most permissive planning regime ever[1]”

1. NPPF 2024 offers almost no additional increases to the protection and enhancement of the environment at a strategic level; albeit with a few exceptions. These include a new provision to ensure policies enhancing the natural environment/providing net gains for biodiversity include features for threatened species (e.g. bat boxes) at para 187, while green belt release includes a requirement to ensure green space through onsite provision – the need to have to release such land from the green belt notwithstanding. The remainder of the ‘Conserving and Enhancing the Natural Environment’ chapter remains mostly untouched, despite substantial relaxations to the green belt and increases to housing supply which present more, not less underlying risks to nature present on greenfield sites and the green belt more widely.

Minerals and Coal, Oil and Gas chapter wording remains too permissive

2. Wording in the Minerals and Coal, Oil and Gas chapters remains untouched, and too permissive in our opinion, despite the government’s manifesto pledge “not to grant new coal licenses” and to “ban fracking for good”[2].
3. Obvious environmental and climate implications will result from maintaining such a permissive energy mineral regime for new applications. By still apportioning ‘great weight’ to the benefits of energy mineral extraction (including oil and gas[3]), while maintaining planners should ‘plan positively’ for what are retained “minerals of local national importance”[4]; the government’s approach to protecting the climate and wider environment is questionable at this point; especially as live applications for gas drilling (North Yorkshire) and a ‘called-in’ application for a huge coal mine (re Whitehaven redetermination) are still to be decided.

Housing led agenda risks undermining environmental (nature and climate) objectives

4. The government’s approach to the 2024 NPPF seems to be based primarily a political need to be seen to be delivering on its Election Manifesto pledge to build 1.5+ million homes by 2029[5].
5. While Friends of the Earth realises the urgent need to address the housing crisis and ensure equitable living standards for all, equally some of the new NPPF provisions are arguably too permissive for volume housebuilders - allowing them to double-down on targeting permissions for market housing in less sustainable (and cheaper) green belt locations; where wildlife and nature impacts are more likely –despite a strengthened ‘brownfield first’ approach and ‘Golden Rules’.

More Local Planning Authority ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ for most developers. 

6. The government continues to point the blame of the housing crisis (including build-out rates) on local planning authorities (LPAs) – whether its delayed decision-making and/or slow plan-making. Maintaining this position is unfair, especially considering over a million housing permissions have failed to be built-out by developers since 2015; or that developers continue to face little/no consequence for not building out housing permissions[6] or that private sector housebuilders have recently admitted that they don’t actually have the workforce or skills (at scale) to build the 1.5+ million houses Labour demands[7]. It remains that the key element of the supply issue that planning authorities can control (i.e. the overall number of housing permissions being granted) seems to be working reasonably well, however build-out rates (re housing being built on the ground) remains, principally, a matter for housebuilders and developers.
7. It’s questionable then why the NPPF maintaining (and in some cases extends) the remit of penalties, such as a failed Housing Delivery Test (HDT) to justify ‘grey belt’ release re para 155 in a decision-making context. Our view is that the potential for scattergun and quick-fire green belt release (re para 155), despite the ‘purposes’ and “Golden Rules” tests for decision-making is more likely than not to lead to further environmental harm.

Environmental and climate risks remain

1. What provisions will the National Policy Planning Framework, as revised under the Government’s proposals, make for protection and enhancement of the environment? Are these provisions likely to be adequate?

3.   To what extent is the current planning presumption in favour of sustainable development compatible with the environmental objective of the planning system? To what extent will the proposed ‘streamlining’ of the sustainable development presumption work to deliver developments which will meet this objective and be compatible with the Government’s environmental targets and obligations?

10. As a precursor, key statutory environmental protections relevant to planning (at least the Town and Country Planning Act 1990/TCPA1990 system) should, at least for now, continue to function despite these latest NPPF amendments. This is due to them being embedded within separate regulations (e.g. separate Environmental Impact Assessment/EIA, Strategic Environmental Assessment/SEA and Habitats Regulations Assessment regs etc). That said, the government’s newly announced plans to enact provisions from the Levelling Up and Regeneration Act 2023 next year, especially linked to forms of environmental protection, such as Environmental Outcomes Reports to replace Environmental Impact Assessments and SEA or a recently announced intent to amend the Habitats Regulations (as evidenced by the government’s newly announced Planning Reform Working Paper[9]) will likely impact these established statutory provisions more directly, or in the case of EIA replace them entirely – as explained below.

