Written evidence submitted by The Property Institute (RDC0003)

About The Property Institute (TPI)

1.      TPI is the professional body for residential property managers, managing buildings across the UK in which private renters, social renters, leaseholders, and common holders live.

2.      Comprising around 6,500 property managers and over 360 managing agent firms collectively, the TPI’s members manage over 1.5 million leasehold homes in over 55,000 residential blocks and estates in England and Wales, freehold flats in Scotland, and institutional build to rent across the UK.

3.      The Property Institute (TPI) was formed in March 2022 following a merger of the Association of Residential Managing Agents (ARMA) and the Institute of Residential Property Management (IRPM), the trade and professional bodies of the residential property management sector and has a combined legacy spanning over 50 years of experience.

4.      TPI’s mission is to raise standards in residential building management, improving the lives of millions of residents and tenants. TPI actively supports its members to continually improve building management standards through their work and ongoing professional development; ensuring people’s homes are managed competently, safely, and ethically.

5.      In addition to its extensive membership network, TPI accredits and audits member firms against its Consumer Charter and Standards, TPI delivers a diverse range of OFQUAL accredited qualifications, comprehensive training course, and Continuous Professional Development (CPD) via seminars, workshops, webinars, conferences, and events. The Institute has awarded 10,000 qualifications to its professional members over the last two decades.

Executive Summary

6.      The aftermath of the Grenfell Tower tragedy revealed the urgent need for comprehensive safety measures. Seven years on, we have a new regulatory regime, but there remain many challenges ahead to ensuring buildings – and more importantly, residents - are safe.

7.      The response to the crisis has been disjointed, and ultimately, whilst there are many routes to remediation, there are still buildings and significant internal safety defects which do not qualify for any of the support or provisions available, despite a clear message from the previous Government that ‘leaseholders must not pay’. The two funding schemes (Building Safety Fund and Cladding Safety Scheme) have experienced delays; the developer pledge, under the ‘polluter pays’ principle, is mired in complexity and lacks urgency; and the Leaseholder Protections provisions, under the Building Safety Act 2022, do not, in fact, protect all leaseholders from remediation costs.

8.      As a result of this disjointed approach, over 3,300 buildings remain identified as unsafe, highlighting both the scale of the problem and the slow pace of remediation. This prolonged process has caused significant frustration for residents, who face not only the threat of fire but also exorbitant insurance premiums, lengthy delays and additional costs for interim safety measures.

9.      Moreover, the remediation programme has highlighted a broader issue of systemic inertia within the housing sector. The pace of change has been impeded by bureaucratic hurdles, disagreements over financial responsibility, the sheer complexity of legislation and a lack of competent contractors and professionals to address safety defects across thousands of buildings.

10.  The focus must now shift from debating financial responsibility to ensuring that comprehensive and effective remediation is carried out swiftly to protect residents and restore confidence in building safety standards. We propose six solutions to achieve this:

11.  (i) Standardised contracts for access and surveys

(ii) A backstop mechanism for Pledged Developers

(iii) Consolidation and enhanced scope of funding schemes

(iv) Establishment of a Risk Mitigation Fund

(v) Introduction of a PAS for internal remediation works

(vi) Empowerment of Accountable and Principal Accountable Persons

Building Safety Challenges

12.  Grenfell Tower Tragedy:

          Seven years ago, 72 lives were lost in a preventable fire caused by failures in safety regulations and oversight.

          The fire exposed serious failures in regulations and safety measures, highlighting the need for urgent improvements.

13.  TPI called on the government to quickly identify, fund, and fix unsafe buildings, putting resident safety above cost disputes. 

14.  The response to the crisis has been disjointed, with some buildings not qualifying for available support, despite the previous Government’s assurances that leaseholders should not pay. Delays in the Building Safety Fund and Cladding Safety Scheme, no backstop for pledged developer remediation, and gaps in the Leaseholder Protections under the Building Safety Act 2022 leave many leaseholders liable for remediation costs. The remediation routes also only tackle cladding and external remediation, with no option for internal safety defects to be resolved – the lack of a holistic fire and structural safety standard mean that interim safety measures are needed, with leaseholders picking up the cost in many cases.

15.  Further delays have been caused by moving buildings out of one funding programme into another – firstly, we saw remediation projects moved out of the BSF and passed to pledged developers under the DRC. More recently, we are seeing yet more projects moved out of the BSF and into the CSS. This stop-start is causing additional delays of weeks and months to many projects. There are also reports of delays in building control approval, meaning that some remediation projects need to be re-quoted, adding significant delays.

16.  More than 3,000 buildings are still unsafe, with slow remediation causing frustration for residents who face the risk of fire, high insurance premiums, and long delays in safety improvements.  

17.  Ongoing disputes over financial responsibility, bureaucratic hurdles, and complex legislation are delaying progress, while a shortage of qualified contractors further impedes the remediation process

Our concerns with the current approach to remediation

18.     Slow Remediation Progress

Out of 4,834 residential buildings identified with unsafe cladding, the latest data[1] reveals that remediation efforts have either commenced or been completed on 50% of these structures, totalling 2,419 buildings. However, only 30% (1,436 buildings) have fully completed the remediation process, leaving approximately 3,398 buildings unsafe.

