DED0022
Unlock Democracy campaigns on a range of democracy-related issues including: transparency and accountability of government, electoral reform, devolution, participative democracy, human rights and for a written constitution. We are a grassroots movement, owned and run by our members.
Unlock Democracy believes UK democracy is vulnerable to foreign interference.
Summary:
Unlock Democracy’s submission lays out the extent to which the Defending Democracy Taskforce, and other organisations like NCA, NCSC, Ofcom and the Electoral Commission, are aware of and equipped to counter threats to UK democracy and democratic institutions. The main threats are online misinformation, especially perpetuated through the use of AI, hacking attacks, as well as foreign funding seeping into UK politics allowing foreign influence to go undetected.
Unlock Democracy finds that the Defending Democracy Taskforce understands the significance and scope of the issues it is facing, and is setting out the right strategies.
However, we recommend further steps are taken to ensure democratic institutions and processes are safeguarded. Our main recommendations for the UK government include the following:
UK democracy faces a number of threats of both foreign and domestic origin.
Unlock Democracy considers any threat - be it perceived or actual - to UK democracy should be considered a threat to national security. This is because weak or less trustworthy democratic institutions make UK democracy more vulnerable to foreign disinformation, conspiracy theories and other risks. During the Covid-19 pandemic, trust in the UK government, as well as traditional news organisations, and the information they release declined drastically across the political spectrum, popularising alternative and easily manipulative sources of information.[2]
The impact of these attacks on and threats to democracy has been significant: “there has been a decline in the quality of democracy since 2019, according to all measures used by V-Dem”.[3] Using a large variety of local experts, historical data and innovative methods to produce “valid and reliable estimates of difficult-to-observe concepts” V-Dem produces internationally recognized data points that map out various aspects of democracy to compare countries and their democratic development.
In the case of the UK, V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy index (an indication of safety, participation and effectiveness of elections, with 1 being the most democratic, and 0 being the least democratic) dropped from .88 in 2019 to .85 in 2023. The EU average is slightly below at .80 . The Liberal Democracy Index (concerning the protection of individual and minority rights against the state majority), dropped from .81 in 2018 to .77 in 2023. The UK has now declined to a lower level of democracy than the average in Western Europe, dropping below France and on par with Italy.[4] A more detailed breakdown of the indicators is provided in the V-dem codebook.[5]
A robust democracy fosters stability, resilience, and the ability to respond to internal and external challenges effectively. Therefore, safeguarding democratic institutions and rebuilding trust in politics are crucial components to minimising all threats.
The following is a list of threats (and their origin) to UK democracy.
Disinformation Campaigns & Manipulation of Social Media and Culture
False information can be spread through social media, news outlets, or other channels to manipulate public opinion, sway elections, or foster social unrest. The 2023 Freedom House report on Freedom on the Net noted that “Purveyors of disinformation are employing AI-generated images, audio, and text, making the truth easier to distort and harder to discern”. The main concerns are increasingly foreign, partisan, and extremist groups potentially using automated ‘bot’ accounts on social media, alongside ‘fake news’, and altered images that shape discussions on social networks. Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) threatens to act as a rocket booster to these online disinformation campaigns.[6]
Generative AI now makes the production of disinformation faster and cheaper than ever before. This could be particularly damaging when used as part of the “firehose of falsehood” technique, where large amounts of inconsistent but false information are propagated over multiple channels with the aim of overwhelming and confusing the audience to the extent that they don’t trust any information[7].
Attempts to shape cultural narratives and perceptions through media, entertainment, or educational channels may be employed to subtly influence public opinion over the long term. Autocratic states like Russia use this technique to sow chaos, division and distrust in western voters with the aim of weakening democratic institutions and their legitimacy.[8]
A lack of appetite in the past, on the part of the UK Government, to investigate disinformation campaigns and possible interference in UK elections and referenda has been damaging as it has left room for speculation about the validity of election results.[9] [10]
Cyber Attacks: Hackers from foreign nations can target high profile individuals, political parties, electoral systems, and government institutions to obtain information, compromise data integrity, disrupt operations, or even manipulate election results.
In December 2023 the National Cyber Security Centre reported that the UK and allies “called out the Russian Intelligence Services for a campaign of malicious cyber activity attempting to interfere in UK politics and democratic processes”.[11] Russia also attempted to disrupt the 2016 US presidential election, using tactics such as phishing and DDoS attacks.