Risks posed by NPPF 2024

11. Requirements for local planning authorities (LPAs) to meet a higher housing quantum, while still having to demonstrate a deliverable five-year housing supply and operate within the restrictive confines of an unfair Housing Delivery Test (HDT) reinforces what is an unfair status-quo of penalising LPAs and risking environmental harms. This is due to the regressive ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’ that kicks-in should a council fail these tests.
12. NPPF paragraph 11d, which ‘tilts’ the balance of decision making in favour of unplanned speculative housing applications outside of formal local plan allocations[10] (and more likely than not proposed on edge-of-settlement greenfield land) undermines positive local plan making, which is itself ‘justified’ by robust evidence formation, statutory consultation and subject to ‘soundness’ tests at examination by the Planning Inspectorate.
13. With LPAs now needing to plan for higher housing targets, (which have been described by a cross- party section of some local councils as “unattainable”[11]), especially for those where statutory designations and constraints severely limit ‘deliverable’ sites, there is a heightened risk of the ‘presumption’ will kick in, leading to more speculative development in the short–medium term. As a result, while there is a housing crisis that needs addressing, it’s arguable that one consequence of the government’s actions is a managed decline of nature; especially when it knows a possible outcome is that cheaper[12], unallocated greenfield plots are speculatively “bulldozed” through the system to a permission stage by developers. At the same time, well-evidenced, ‘justified’, sustainable housing allocations remain untouched, left fading on proposals maps in understaffed and under-resourced council offices across England.

Future Risks

14. As hinted at above, it is likely changes yet to be made to national policy and regulations next year[13] to the TCPA 1990 planning system (and wider regulations) that could pose further uncertainty in terms of environmental protection and enhancement going forward. These include the likely replacement of established environmental protection mechanisms of EIA and SEA with a new, untested and litigious Environmental Outcomes Reporting (EOR) system; possibly without the safeguards of established SEA/EIA methodologies[14]. There is also the unknown remit and content of National Development Management (NDMPs) which effectively centralises local plan making considerations and content in some instances, and to a point decision-making (as their policy content takes precedence over local plan policies where there is a ‘conflict’[15]). Add into the mix the prospect of more scheduled primary legislation (i.e. Planning and Infrastructure Bill to amend the Habitats Regulations to ease the Nutrient Neutrality stand-off) the recent addition of a series of recent written ministerial statements linked to oil and gas permitting and licensing and, quite likely, a further NPPF consultation in 2025 all having the combined effect of causing substantial cumulative disruption to the local plan making landscape. Such instability and flux compacts uncertainty and delay – much less the fault of LPAs for slow plan making, but of successive government tinkering.

Delays to Plan Making

15. The prospect of such a series of further policy and regulatory paradigm shifts for planning ‘coming down the line’ will continue to impact local plan-making, principally the ability of LPAs to ensure they have a robust local policy framework in place which to guide new development and ensure sensitive environmental designations and nature sites are protected.
16. While some LPAs will be pushing hard to get their plans submitted for examination before the March 2025 deadline (for consideration under the old NPPF), others will be pulling plan development altogether, as they can’t meet the 80% requirement of the revised standard method[16].  In many instances, even extant, in-date local plans will become ‘out of date’, especially in the wait for detailed government LURA 2023 local plan making provisions to be “brought into force” (as per para 236). The result is that at least in the short to mid-term, the rate of local plan adoption could get worse, not better, meaning more risks to the environment as speculative housing development favours greenfield sites at the expense of evidenced housing allocations.

Question 2: What policy levers does the Government plan to use to ensure that local authorities deliver the development which the revised NPPF ‘standard method’ requires? Do the Government’s plans result in local planning authorities being penalized if delivery falls short? What policy levers will be available to local authorities to ensure that developments which have received planning approval are delivered in accordance with consents?

17. As indicated above, LPAs are at risk from the ‘presumption’, where they fail to either:

-          Demonstrate a 5 year rolling housing land supply; or

-          Have an UpToDate adopted local plan (last 5 years); or

-          ensure that 85% of housing permissions over the last three years were built out (re Housing Delivery Test) - despite insufficient powers to do so.