19.     Data collated from six TPI Member firms for buildings in need of remediation (representing around 10% of the current portfolio of identified buildings needing remediation) highlights the stages where remediation projects are stalling.

• Only 7% of reported projects have completed work and only 14% have work underway.
• 37% of all projects are stalled at Stage 2 (awaiting FRAEW assessment);
• Over half (62%) of remediation projects are Developer Pledged – just 3% of those have reached completion stage and 16% have works underway. 45% are stuck at the FRAEW assessment stage (Stage 2);
• 13.5% are going through the BSF; 30% have reached completion and 24% have work underway.
• A fifth (20%) are going through the CSS; 37% are stuck at the FRAEW assessment stage, and 24% are currently going through the tender process (Note that many BSF projects have been moved into the CSS in the last 12 months)

20.  Pledged Developers and the Responsible Actors Scheme (RAS)

Under the Developer Pledge, 1,629 high-rise buildings over 11 meters have been identified with serious fire safety defects, including cladding issues and problems like faulty fire barriers and doors. While 47% (772) of these buildings have started remediation, only 25% (413) have completed the necessary work, indicating slow progress in addressing safety concerns.

21.  Many of the delays in remediation projects are largely due to the transition from the Building Safety Fund (BSF) to the Developer Remediation Contract (DRC). The BSF provided clear funding and oversight, helping remediation move more quickly.

22.  However, after buildings moved to the DRC, progress stalled as the funding and regulatory mechanisms of the BSF were no longer in place, leaving many buildings awaiting delivery agreements to begin repairs. The DRC provides no backstop for undertaking this work and no hard deadlines on when it should be completed. As our data above shows, many of these projects are stalling at Stage 2 – this is largely due to a lack of supply, and because pledged developers may also be insisting on appointing their own risk assessor to carry out a survey.

23.  ‘Mind The Gap’ – Standards

The Developer Remediation Contract, Building Safety Fund, and Cladding Safety Scheme focus on external fire safety issues but overlook critical internal safety defects, such as inadequate fire compartmentation and faulty fire doors. There is no dedicated funding or legal obligation for developers to address these internal issues, leaving a significant gap in overall building safety standards.

24.  The lack of financial support for internal defects places a heavy burden on property owners and leaseholders, especially when applying for a Building Assessment Certificate under the new regulatory system. Without targeted funding and limited developer responsibility, they face financial strain while trying to meet the stringent safety standards set by the Building Safety Regulator.

Measures to accelerate and improve remediation standards

25.  The urgent need for a more comprehensive and expedited remediation strategy is clear. Without swift and coordinated action to address both external and internal safety issues, residents remain at significant risk, and financial pressures on building owners and leaseholders continue to escalate. Furthermore, the integrity of building safety standards is undermined when internal defects are overlooked, leading to a piecemeal approach that fails to fully protect resident communities.

26.  The Property Institute recommends a more coordinated and faster remediation strategy to address both external and internal safety defects, reduce financial pressures on residents, and restore confidence in building safety and property markets.

27.  To effectively address and resolve fire safety issues in high-rise buildings, several key measures are needed. These measures should focus on streamlining processes, enhancing oversight, and ensuring adequate funding and resources:

28.  (i) Standardised contracts for access and surveys: Developing standardised, legally binding contracts tailored to various types of landlord and freeholder arrangements is crucial. These contracts should clarify access rights, include penalties for delays and provide provisions for fast-tracked approvals and access to emergency remediation services

29.  (ii) A backstop mechanism for Pledged Developers: Introduce a stringent backstop mechanism with defined deadlines for developers under the DRC. This mechanism should include automatic reversion to a government fund, with the developer remaining liable for all associated costs; introduce financial penalties or legal actions against developers who miss deadlines and require developers to submit prescribed progress reports, to ensure compliance and transparency.

30.  (iii) Consolidation and enhanced scope of funding schemes: Merge the BSF and the CSS into a single, integrated funding programme for both external and internal fire safety defects, with a unified delivery partner and digital portal. This consolidation should streamline the application process, provide centralised oversight with dedicated case managers and adopt a risk-based prioritisation of funding based on the severity and immediacy of external and internal safety issues, ensuring that the most critical buildings receive funding first.

31.  (iv) Establishment of a Risk Mitigation Fund: Create a separate dedicated fund to support temporary risk mitigation measures, including immediate measures such as fire wardens or "waking watch" services, and medium-term measures such as fire alarms, while buildings await permanent remediation.

32.  (v) Introduce a PAS for internal remediation works: In addition to PAS 9980, there is an urgent need to develop and publish a PAS specifically for the remediation of internal fire safety defects. This PAS should outline comprehensive guidelines for internal safety issues such as fire compartmentation, fire-resistant materials, and emergency escape routes.

33.  (vi) Empowerment of Accountable and Principal Accountable Persons (APs/PAPs): Grant APs and PAPs greater authority and resources to oversee remediation work by establishing a direct regulatory connection between the Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA) and the remediation process, giving PAPs and APs a formal role in remediation efforts.

34.  By implementing these comprehensive measures, the process of addressing fire safety issues in high-rise buildings can be significantly improved, leading to more effective remediation, enhanced safety, and greater accountability.