Hackers linked to China have also been responsible for high profile attacks on foreign governments, companies, well known individuals, and institutions in recent years[12].
The main objectives of the Defending Democracy Taskforce are to reduce the risk of foreign interference in the UK’s democratic processes, institutions and society, and ensure that these are secure and resilient to threats of foreign interference[13]. The Defending Democracy Taskforce’s stated aims are as set out in the JCNSS’s terms of reference for this inquiry.[14]
“The Taskforce emphasises partnership working and works across government and with Parliament, the UK intelligence community, the devolved administrations, local authorities and the private sector on the full range of threats facing democratic institutions.”[15]
Between January 2023 and January 2024 the Taskforce met at least 11 times. [16]
Since its creation in 2022, it has established the Joint Election Security Preparedness unit (JESP), which takes overall responsibility for coordinating electoral security and drives the government’s election preparedness.[17] The JESP works between the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities and the Government Security Group in Cabinet Office. In a written answer the Government chose not to disclose how many people work in the JESP, making it hard to ascertain whether it is suitably resourced.[18]
The Taskforce has also been playing a role in defending higher education, supporting the government’s proactive approach to protecting universities and higher education.[19]
At its inception, the Taskforce was expected to operate cross-party. Its cross-party nature needs to be re-energised.
To act on the recommendations from an UNDP report on the safeguards that need to be in place before elections, the Defending Democracy Taskforce should support; fact checking, embedding resilience through civil education and engagement, the prevention of disinformation and attacks on parties, officials or infrastructure, engagement with political stakeholders and social media platforms.[20] A discussion with one of the UK’s political parties confirms they would welcome additional government support, including the secondment of technical staff. The Government should ensure this support is provided.
To protect elected officials from foreign interference, the Taskforce should ensure online threats and the risk of hacking attempts are minimised. Further steps could include specialised security and data protection briefings so that elected officials are less vulnerable if targeted, and know how to react appropriately to interference with their personal devices.
In addition, Full Fact, the fact-checking organisation makes a compelling case for the introduction of a UK Critical Election Incident Public Protocol[21]. It would provide a “depoliticised mechanism for warning the public about incidents that threaten the country’s ability to have a free and fair election during the period when the government is in caretaker mode.”[22] This Protocol would be activated in a scenario similar to the hack of the Electoral Commission database should an incident of this nature be detected during an election campaign.[23]
The work of the Defending Democracy Taskforce is reported to the Prime Minister via the National Security Council.[24]
The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, backed by the Taskforce, intends to engage in more consultations aimed at improving information-sharing among relevant agencies or public bodies. This effort aims to identify and diminish the threat of foreign interference in political donations.[25] It is not clear what progress is being made on this front as there would not appear to be any public consultations launched on this matter, although internal consultations may have been initiated.
The Taskforce has updated many MPs on different ways in which they can improve their own security and make sure that the UK’s democracy is safer.
Further details of the Taskforce’s role in safeguarding UK democracy and countering state threats were set out by the Prime Minister in his statement (UIN HCWS1026) on the 14th September 2023.[26]
Recent domestic changes to electoral legislation have arguably made the UK more vulnerable to foreign interference and influence.
1) Loopholes in election spending rules
Foreign interference in UK elections may manifest itself through the provision of financial donations from foreign sources to specific candidates, parties, or causes.
Under current legislation, there are a number of pathways through which foreign entities may donate to political parties.
Any company registered in the UK may donate to a political party, regardless of how much of its profit is generated here. This means that a company which generates the vast majority of its profit abroad may still wield financial influence in British politics. To address this the Government should act on the relevant recommendation (no 3) in the Regulating Election Finance Review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL).[27]
The Elections Act 2022 removes the 15 year limit on voting rights for UK citizens living abroad. This also means that any UK citizen living abroad can donate to a political party. Tracking the original source of any donation provided by a UK citizen living abroad is harder than for a donation from a UK based donor. The Government should consider allowing only UK citizens resident in the UK to donate to political parties or non party campaigners.
Unincorporated associations have been flagged in the Regulating Election Finance Review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life as having doubtful levels of financial transparency. An openDemocracy report highlights relevant concerns about the Carlton Club.[28] The government should act on the CSPL Review recommendations 4 to 6.