18. While these are established policy sticks (at least in the last 13 years), the government has now extended some of these tests to justify green belt/grey belt release (re paragraph 155). This means that where housing developers have failed to build out permissions they’ve been granted by a LPA; that same LPA which granted those and other housing permissions risks suffering the presumption due to “build-out rates” over the last three years dropping below 85%. If this is the case, it is forced to consider allowing grey belt release, even when it knows the original developer is either sitting on the permissions it granted (perhaps to sell on), is slow the rate of buildout (to ensure local saturation isn’t reached) or lacks the capacity to build-out. Para 155 will apply where a LPA’s housing target has been calculated to substantially increase beyond recent historic amounts; even where LPAs cannot identify such larger quantums of “deliverable” sites in the SHLAA[17] exercise due to statutory and other designations. Such instances will be rare, but are also relevant in this context.
19. LPAs do have an option in policy to prevent delay to enacting permissions, by conditioning new housing permissions with shorter timeframes as para 81 states:

“To help ensure that proposals for housing development are implemented in a timely manner, local planning authorities should consider imposing a planning condition providing that development must begin within a timescale shorter than the relevant default period”

20. The NPPF also makes it clear, however, that shorter timeframes are only allowed where “this would expedite the development without threatening its deliverability or viability”. Essentially, its use is not guaranteed, meaning those same LPAs could still fail the HDT as a result - subject to the ‘presumption’ or the new ‘stick’ of NPPF para 155 (where grey belt release might not be considered ‘inappropriate’ in decision making terms).
21. We appreciate the need to build more houses more widely, but can see the limited arsenal of options available to LPAs to ensure permissions are built out in good time – which is unfair for them and for people waiting to live in the housing. The development industry – especially housebuilders – essentially have all the power to dictate when and if they build out a housing permission. The LPAs role is to grant permissions, and condition them accordingly, which they are doing. They should not be overly penalised when volume housebuilders fail in their duty to build actual houses, which is likely to happen even more even if more permissions start being granted[18].

4. How will the revised NPPF work to deliver the social and environmental objectives of the planning system? To what extent will it promote outcomes which deliver sustainable social and environmental benefits together, such as access to essential amenities, to public transport and to active travel routes?

22. The approach to some of the more controversial changes (e.g. grey belt release and strengthening the ‘presumption’) in NPPF 2024 do little to improve on the  delivery of environmental objectives[19]; making an arguably regressive situation for nature and climate worse with respect to the available scope of new housing locations now available to developers. Nearly all green belt is set in quasi-rural or rural locations (as well as those washing over lower order settlements) in order to limit sprawl, coalescence, preserve openness and the setting of historic buildings (as well as other relevant ‘purposes’). While brownfield (or grey belt) sites exist in the green belt - although there are likely only so many redundant carparks available to build on! - that doesn’t mean their location is suitable, or can be made so. Even with the ‘golden rules’, and some tests on locational sustainability, the release of ad-hoc grey belt land, especially at the decision making stage (re para 155) could lead to further cumulative climate and nature regressions; especially as car dependency is already high in such areas and is set to remain the “only practical solution” according the government. 
23. While net gain requirements should, of course, come into play in circumstances where grey belt is released, we’d suggest that the extent of BNG exemptions being applied nationally[20] is likely to undermine the nature compensation potential it might otherwise introduce.
24. Areas where environmental objectives are being better delivered by NPPF 2024 include the removal of the effective onshore wind ban from 2015, as well as giving additional “significant weight” to the benefits of renewable energy (in addition to meeting Net Zero) and the new requirement for applicants to consider mitigation and adaptation in decision making – all very welcome additions (although wording at para 163 not as strong as we’d like; however a step in the right direction).
25. As to social objectives, there have been some positive steps made, such as ensuring consideration of nursery provision and ‘looked after children’ in plan making; as well as a greater push for more affordable housing (re larger sites to meet needs more generally, as well as in the context of ‘Golden Rules’ for major site release in the green belt – notwithstanding that such means environmental objectives take a hit. The definition of ‘affordable housing’ now also includes social rent - a positive step (re para 66). That said, while we support the government’s aim to try and level-out social inequalities in the housing market, the means by which it’s redesigned the NPPF to do so will have draw-backs for environmental objectives.
26. By strengthening the ‘presumption’ and expanding the remit of an already unfair HDT to justify further ad-hoc ‘grey belt’ release (re para 155) in decision making, NPPF 2024 gives no new ‘sticks’ to the housebuilders. This is presumably why it was this week labelled as the “most permissive planning regime ever” by prominent legal commentators[21]. While permissive was the government’s aim, that doesn’t mean sustainable outcomes that are beneficial for nature or climate result. 
27. While the government’s amendments may eventually force councils to release more housing consents, it’s also very possible that build-out/completion rates for homes could simply remain at the same level. Unless a national skills drive for new builders is ratcheted up; unless more ‘sticks’ are applied to disrupt the oligopolistic market housing delivery model (artificially slowing build-out rates to ensure homes are ‘drip-fed’ into local housing market to limit oversaturation) it’s unlikely the big six housebuilders, even with the help of SMEs have capacity to build Britain out of its housing crisis.
28. Indeed, it seems the government’s overreliance on commercial house builders to try and get us out of the crisis and deliver on social sustainability objectives is risky, especially when:

