Human Rights Watch – Written evidence (AFG0022)

To what extent have international and domestic efforts to build

Afghanistan’s institutions (such as the judiciary and the rule of law) and measures to promote the rights of women, freedom of religion and belief and freedom of expression, and anti-corruption initiatives been successful? How best can they be sustained and strengthened?

It is a very mixed picture. Through much of the post-2001 period,

Afghanistan’s major donors, including the UK, have supported projects to

expand women’s participation in public life; reforms in education to address gender-based disparities and support girls’ schools; programs to train and support open media; and legal reforms to improve access to justice. These have had significant impact in fostering a more open society and building awareness about human rights—but this progress is limited: urban Afghans have benefitted disproportionately from donor assistance, and donor support has had little effect in curbing systemic human rights violations or ensuring that government officials adhere to the rule of law.

Over the past 18 years, the UK, like other donors who took part involved in the US/NATO-led military campaign against the Taliban (and later ISIS), seldom called out widespread abuses by Afghan National Security Forces they partnered with and trained, or the failure of Afghan judicial institutions to address impunity. As the military effort took priority, the UK failed to deliver a clear message that Afghan government institutions needed to address human rights abuses.

In the years since 2002, the Afghan government (under both Presidents Karzai and Ghani) very seldom prosecuted cases of torture and extrajudicial killing, particularly when cases have involved senior officials. Under some pressure about detainee abuse from the UN and donors, the Afghan government did establish human rights units in relevant agencies and required personnel to participate in training on human rights. However, without accountability, including prosecutions, abusive police and militia forces have had little reason to change their behaviour and have continued to engage in torture, enforced disappearances, and other abuses. Human rights training has meant very little since it has not been accompanied by measures to hold accountable those who have committed serious violations.

Similarly, while the Afghan government—with donor support—has developed important legislation, too often these remain laws on paper only. Despite the landmark 2009 Elimination of Violence against Women Law, perpetrators of

violence against women largely go unpunished. In fact, prosecutors and police actively discourage women from pursuing justice in the courts even in cases of serious violence. At the same time, despite government promises to end prosecutions of women for so-called “morality” offenses, like running away from abusive homes, prosecutions of women for such “crimes” continues. Afghan security forces have also been complicit in the sexual exploitation and recruitment of children. Although the government strengthened the penalties for such abuse in the revised Penal Code, it has again largely failed to conduct adequate investigations and hold senior police and security forces accountable.

The Afghan government has also established institutions and mechanisms designed to curb corruption but has prosecuted few cases. Corruption remains endemic particularly in those institutions Afghans most frequently encounter: the police and the courts, as well as educational institutions and the Ministry of Health. Graft has essentially insulated the elite—those in office and those in opposition as well as local strongmen and business leaders—from holding themselves accountable to the public.

The failure to curb impunity and corruption, and the government’s continued reliance on abusive police and militias, has fuelled grievances that have led to support for insurgents and have undermined important gains: The number of girls in school is falling not only due to insecurity, but to the lack of female teachers, which is partly due to corruption.

While the media remain a vibrant part of Afghan civil society, thanks in part to donor support and funding, the media face serious risks, and not just from the Taliban. The government has failed to investigate and prosecute dozens of cases of violence against journalists by security forces. In 2020, the government proposed amendments to the Media Law that would have compelled journalists to reveal sources and allowed government censorship of news reports. In response to protests by media organizations, human rights groups, and other civil society organizations, the government withdrew the amendments.

What is lacking on human rights and accountability is not training, or capacity, but political will. As an example, as of October 2020, Keramuddin Karim, the former governor of Panjshir province and former president of the Afghan Football Federation, whom the Afghan attorney general indicted on multiple counts of rape, sexual assault, and harassment of female athletes, remains at large.

The UK and other donors should press the Afghan government to enforce the existing legal prohibitions on the use of coerced confessions in judicial proceedings and take appropriate disciplinary action against prosecutors and judges who permit the use of such information; promptly and thoroughly investigate all allegations of and appropriately prosecute all those found responsible for the recruitment and sexual exploitation of children; and invite the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to visit Afghanistan.

On the talks, the UK and other donors should:

Encourage and support the participation of women’s rights activists, civil society representatives, media associations, and constitutional law experts in the thematic working groups at the negotiations.

Encourage and provide necessary financial support for civil society groups to play a meaningful role in the negotiations.

As a strong supporter of education, the UK should continue to fund girls’ education, particularly community-based education programs working in areas where girls otherwise have fewer opportunities to attend school.

The UK should actively raise cases, like that of Keramuddin Karim, through bilateral channels, and call for his arrest and appropriate prosecution.

What role is being played by women in the current peace negotiations, and how can women’s rights be safeguarded through and beyond the talks?

Afghan women’s rights advocates, international human rights groups, and donors campaigned for years to press the government of Afghanistan and its international supporters, especially the United States, to ensure that women were a meaningful part of the government’s negotiating team. Ultimately, out of the government’s 21-member delegation, four women were included.

How women’s rights can be safeguarded in the talks and afterwards in the implementation of whatever agreement may emerge is a critical question. It will be essential for donors to continue to use their leverage and financial assistance to insist that the parties make no compromises that would undermine the rights of women and girls—including education through secondary school and university, freedom of movement and association, the

right to employment and to hold public office (including judgeships), and other rights gained since 2002.

The UK and other donors should reinforce with both parties their expectation that a political agreement will protect fundamental rights, including women’s rights, and link future financial assistance to the government to a firm commitment in the peace agreement to uphold these rights.

The UK and other donors should urge that the structure of the talks allows for ample time and space to discuss rights issues and involves consultations with a broad range of Afghans, including women’s rights advocates, victims’ representatives, and other civil society groups.

What are the social and economic conditions in areas under the

Taliban’s control?

In June 2020, Human Rights Watch published a report on the everyday experiences of people living in Taliban-held districts and the impact Taliban policies have had on their rights and freedoms, including education; information and media; and movement. Taliban-held areas are largely rural and are generally among the poorest areas of the country. The Taliban manage schools and healthcare services in these areas. Access to education for girls varies, but seldom includes secondary or higher education.

Social controls embodied in “morality” officials—known as “vice and virtue” police when the Taliban were in power in the 1990s—continue to operate in districts under Taliban control. These officials patrol communities to monitor residents’ adherence to Taliban-prescribed social codes regarding dress and public deportment, beard length, men’s attendance at Friday prayers, and use of smartphones or other technological devices.

What are the prospects for the return of the almost 2.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan (UNHCR figures)? What is the impact of hosting Afghan refugees on its neighbours?

In 2020, over 500,000 Afghans returned from Iran. Afghans have long had a precarious status as “unwelcome guests” in Iran, and with the deteriorating economy have faced increased harassment. The approximately 2.5million Afghans in Pakistan have only a slightly less precarious situation, and could face pressure to return on a scale similar to 2016 when several hundred thousand were coerced to return. Afghanistan has little capacity to absorb