Non-party campaigners also present a potential route for foreign influence into UK democracy. Non-party campaigns which spend less than the threshold amount do not need to register, and therefore escape all scrutiny and oversight. Current technologies like social media platforms, generative AI, and advanced data analysis make it possible for a non-party campaigner based abroad to produce digital campaigning material and target it at key voter groups during the regulated period before an election, and then disappear once the election is over. Recommendation 17 in the CSPL Review should be actioned.
The lack of money-laundering checks on political donations is also a source of concern. Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee MP Julian Lewis has questioned why companies, charities and other private entities receiving large sums of money were required to perform extra due diligence checks on the source of donations and to declare it, whereas political parties face no such requirement “even when a donor is operating from a high-risk country listed in terrorism-financing or money-laundering legislation.” The Conservative Party has had significant donations from donors with links to Russia raising concerns about possible foreign interference or influence.[29] To address this the Government should act on recommendations 7 to 10 in the CSPL Review.
2) Cyber attacks
A range of cyber attack techniques have already been used, possibly by foreign actors, against high profile democracy-related targets in the UK. Most notably:
● The UK’s Electoral Commission was the victim of a successful cyber attack identified in 2022 (access had been gained a year earlier). As a result of this attack, the following data was breached:
○ Names and addresses of anyone in Great Britain who registered to vote between 2014 and 2022
○ Names of overseas voters who registered in the same period
○ Names and addresses of anyone in Northern Ireland who registered to vote in 2018[30].
● The UK National Security Centre identified attempts by FSB backed group Star Blizzard to use spear-phishing attacks against UK parliamentarians.[31]
The UK’s use of pencil-and-paper ballots in elections means that cyber interference in the voting and ballot counting process is unlikely. However, cyber attacks could be used to attack the integrity of UK democracy in other ways. It is possible data acquired through high-level Electoral Commission hack could be used to target voters more effectively with online disinformation. DDoS attacks could be mounted against websites offering important information about elections, including voter registration portals. Successful attacks on public institutions and election infrastructure, including the political parties, may also undermine public trust in the integrity of elections, leading to further apathy and disengagement with the democratic process.
The successful Electoral Commission hack and attempted attacks by Star Blizzard highlight both the vulnerability of some aspects of our electoral system and the willingness of bad actors to seek to obtain information illegally which could be used to harm UK democracy.
The role of independent bodies like the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Ofcom, the Metropolitan Police and the Electoral Commission in addressing foreign interference is crucial but faces challenges in empowerment and resources.
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) serves as a vital link between industry and government, offering unified guidance on cybersecurity and managing cyber incidents.[32] In its 2023 annual review, the NCSC acknowledges its limited capacity and the need for further collaboration and resources. As the report states, “Defending the UK’s democratic institutions and processes is a priority for the NCSC. However, it is not something we can achieve alone. It requires a collective effort across the whole of society, including industry, and in partnership with allies, to defend our values and make the UK an unattractive environment for hostile actors.” The rapid evolution of technology, coupled with the expanding range of threats posed by state and non-state actors, will make it more difficult for the NCSC to effectively detect and counter foreign interference by itself.[33]
Similarly, the National Crime Agency (NCA) possesses broad national-level powers and specialised legal tools to address national security risks and money laundering which are pertinent to enforcing electoral laws and safety. However, despite its capabilities and close collaboration with agencies like MI5, it has been criticised for its passive approach to enforcing these laws, even when cases are referred to it, particularly cases of electoral breaches involving dirty money and funding transparency.[34] This raises questions about the organisation's effectiveness.
Ofcom plays a role in regulating media and telecommunications, which are avenues for dissemination of foreign disinformation and propaganda.
The Online Safety Act 2023 requires the largest social media platforms to ensure that they have adhered to their own terms and conditions. For example, removing misinformation or disinformation content that meets the thresholds set out in their own policies. Ofcom has relevant enforcement powers, including the ability to issue fines of up to £18 million or 10% of a company’s worldwide revenue which it can deploy should companies not adhere to their own rules. However, when the largest platforms' own rules allow misinformation to be spread (for instance by prominent politicians), Ofcom’s powers are ineffective.