i)                    Developers have failed to build out over 1-million+ secured planning consents for housing since 2014;

ii)                   The planning system itself – i.e. LPAs - managed to deliver consents for 301,000 dwellings on average over the last 8 years[22], so much so that the PLC housebuilders haven’t not been able to keep up, building roughly on average only 130,911 new-build homes per annum over the same period.

iii)                 A range of other levers for addressing the crisis also exist, but seem to be routinely ignored in government discourse. These include a real push to bring back millions of empty and second homes (and with more needing to be done than simply raising council tax and stamp duty to discourage would-be private or commercial landlords, such as Blackstone, who continue to swallow up even off-plan housing stocks to satisfy its US investors[23]).

29. Overall, while we support the government’s aim of delivering more on planning’s social objectives: namely ensuring more housing is available; it’s likely environmental impacts will however result from NPPF 2024, unleashing further impacts to:

i)                    The climate: as more car dependant, grey belt (and undoubtedly) housing permissions are given in less sustainable rural contexts and built to poor energy efficiency standards[24]; and

ii)                   the wider environment: as, despite the reinforced ‘brownfield first’ test (at para 125c), national policy risks an unknown number of housing (and commercial) permissions being given on former green belt in a decision making context. These sites are likely to host local wildlife, located closer to protected sites; all the while robust and more sustainable housing allocations remain undeveloped in ‘out-of-date’ local plans.

5: What contribution can the NPPF make to meeting Government targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions? What account does the NPPF take of advice from the Climate Change Committee on reducing the use of embodied carbon as well as operational carbon in the built environment?

30. Friends of the Earth has lobbied for a long time to try and get the government to align planning decision making with the UK’s binding carbon budgets.  Our ‘Big Ask Campaign’ in the mid noughties helped to influence the notion of binding carbon budgets for the UK, and we continue to ensure their effectiveness across all sectors, including town planning. Our most recent attempt (in a planning context) focused on trying to influence planning legislation linked to the ascent of the Levelling Up and Regeneration Act (LURA) 2023)) as part of the Better Planning Coalition‘s Climate Working Group. We lobbied – with others - for climate mitigation and adaptation to be apportioned “special regard” in decision making (re applications); although what the then government gave us instead was an ‘amendment-in-lieu’ to ensure NDMPs deliver on climate mitigation and adaptation. While welcome, FOE continues to lobby the government, both unilaterally and as part of wider coalitions to achieve fuller alignment of the TCPA 1990 system with binding carbon budgets and net zero.
31. In this context, we note one of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC’s) ‘Priority Recommendations’ to government (as taken from their 2024 Progress Report to Parliament) remains to:

• ‘Make overall planning policy consistent with Net Zero’[25].

32. The CCC seeks for the government to achieve this aim by conducting a:

“Review and update the National Planning Policy Framework to ensure that Net Zero outcomes are consistently prioritised throughout the planning system, making clear that these should work in conjunction with, rather than being over-ridden by, other outcomes such as development viability”

33. It’s worth noting that even the last government’s commissioned Net Zero Review (2023) included a similar key recommendation.
34. On a basic level, we need to ensure that what gets built now is fit for a net zero future and resilient to the already locked-in effects of climate change. We have had such a climate duty for plan making (at least of sorts) since 2010, and despite its arguably ineffectual wording, a duty for decision-making remains. New NPPF Para 163 obviously aims to start filling this lacuna, stating:

‘the need to mitigate and adapt to climate change should also be considered in preparing and assessing planning applications, taking into account the full range of potential climate change impacts.’

