DED0047

Written evidence submitted by the Home Office

Summary

1. The Government has a long-standing commitment to defending the UK’s democracy, and the UK plays a leading role in promoting democratic values internationally, evidenced for example through the UK’s co-hosting of this year’s Summit for Democracy on 18th – 20th March.

2. Together with our allies, we are taking steps to safeguard our open and democratic societies which underpin our stability, security, and prosperity. This is especially important in 2024 as billions of people go to the polls around the globe, including in the UK.

3. The Government’s 2021 Integrated Review (IR) established that state threats to the UK are growing and diversifying as systemic competition intensifies. The IR noted that state threats take many forms, including foreign interference in our democracy.

4. In November 2022, the Government established the Defending Democracy Taskforce (the Taskforce), to ensure a whole of Government approach to protecting the democratic integrity of the UK, with a particular focus on foreign interference. Importantly, as the Security Minister described in his Policy Exchange speech in December 2022, the Government takes a broad interpretation of what is needed to defend democracy. This is not only about protecting the running of elections or the activity of democratically elected officials, but also about ensuring that citizens are free and able to debate ideas. The Security Minister noted that foreign interference undermines our sovereignty and “our way of life.”

5. The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh described “democratic and wider societal resilience” as a vulnerability which had come into sharper focus since the IR in 2021. It confirmed the Taskforce as an enduring function of Government and noted its important role in bridging the gap between the national security establishment, and non-traditional partners such as local councils.[1]

6. As is common with many major events, the Cabinet Office (CO) are responsible for ensuring the coordination of work across Government on the security and preparedness of specific electoral events, with this work overseen by the Deputy Prime Minister. This includes efforts to ensure the safety and security of the elections scheduled for 2 May and the next General Election, progressing mitigation of risks to people, infrastructure and information. This work is being led by the joint CO and Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC), Joint Election Security & Preparedness (JESP) Unit. In parallel, the Taskforce works to improve the security of elections and democratic resilience in the long-term to ensure that pressing work on election security is prioritised and that it remains coherent with the longer-term work needed on defending democracy.

7. We are increasing activity focussed on defending democracy. For example, as set out in the recent Government announcement, £31m has been committed to protect democratic processes and enhance security measures for elected officials, and implement the Defending Democracy Policing Protocol agreed with police leaders.[2]

8. The Government continues to view the defence of the UK’s democracy as one of its highest priorities. Our elected representatives are experiencing heightened levels of intimidation and harassment, some to such an extent that they may leave their roles.

9. We face growing cyber threats, with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assessing that “democratic events, such as elections, almost certainly represent attractive targets for malicious actors,” and the changing geopolitical situation making “the prospect of influencing the political discourse in democracies ever more attractive to state actors”[3]. The Government will continue to work with our allies to call out unacceptable behaviour targeting our democracy such as the 25 March attribution of malicious cyber activity by Chinese state-linked actors.

10. New legislation, including the National Security Act 2023 and Online Safety Act 2023, has already given us more tools to tackle threats to democracy, as part of this work. However, there is more work to be done to facilitate greater cooperation between the many elements of government aimed at protecting our political parties, elected officials, core electoral democratic infrastructure and broader way of life. The Taskforce brings the community of government departments and operational partners together, to address the threat we face using a coordinated, cross-HMG approach.

Written evidence in response to the questions raised by the JCNSS

Q1. What are the actual and perceived threats to the UK’s democracy, and from where do those threats originate?

11. Threats to democracy come from a wide range of domestic and foreign actors with the tools to attempt to interfere and disrupt. The forthcoming General Election will provide an opportunity for such actors to threaten our democracy at a particular point in time. Once the polls are closed, attempts to interfere will likely shift from influencing voters to undermining confidence in the outcome.

12. However, threats exist prior to and beyond the election also. For example, our elected representatives face a range of threats and risks which in turn impact our democracy - with a heightened focus on individuals expected in the lead up to elections, and increased tensions surrounding the conflict in the Middle East, the level of threat posed to them is likely to be high. Elected representatives have been threatened and had their family homes targeted in a series of high-profile incidents. These incidents are part of a pattern of increasingly intimidatory behaviour seemingly intended to coerce elected representatives and hijack the democratic process through force itself.