Ofcom is required to establish and maintain an advisory committee on disinformation and misinformation (covering how providers should deal with disinformation and misinformation and the promotion of media literacy). Ofcom should give the committee a particular focus on tackling foreign disinformation and misinformation. The committee must be fully operational before a possible autumn General Election.
Spotlight on Corruption has highlighted that the Metropolitan Police is the sole law enforcement agency equipped with a specialised unit to address violations of electoral law but its jurisdiction is confined to electoral fraud and malpractice solely within London. It has not initiated any investigations into two offences outlined in the Political Parties, Elections, and Referendum Act 2000 over the past 13 years: “facilitating the making of an unlawful donation, and failing to provide information to a party about a principal donor.” The Met also considers it is not best placed to enforce electoral law, having recently recommended that it fully withdraw from the enforcement of election finance laws.[35] A clear mandate for the police in matters of electoral law enforcement is needed.
The Electoral Commission is the organisation with the most relevant expertise and interest in upholding electoral law. It does not have the powers to do the job effectively.
Unlock Democracy supports granting the Electoral Commission powers to raise larger fines (Recommendation 37 in the CSPL Review).
Unlock Democracy also supports reinstating the Electoral Commission’s powers to bring prosecutions against those who break electoral law relating to parties and campaigners.
Generative AI is likely to accelerate many of the trends around digital campaigning that have arisen in the past couple of decades.
The creation and dissemination of disinformation and misinformation will be possible on an industrial scale, at very low cost, with the use of freely available AI tools. The spreading of disinformation and hate speech through deep fakes has the potential to undermine core functions and norms of democratic systems by interfering with people's ability to access trustworthy and reliable information, determine collective agendas, and express political will through informed decision-making.[36]
AI can be used to easily develop micro-targeted political ads at scale. Their use will make it much harder to detect and counter disinformation.[37]
Disinformation could also be used to disrupt electoral processes and infrastructure, through the dissemination of misleading or false information about polling locations, poll opening and closing times, or the importance of voting. Audio deep fakes have been used repeatedly as a voter suppression tool in elections already this year[38]. Their authenticity is very difficult to disprove.
Known technologies such as bots and automated fake accounts will undoubtedly again play a role in upcoming elections. Research finds that most successful low-credibility sources are heavily supported by social bots. Data analysis by nature researchers suggests that “curbing social bots may be an effective strategy for mitigating the spread of online misinformation.”[39] The government should challenge all the social media platforms to raise their game to limit the numbers of bots and fake social media accounts.
Education
Unlock Democracy, and other organisations that campaign on democracy issues believe better education and training on disinformation and misinformation, particularly for younger people, is a priority. According to the Misinformation Review by the Harvard Kennedy school: “Those between 15-29, are most concerned about encountering false information online, with concern decreasing with age.”[40] Young people are most likely to get their communications online, meaning that they are particularly vulnerable to propaganda, misinformation and fake news.[41] Their understanding of the world relies heavily on information circulated online affecting how they perceive reality. Democratic education in schools - including media literacy education - is currently a neglected area of the curriculum.[42]
Political literacy and democratic education for all should be enshrined and resourced in the school curriculum to create the next generation of more engaged citizens. This includes providing training for teachers on media and information literacy, which is the key to raising awareness of the issue in schools.[43] Finland, for example, is tackling disinformation head on through its education system. [44]
Journalism
Whilst freedom of speech remains protected by law, increased market concentration and pressures on local journalism are affecting the UK media’s ability to provide the depth and balance of coverage needed in a healthy democracy. Local journalism should be supported and market concentration in the news sector monitored.[45]
No comment
Unlock Democracy has long standing concerns that some think tanks in the UK may receive funding from foreign individuals or companies whose agenda is unknown. The FIR scheme does not address this.
Predicting the exact evolution of threats to UK democracy in the medium and long term is challenging due to the complexity of political, social, and technological factors involved. However, some potential trends and challenges that could impact UK democracy include:
● Global geopolitical dynamics and technological advancements: According to an EU report there are currently over 80 countries known to spread disinformation intentionally and systematically through social media. Non-state actors such as the Russian paramilitary Wagner group also play a significant role in foreign interference and disinformation (in particular in Africa).[46] The rising popularity and availability of the technologies that facilitate foreign interference will almost certainly drive an increase in attacks on UK democracy. They will be more complex, spread through a wider variety of ways and from different actors which will make countermeasures more complicated.[47] A rise in authoritarian regimes and geopolitical tensions could further increase the number of foreign actors attempting to interfere in UK elections.