35. While para 163 represents a step in the right direction, the “considered” wording is slightly vague, failing to represent the step-change and link to carbon budgets the CCC’s recommendation requires: ‘to make planning “consistent” with Net Zero.
36. For example, developers might suggest in their applications they’ve “considered” X and Y, but to be of any use, we feel they ‘must demonstrate compliance with net-zero’ (or similar test) to ensure better compliance. Without firmer wording, it’s likely the NPPF (together with the low ambition of the Future Homes Standard) will continue to lead to poor climate outcomes, costing:
1. Householders: as they pay higher energy bills due to low thermal building performance (re inefficient building fabrics) in new homes being mandated. Also, mandatory requirements for renewable energy generation in new home still don’t exist; despite the benefits of solar and battery-storage being mooted in Labour’s recent Clean Power Action Plan 2024 (re saving owners money on their bills[26]);
2. Taxpayers: if the government decides to further to ‘bail-out’ consumers again (as it did by the tens of £ billions 2022-23) due to pressures on gas and electricity prices; and
3. The climate: as more comparative CO2(eqv) is released from the UK’s building stock,
4. Future generations: as the well-being of future generations is put at risk due to our further climate inaction. 

Legal Change

37. While the government has attempted to initiate closer linkage between decision making and net-zero in NPPF 2024, we maintain that such an important amendment cannot effectively be delivered via national policy alone. What is likely to be viewed by some as a progressive policy requirement, could be seen as a unneeded cost by many developers – running risks of the paragraph’s redaction/dilution in future NPPF reviews[27]. For the NPPF to maintain the momentum and expand upon the remit of para 163 into the long term, it’s likely the law needs to also change: establishing a legal principle of closer carbon budget/net-zero alignment in planning decision-making. Future NPPFs and other national policy levers would then be required to expand upon such a requirement rather than be able to water down or delete such a needed test.
38. An example of where the law has been useful in this regard relates to the mitigation and adaptation duty for plan-making, where NPPF para 20(d) mentions the need for “planning measures to address climate change mitigation and adaptation” in the context of strategic plan making[28]. Only a climate duty on decision making will ensure the policy test remains and improved in future NPPFs.

Reducing Embodied carbon and operational carbon in the built environment

39. Before new para 163 (which again we welcome in principle) the NPPF had done little to further encourage embodied or operational carbon reducing strategies, encouraging instances where less sustainable locations for housing (as it does now) will result.
40. This long lasting policy lacuna has been intriguing, especially as the latest CCC Progress Report (2024) states that the country remains off-track in achieving its 2030 NDC commitments (i.e. 68% emissions reductions). The report also states that ‘only a third of the emissions reductions required to achieve the 2030 target are currently covered by credible plans’ – with the TCPA 1990 planning system likely included in the 2/3rds without – deeply ironic for a system that places planning at its heart. 

Constraint of Other National Policies

41. Aside from the NPPF, other national policy mechanisms such as Written Ministerial Statements - that carry similar weight as the NPPF in planning decision and plan making – can prove very unhelpful in stymieing progressive climate ambition at a local plan making level (re consideration of embodied carbon and whole life assessments).
42. The CCC even documented this issue in its 2024 Progress Report, highlighting the well-known regressive government approach to restricting the ability of local plan policies to exceed the ambition of the Future Homes Standard linked to energy efficiency (e.g. including those considering ‘fabric first’ and whole life cycle assessment approaches to new housing development).
43. Despite the effect of progressive policies ultimately increasing comfort levels for householders, reducing demands on central heating use, and requiring lower carbon building materials, the WMS – for now – remains in place. This is a fundamental example of national policy obfuscation, which the CCC states is:… ‘likely to cause further confusion and delays around adopting local Net Zero policies, which is a setback’ [our emphasis]. While NPPF 2024 is far from perfect, the wider national planning policy landscape is also[29] preventing closer net-zero alignment at the local level.
44. Overall, the NPPF should also, in our view, be much more explicit as to the potential jeopardy in not planning for net zero (e.g. poor health, well-being, nature, flooding, heating and other relevant outcomes) – but it is not. Our recent adaptation challenge[30] in the High Court demonstrated the perils and inadequacies of the latest National Adaptation Plan[31] (NAP3) and resulting poor adaptation strategies for residents of coastal settlements, yet adaptation was subject to only slight amendments in the NPPF. The appeal, however goes on.
45. Overall, National Policy (re NPPF and relevant WMSs) require further strengthening, to further elaborate on carbon accounting or a “special regard” test. Paragraph 157 (re “shape places in ways that contribute to radical reductions in greenhouse gas emissions”) needs to be radically reframed with the reality and candour of the climate crisis in mind, as well as realigned with the expectations and recommendations of the CCC (re binding carbon budgets), together with a realistic strategy to ensure planning decision (and plan) making delivers on its ability to reduce emissions in our building stock and to influence behaviour. While para 163 makes a step towards greater integration of planning and Net Zero, it feels like more work is needed, and time is running out.