13. We have seen through recent incidents – including the reported hacking of Stewart McDonald MP’s private email account - that cyber threats are all too real and there are adversaries who are determined to undermine our democracy. At their most serious, the tragic murders of Jo Cox and Sir David Amess, are examples of the threats the UK and its elected officials are now facing.

14. In recent months the Deputy Prime Minister has provided two statements to Parliament on attempts to target the UK. In December 2023, the UK (with international partners), exposed attempted Russian cyber interference in politics and democratic processes.[4] This included the public attribution of the Russia-based cyber actor ‘Star Blizzard’ as almost certainly subordinate to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[5] Similarly, in March 2024, the UK attributed malicious cyber activity to Chinese state-linked actors which targeted the Electoral Commission and parliamentarians in 2021[6].

15. Finally, the threat of online harm coming into the real world is growing. We know that elected representatives are changing what they say, and how they vote, based on extreme levels of online harassment they are facing. This may be exacerbated by the growing use of AI. This is having a tangible impact on democracy and stirring up significant amounts of real-world activity including protests outside homes of elected representatives, which is increasingly being reported to the police.

Q2: What are the objectives, working methods and resources of the Defending Democracy Taskforce? What has it achieved since its creation in November 2022?

16. The Taskforce’s mission statement is to ‘reduce the risk to the UK’s democratic processes, institutions and society and ensure that these are secure and resilient to threats of foreign interference.’ The Taskforce brings together Ministers, operational agencies, and other partners to work on the full range of threats facing the UK’s democracy and improve confidence in the integrity and security of our elections.

17. Minsters at the Taskforce oversee a wide portfolio of work delivered by teams across government. Teams working on the Taskforce’s priorities are coordinated by the Taskforce Secretariat, which also leads on specific projects to address priority issues (see below). The Secretariat also develops advice for Ministers on the Taskforce to support decision making.

18. While the Taskforce has a particular focus on foreign interference, it has taken a broad view of its remit, acting to galvanise activity and address gaps wherever identified.

19. Since its creation, the Taskforce has:

▪         Established the Joint Election Security and Preparedness (JESP) Unit to lead on preparedness for the next general election.

▪         Strengthened our operational response to information operations that target the UK domestically including mis/disinformation during elections.

▪         Supported Parliament and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in their delivery of a new enhanced cyber security offer for Parliamentarians to better protect them, their teams, and families from attacks.

▪         Committed to £31m of additional funding to enhance protection for elected representatives. The Taskforce will continue to review the effectiveness of arrangements for protective security for those in public life.

▪         Agreed a Defending Democracy Policing Protocol with police leaders, which contains seven key commitments to implement minimum standards of policing at democratic events. The protocol aims to prevent intimidatory protest at home addresses, and to ensure protests at democratic venues do not inhibit democratic processes.

▪         Progressed a comprehensive review of transnational repression (TNR) – examining to what extent and how foreign powers threaten and exert pressure on individuals and communities living in the UK. The review’s upcoming recommendations are likely to focus on building resilience, including mobilising the new powers in the National Security Act 2023 (NSA), supporting communities potentially at risk of TNR, and building a system of continuous learning to improve the current evidence base.

▪         Led a programme of engagement across the UK, including with local authorities and devolved administrations, to raise awareness of the threats to democracy and begin collaboration in key areas to help address these risks including cyber security.          

20. A dedicated Secretariat supports delivery of the Taskforce’s priorities, however the main resources for Taskforce work are provided by member departments, and each department is responsible for delivery on their respective policy issues. The Taskforce has a wide government and operational membership, meaning Ministers and the Secretariat can draw upon cross-HMG perspectives and expertise to deliver its work.

Q3: Is there more that the Defending Democracy Taskforce could do before upcoming elections to protect political parties, elected officials, and core electoral infrastructure?

21. This work sits alongside other recent Government improvements via the Elections Act 2022 to ensure our elections are secure, safe, modern, and transparent. These include the introduction of the digital imprints regime which will increase the transparency of digital campaigning, the requirement for voters to show photographic identification to vote at polling stations, the new disqualification order to protect candidates, campaigners and elected officials from intimidation and the revised offence of undue influence.

Coordination of election security

22. The JESP Unit is a joint unit between the Elections Division in DLUHC and the Government Security Group (GSG) in Cabinet Office. Its work includes increasing the resilience of national election systems and providers, local authorities, political parties, elected officials, and candidates. Their role includes standing up an Election Cell in the run up to an electoral event, which coordinates across government to prepare to and respond to potential risks to elections. JESP leads a community including government departments, technical agencies, UKIC, and the police who have the technical and policy expertise to collectively address risks to the election process.