● Social polarisation and emerging forms of extremism: Growing social divisions and polarisation within the UK accentuated by foreign propaganda could weaken social cohesion and exacerbate political tensions. The emergence of new forms of extremism, including online-fomented extremism and far-right or far-left ideologies, again influenced, or funded by foreign actors could pose threats to democratic values, pluralism, and tolerance.
First and foremost the UK should lead by example and prioritise safeguarding its democratic processes and institutions from foreign interference. Enforcing exemplary, tight and clear transparency, anti-corruption standards and rules on foreign funding in UK elections would inspire others to follow the UK’s lead.
Evidence of active cooperation between the UK government and non-governmental organisations that observe UK elections, fact check social media posts and government statements, investigate suspicious political funding and support UK democracy would also provide international leadership.
The UK should be at the forefront of regulating technological development with more initiatives such as the first global AI summit to bring together industry, governments, and civil society actors concerned about the integrity of elections. The UK could help create a global code of conduct to clearly define the role and responsibility of political consultants, social media platforms, election regulators, data controllers of electoral data, producers of election equipment to increase transparency and cooperation on the issue of foreign interference in elections. In addition, UK politicians and parties should commit to a responsible and transparent use of AI in their campaigning. This would increase public trust, avoid suspicion of unregulated or unethical use of technology for political gains and set a global standard.
The UK should maintain and preferably increase funding for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy which funds democracy-building projects around the world.
Foreign interference in elections is not a new phenomenon but modern technology and social media have made voters more susceptible and reachable. There is no precise definition of “interference” or which actions constitute acceptable or illegitimate interference, especially concerning online activities.[48] [49] The UK should work with its allies to draw up and publicise a definition of interference.
Collaborating with other democracies to define the issue and parameters around foreign interventions in elections would be another positive step in upholding democratic values. The Kofi Annan Foundation suggests in the KACEDDA report that: “Democratic governments must come together to develop international norms that distinguish legitimate cross-border assistance [in elections] from illicit or unlawful interventions.”[50] This is another area where the UK could take the lead.
Other effective tools for international collaboration in tackling foreign interference are sanctions and deterrence: Democracies can coordinate the imposition of targeted sanctions and other measures to deter foreign actors from interfering in democratic processes. This can include diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and legal actions against individuals and entities involved in malign interference activities.[51] The UK should continue to play a leading role in coordinating sanctions.
Overall, by working closely with other democracies, the UK can leverage collective strengths and resources to effectively confront foreign interference. To uphold democratic values, and safeguard the integrity of democratic processes worldwide the UK should engage further in strengthening multilateral partnerships, sharing information and intelligence on possible threats and by developing joint policy and cyber law to tackle the issue of interference while promoting democratic norms and values.[52]
17 March 2024
[1] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60e460b1d3bf7f56801f3bf6/CSPL_Regulating_Election_Finance_Review_Final_Web.pdf
[2] Trust in UK government and news media COVID-19 information down, concerns over misinformation from government and politicians up,
[3] Toby S. James (2023) The UK’s Democracy Under Strain: Democratic Backsliding 2019-23. Unlock Democracy: London
[4] V-Dem Institute, Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot, https://v-dem.net/documents/44/v-dem_dr2024_highres.pdf, https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/
[5]V-Dem, Varieties of democracy, Codebook (2024), https://v-dem.net/documents/38/v-dem_codebook_v14.pdf
[6] Freedom House (2023), Freedom on the Net: United Kingdom 2023. Washington DC: Freedom House.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/repressive-power-artificial-intelligence
[7] https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html
[8] Matt Ross (2024), Organised chaos: how Russia weaponised the culture wars, https://www.globalgovernmentforum.com/organised-chaos-how-russia-weaponised-the-culture-wars/
[9] Simon Murphy (2020), UK report on Russian interference: key points explained,
[10] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/21/russia-report-reveals-uk-government-failed-to-address-kremlin-interference-scottish-referendum-brexit
[11] National Cyber Security Center (2023), UK and allies expose Russian intelligence services for cyber campaign of attempted political interference, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-allies-expose-cyber-campaign-attempted-political-interference
[12] https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents
[13] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-04-25/182673/
[14] https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/111/national-security-strategy-joint- committee/news/199739/jcnss-launches-inquiry-on-defending-democracy-with-uk-election-expected-this-year/
[15] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ministerial-taskforce-meets-to-tackle-state-threats-to-uk-democracy
[16] https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2024-01-12.9336.h
[17] NCSC Annual Review 2023 - NCSC.GOV.UK
[18] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-01-31/12399
[19] https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/119091/pdf/
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[20] UNDP (2023). SELECT Project Report: Information Integrity during electoral processes 2021– 2024.