Oil, gas and coal developments

46. Finally, as we noted in the document summary, both the Minerals and Coal, Oil and Gas Chapters in the NPPF remain untouched. Such inaction continues to allow permissive decision making and positive local plan making for new gas and oil drilling to continue (albeit less permissive for coal). It’s a highly questionable how in a climate crisis, the government has not acted and taken a sterner view on new applications; especially with likely negative impacts for the climate and wider environmental.
47. As we write, a new onshore gas drilling application[32] is under consideration near Scarborough, North Yorkshire. The applicants have already circumvented EIA requirements (i.e. getting the development ‘screened-out’ of EIA requirements after appealing to the Secretary of State HCLG) and it’s possible the scheme will have unknown environmental harms if granted as it plans to use “proppant squeezing” (or mini-fracking) to stimulate the gas resource/borehole.
48. Then there is the matter of one of the largest deep coal mines ever proposed in Whitehaven, Cumbria. Despite it being thrown out by the High Court last August (2024), it remains to be redetermined by Angela Rayner’s office (due to its ‘call-in’ in 2021). Despite the government suggesting it will end new coal licences, it missed a trick in leaving NPPF coal wording in its current state; comparatively more permissive than the Welsh government’s approach to coal, which is in “wholly exceptional” circumstances, only. This is simply unacceptable in 2024, and NPPF amendments will be needed to restrict the prospect of new fossil fuel drilling and consumption in England.

6. Will the Government's proposals affect the ability of local authorities to implement policies designed to protect the natural environment in their areas?

49. Possibly. A lot depends on the circumstances of each planning authority regarding its local plan. Those with plans adopted in the last 5 years, and which seek 5 yearly reviews might be less prone to the ‘presumption’ (or ‘tilted balance’) at para 11d, however even a recently adopted local plan in place doesn’t guarantee its primacy in decision making for the respective plan area. This is because the NPPF reinforces the status-quo that LPA’s failing to meet the HDT, demonstrate a rolling 5-year housing land supply (albeit on likely higher housing target) or with an out-of-date plan triggering the ‘presumption’, which – as explained earlier – undermines good local planning and incentivises developers to submit speculative housing applications on unallocated sites.
50. Statutory local plan policies linked to nature and climate are not bypassed in this regard (more policies linked to housing location and supply), although it remains that statutory housing allocations in plans identified by a robust and evidenced local plan process based community consultation (as to housing allocation location: factoring in landscape and visual impacts, access, settlement hierarchy position, impacts to biodiversity etc) and independently examined by Planning Inspectors run a greater risk of either being avoided and the wider plan area subject to speculative applications/ housing by appeal. The ‘presumption’, when triggered, undermines the plan-led approach to building out statutory housing allocations in many instances; bypassing the detailed nature and biodiversity considerations that went into justifying them.
51. The government’s new strategy towards ‘grey belt’ release ratchets-up such cumulative risks to the natural environment. Allowing a scattergun deselection of grey belt sites (in decision making) from the nation’s 14 green belts is risky to both nature and climate.  While strategic green belt release is a recognised mechanism, this is a plan making process, however para 155 suggests grey belt sites could be released at the decision making stage, despite less sustainable locations (such as greater dependency on car-based modes).
52. With no Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) or Impact Assessment findings of such a radical step change, it’s possible– despite a number of ‘fail-safes’ outlined by the government (e.g. release not undermining some of the green belt purposes and subject to ‘Golden Rules’ including “access to nature”) housing sites released in this way present a cumulative threat to nature. Even Para 144’s sequential test to deallocating ‘grey belt’ suggests greenfield sites in the Green Belt might be considered eventually; even when they should be ‘off-the-table’ in our opinion:

“…give first consideration to previously-developed land in sustainable locations, then consider grey belt land in sustainable locations which is not already previously-developed, and only then consider other sustainable Green Belt locations.

