

### HCDC: Further Readiness Follow Up Questions

- 1) When is the Committee likely to receive the follow ups from the meeting on 23 November given these were not included in the document sent yesterday?**

The Department has yet to provide a response.

- 2) In response to the first answer (Q198 of the CAS/CGS session), the document excised part of the question which noted that the suggestion was that "(Ft Lt Damon Green) was not promoted in rank, he was in fact promoted on squadron to executive. This was seen as being a prestigious role which meant that he had the potential to becoming Red 1 further down the line." Please could a response be provided in relation to the point about recognition in squadron, rather than promotion across the Air Force?**

As raised by Air Marshal Paul Lloyd during the Women in Armed Forces session on 14 November [[committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13817/pdf/](https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13817/pdf/) question 40-42] individuals may be given more responsibility but that does not amount to promotion of rank. Promotion happens across the Air Force, and decisions are not taken within a single unit. Individuals may take on an increased level of responsibility such as leadership of larger size formations or leading logistics of a department in other squadrons. The individuals referred to were not promoted and left at the same rank.

- 3) On Q274 of the CAS/CGS session, please could the MOD provide the information on all "Milestones, targets and indications of progress" since Lord Lancaster's 2021 Report?**

The Reserve Forces 30 (RF30) Review was published in May 2021. Since the report's publication, there have been changes in the global context and the Department's strategic thinking has shifted as a result. The RF30 Report, and the pan-Defence collaboration this generated, provided key insights into the Reserve Forces with many of the recommendations included in overlapping reports (Defence Command Paper 23 (DCP23) and Haythornthwaite Review).

In a Written Ministerial Statement on 26 October 2023, the Minister for Defence Personnel and Families (MinDPF) reported that the Department are reviewing the way ahead on Reserves recommendations in the context of the RF30 Report, the broader Haythornthwaite Review of Armed Forces Incentivisation (HRAFI) report and the focus on people in the DCP23. The Ministry of Defence is developing a Defence Reserve Campaign Plan which brings the key recommendations for Reserves from these documents together into one plan. We expect Ministers to update the House on this work before Summer recess this year.

- 4) On Q1 of the 1SL follow ups, please could the MOD provide details of naval exercises carried out under Ex. Agile Stance?**

The Agile Stance Campaign Plan (ASCP) was designed to deliver a series of exercises, over the period 2021 – 2024, which represent campaign way points during which capabilities, structures and processes would be tested and lessons applied or learned. The lines of operation within the ASCP include the strategic base, protecting the homeland, whole force readiness and reserves. Thus, to answer the question relating to naval exercises that have been carried out under ASCP –

there have been none. Although, elements of the Maritime Reserve have conducted limited mobilisation activity as part of the ASCP where some of the processes of mobilisation have been tested.

**5) On Q383 from the MinAF session, can you confirm that the purchase of radars is the only instance of capability originally procured for Ukraine being adopted by the UK Armed Forces?**

A: To date this is correct. The Armed Forces are exploring which other technologies that have been successful in Ukraine could similarly be pulled through onto the existing force at pace.

**6) On Q2 of those that the Committee did not have time to cover with MinAF, the response makes no mention of Persistent Engagement operations – can you confirm whether that is because persistent engagement operations are deemed to have no impact on the readiness on individual units and on the overall readiness of the Services? If not, please could an answer be provided?**

That is correct, persistent engagement operations are deemed to have minimal impact on the readiness of individual units and on the overall readiness of the Services. This is because they are managed through the Strategic Effects Cycle to ensure that they are conducted in such a way as to achieve the balance between 'Warfight – Transformation – Operate', with persistent engagement being part of our Global Operate programme.