Written evidence submitted by Manchester City Council (HS2U0007)

1.      Introduction

Manchester City Council (MCC) welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to this Inquiry. Manchester is a major destination within the heart of the Greater Manchester conurbation. In the context of HS2, this has meant coordinating a programme to support the effective design and delivery of HS2 in the city-region, in a way that seeks to maximise the benefits for our city’s residents and businesses. MCC has collaborated closely with the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) and its executive arm for transport, Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM), and neighbouring authorities directedly affected by HS2 Phase 2b, including Trafford, Tameside and Wigan local authorities, as well as Manchester Airports Group (MAG). This response compliments the separate TfGM evidence submission to this Inquiry.

The decision, made without any public consultation by the former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, to cancel HS2 north of Birmingham (Phase 2), has had significant impacts on our local and regional economy. We are pleased to have the opportunity to provide the Inquiry with; (1) our views on the impacts and consequences of the cancellation for Manchester and the country; (2) our views on the emerging alternative solutions to address the impacts and consequences of the cancellation; and (3) our recommendations to Government for ensuring the future prosperity for our residents and businesses in the City, and Greater Manchester conurbation.

2.      Cancellation of HS2 north of Birmingham (Phase 2) will have serious negative economic and social consequences for Greater Manchester, the West Midlands, and the Nation.

MCC agree with recent reports from both the National Audit Office (NAO); HS2: update following cancellation of Phase 2[1], and National Infrastructure Committee (NIC); Infrastructure Progress Review 2024[2] which highlight that the cancellation of HS2 north of Birmingham leave serious challenges in improving connectivity between both urban and interurban transport networks in the UK. Most notably, the adverse consequences for cities, such as Manchester and Birmingham, which have based economic growth plans around the delivery of such projects.

In our view, the most consequential impacts of the cancellation are that;

Constrained, and at capacity, rail infrastructure between the England’s largest economic centres and cities will hold back economic growth at a national level, which undermines business confidence in the UK PLC.

Continued poor transport connectivity in the North of England is a key reason for productivity levels significantly lagging behind the South East and London, and peer cities in Europe, over a sustained period of time.

Many National and Regional business groups, such as British Chamber of Commerce[3] and Federation of Small Businesses, have all raised concerns around how the cancellation of HS2 (Phase 2b) will negatively affect future private investment in the UK by undermining confidence.

Specifically for Greater Manchester, the economic impacts of the cancellation are significant, with the Federation of Small Businesses finding that HS2 (including Phase 2) together with Northern Powerhouse Rail (NPR) would have added £9billion to Greater Manchester’s economy each year, unlocking almost 100,000 jobs[4], and narrowing the productivity gap with London. The uncertainty around improving connectivity in place of HS2 (Phase 2) puts these benefits at serious risk.

The West Coast Main Line (WCML) faces serious capacity and reliability challenges north of Birmingham, and a potential future scenario of a mixture of HS2 and ‘classic’ trains operating on the WCML north of Birmingham would be much more complex than today’s operations, potentially compounding existing reliability challenges through the spine of the UK rail network. This would also impact on freight movements – over 40% of UK rail freight shipments use the WCML at some point in their journey – a key aspects of unlocking the UK’s net zero ambitions for the transport sector.

Local authorities, and transport bodies, at the heart of our economic centres in England (such as Manchester, Birmingham, and London), cannot efficiently and effectively plan strategic development and economic growth plans, due to uncertainty around infrastructure investment. Substantial ‘sunk costs’ have already been incurred by MCC, and our close neighbouring local authorities and transport body, in seeking to support the delivery of HS2 (Phase 2b), which may be entirely abortive unless an alternative – which delivers similar outputs in terms of connectivity as HS2 (Phase 2b) – is taken forward. Additionally, the potentially significant national economic benefits of improving international connectivity via Manchester Airport will be diminished without these vital connections to Birmingham Airport, London, and other key destinations.