Protective security

23. A protective security uplift was announced by the Government on 28th February 2024 to increase the protective security of elected representatives, including:
1. An expansion of security support for all elected representatives on a needs basis to have a dedicated, named, police office to contact;
2. New funding for additional patrols to respond to any heightened community tensions;
3. Private security for those most at risk;
4. A new Defending Democracy Policing Protocol as outlined as part of the response in question 2.

Cyber risks

24. DLUHC and the NCSC continues to work to protect the digital infrastructure for the election. Alongside this, DLUHC is also working with electoral administrators, print suppliers, Royal Mail and other organisations involved in delivering elections, to ensure their integrity and safety. The NCSC is working with the main political parties to support their effort to enhance their cyber resilience.

25. The NCSC will be publishing updated guidance for local authorities and political parties alongside new guidance for candidates. NCSC is also working with Electoral Management System providers and the main parties to support them in implementing enhanced cyber security measures like the Active Cyber Defence (ACD)[7] offer.

Q4. How does the Defending Democracy Taskforce inform the decisions of the National Security Council, the National Security Risk Assessment process and wider Government activity to counter state threats?

26. The Security Minister (Chair of the Taskforce) is a member of the National Security Council (NSC) and has updated the Council on the work of the Taskforce and informed decisions taken by that committee. Senior representatives from the intelligence agencies, assessment partners (such as the Joint Intelligence Organisation) and law enforcement (who will often also be involved in informing decisions put to the NSC), are members of the Taskforce.

27. The work of the Taskforce drives elements of the Government’s overarching approach to countering state threats as set out in the Integrated Review Refresh and overseen by the Deputy Prime Minister. In particular the Taskforce helps to inform discussions and approaches on foreign interference. The Secretariat is jointly housed in the Home Office’s Directorate for State Threats & Cyber and National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office and is jointly led by senior officials who actively ensure join up with HMG’s wider work on countering state threats and our national security response.

28. The Taskforce had not been created when the NSRA was last reviewed, but it will be consulted during the 2024 NSRA risk cycle.

Q5: How secure and resilient are elections across the UK, when it comes to foreign interference?

29. The UK is facing a range of threats from states who are actively seeking to disrupt our political system and it is likely that states will continue to make interference attempts [8]. 

30. The UK has robust new legislative tools to protect the democratic integrity of the UK against foreign interference. The National Security Act 2023 modernises and reforms the government’s tools to tackle state actors and the foreign interference threats they pose. The Act allows us to tackle the growing and diversifying range of state threats including foreign interference in elections.

Q6: What is the role of independent bodies such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Ofcom and the Electoral Commission when it comes to foreign interference? Are they sufficiently empowered and resourced to undertake that role?

31. Defending democracy is a critical part of the NCSC’s mission. Over recent years, the NCSC has surged its efforts to advise on the smooth running of local elections and political party leadership contests. The NCSC have supported a range of entities involved in the democratic process with their responses to cyber incidents, ranging from phishing attacks to more sophisticated compromises. The NCSC has provided longer-term guidance for improving resilience, both across supply chains that underpin the functioning of key services, and to individuals active in our democracy - such as politicians where we have seen them being targeted.

32. Ofcom enforces a Broadcasting Code to ensure that audiences are adequately protected from harm and news is reported with accuracy and due impartiality. As the regulator for online safety in the UK, Ofcom will regulate duties on companies under the Online Safety Act to remove illegal content, including foreign interference, on their services. These duties will become operational at the end of 2024.

33. Furthermore, UK electoral law sets out a stringent regime of controls that safeguard elections. The Electoral Commission (EC) plays a significant role here. Legislative tools, including those in the Elections Act (2022), empower the Commission to enforce greater transparency of digital political advertising, monitor compliance with electoral finance laws and enforce offences to mitigate the risks of foreign interference in elections through political donations. The Elections Act 2022 also removed the scope for foreign campaign spending above £700.

34. During the passage of the National Security Act 2023, the Government committed to consult relevant authorities with the aim of finding ways to improve information sharing between relevant bodies to facilitate enforcement of existing electoral law. The sharing of information could improve the ability of relevant authorities to identify any individuals making or facilitating donations from foreign powers and sanction those individuals. The Government will report to Parliament on its findings by the end of 2024.