53. Again, it is those legislative and policy changes coming down the road, especially linked to NDMPs and their unknown content, but equally in their ability to override local plan policies where there is a “conflict” which might impact more on the ability of LPAs to implement policies to protect the natural environment in their areas; at least in the short to mid-term while we wait for the new LURA system to take effect (and where many plans will be paused).
54. Should, for instance NDPM ambition be set too low on biodiversity themes, it could undermine more progressive local plan policy as drafted (as has already been demonstrated in terms of energy efficiency standards and a draconian WMS in the above question). Despite local plans having been through examination and deemed “sound”, a possibly poor performing future NDMP would still have primacy in decision making. The difference with what happens now is that while existing local plan policies need to pass tests of soundness at examination, a departure from “consistency” tests in the NPPF are occasionally possible where ‘justified’; although no such mechanism exists for NDMPs – the content and timing of which we are all still in the dark.  
55. As to EORs, the risks of such a system replacing EIA could, if not properly thought through, lead to gaps in current requirements, as illustrated by the recently confirmed Finch legal judgement for developers to have to account for ‘downstream’/ Scope 3 emissions in relevant instances within Environmental Statements (as case we ‘intervened’ in from the start as an organisation). These hard-fought downstream requirements could be left to fall by the wayside in a new EOR system, which aims to “improve outcomes at a regional and national level”, but how it might assess the significance of a major polluting development (re EIA) still remains unclear.
56. Despite these fundamental changes apparently due to be introduced next year, it remains to be seen what the government’s approach will be to both enacting NDMPs and EORs (as well as amends to the Habitats Regulations re nutrient neutrality), or its impacts to the TCPA 1990 system. Such change is especially risky if Labour also wants to deliver – and at speed - a record number of new homes by 2029, while at the same time claims to be protecting and improving nature.

LPA Capacity

57. The NPPF and future policy/legislation aside, the need for government to invest more in local authority planning capacity and expertise (including ecology expertise more generally) will be paramount in terms of ensuring LPAs can start delivering on the environmental arm of sustainable development. While the government has suggested 300 new planning officers to fill the expertise voids, we support the New Stateman’s view that it’s more the drain of experienced planning, ecology and other types of officer, once they are fully trained-up (and after years on the job and hundreds/thousands of applications considered) to the private sector - that is the key issue. An example of this is the very limited numbers of ecology officers available to LPAs: to the point of single officers being shared across multiple authorities or consultants brought in at high costs to LPA budgets. Overall, this leads to gaps in valued biodiversity expertise, contributes to delays and (possibly) less well-informed decisions being issued.
58. With the status quo set to continue as less than 1 new planner is to be assigned to each authority (i.e. 300 new planners divided by 316 authorities), new capacity to respond to the planning and ecology demands of so many more housing applications will remain limited, and could get worse; and ironically when the demands of a newish BNG really start kicking in[33] - as developers are forced to actively engage and commit to BNG delivery, rather than seek exemptions.

7.    What (if any) trends are observable in (a) delivery of environmental improvements (b) the purchase and trading of credits arising from the Environment Act requirement for developments to yield biodiversity net gain (BNG)? How are planning authorities using BNG in the planning process to deliver environmental improvements from housing development?

              24. No response submitted

8. How will the revised NPPF operate to promote the Nature Recovery Network and the implementation of local nature recovery strategies by responsible authorities?

We support WCL’s comments on this issue:

25.    “It is clear the draft NPPF does not effectively promote the Nature Recovery Network and the implementation of Local Nature Recovery Strategies (LNRSs) by responsible authorities. The consultation document recognises that LNRSs are important existing and emerging documents. Currently, however, they do not have a strong enough connection to delivery mechanisms such as Biodiversity Net Gain (BNG) and Environmental Land Management (ELM) schemes and the land use planning system. There are also no proposals in the revised NPPF that would further strengthen the link between planning policy-making and planning decision-making and LNRSs.

26.    There is a potential link from LNRSs to land use planning, in the form of a new duty in the Levelling Up and Regeneration Act for local planning authorities to ‘take account of’ LNRSs in local development plans – however, this duty has not yet been commenced.