3.      There are credible alternatives to HS2 Phase 2 that can deliver similar outputs in a more viable and deliverable manner

Despite the serious impacts of the cancellation, we are not advocating for a ‘resurrection’ of HS2 Phase 2b. We acknowledge the current fiscal climate challenges and believe that a new approach to enhancing inter-region connectivity is required. We believe that a place-centric approach, that recognises and reflects the economic needs and ambitions of places along a route, should be promoted by the Government to help deliver challenging long term infrastructure projects.

The ‘Opportunity through Connectivity’[5] report employed a place-based approach, examining a range of potential alternative options across a number of different criteria, including costs, benefits, and commercial viability. The conclusion, which MCC broadly concurs with, recommends a new rail line be constructed between Fradley / Handsacre Junction (the current terminating point for HS2 Phase 1) and High Legh, where it can connect into the planned NPR corridor for onward connections to Liverpool, Manchester Airport, Central Manchester, and beyond.

The report recommended using the same route planned for HS2 Phase 2, which would enable delivery up to three years faster than other options and make best use of the resources and money already expended on consenting and land acquisition.

The report recommended that the delivery of this new line be phased and also examined alternative funding and delivery models, including the potential for private investment in the scheme, which could further reduce costs and risks.

While more detailed investigation of this solution is needed, it is clear that there are viable options for addressing the severe economic and operational impacts from the HS2 Phase 2 cancellation.

4.      We are recommending three specific actions be taken by the Government to move this forward and address the challenges that have been created by the HS2 Phase 2 cancellation

The decision to cancel the Northern leg of HS2, and the way in which this decision was made, had serious consequences for our city-region and beyond. It is, however, not too late to make choices that can allow us to find a way forward – one which addresses the economic and operational constraints we now face, takes advantage of the public expenditure that has already been incurred, maximises the benefits from HS2 Phase 1 and NPR investments, and rebuilds investor confidence.

Retain land already acquired for HS2 Phase 2, while alternative approaches are considered by Government. We welcome the Government’s recent indication by Lord Hendy[6] that the sale of already acquired land would be paused, and we ask that this remains the Government’s position until alternatives to HS2 Phase 2 are properly considered, and a clear solution to capacity and connectivity issues north of Birmingham are established. Releasing already acquired land, before this, could prejudice future connectivity enhancements for a generation.

Undertake a detailed feasibility study of alternative solutions that are more affordable, deliverable, and represent strong value for money – building on the ‘Opportunity through Connectivity’ report and working with local leaders and transport bodies, on this study.

More broadly, Government should adopt a new and more collaborative model for working with city-regions on infrastructure projects of national importance. Over the years, Greater Manchester has sought to work with the Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd in a collaborative way. We have aimed to support the development and delivery of a robust scheme that integrates into existing and future transport infrastructure within our City, and region, on the basis that this approach would maximise benefits of the scheme and deliver a better outcome for generations to come. However, the current structure for engagement between sponsors and local partners is centred around a hybrid Bill petitioning process. This is time and cost-consumptive for all parties and has the potential to create conflict or adversarial positions – rather than one of collaboration. We recognise that the Government has already set out a number of recent reviews and consultations on its approach to delivering its growth ambitions, which relate to infrastructure delivery, and we look forward to engaging in these.

Additionally, The Liverpool City Region Mayor, Steve Rotheram, and Greater Manchester Mayor, Andy Burnham, have established a new Liverpool-Manchester Railway Board[7] to maximise the economic and social benefits of a new railway between Liverpool City Region and Greater Manchester. The Board has committed to advancing a place-based, bottom-up approach to developing the Liverpool to Manchester line to turbocharge the economy of the North West. Given the close working relationships between Greater Manchester and the West Midlands, we believe that there is an opportunity to establish similar arrangements to develop a Manchester to Birmingham scheme.

We welcome the Public Accounts Committee’s Inquiry into this matter and look forward to its views on moving forward in a positive manner.

December 2024

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