Q7: How effective is the UK’s legislative framework for defending democracy, including the new powers under the National Security Act 2023?

35. The UK’s legislative framework for defending democracy includes The National Security Act 2023, The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, The Online Safety Act 2023, The Elections Act 2022, The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, the National Security and Investment Act 2021, and the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. 

36. The National Security Act 2023 is a landmark piece of legislation, welcomed by DG MI5 as “a game changing update to our powers”.[9] It contains a range of new offences and measures that will protect the UK from state threats activity, such as interference in our democracy from foreign powers. This includes the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), which imposes certain registration requirements on certain activity in the UK that is directed by foreign powers or organisations. Parts 1-3 of the Act came into force in December 2023. Part 4 of the Act, containing FIRS, is planned for commencement later in 2024.

37. The Act also establishes the new role of the Independent Reviewer of State Threats legislation. Jonathan Hall KC has recently been appointed to this post. This role will ensure continued scrutiny of the effectiveness of the UK’s counter-state threats legislative framework.

38. The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 ensures that universities in England have the tools they need to tackle interference and threats to freedom of speech and academic freedom, wherever they originate.

Q8: How does the Foreign Influence Registration scheme (FIRS) strengthen the resilience of the UK political system against covert foreign influence?

39. The UK welcomes engagement from foreign governments. Influencing conducted in an open and transparent way contributes positively to the UK. However, when foreign powers seek to exert influence in a way that is not transparent, this can have serious implications for our democracy.  

40. FIRS will strengthen the resilience of the UK political system by requiring transparency from those being directed to undertake political influencing activities by any foreign power and certain other organisations. Political outcomes covered by FIRS include seeking to influence an election in the UK, a decision by a Minister, the proceedings of a UK political party or influencing members of legislatures. FIRS will provide greater assurance around activities directed by those foreign powers who pose the greatest risks to the UK’s democracy. Registrations concerning political influencing will appear on a public register, bringing transparency to these activities. Those that fail to register, or otherwise do not comply with the requirements of the political influencing tier of the scheme, risk a two-year custodial sentence.

41. We intend that FIRS will commence in Autumn 2024.The NSA requires an annual report to Parliament, which will provide regular information about the operation of FIRS.

Q9: What role are emerging technologies, such as generative AI, expected to play in upcoming elections?

42. HMG is committed to addressing information threats to national security, including the emerging risks posed by AI.

43. AI’s ability to exacerbate existing issues may pose the biggest immediate threat, as it may be used to generate fabricated content, create hyper-realistic bots to spread disinformation and enable deepfakes campaigns. We have already seen examples of AI-driven election interference across the globe and in the UK, targeting political figures and seeking to influence debate, and the challenges posed should not be underestimated.

44. The National Security Online Information Team (NSOIT) in DSIT is focused on understanding threats from foreign states and risks to elections, including from the use of deepfakes. DSIT are also working with developers, academia, civil society, and experts, to understand the AI threat, keep appraised of technical developments and understand the timelines of technology to allow detection. DSIT Ministers meet regularly with industry to understand how they will respond to these threats.

45. Government is also working with industry and international partners to understand the opportunities and risks presented by AI. 2023’s international AI summit, led by the UK, was a major step in developing our approach to Artificial Intelligence. Countries in attendance agreed to the Bletchley Declaration, a landmark agreement establishing a global consensus on the opportunities and risks of AI, and the need for collaborative action on frontier AI safety. The government is now building on the outcomes agreed. DSIT and FCDO are working closely with the Republic of Korea (RoK) and France, who will both be taking their turn in hosting the Summit this year.

Q10: What can be done to improve public awareness of disinformation, fraud, and technological interference such as that through AI or deep fakes?

46. Improving public awareness of fraud by streamlining and amplifying messaging, is a key part of the government’s Fraud Strategy, which includes the ‘Stop! Think Fraud’ campaign, which launched on 12 February. This is a major campaign across TV, radio social media, and billboards, that will help people spot and avoid fraud. The campaign (and supporting website) will make it easier for the public to recognise fraud – including where generated by AI - and take steps to protect themselves, their family, and friends.

47. The government is taking steps to improve public awareness and build resilience against foreign interference, including mis/disinformation and artificially generated deepfakes.