[21] https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy/critical-election-incident-public-protocol.html
[22] https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/38455/pdf/
[23] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/privacy-policy/public-notification-cyber-attack-electoral-commission-systems
[24] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-07-13/193969
[25] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-07-13/193968
[26] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2023-09-14/hcws1026
[27] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60e460b1d3bf7f56801f3bf6/CSPL_Regulating_Election_Finance_Review_Final_Web.pdf
[28] Martin Williams (2023) Revealed: Elite club took £150,000 from property firm
[29] Matei Rosca (2023), UK government accused of avoiding dirty money checks on political donations despite scandals,https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/uk-government-accused-of-avoiding-dirty-money-checks-on-political-donations-despite-scandals/
[30]https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/privacy-policy/public-notification-cyber-attack-electoral-commission-systems
[31] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/star-blizzard-continues-spear-phishing-campaigns
[32] UK Government, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-cyber-security-centre
[33] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/annual-review-2023/overview/ministerial-foreword
[34] Letter to Mr Graeme Biggar CBE, National Crime Agency https://www.spotlightcorruption.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Letter-to-NCA-on-election-finance.pdf
[35] https://www.spotlightcorruption.org/enforcement-electoral-finance-laws/, Spotlight on Corruption, 7. Dec. 2023,
[36] Pawelec, M (2022). "Deepfakes and Democracy (Theory): How Synthetic Audio-Visual Media for Disinformation and Hate Speech Threaten Core Democratic Functions". Digital Society: Ethics, Socio-legal and Governance of Digital Technology. 1 (2): 19. doi:10.1007/s44206-022-00010-6. PMC 9453721. PMID 36097613.
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36097613/
[37] https://www.techpolicy.press/study-suggests-we-should-worry-about-political-microtargeting-powered-by-generative-ai/#
[38] https://www.ft.com/content/bd75b678-044f-409e-b987-8704d6a704ea
[39] The spread of low-credibility content by social bots, 2018,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-06930-7
[40] https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/who-is-afraid-of-fake-news-modeling-risk-perceptions-of-misinformation-in-142-countries/
[41] Ofcom (2023), News consumption in the UK: 2023, Research findings, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/264651/news-consumption-2023.pdf
[42] James, T., Democratic Backsliding (2023) https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bd057c434c4e2d8eb0434e6/t/6492f224295cc1115f5bad6f/1687351856614/backsliding_report_digital_v1.pdf
[43] https://www.coe.int/en/web/campaign-free-to-speak-safe-to-learn/dealing-with-propaganda-misinformation-and-fake-news
[44] Jenny Gross, “How Finland Is Teaching a Generation to Spot Misinformation.” The New York Times, January 10, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/world/europe/finland-misinformation-classes.html
[45] James, T., Democratic Backsliding, (2023), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bd057c434c4e2d8eb0434e6/t/6492f224295cc1115f5bad6f/1687351856614/backsliding_report_digital_v1.pdf
[46] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/747908/EPRS_ATA(2023)747908_EN.pdf
[47] https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/electoral-integrity/foreign-interference-in-elections-how-to-define-it/
[48] Kofi Annan Foundation (2023), Safeguarding Democracy: Navigating the Complex Landscape of Foreign Interference in Elections
[49] European Parliament (2023), Foreign interference in EU democratic processes: Second report, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/747908/EPRS_ATA(2023)747908_EN.pdf
[50] The Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age, https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/our-work/kofi-annan-commission/the-kacedda-94nfyd3mjqo9phewncbtfd5tcgitolhz/
[51] https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=244685
[52] https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Scenario_01:_Election_interference