27.    To strengthen the role of LNRSs in the land use planning system, the Government should:

1. Swiftly commence and strengthen the duty on LPAs to take account of LNRSs in local development plans.
2. Embed the LNRSs local habitat restoration targets into local development plans and require the inclusion of policies to achieve those targets.

28.    In the context of the Government’s specific NPPF proposals, the Government should:

1. Ensure LNRSs inform new strategic planning mechanisms, such as Spatial Development Plans.
2. Exclude areas identified in draft or published LNRSs as areas that are of, or could become, of particular importance for biodiversity, be excluded from the definition of grey belt land, from the definition of ‘suitable’ brownfield land, and be considered for environmental enhancement.
3. Ensure releases of Green Belt land remain strategic be accompanied by improvements to the wider Green Belt, such as the setting aside of further Green Belt land to form habitats and natural green or blue corridors between designated nature sites – this should be in line with LNRSs.
4. Once areas within the Green Belt have been identified, enhanced and/or created for nature they should be protected from future development.

9. What use can planning authorities make of the data analysis and modelling being developed under the National Land Data Framework to support planning decisions which lead to better environmental outcomes? How should the NPPF be integrated into the forthcoming Land Use Framework?

29.    No response submitted

10. What environmental regulatory arrangements within Defra’s remit which relate to the planning process are likely to be under review as potential inhibitors of growth? What effect on environmental protections would reform of these regulations be likely to have?

30.    Those regulations under DEFRA’s remit most likely to be at risk of review due to the government’s perception of them being considered “blockers to growth” are:

-          i) Habitats Regulations (which protect rare species, our most rare and vulnerable nature - and thanks to the NPPF RAMSAR) sites) especially in the context of ‘nutrient neutrality’ hold-ups for housing (as evidenced by the government’s newly announced Planning Reform Working Paper[34].

-          ii) Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (re TCPA Regulations 2017); which aims to ensure major Schedule 1 (automatically screened-in by regulations) and 2 (screened-in subject to evaluation) developments do not have significant effects on the environment (land, water, air, emissions), population (health) etc; or where such risks are present, there is suitable mitigation in place. Requirements now include consideration of scope 3/downstream emissions.; and   

-          iii) Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) (re Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004) which evaluates the environmental impact (similar to EIA) on relevant plans, policies or programmes.

31.    As highlighted in answers to questions above, the replacement of EIA and SEA with an unknown EOR system could present a range of risks to the environment, raising questions of robustness, or allowing as much statutory public participation and scrutiny or provide an equivalent level of environmental protection (e.g. consideration of downstream emissions for fossil fuel and other protects that EIA now requires). The use of EIA to evaluate the significant effect of a range of major development applications and SEA for plans, programmes or policies as to possible ‘significant effects’ are tried and tested methodologies that push developers to think hard and demonstrate - using objective evidence - the impacts of their proposals (as well as mitigation where needed).  While criticism comes from developers as to costs and timeframes, as well as directly from the last government administration which triggered the EOR clauses in the LURA 2023, other formal reviews by government departments, such as the OEP[35] have also summarized these perceived “failures” as being linked issues aside from the drafting of the regulations and their aims, and which would should be addressed if the existing are retained (and would be needed in a new EOR system), such as:

- Improving environmental data availability and standards

- Creation of a map-based portal to sign-post users on existing national/regional databases

- Improving post decision monitoring evaluations, accessibility and reporting (re EIA mitigation), as well as success of compensatory measures for HRA.

- Ensuring necessary expertise is available in-house (at LPAs and statutory consultees)

- Revision of a suite of guidance on environmental assessments and expectations of their functions.

32.    The same report also refers to possible issues with (EIA) scoping, delays, overly long and inaccessible Environmental Statements, although also states, however, that none of the root causes of these issues come from the design of the legislation itself, rather “inadequate implementation” of the law (pg. 10). It also states existing environmental assessments “continue to be essential in helping secure Government’s objectives to significantly improve the natural environment within a generation, whether that is in terms of improving air and water quality, restoring biodiversity, minimising waste or mitigating and adapting to climate change’.

33.    It seems that many of the issues identified above could be resolved if focused on by DEFRA/Whitehall in the right way, with existing established HRA/SEA/EIA systems preserved, which would itself save the system from a huge transition to unknown EORs, the detail and content of which could raise more questions than answers, especially in terms of its suitability and robustness to protect the environment.

December 2025