48. DSIT’s Online Media Literacy Strategy is driving better media literacy outcomes with a clear action plan to achieve the Government ambitions. The Government has committed to providing over £1.4 million in continued grant funding as part of this work and evaluations will be undertaken to understand impact and inform evidence-based decisions to scale up further. AI generated threats and emerging harms will be a key focus.

49. A free, sustainable, and plural media plays an important role in raising public awareness of the risks of disinformation, and trustworthy journalism can act as a key channel for challenging false narratives arising from AI-generated content. Measures from Government including the Media Bill, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill and various tax reliefs and innovation funding support this goal. Government is also working with industry to understand the challenges and opportunities of AI, including considering AI-generated mis- and dis-information.

50. As well as combatting technological interference in media, the UK Government is committed to the promotion of media freedom. It is paramount that all media professionals are free to work without fear and journalists must be able to investigate and report independently. As a proud member of the Media Freedom Coalition, the UK is committed to championing freedom of expression and the freedoms of journalists in the UK.

Q11. How will threats to UK democracy evolve in the medium and long term? How prepared is the UK for addressing these threats?

51. It is likely that states and non-state actors will continue to attempt to interfere with UK democracy in the medium and long term, and that AI will create enhanced opportunities for interference. Without further government action, the intimidation and harassment of elected officials will grow. It is, and always will be, an absolute priority for the Government to protect the UK from attempted foreign interference and we will always take the steps necessary to do so. This includes calling out unacceptable behaviour by state-linked actors such as the attribution on 25 March of malicious cyber activity by Chinese state-linked actors targeting our democracy.

52. Since the last general election, geopolitical tensions have increased with both the war in Ukraine and the Israel/Hamas conflict influencing those who seek to harm the UK. This is driving growing intimidation and harassment online and in the real world. How deepfakes will affect the public may be difficult to predict at this stage, but we have seen them used in elections in a number of countries including the UK. This is combined with a move from established media channels to online news sources especially amongst younger audiences.

53. We have seen these trends grow since the last general election and we expect that they may continue to grow. The new JESP Unit is focusing on election security and the Taskforce, as an enduring function of government, will take forward work alongside the assessment community to address the long-term security and resilience of our democracy in light of these evolving trends.       

Q12. What does the UK do to support democracy abroad and how should the Government work with non-governmental organisations to contribute to defending democracy?

54. The Integrated Review highlights that the state of democracy around the world matters to the UK. It commits us to increase our efforts internationally to protect open societies and democratic values. Whilst it is not the role of the Taskforce to support democracy abroad, there are mechanisms in place for the Government to reinforce democracy overseas. The FCDO are responsible for extensive efforts to support democracy abroad. They are a standing member of the Taskforce to ensure that the UK’s work domestically and internationally to defend democracy is coordinated.

55. The FCDO has proactively engaged with international partners to build collective democratic resilience and counter foreign interference. The department actively contribute to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism which aims to strengthen G7 coordination to identify and respond to threats to democracies. There are opportunities this year to progress our work in this space with international partners, including the Summit for Democracy being hosted by the Republic of Korea and the third Counter Foreign Interference Summit, being hosted by Holland.

56. In concert with the FCDO, the NCSC co-chairs the Strategic Dialogue on Cybersecurity of Civil Society Under Threat of Transnational Repression with the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The focus is on supporting the cyber resilience of high-risk communities (including non-governmental organisations) as they face heightened threats.[10]

57. The Summit for Democracy on 18th – 20th March 2024 will discuss a proposal for an International Government Compact to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections.

Q13. How can the UK work better with other democracies to tackle foreign interference and uphold democratic values?

58. The UK’s closest international partners will be similarly exposed to political interference risk. Collaboration with these partners is an essential part of countering this risk, and we work both bilaterally and through multilateral groupings. There are approximately 4 billion people globally going to the polls in 2024 - an assessment of key risks, learning and response to manage the emerging risks to the UK following these elections is discussed at the Taskforce’s Ministerial meetings.

59. We engage with like minded partners at the political, policy and operational level around building capability and resilience to defend democracy; encouraging and supporting leadership on defending democracy; and undertaking joint activity and/or programming.

60. This work, led by the FCDO, includes building the capability of countries to counter state-backed disinformation activity. In February 2024, we issued a joint statement with Canada and the US to increase international coordination efforts to counter state-backed information threats. 

DDTF Secretariat

April 2024